RoR: Forum

Good question, Teresa.

Good points, Jon.

Bill,

Your use of the “If not-P, then not-Q” business is just so damn precious (close to an insult.) What it implies is that the victim’s right against being killed by the perp can be vaporized, not by a third party wielding a gun, not by an unfortunate act of nature, but by the vicious actions of the perp himself!
Right. So? You're acting as if this constitutes a refutation of my argument. It doesn't.

But here's what you had to say about rights in the "getting the right Rights right" thread ...

What about the fact that (within the proper social context) one ought to respect other people's freedom of action? Is that epistemological or metaphysical. It's metaphysical; like the earth's revolution around the sun, the obligation to respect the freedom of others exists whether anyone recognizes it or not.

So "a right" can refer to a principle of action -- a guide for making choices -- or it can refer to the moral obligation to make certain choices. Rand's definition of 'a right' as "a moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context" is an example of the first; her statement that "rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival" is an example of the second.

Joe has already made what I regarded as a valid criticism of Rand's second statement. He pointed out that freedom of action is a condition of existence required for a murderer's proper survival but that that doesn't mean that a murderer has a right to freedom of action. So how can 'rights' be conditions of existence required for man's proper survival?

Perhaps Rand would have responded to Joe's criticism by pointing out that in her statement about rights, she was referring not to criminals and other rights violators but to people who deserved to have their freedom respected. At any rate, insofar as she regards the second statement as a description (if not a definition) of rights, she would seem to be acknowledging that rights can be considered metaphysical in the sense that the conditions to which she refers exist independently of anyone's recognition.

So, you then seemed to agree (with Rand and I and others) that rights are metaphysical conditions for man's proper survival. That it's proper for innocent victims to hold rights against criminals. That criminal life isn't proper to man.

But here (in this thread) you seem to contradict these ideas. Can you explain that apparent paradox?

Ed

Post 161

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 1:27pm

I wrote, “I don't know what Rand would have said, but I doubt that she would have said that. In any case, this is not a valid argument but an appeal to authority. If you care to make an argument, I'm always open to considering it.”

He replied,

Ah, but you initiated the use of appeal to authority here:

“Jeff, I appreciate your input as well as your courage and honesty in acknowledging that you misunderstood Rand's position on this issue.” (Post 146)

Jeff was claiming that his position was consistent with Rand's. I pointed out that it wasn't by quoting Rand's statement to the contrary. How is that an appeal to authority? If you say, "Rand believes X," and I refute that assertion by quoting Rand as saying that she doesn't believe X, that is not an appeal to authority. An appeal to authority, as a logical fallacy, is the claim that an argument is valid, because it is endorsed by some authority figure (e.g., Ayn Rand). As for my own argument, I demonstrated that it is valid through the simple logic of modus tollens; you contested its validity by arguing that Rand wouldn't have endorsed it. That is the logical fallacy of "appeal to authority."

In the very next post I begin disputing that you are applying “Rand’s position” correctly. The last para pretty much buries your case.

Here it is again: "“Bill, you imagine that Rand—who said she would have jumped into the path of a bullet to prevent her husband being shot—would support your view that rapists, if they want to be moral, should kill their victim if the unthinkable happens and one of them turns out to be armed.”

And, “She wouldn’t want to live without him, so there would be no value in her life without Frank. Yeah, but she’d be all over the value of life as a rapist/murderer!”

You responded to that para with: “If you were aware that her context was different, then why did you make the argument, since it clearly doesn't apply to your example?!”

“?!,” indeed!

I was saying there's no comparison, because the rapist doesn't value the life of his victim in the same way that Rand valued her husband. That's what I meant when I said that her context was different and didn't apply to your example. According to Rand's statement, she would not have wanted to live without her husband (although it turns out that she did for a number of years after he died). It is absurd to think that the same reasoning would apply to the rapist vis-a-vis his victim. In any case, what Rand would or would not have wanted is irrelevant to the validity of my argument.

Rick in his post 112, Jeff, Glenn and Ed have also made the same point in various ways.

Just so there's no misunderstanding, please state explicitly and clearly the point that you're referring to.

- Bill

Post 162

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 2:13pm

Teresa wrote,

I really appreciate this exchange. It's interesting and frustrating at the same time. I have a question for Bill regarding his view here:

Okay, don't call it an "emergency." Call it a situation in which the rapist is faced with the choice of allowing his victim to kill him or of preventing his victim from killing him. If I read you correctly, you're saying that he should allow his victim to kill him. My question is: How is that in his interest?

I'm wondering, why are his interests open for consideration? Why do they matter? Are you thinking simply from the criminals moral point of view, or from the bigger picture point of view? Should the criminal's point of view even be considered within the bigger picture, which contains an objective justice? How can there be objective justice if a criminal's moral view should be considered? Thanks in advance.

The ethics of egoism says that a person's own interest is his highest moral purpose. Since it's not in the rapist's interest to allow his victim to kill him, he should do whatever is necessary to prevent it.

Now, of course, the rapist shouldn't have attempted to rape his victim in the first place, because doing so violates the principle of non-aggression, which under normal circumstances, it is in our interest to follow. Everyone's interest is served by adhering to a principle of rights and renouncing the initiation of force. But once the rapist is involved in a confrontation with his victim in which she is attempting to kill him, it is not in his interest to let her do so. If he values his life, which I assume he does, he should do whatever is necessary to sustain it.

Does that mean that the victim shouldn't defend herself? No. Does it mean that, if the police catch the rapist, they shouldn't arrest him, or the legal system put him behind bars? No, of course not, for it's clearly in the interest of the rest of us to remove this person from society and punish him for his crime.

- Bill

Post 163

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 2:33pm

In a post far, far away in another thread, I wrote,

What about the fact that (within the proper social context) one ought to respect other people's freedom of action? Is that epistemological or metaphysical. It's metaphysical; like the earth's revolution around the sun, the obligation to respect the freedom of others exists whether anyone recognizes it or not.

So "a right" can refer to a principle of action -- a guide for making choices -- or it can refer to the moral obligation to make certain choices. Rand's definition of 'a right' as "a moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context" is an example of the first; her statement that "rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival" is an example of the second.

Joe has already made what I regarded as a valid criticism of Rand's second statement. He pointed out that freedom of action is a condition of existence required for a murderer's proper survival but that that doesn't mean that a murderer has a right to freedom of action. So how can 'rights' be conditions of existence required for man's proper survival?

Perhaps Rand would have responded to Joe's criticism by pointing out that in her statement about rights, she was referring not to criminals and other rights violators but to people who deserved to have their freedom respected. At any rate, insofar as she regards the second statement as a description (if not a definition) of rights, she would seem to be acknowledging that rights can be considered metaphysical in the sense that the conditions to which she refers exist independently of anyone's recognition.

Ed replied,

So, you then seemed to agree (with Rand and I and others) that rights are metaphysical conditions for man's proper survival. That it's proper for innocent victims to hold rights against criminals. That criminal life isn't proper to man.

But here (in this thread) you seem to contradict these ideas. Can you explain that apparent paradox?

Yes, people have rights against criminals, under normal circumstances, in which it's not in anyone's objective interest to initiate force. But in cases in which the moral agent's survival requires the initiation of force, the victim cannot have a right against it. If he did, then the moral agent wouldn't be justified in initiating it.

- Bill

Post 164

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 3:41pm

Bill writes:

> The ethics of egoism says that a person's own interest is his highest moral purpose. Since it's not
> in the rapist's interest to allow his victim to kill him, he should do whatever is necessary to prevent it.

This highlights everything that is wrong in Bill's view of ethics. It requires of us that we act morally, but we must be perfect in that execution, since just one slip over the edge into the dark side and it's a steady, unstoppable decent into hell. Bill says:

> Now, of course, the rapist shouldn't have attempted to rape his victim in the first place

This is something with which we all are in agreement. But look at every example that Bill has argues in this thread. Once a person commits a moral breach which then places them in any form of danger, whether that is starving, freezing to death on Everest, being caught by the police and jailed for their crime or dueling it out for their life with their victim, Bill argues that in the name of self-interest, they are justified in taking any action necessary to extract themselves from danger, regardless of the consequences to others. So, by having committed one crime, that person is now actually obligated by their ethics to commit any number of additional crimes and atrocities as necessary to preserve their life, freedom and happiness. There is no way out for the poor schmuck. According to Bill's logic, his first error compels him to act (I was going to say immorally, but, since that's off the table, it seems that Bill might approve of the word) "selfishly". And now, in a total perversion of Objectivist philosophy, we see where Rand's formulation of ethical egoism apparently leads. Not in service of the good, but as a justification for murder in the name of self-preservation. Earlier, I asked bill if he couldn't see anything wrong here. Apparently not.

Back in post #152, Ed pointed out that a criminal did in fact have something to gain by not continuing down the path outlined by Bill. And that thing which he could regain was his integrity. Spot-on Ed. I would generalize this observation and call it redemption. This is one of the great failings of Objectivism as a comprehensive philosophy, in that it offers no clear path for redemption from one's moral failings. I have a great deal to say on that topic, but I wanted to congratulate Ed on his excellent awareness of the issue.

In post #163 Bill writes:

> Yes, people have rights against criminals, under normal circumstances, in which it's not in anyone's
> objective interest to initiate force. But in cases in which the moral agent's survival requires
> the initiation of force, the victim cannot have a right against it. If he did, then the moral
> agent wouldn't be justified in initiating it.

I wonder if it ever occurred to Bill to look at this the other way. Maybe it is people's rights that are the constant, even in his "emergency situations", and it is his personal conception of "self-interest" that must yield? Bill just asserts his position over and over as though it were self-evident fact. I do not remember him ever offering any proof that what he asserts is true.

Back in post #89 which is what kicked off this new thread, I stated:

> I have argues for years against this "life-boat" concept and the attempt to use this as an argument
> for the bifurcation of morality into two distinct camps: the normal vs. the emergency situation. I
> argue that if one defines one's moral code with sufficient precision, then there is no need to hold
> a separate set of moral principles (or abandon moral principles altogether) in emergency
> situations. If people are having difficulty deciding what is the correct course of action to pursue
> when presented with various hypothetical emergency situations, then I would suggest that
> they have not thought hard enough about their hierarchy of values and how they would apply them
> in difficult situations, thus leaving them unprepared to respond quickly and appropriately in
> an emergency. [...] I think Objectivist ethics has been undermined considerably due to this
> "life-boat" approach and I feel strongly that it needs to be corrected.

I rest my case.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 165

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 3:54pm

“Rick in his post 112, Jeff, Glenn and Ed have also made the same point in various ways.” [Jon]

“Just so there's no misunderstanding, please state explicitly and clearly the point that you're referring to.” [Bill]

How could there possibly be any misunderstanding, if you were trying to understand?

Simply consult Rick’s post 112. In post 113, you responded to half of it. I am referring to the other half, THE HALF YOU IGNORED, as I stated.

Post 166

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 4:09pm

Bill, you write, “I was saying there's no comparison, because the rapist doesn't value the life of his victim in the same way that Rand valued her husband. That's what I meant when I said that her context was different and didn't apply to your example.”

Again, are you trying to understand any of us, or not?

Try looking at this another way. Namely, that Rand would jump into the path of the bullet not because she valued her husband, but because she DOES NOT value her life without certain values, such as without her husband, or without integrity, rationality. Look at it this way and you might see that if she didn’t value her life absent certain values, then perhaps she wouldn’t value her life if it were one as a rapist/murderer.

I officially give up. I may respond to additional half-blind interpretations of my words thus far, but I’m through trying to help you see your error. That would require that you participate by applying a minimum effort to understand and you are not doing that.

Post 167

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 5:17pm

I'm just trying to be careful and not misrepresent your views, Bill. Please let me know if I'm being unfair.

Okay, it took a drive out to get ice cream, but I'm thinking the problem I have with this -

But once the rapist is involved in a confrontation with his victim in which she is attempting to kill him, it is not in his interest to let her do so. If he values his life, which I assume he does, he should do whatever is necessary to sustain it.

-is that it assumes everyone values their life for the same reasons and in the same regard. Or that the reasons for the value are unimportant. Obviously that isn't true. Most people do value their lives, but certainly not for the same reasons. The reasons matter a great deal, don't you think?

I guess what I find unnerving about this is that you seem unwilling to condemn the reasons a worthless human being has the gall to value their life for, as if they simply couldn't choose to think or act or value otherwise. He values his life, yes, but why?

I think maybe Ed, who's been paying far more attention to your determinist views than I have (and I commend him for it) really may be on to something about this as a problem.

If someone values their life as a rapist, then they should act to continue that life. That's what I'm reading into what you've written. You appear to be lending moral credibility to some pretty immoral stuff. That's how it looks.

Post 168

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 6:01pm

Two and a Half Comments

First, rather than: a person's own interest is his highest moral purpose which sounds solipsistic, I would substitute: each person's own happiness is his highest moral purpose, which he achieves by pursuing his rational interest according to his nature. This is much more easily universalizable, and excludes mad rapists from the arena off the bat.

Second, if there were someone whose nature made it impossible for him to be happy unless he were a rapist, he might see that his nature is incompatible with civil society, and try to change it. Or he might seek out a "community" where his pursuits could be safely channeled - like a consensual role-playing group. Or he could try to go work for Idi Amin or bin Ladin. Of course, in the last case, he should hardly have cause to complain if those of us whose nature it is to hang those whose nature it is to rape For that case, see here.

Hence, I believe it follows that Bill should support the death penalty?

Ted

Post 169

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 7:06pm

Teresa,

Okay, it took a drive out to get ice cream, but I'm thinking the problem I have with this -

But once the rapist is involved in a confrontation with his victim in which she is attempting to kill him, it is not in his interest to let her do so. If he values his life, which I assume he does, he should do whatever is necessary to sustain it.

-is that it assumes everyone values their life for the same reasons and in the same regard. Or that the reasons for the value are unimportant. Obviously that isn't true. Most people do value their lives, but certainly not for the same reasons.

That's it! That's what I was talking about when I told Bill, regarding the "morality" of the murdering rapist:

I didn’t say it would “serve” his interests – not in the limited and partial and amoral manner in which you are viewing the concept “serve.” The reason that you view this subject in this way is because of your ‘value-determinism’ – wherein it’s assumed that human action and choice are the mechanical result of most-felt desires.

By enshrining feelings in this way – and making some generic presumptions about an individual’s intellectual intentions and reflections – you are able to forward an argument for such an inversion of morality (where a victim doesn’t retain a right to her own life against a criminal).

So, when I say that Bill has extracted-out the human intellectuality in his value-determinism, I'm saying that he basically assumes or presumes some sort of generic or average train of thought (because feelings, not thoughts, are the cornerstone of value-determinism) ... which is something very close to your point about Bill having to assume "everyone values their lifr for the same [intellectual] reasons and in the same [intellectual] regard -- or that "the [intellectual] reasons for the value are unimportant" -- in order for his argument to 'get off of the ground.'

Post 170

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 7:16pm

Jeff, thanks very much for the kudos.

Bill,

But in cases in which the moral agent's survival requires the initiation of force, the victim cannot have a right against it. If he did, then the moral agent wouldn't be justified in initiating it.

The limitation of this view is that it takes the exercise of rights to be the rights themselves but, as I've tried to explain about half of a dozen times on this web forum -- these are 2 differing things. It's begging the question. You're saying that folks couldn't have rights against criminals (read: rights violators) when the criminals' lives are on the line. Why? Well, because you've already pre-ordained that criminals are justified in murdering folks who engage in lethal self-defense against them -- and, since that's a rock-solid fact, well then, then those rights ... those rights of the innocent victims ... well, then they just have to go bye-bye (because they are, otherwise, hairy details).

You have to first presume that you are right about criminal rights, and then just justify a pre-conceived non-existence of victim rights (to remove the contradiction, by fiat).

Ed

Post 171

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 8:16pm

Teresa wrote,

If someone values their life as a rapist, then they should act to continue that life. That's what I'm reading into what you've written. You appear to be lending moral credibility to some pretty immoral stuff. That's how it looks.

Look, if the rapist values his own happiness, which he does, then he should act to achieve it. Now that doesn't mean that he should seek his own happiness as a rapist; he should, to whatever extent possible, seek it as a rational, rights-respecting human being. But he can't do so, if he's dead. He must, at the very least, remain alive in order to achieve it. He has nothing to gain by committing suicide, which he would be doing, if he allowed his victim to kill him.

- Bill

Post 172

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 8:30pm

(Why do I bother?)

Ed wrote,

So, when I say that Bill has extracted-out the human intellectuality in his value-determinism . . .

Ed, for the nth time, this has nothing to do with value determinism, of which you haven't the barest understanding.

I'm saying that he basically assumes or presumes some sort of generic or average train of thought (because feelings, not thoughts, are the cornerstone of value-determinism) ...

Amazing!

. . . which is something very close to your point about Bill having to assume "everyone values their lifr for the same [intellectual] reasons and in the same [intellectual] regard -- or that "the [intellectual] reasons for the value are unimportant" -- in order for his argument to 'get off of the ground.'

I am not assuming that everyone values their life the same. I don't know where you got that idea, but it has nothing to do with my argument. What I am saying is that the rapist has nothing to gain by allowing himself to be killed. Why anyone would think that he does is beyond my comprehension.

- Bill

Post 173

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 9:27pm

Bill,

Ed, for the nth time, this has nothing to do with value determinism, of which you haven't the barest understanding.

Understanding is hard to prove. After all, I could parrot your arguments for value determinism all day long, I could do that as good, or better, than most philosophers in existence today -- but you can still sit back (like the mystic) and say: "Well, you just simply do not understand."

The implication is that, if I understood, then I would have to be on-board with it (like you are). It's a common theme. Someone differs on something. One or both parties blames the other for not understanding or, in this case, not having even "the barest understanding."

I am not assuming that everyone values their life the same. I don't know where you got that idea, but it has nothing to do with my argument.

Let's suppose -- for the sake of argument -- that some folks value their lives differently. In that difference, there will be a continuum of morality. Folks who adopt criminal lifestyles can be said to value their life less morally than others do (because of the kind of creatures that we are). Therefore, in cases where one life over-reaches on another and, as a consequence, one life has to be taken, then those who value their life less morally "ought" to be destroyed. (This line of reasoning is evident in Rand when she spoke -- in a Phil Donahue interview -- about how it's really very easy to "take sides" regarding the conflict then in the Middle East: Israel vs. "Palestine").

She said that one should never side with the more-barbaric (less civilized) of any 2 societies in conflict with one another. So there are really 2 things to think about:

(1) moral judgment
(2) living well

They're not separate issues, even if we can talk about them separately. Folks ought to be judged against a standard of living well. That's how we can judge you (objectively) -- because we have more than an inkling of what it means for a human being to live well. Folks who adopt criminal lifestyles are -- as long as they continue -- lower on a moral totem pole (morally subhuman). They become disqualified for "equal" moral judgment. On this view, it couldn't ever be moral for a criminal to sacrifice a victim's life for the purpose of self-preservation.

And that's because morality isn't about mere death avoidance (i.e., vulgar survivalism), the very concept of morality is specifically human -- and 'guaranteeing your own continued breathing' (or anything on that subhuman level) doesn't qualify as being moral (even though life is required to engage in morality). It takes more than self-preservation to be a moral human being (the only kind of moral being that there is).

What's definitely not moral is for a savage to guarantee his own continued breathing, by taking the morally-superior life of an innocent victim. This is what Rand called giving poison, and then offering more poison as an antidote. It's a slippery slope. The criminal is caught, convinces us he's changed and that we should be lenient in punishment (rather than having the punishment fit the crime), and -- more often than not -- morally "relapses."

Innocents always have rights -- to be respected or infringed. It's not just mere acts that make something moral, it is these acts in the background of a built moral character. Morality isn't about the survival of man, it's about something more than that (i.e., what Rand meant when using qualifiers such as "rational" or "man qua man").

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 5/24, 9:34pm)

Post 174

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 9:38pm

Ed wrote,

[M]orality isn't about merely death avoidance (i.e., vulgar survivalism), the very concept of morality is specifically human -- and 'guaranteeing your own continued breathing' (or anything on that subhuman level) doesn't qualify as being moral. It takes more than self-preservation to be a moral human being (the only kind of moral being that there is).

I know it does, Ed. But you can't pursue the life proper to man if you're dead. Being alive is a necessary, if not a sufficient condition, for achieving happiness.

- Bill

Post 175

Saturday, May 24, 2008 - 11:17pm

"I know it does, Ed. But you can't pursue the life proper to man if you're dead. Being alive is a necessary, if not a sufficient condition, for achieving happiness"
Bill D.

When people are faced with these life or death emergencies, the hope is that whatever choice one is forced to make will at least enable one's values to live on, despite death. It's a romantic ideal, and you see it all the time in movies and theater. It even happens in real life.

It's extremely difficult for me to envision a rapist valuing his life the same way you and I value ours. It's difficult for me to envision a rapist objectively valuing anything at all. Anything he does to defend himself from his victim isn't coming from a sense of objective value, but of subjective cowardice.

A homeless man sexually assaulted a 10 year old girl here in my city last week. He was arrested and placed in county jail.

County jail inmates get newspapers and can watch the news on television. The rapist was severely beaten by other inmates because of the nature of his crime. It isn't a rumor that pedophiles have to be isolated while incarcerated, it's a fact.

Even other criminals value the life of an innocent over abject evil. It's a glimmer of the hope that values may live on.

Post 176

Sunday, May 25, 2008 - 2:01am

Bill,

But you can't pursue the life proper to man if you're dead.

And, guess what? You can't if you've been sentenced to life in prison, either. So, if anyone has committed "murder one" (which carries a life-sentence), then under your relativistic view of morality, it would be "moral" for them to continue killing humans -- whenever necessary to avoid capture and sentencing.

You appear to lack an objective view of justice.

Ed

Post 177

Sunday, May 25, 2008 - 8:15am

Bill, here’s a relevant excerpt …

Nietzschean egoism

“The Objectivist ethics holds that … man must act for his own rational self-interest. But his right to do so … is applicable only in the context of a rational, objectively demonstrated and validated code of moral principles which define and determine his actual self-interest. It is not a license “to do as he pleases” and it is not applicable to the altruists’ image of a “selfish” brute nor to any man motivated by irrational emotions, feelings, urges, wishes or whims.

This is said as a warning against the kind of “Nietzschean egoists” who, in fact, are a product of the altruist morality and represent the other side of the altruist coin: the men who believe that any action, regardless of its nature, is good if it is intended for one’s own benefit.” – VOS, ix

Recap:

(1) Irrational brutes don’t have the “right” to be selfish (because objective ethics requires first buying-in to the correct morality, before you take action).

(2) Acting with the intention to benefit yourself is not, de facto, “moral” (in its own right).

Can you either square what it is that you have to say with that, or find a way to discount or disqualify Objectivist ethics? Because it seems to contradict what it is that you are arguing.

Post 178

Sunday, May 25, 2008 - 9:06am

I wrote, "But you can't pursue the life proper to man if you're dead."

Ed replied,

And, guess what? You can't if you've been sentenced to life in prison, either. So, if anyone has committed "murder one" (which carries a life-sentence), then under your relativistic view of morality, it would be "moral" for them to continue killing humans -- whenever necessary to avoid capture and sentencing.

First of all, what do you mean by a "relativist view of morality"? Would you say that a person who believes that lying is appropriate under some conditions but not under others has a relativistic view of morality? If so, then Ayn Rand has a relativistic my view of morality. Would you say that a person who believes that different ethical standards apply to emergency conditions than to normal ones has a relativistic view of morality? If so, than Ayn Rand has a relativistic view of morality. But that's not the sense in which "moral relativism" is generally understood. The term "moral relativism" refers to the view that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect objective and/or universal moral truths. That's certainly not Rand's position, nor is it mine.

Secondly, let us assume that if the criminal is captured, he is virtually certain to receive the death penalty or spend the rest of his life in prison. In that case, how is it in his self-interest to turn himself in or allow himself to be apprehended by the police? What could he possibly have to gain by doing so? Nothing, as far as I can see. So, why shouldn't he do whatever is necessary to prevent himself from being arrested, including killing innocent human beings, if it should come to that?

You're not comfortable with this conclusion, because it seems wrong to you -- because it flies in the face of your moral presuppositions. But you haven't given me a good argument as to why it is against the criminal's self-interest? Instead, you're assuming the very point at issue, and simply repeating your conclusion that murdering innocent people is morally wrong under all conditions, regardless of the context. Then you say,

You appear to lack an objective view of justice.

Let's define our terms. According to Rand, "Justice is the recognition of the fact that . . . every man must be judged for what he is and treated accordingly . . . ." Or, in the classical definition, "justice is giving every man his due," which in this case, means putting the criminal behind bars. Since I've stated that that's what we should do if we catch him, why would you say that I lack an objective view of justice?

- Bill

Post 179

Sunday, May 25, 2008 - 9:23am