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Monday, February 25 - 10:19amSanction this postReply
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What about (5): Don't do things to other folks, you don't want done to you.

According to R. Hillel, that is the entire Torah recited while standing on one foot.

Bob Kolker




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Post 1

Monday, February 25 - 11:25amSanction this postReply
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Bob, thanks for commenting. But a more accurate classification of the "Golden Rule" is that it is either "sentiment-focused" (ethics category #2 from the essay) or "action- or rule-focused" (ethics category #3).

This is true because there isn't any content in the Golden Rule -- and because it's a rule. Here's the late Mortimer Adler on this:

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In Matthew: 7.12. Jesus says: "All things whatsoever you would have men do unto you, do you ever so to them."

As most of us rephrase this when we use this in our daily lives, we say, Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. And when we say this, we think we are summing up moral philosophy in a nutshell. This is all you need to guide the conduct of your lives.

I am going to try to show you that this is not so -- that the golden rule by itself is vacuous, i.e., empty of meaning; that by itself it does not tell you how to behave towards others or how to conduct your own life. I must add that it does contain one true moral insight, namely that any sound rule of conduct or moral precept must be universal -- applicable to all human beings everywhere.

This is the only truth in Immanuel Kant's famous categorical imperative (which is otherwise as vacuous as the golden rule).

So act that the maxim of your conduct can become a universal law of nature. In other words, what you are morally to do in your conduct toward others is what they are morally obliged to do in their conduct toward you. But this truth does not tell you what either you or anybody else is morally obliged to do. It merely says that all true moral obligations, in either direction -- you toward others or others toward you -- must be the same. Before I go any further and try to solve this problem for you, I must tell you that the golden rule, which we find Jesus stating in the gospel according to St. Matthew, is to be found also in most of the great religions of the world.

Judaism's Talmud: What is hateful to yourself, do not do to your fellow men" (i.e., what is injurious to you, because it violates your rights is injurious to others also because it violates their rights; so that if you expect them to be just in their conduct toward you, be just in your conduct toward them).

Islam: "No man is a true believer unless he desires for his brother what he desires for himself" (i.e., right desires are the same for all, for you as well as for others, and all right desires are for what is really good for human beings, which is the same for all).

Hinduism: "One should never do to another that which one would regard as injurious to one's self" (i.e., the same as before -- injustice) (i.e., which is injuring others) is the same whether it is injustice toward you or toward others, and no one should be unjust.

The fundamental terms of moral philosophy are good and evil, right or wrong. Which is primary, which is secondary? I think the answer to that question is that good and evil are primary, and right and wrong are secondary.

Good and evil are the subject of our desires and aversions. Right and wrong apply to our conduct towards others. In Christian moral theology, we find two precepts of natural moral law. The first precept is: Seek the Good. The second precept is: Harm no one (i.e., do not do anything that deprives others of real goods or interferes with their attaining what is really good for them).

As thus understood, the second precept is obviously dependent on the first and derivative from it; for if we do not know what is really good for us, we cannot avoid harming others.

The first principle of moral philosophy -- its categorical imperative -- is: You ought to seek everything that is really good for you and nothing else. Only when you know what is really good (e.g., truth is really good for human beings to know) can you draw any conclusions, such as seek the truth.

Now let us face the most difficult of all problems in moral philosophy. To do this, let us suppose that you understand the difference between what is really good for all human beings and what is only apparently good to some individuals but not to others.

Then you will be able to discover what you ought to seek for yourself.

That will also tell you what others ought to seek for themselves.

But how will that tell you why you ought to do unto others what you expect them to do unto you? How is the second precept of natural moral law derived from the first precept: how does your seeking the good lead you to obey the injunction: harm no one; i.e., do not injure them by depriving them of what is really good for them?

Let me restate this problem another way. Unless you understand the problem, you will not be able to understand the solution.

The problem is the age-old problem that everyone recognizes -- the problem of whether selfishness and altruism come in conflict, or are inseparable from one another (i.e., no one can be truly selfish without also being altruistic)?

To make this clear, let us consider what are traditionally called the four cardinal virtues: fortitude or courage, temperance, justice, and prudence.

Of these, temperance and courage are entirely self-regarding virtues; and justice is entirely other-regarding.

Now if one can be temperate and courageous without also being just, then one can seek the good and at the same time harm or injure others, that is, be unjust toward them.

And if that is the case, the golden rule is out: you do not have to do unto others what you would have them do unto you. You want them to be just to you because that helps you to attain what is really good for you; but you can seek what is really good for you, without being just toward them if you can get away with it.

This problem arises in our seminars when we discuss the ring of Gyges in Plato's Republic. If, with the ring of Gyges, you can be unjust to others and get away with it, why not do so? What's in it for you to be just to others, if you can seek your own good without being just toward them?

In that little word if lies the whole problem. If it is not possible to seek your own good without being just to others, then you must act toward others as you would have them act toward you.

In short, the solution lies in a question that Aristotle answers in one way and all other moral philosophers answer in the opposite way.

The question is: are these moral virtues existentially separate virtues (so that you can have any one of the three without having the other two); or are they only three analytically distinct aspects of moral virtue, so that if you have moral virtue, you will have justice along with temperance and courage. ...
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http://radicalacademy.com/adlergoldenrule.htm


Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 2/25, 11:28am)




Post 2

Tuesday, February 26 - 6:01amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

The maxim Bob Kolker states is not the Golden Rule, but a version of  the Negative Golden Rule. The former concerns how to treat others. The latter concerns how not to treat others.

I don't understand Adler's saying the Golden Rule is vacuous. It is very abstract and is ambiguous (or fails) as a concrete guide in many situations. The same holds for the Negative Golden Rule. However, I believe each provides guidance in many situations, so neither is vacuous.

I believe the Negative Golden Rule is the far better of the two. It is about restraint, and an excellent one against initiating coercion. Think how much better the world would be if it were followed in the political arena! Obviously neither rule is a complete moral guide, since neither says anything about how to treat one's self, as Adler explains. So they are only vacuous in that way.




Post 3

Tuesday, February 26 - 7:42amSanction this postReply
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Thanks for pointing that out, Merlin.

I think that what Adler meant in saying the Golden Rule is "vacuous" is illuminated upon comparison of it with Nicomachean Ethics (which, ironically, has been charged with being somewhat vacuous itself!).

If you look at the ethics of Aristotle or Rand, you get this big emphasis about what kind of person to be. If you look at the Golden Rule -- or the negative Golden Rule, for that matter -- there's no mention of moral character (but a certain moral character is implied).

In other words, if you're a masochist and you follow the Golden Rule -- or the negative Golden Rule -- then you are going to hurt people. And that's wrong to do.

Ed



Post 4

Tuesday, February 26 - 11:23amSanction this postReply
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One should also bear in mind the context of the times in which these sentiments were made - the social structure and level of civilization involved - and the fact these were made for the times, not for all time as so oft presumed......



Post 5

Tuesday, February 26 - 2:08pmSanction this postReply
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Right Rev' -- but it pays to keep in mind that the folks who came up with these "revelations from God" PUBLICALLY (if not personally) meant for them to be held immutable.

:-)

Ed



Post 6

Tuesday, February 26 - 8:23pmSanction this postReply
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Here's a paper on morality that I will be presenting at the local Orange County "Backyard Skeptics" this Thursday:

http://philosborn.joeuser.com/article/301081/on_morals

I believe that I deal with one key issue more successfully than Rand or Aristotle - although not in conflict with their positions.




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Post 7

Wednesday, February 27 - 7:57amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

 

You described Rand’s ethics as “being based on building one’s character via virtue.” You noted that her ethics is focused “on one’s nature as a human being” and that “it can be characterized as ‘agent-focused’ morality.”

 

But Rand first treats value, then virtue. She defines the latter in terms of the former. It would seem that for Rand value is first not only in order of teaching-presentation, but in the conceptual order correctly reflecting living nature, including human nature.

 

You observed that utilitarian ethics are “beneficiary-focused.” Don’t value and beneficiary precede virtue in the conceptual dependencies in Rand’s ethical theory? Isn’t an appeal to self-benefit part of how Rand makes ethics a rational endeavor? It would seem right to say that in the center focus of Rand’s ethics there is value and with it the organism to which value pertains.

 

~~~~~~~~~~~

 

David Kelley has added to Objectivist thought about virtue. He emphasizes that we are motivated by the desire to achieve our goals, not by the desire to conform to our principles. “One’s motivation flows from one’s purpose. One does not live for the sake of being moral; one acts morally in order to make the most out of one’s life” (IOSJ Spring 1992). He takes virtue to consist “in the rules of conduct, the traits of character, that are required for living successfully. . . . The purpose of virtue is to help us live in the world. . . . This is not to say that virtue is merely an instrument. Because we are beings of self-made soul, because our character is itself a crucial achievement, virtue ought to be a source of satisfaction in its own right—and a matter of concern in any action we take. But it nevertheless must take second place to achievement as a global value” (IOSJ May 1993).

 

In Rand’s conception, “productive work is the central purpose of a rational man’s life, the central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values” (OE 25). Kelley elaborates this conception. Recall that moving, final scene for Eddie in Atlas: “not just business and earning a living . . . but Dagny, business and earning a living and that in man which makes it possible—that is the best within us.” (Cf. NE 1177a12–18.) Kelley thinks that “productive work expresses ‘the best within us’ because it reflects man’s basic relationship to reality: the use of reason to create the values his survival requires” (IOSJ May 1993). Kelley generalizes from work (in the sense of making a living) to achievement, which would include work, raising children, maintaining a house, sustaining a happy marriage, organizing a civic cause, or overcoming a physical handicap or psychological problem. “An achiever is a doer: someone who projects a goal, who takes responsibility for bringing it about, and who takes pride in doing it well” (ibid.).

 

This generalized value, achievement, Kelley calls a global value. Global values cut across many, more particular values. Other global values would be enjoyment and virtue (virtue as a value). Such values have enough breadth and depth to be serious possible answers to the questions, “what do I want out of life? What is it that gives my life meaning and would leave me feeling empty and aimless were it taken away?” (ibid.). Kelley argues that the values of enjoyment and of virtue are intimately connected with the value of achievement, but that achievement should be the central global value, if our ultimate value is life and our highest purpose is happiness.




Post 8

Wednesday, February 27 - 10:23amSanction this postReply
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Stephen, thanks for the critical comments.

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You described Rand’s ethics as “being based on building one’s character via virtue.” You noted that her ethics is focused “on one’s nature as a human being” and that “it can be characterized as ‘agent-focused’ morality.”

But Rand first treats value, then virtue. She defines the latter in terms of the former. It would seem that for Rand value is first not only in order of teaching-presentation, but in the conceptual order correctly reflecting living nature, including human nature.
====================

But the contrast that you have set up here where, on the one side, I appear to have Rand champion virtue and, on the other side, you show Rand championing value -- is a straw-man that would break-down should you request that I reformulate things into syllogisms. The reason that this is so is because, I have already universally implied the "value" of which you speak, using a sorites argument (with missing premises). Value -- even OBJECTIVE value -- is written in-between the lines of the following ...

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... the focus is on one’s habitual actions and on one’s nature as a human being; it can be characterized as “agent-focused” morality; this dual-focus reveals ...
============

The unspoken "mention" of value in the words above is subtle; it's within the 5 words: "nature as a human being." This is the part of the focus -- which I mention as a "dual-focus" -- which makes it seem like what's been called Natural Law Ethics. It's about discovering what's really good for you (i.e., rational values).

Rand berated previous moral philosophers because they never questioned whether morality was needed (but merely compared and adopted already-existing codes). One of the 2 methods of attack here would be to start with value and then, applying it toward humans, derive our objective need for rational values.

The second method of attack here -- equally effective -- would be to start with the nature of human beings and then, applying that what's really good for this kind of creature, derive our objective need for rational values.

The logical reciprocity here can be shown by rewording your quote:

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It would seem right to say that in the center focus of Rand’s ethics there is value and with it the organism to which value pertains.
============

... to ...

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It would seem right to say that in the center focus of Rand’s ethics there is [the human] and with it [their objective need for rational value (in order to live and thrive as the kind of creature that they are)].
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You had preceded with ...

============
You observed that utilitarian ethics are “beneficiary-focused.” Don’t value and beneficiary precede virtue in the conceptual dependencies in Rand’s ethical theory? Isn’t an appeal to self-benefit part of how Rand makes ethics a rational endeavor?
============

Value and beneficiary do precede virtue in the conceptual dependencies in Rand’s ethical theory, as you appear to ask rhetorically. But, in actuality (metaphysically), they cannot by abstracted and 'rationalistically' floated away from their base: the nature of humans. And yes, Rand's appeal to self-benefit is ethically legitimated.

In short, it's not a leap (of logic or faith) to infer -- from what I've written and meant -- these wise quotes in your post ...

“One’s motivation flows from one’s purpose. One does not live for the sake of being moral; one acts morally in order to make the most out of one’s life”

“what do I want out of life? What is it that gives my life meaning and would leave me feeling empty and aimless were it taken away?”

Ed




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