RoR: Forum

Thanks for looking that up. T

Post 21

Tuesday, June 7, 2011 - 1:28pm

Greg Johnson's criticism of Professor Machan's concept of 'consent' begins with Johnson's consideration of the nature of rights and a comparison of Machan's position with Rand's position:

"... it seems that Machan doesn't quite get Ayn Rand's distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'objective.' On page 3 Machan announces that 'I argue that from the time that human beings emerged, they had the rights that they now have, however clearly or unclearly this was recognized.' I think that Rand would disagree with this, and for good reason.

Rand considers a right to be a moral principle, ie., a conceptual identification of a fact of reality. And conceptual identifications are conscious, human achievements. They do not exist whether they are recognized or not. Only human nature exists whether it is recognized or not. Rand considers rights to be objective because they are conceptual identifications based on human nature. She would consider Machan's rights to be intrinsic because they are supposed to exist regardless of man's conceptual achievements.

This may seem to be a nit-picking distinction, but it has important implications. One of the great appeals of subjectivist or conventionalist theories of rights is that they avoid some of the absurd conclusions to which intrinsic concepts of natural rights lead. A classic problem that intrinsicists face is the punishment of criminals. If criminals have intrinsic rights to life, liberty and property, then are not capital punishment, incarceration, and fines violations of the criminals' rights? If this is the case, then the protection of one person's rights entails the violation of another's, which implies that there is no moral difference between committing a crime and punishing a criminal. Given this sort of implication, is it any wonder that people wish to reject inalienable natural rights?

Machan's way out of this problem is to claim that criminals implicitly consent to their punishment. But what in the world does "implicit" consent mean? To consent to something is a cognitive act. 'Implicit' consent seems to be a cognitive act that one hasn't actually acted out. This strikes me as extremely dubious."

To start with, Mr. Johnson appears to be the one who is mixing up intrinsic and objective. Blue eyes might be intrinsic in a given individual, but the CONCEPT of blue and the CONCEPT of eyes are both objective and not intrinsic. They are abstractions that are objective because they are based upon reality.

Individual rights are concepts that bridge between two different abstractions: certain aspects of human nature and certain aspects of society. Both of these abstractions have actual consitituents in reality. Human nature is itself a complex abstraction. The particular aspects of human nature are the need to take actions that will sustain life, the capacity of the human mind to understand what actions are going to sustain life, and that humans make choices. Society is one of the contexts in which humans may exist. In one societal context, rights are recognized and respected. In others they are not. The aspects of human nature and the aspects of society both are existents available to be recognized and abstracted. This process produces awareness of those moral principles which are objective and not intrinsic. They are not intrinsic, but they are inalienable in the sense that they existed prior to government and independent of whim. That is to say, individual rights are objective - they are not properly described as intrinsic, or by the subjectivist or conventionalist theories. All of those aspects of reality exist independent of awareness.

Individual rights are a real moral principle of humans in a social context even if they are not being observed by anyone in any society that currently exists - just as the color red would exist even if everyone in the world were currently inside of rooms whose walls, furniture, clothing... everthing, was white. There is a difference between some concepts, such as a species whose members are now extinct, like the dinasaur, and the concept of the unicorn, which has never existed and never will. The dinasaur had actual members which makes the concept objective. The unicorn is not so tied to reality and is subjective. Individual rights are not like tinkerbell in that they wink out of existence if they aren't believed in.

Two individuals are on a desert island. One of them has a coconut and the other would like to have it - he's hungry. He is far bigger and stronger than the little fellow with the coconut and could easily take it by force... and do so much easier than climbing the tree to get his own. He decides not to use force. A simple recognition of individual rights might just be that he "felt" it wouldn't be fair. Or, he might have decided that it would be more practical to stay on good terms with the little guy who is a better tree climber - which, in and of itself, is not a recognition of individual rights. Or he might use force and take the coconut. But the point is that the individual right of the little guy to keep the coconut exists no matter what is in the minds of either person. The facts of human nature exist and that there are social interactions that directly relate to those aspects of human nature also exist. Choice is violated or not - that is the final word on this.

Now, the issue of "consent." First let me point out Mr. Johnson's error where he says, "To consent to something is a cognitive act. 'Implicit' consent seems to be a cognitive act that one hasn't actually acted out. This strikes me as extremely dubious." Consent is a cognitive act that can be expressed explicitly or implicitly. I would only agree that an act of some sort is needed.

But having said that, I do not agree that we give an implied consent to a government in the course of normal life.

I believe that the person violates the law or violated an individual right, by their act, expresses where they stand in that context. A thief, by his act of stealing, implies that he does not agree to the constraints of a government based upon individual rights as they pertain to theft. The thief still has the human nature aspects that give rise to the the possibility of individual rights, and lives in a society, so individual rights do apply, but the thief has rejected the aspects of society that support those human nature aspects. The thief has chosen to reject the social conventions that support individual choice. This can be seen as understanding that his may be violated to a proportional degree and morally so. This is what I believe Rand implied with "There is no right to violate a right." This is like a 'contractual' arrangement. I can choose to give up something of value of mine in exchange for something that belongs to another. The thief gave implied consent, by his action, in a form of social contract that lets a government morally take away values from the thief that are proportional to the immorality of his theft. Note that this only works where an individual right is violated. There is no such implied consent when a government, say, regulates a trade and fines a person for violating such a regulation. When the person, say cuts someones hair without a government license to do so (and assuming no fraud), they are not violating choice. That means they have not given up any degree of their right to exercise their choice.

When Mr. Johnson states that it is ridiculous to imagine a person consenting to being incarcerated, he is dropping context. The 'consent' was to the entire picture which could be stated as, "I'm going to steal something and I'll keep it if I don't get caught, and if I do get caught, and convicted, then I will pay a some penalty." That is not an explicit contract, but it is a logically implied contract to the degree that it is a recognizable statement of the facts.

Facts about the government and its current laws make up a context in which an act occurs. By itself this is the context for the implied, logical awareness that states what is legal and not legal and the penalty. If I jay-walk, the context is that I'm choosing to violate a law and understand that government may choose to penalize me for doing so. By itself, there is no moral statement - that is a different dimension for an act.

Individual rights govern what is moral and immoral in this example. This is another context of the act in question - a different dimension of that act. If the act was theft, it violated an individual right. If it was jay-walking it did not. Each act that violates a law contains that implied logical understanding - not an agreement or a consent that it is a correct or valid law, but that it is a law and that a penalty might follow. Each act that denies choice to another is an implied understanding that the actor chose to ignore the moral stricture of individual rights and that the consequence is that his choice might not be treated as sacrosanct.

When the thief steals something, it does not mean his capacity to choose disappears, or that his capacity to reason disappears, or that his existence in a universe that requires action is no longer a fact. Those are intrinsic to that individual and the universe we share. The other fact is that he is in a society - there are others with the same aspects of human nature that he interacts with. What does change with his act is the moral nature of this individual. He acts and in a way that changes his moral status and his individual rights are diminished - they are, after all, part of the relationship between him and society.

Post 22

Tuesday, June 7, 2011 - 3:41pm

When the thief steals something, it does not mean his capacity to choose disappears, or that his capacity to reason disappears, or that his existence in a universe that requires action is no longer a fact. Those are intrinsic to that individual and the universe we share. The other fact is that he is in a society - there are others with the same aspects of human nature that he interacts with. What does change with his act is the moral nature of this individual. He acts and in a way that changes his moral status and his individual rights are diminished - they are, after all, part of the relationship between him and society.

I agree that Greg Johnson's criticism fails, but for a different reason than stated above (by T. Machan?). I disagree that rights, themselves, ever get diminished. There is some talk about intrinsic and objective and about how rights, if held to be intrinsic things, would ironically curtail the punishment of criminals (because punishment, such as incarceration, violates the so-called "intrinsic" right to freedom). But were rights ever rights to get away with murder in the first place?

I say: no.

Even if rights are held to be intrinsic things (I prefer the terms: inherent and natural and inalienable), they would not themselves preclude the punishment of criminals. The critic who claims rights can't be inalienable because then that would mean that criminals couldn't get punished -- has indeed dropped the context. There never was a right to violate rights, so there is no contextual right to be free from jail if you do so.

On the one hand, you have these rights that are never diminished (they're fully inalienable). On the other hand, you have to remind yourself that they were never actually rights to stay free after committing crimes. So you have all these rights all of the time, but the context restricts an attempt at unlimited exercise of these rights. I maintain that the scope of the exercise of rights, not the rights themselves, is what it is that gets diminished after committing a crime.

This can be so because rights were never rights to a limitless, super-contextual, absolute freedom in the first place. The human right of freedom is absolute, but not the wanton exercise of freedom. You may not exercise an unlimited freedom --e.g., to commit crimes without jail time, etc. Rights, like insurance policies, never originally covered that kind of behavior (crime) in the first place -- so they do not protect you from the consequences originating from that kind of behavior.

A jailed man has all of his rights fully intact, but they never included being able to be free after committing crimes.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/07, 3:42pm)

Post 23

Tuesday, June 7, 2011 - 10:58pm

Implicit consent is easy to illustrate: You walk into a restaurant, take a seat at a table and notice that it has an ashtray on it. You look around and so do the other tables. You then figure, I may smoke in this place and light up. If someone objects, you point to the ashtrays indicating they imply that you have permission to smoke. Or you are invited to dinner at someone's home and just before sitting down to eat you make use of the bathroom. It won't do to object thus: "Hey, yes, I invited you to dinner but said nothing about your using my bathroom." QED

Post 24

Wednesday, June 8, 2011 - 12:00am

What you say about implicit consent, Tibor, is certainly true. The fact that my guest invites me for dinner does indeed imply that he consents to my using his bathroom, because it's reasonable to assume that his invitation would include his willingness to let me use it.

But I don't think that criminals implicitly consent to being punished, any more than you or I implicitly consent to being taxed. To say that someone implicitly consents to something means it is clear that he actually consents to it even if he doesn't say so explicitly. But there is no indication, as far as I can see, that a criminal (qua criminal) consents to being punished; otherwise he would turn himself in voluntarily, which very few criminals do. Most of them go out of their way to avoid being apprehended.

Steve also addressed this issue as follows:

When Mr. Johnson states that it is ridiculous to imagine a person consenting to being incarcerated, he is dropping context. The 'consent' was to the entire picture which could be stated as, "I'm going to steal something and I'll keep it if I don't get caught, and if I do get caught, and convicted, then I will pay a some penalty." That is not an explicit contract, but it is a logically implied contract to the degree that it is a recognizable statement of the facts.

It's not an implied contract, because there is no actual contract. There is simply his recognition of what will happen to him if he is caught. I may recognize that if I walk through a dangerous neighborhood and get mugged, I will lose my money, but that doesn't mean that I implicitly consent to lose my money or that I've implicitly 'contracted' with the mugger to have it stolen.

As far as rights are concerned, I agree that they exist even if not recognized; I don't think that Rand would disagree. When she says that a 'right' "is a moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context," she is saying that human beings ought morally to respect the rights of others whether they recognize it or not. She also defines 'rights' as "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival," and those requirements also exist whether or not they're recognized.

(Edited by William Dwyer on 6/08, 12:14am)

Post 25

Wednesday, June 8, 2011 - 1:15am

Bill,

You are correct. I should not have used the word "contract" - it is not a contract. Sloppy thinking on my part.

Here is what I was trying to say. The thief is aware that that the government will penalize him if he is caught. This is the 'package' that is in front of everyone. It would be illogical of the thief to look at only one side of this equation and say, "I'm saying it is okay to steal, but not to put me in jail." That is trying to have the cake and eat it too. Any lies they make to themselves about never getting caught or that someone 'owes' it to them don't change those facts. Thieves know both sides of the package and that is not a contract or some form of consent. It is a recognition, an awareness, of the conditions that exist.

We have 'packages' like that existing at the legal level and at the moral level. For example, I can choose to jay-walk. It is a violation of the law and I may end up paying a fine - and it doesn't violate the ability of anyone else to choose.

Unlike jay-walking, someone can choose to steal which is not only a violation of the law, but it is also a moral transgression. Thieves know they would not like to have what they value stolen from them, so there is no excuse that they don't know that other people would not like their things stolen.

Even if we had a perfect minarchy, I don't think the people implicitly consent. We each have not each and everyone of us gone out and put down an ashtray (referrinig to Tibor's example). But the good news is that there is no consent needed if it is a government's laws are all objective and based upon individual rights.

We don't have that perfect minarchy, and instead we have some laws that need no consent because they are objective and based upon individual rights, like laws against murder or theft. But other laws are wrong and they become just packages where we have to make our own decision to obey or not. There is a strong value in respecting the law where reasonable, but apart from that it is like the jay-walking example - you make a decision based upon the size of the fine, the likelyhood of being fined, the time saved, etc.

Post 26

Wednesday, June 8, 2011 - 4:48pm

When I go to my dentist and then he drills me and then he even hurts me some, I have nothing to complain about since I implicitly consented to his doing his thing on my teeth and they, reasonably, involve some pain. (Grunting "ouch" isn't the same as complaining.) Nor that I want to experience the pain, of course. Nor may I acknowledge that I asked for the pain, although, again, reasonably I should have known I will hurt some while he works on me. A criminal may not want to go to jail but reasonably he should know that when he violates others' rights, they will retaliate and in an advanced civil order even set up institutional responses that can include jailing criminals. Shortsightedness is no excuse, just as ignorance isn't because, well, one ought to have known what's involved (or likely to be involved). Since taxation is extortion and not anything anyone explicitly or implicitly agrees to, the comparison is bad. Taxation is the feudal kin of serfdom! Implicit consent is falsely assumed when one goes to a movie and is faced with a bunch of plain old commercials of the kind [on TV] that one could well have wanted to get away from when one went there.

(Edited by Machan on 6/08, 5:02pm)

Post 27

Wednesday, June 8, 2011 - 6:09pm

Bill wrote:

But I don't think that criminals implicitly consent to being punished, any more than you or I implicitly consent to being taxed. To say that someone implicitly consents to something means it is clear that he actually consents to it even if he doesn't say so explicitly. But there is no indication, as far as I can see, that a criminal (qua criminal) consents to being punished; otherwise he would turn himself in voluntarily, which very few criminals do.

Tibor responded:

A criminal may not want to go to jail but reasonably he should know that when he violates others' rights, they will retaliate and in an advanced civil order even set up institutional responses that can include jailing criminals. Shortsightedness is no excuse, just as ignorance isn't because, well, one ought to have known what's involved (or likely to be involved). Since taxation is extortion and not anything anyone explicitly or implicitly agrees to, the comparison is bad.

I agree with Bill. If there is this 'implied' consent given by a criminal to be punished because he should expect a consequence to his actions, then it should follow that any expected or ought to be expected consequence is also a matter of implied consent. So if an 'expected consequence' is grounds for consent, then it should follow that I should expect to go to jail for failing to pay my taxes and that I consented to that jail term.

Let's take another example, a woman wearing a mini-skirt walks down an alley that she should've known is dangerous, and she's raped. Well that was a consequence she perhaps should have considered, so does that mean she consented to the rape?

Or, let's say whenever I drive my car I should expect a level of risk when I drive, and should I get into a car accident due to the fault of another driver, does that mean I consented to that accident because I should have known (ignorance is no excuse) that I might suffer an accident?

Obviously consent is not just a matter of an expected consequence. If I live in a dictatorship and I risk my life speaking out or fighting it, and if I'm caught, it would be ludicrous to conclude I consented to my soon to be punishment, even if I very well expected to get caught. Consent requires some kind of agreed upon relationship with whatever conditions set within it. Force lacks this characteristic, hence we differentiate between two different kinds of force, initiation and retaliation.

Again the prior argument given by Bill, Steve and myself is that consent is not even a necessary factor to be considered when it comes to the just use of retaliatory force.

(Edited by John Armaos on 6/08, 6:15pm)

Post 28

Wednesday, June 8, 2011 - 6:17pm

When you go to the dentist, that is a voluntary action and there are lots of dentists to choose from, or you could choose to not go to the dentist, and you can choose to only go to a dentist that goes to extremes to avoid any pain for a patient. And consent is all over the place - making the appointment, showing up, cooperating with the process, etc.

Government, on the other hand, isn't voluntary, and doesn't wait for, or that I can see, asks for consent. It will march forward and do what it does with or without implicit or explicit consent.

Some anarchists advocate for defense agencies or multiple governments - those would bring consent to the forefront - requiring people to chose and sign up, but they aren't workable because you need a monopoly of law - and by its nature, a monopoly of law doesn't allow consent.

I did not consent (implicit or otherwise) to any of the 70,000 pages of federal regulations passed last year. I don't know which ones will apply to me or even what they all are. But they aren't voluntary or optional - they are law.

You said that it is government that we consent to and not the laws, but they are too entwined to separate. And consent must have some degree of voluntary action or acknowledgement. Government, by its nature, doesn't wait for me to give it some sign that I'm on board - at least none that I can think of.

I like the fact that the government enforcement of an objective law supporting an individual right needs no consent. All of the other laws (non-objective or violates rights) can not be justified even with consent of this or that person.

Post 29

Wednesday, June 8, 2011 - 9:31pm

If you consent to an interaction, then you are not being forced or coerced; if you are being forced or coerced, then you do not consent to it. If a criminal is forcibly apprehended and taken into custody, then he does not consent to being in police custody, but that doesn't mean that he can rationally object to it.

Post 30

Thursday, June 9, 2011 - 1:39am

Thursday, June 9, 2011 - 7:57am

As children, we all get a bye on this concept; no child ever asked to be born, and even though every child is a skin full of mostly needs, those needs are met, are an obligation of those who invited that child to this world. Children get to receive the benefits they need/demand -- from others. It is a totally natural obligation, one that is often met with great joy by those providing their sustenance and subsidy. Especially when they behave themselves. Mostly.

Children/minors have no contributory ethical obligation to support the public political and private family contexts they find themselves in. At most, they receive training in the concept by caring parents preparing them for adulthood.

But, this is not true of adults. Because, by the time we are adults, we are perfectly capable of accepting and denying invitations to receive benefit from others. That includes private family benefits, and that includes public political context, with which we share with other adults as peers, not dependent children.

We can say, "I did not ask to be born, and I did not ask to be born here." As children, we have a right to stay, with subsidy, without an obligation to contribute, where we find ourselves, unasked and not agreed to by us.

But as adults, we have an ethical obligation to contribute to and pay for the benefits that we accept as adults. Our consent is, that we remain within this political context-- one which does not forbid us from freely leaving it, should we so choose. Our personal ability to leave is our responsibility, not the responsibility of our peers. It is possible to leave, and many have and do and will. It is, in fact, a benefit of this political context that it is possible within this political context to achieve the means to readily leave it, easily.

I don't see how it is possible to deny the fact that we all receive benefit from our political context, and, as well, that our political context was expensively established and maintained by way of collective actions. For example, every free market economic opportunity in post WWII America is directly the beneficiary of the 16 million Americans who put themselves in uniform, who left 400,000 of themselves in a meatgrinder, and a nation that sacrificed and borrowed the equivalent of 3T in today's dollars from their less than half our present population economies and banded together to risk all in the face of meat eating and freedom eating totalitarian alternatives. Those global forces of tribe-uber-alles were not going to be faced down by anything other than our own do-or-die version of (what should have been temporary) soft-fascism, made necessary only because totalitarianism was on the march in the world.

Unfortunately, the 19th century German philosophers disease which had infected Europe had also infected America, and that soft-fascist beast, once unfettered, has never stood down. However, if it ever finally will stand down is still -- barely -- yet a political issue in our struggling political context(I think, the very weakest part of my argument; I'm likely delusional that this is the case), and as for long as we continue to accept benefit from that political context, we have an ethical obligation to pay for it. Our consent is our presence here as adults more than able to leave it.

The issue with consent in a pluralistic nation -- even one with a fealty to free association -- is that there is an implied forced association with whatever the state does as 'the state.' And so, what the state does must be fettered under some principles of freedom. But even under that imperfect fettering, this is still a pluralistic nation of gays, straights, PETA activists and meat eaters, on ad infinitum, and there will still appear constant and roaming occasions of disagreement with state actions.

When that happens, what are our ethical choices?

1] We can act politically to change the political wind on the given issue of disagreement, even as we continue to largely receive benefit from and pay for our political context.

2] We can accede. Pick our battles. Move on. Even as we continue to largely receive benefit from and pay for our political context. Surrender the issue(one of hundreds of issues). Do you take it to the streets on every issue you don't get your way on, or do you pick and choose? Not your only choice. It is entirely possible to say, "I do not agree with everything this state does, and so, I will regard the taxes I pay as paying only for the things that it does that I agree with" and call it a day, and get on with our lives. Because to believe otherwise is to attempt to elevate myself as emperor over what other peers of mine in freedom do agree with and do support with their tax dollars. (Which admittedly has a flaw, if what they agree to is to eat me, but that would be violating a required principle of peer based freedom and would quickly move such an issue further down this list.)

3] Leave. www.privateislandsonline.com. I'm not impressed by 'I can't afford it arguments.' Are you impressed by 'I can't afford it arguments' when someone uses that as an excuse to take what they want? Because, in this political context, it is in fact possible to afford it. That is one of its offered benefits.

The above are the ethical choices within a given political context. And, I would argue, the slide of America towards socialism is being fought in the above ethical framework-- even if the politics include lies, deceit, fraud, and propaganda.

4] Scofflaw. Go for it. Stay, accept some benefits, but don't pay for them, in protest of other issues. Self immolation, as protest. (The existing political context is not going to be handing out Get Out Of Jail Free cards. It is still there, after your protest. Maybe moved to change, and maybe moved to grant itself greater powers. Depends on the nature of the protest, doesn't it? If by a bunch of cranks who've come to the end of their short ropes, then this goes one way. If goaded by their political opponents to half-baked actions, then the political outcome can easily be 180 degrees from their intent. Like, Schumer in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, freshly targeting the Caymans with renewed vigor and greater government powers(McVeigh's effective legacy.)

In the face of a sufficiently egregious issue, one that cannot be tolerated, there is one more choice which is beyond political ethics(ethics within a given political context) and in the realm of pure ethics. Depending on the principles being fought for, the pure ethics are subject to analysis, but not the outcome; the outcome is determined by brute force.

5] Megapolitical overthrow. Revolution. But, no half-way here. It's all in, all or nothing. A revolution that rolls the boulder 99% up the hill is a failure; it has to go over the top, and prevail.

Post 32

Thursday, June 9, 2011 - 8:14am

Tibor no offense but this isn't muddying the issue, this is drawing logical conclusions from the premises that you stated.

Just curious, what did Rand mean when she spoke of retaliatory force? Why would she use the term force?

What does force mean? To use coercion, i.e. the absence of consent.

To say that a criminal consents to retaliatory force is an unintelligible argument.

Post 33

Thursday, June 9, 2011 - 8:29am

Taxation is a non-issue in this context. Muddies the water. Just as conscription would or eminent domain. The real issue is when I violate someone's rights, should I expect the rational response of self-defense (or delegated self-defense). Yes.

If I am reading "in this context" correctly, then absolutely.

In this context, our political context, I think this nation should expect, as a near guarantee, that at some point, there will be a megapolitical response to continued encroachment of tribal socialism, forced association, tribe-uber-alles.

This certain knowledge is apparent in the stealth moves towards socialism, the vampire religion that dare not ever speak its name in the light of day in this nation, for exactly the expectation you describe.

On our current track, the nation will slide towards 5] sooner or later.

And so, the latest UN Resolutions, and so on, which are an uncomfortable recognition of this absolute fact.

Alcohol prohibition? Total bust.
Drug prohibition? Total bust.
Gun prohibition? Nobody seriously holding their breath over that ever coming about in this nation, ever. Any effective attempt would itself be the trigger for broad violence against a government that would attempt it. The 2nd Amendment was listed as an individual right precisely for this reason. The attempt of any government to effectively remove that right is defacto evidence that it is time to defend ourselves against that government.

You can take that to the bank. The real issue is when I violate someone's rights, should I expect the rational response of self-defense (or delegated self-defense). Yes.

Absolutely.

The closet socialists loose among us fully understand this. It is why the 2nd Amendment is such a hair shirt with the left.

And as for the folks who make up the military, there is nobody losing any sleep over them taking an order to confiscate arms from the population. That would be an open invitation to the biggest fragging in the history of fraggings, going all the way up to whatever fools issued, accepted, and/or passed on any such order.

There is no freedom without law, there is no law without enforcement, there is no enforcement without force, and in our political context, there is no justification for force unless it is in support of freedom.

Which means, there is no justification for law unless it is in support of freedom.

Which means, there is no justification for enforcement unless it is in support of freedom.

Which means, in our political context, there is no justification for a slide away from freedom and towards socialism.

Take that to the bank.

Post 34

Thursday, June 9, 2011 - 9:29am

I suspect Rand meant by force "the deployment of physical power" so as to bring about some goal. Force, however, is morally neutral--it could be deployed defensively or offensively. Coercion--or coercive force--is where trouble enters. That would be "initiated, unprovoked physical power".
On the other matter, there is no implication that when I implicitly consent to your use of my bathroom after having invited you to dinner this resembles in any way at all the alleged implicit consent to having my resources extorted from me via taxes. In a country committed to justice, i.e., protection of individual rights, what one agrees to, implicitly or explicitly, is to respect the rights of anyone with whom one has dealings, period. This does not include being taxed (which is a feudal practice used by the king or czar or some such thug who falsely claims to own the realm and collect rent from those using it).

Post 35

Thursday, June 9, 2011 - 9:46am

Tibor I think you're too concerned with the analogy of taxes that Bill brought up. It was only used to illustrate the point that you can't use an 'expected consequence' as an intrinsic definition to consent. It's not just an expected consequence, it requires a willingness to accept an arrangement, and in no way can we characterize criminals as willingly accepting their due punishment.

Consider also that half of all murders remain unsolved. It's not even a guarantee that a criminal would get caught. Does that mean half of the time the victims actually consent to being murdered because a criminal that remains unpunished is an expected consequence? This is why your characterization of criminals giving implied consent needs to be discarded all together. A consequence is not an adequate definition for consent.

I suspect Rand meant by force "the deployment of physical power" so as to bring about some goal.

This is too broad of a definition. This definition matches any goal-oriented action, including things like a mechanic fixing a car or spending the weekend gardening.

I don't think Rand was careless in the words she chose. She was very specific about this, she made a distinction between two different kinds of force, initiation and retaliation. What does it mean to initiate force? It means that one has breached the harmony of interests that exists amongst men and therefore has acted against these interests, a retaliation of force seeks to restore that harmony. In both instances force is the act of compelling someone into an arrangement they were unwilling to accept freely, it's just that we make a moral distinction between initiation and retaliation, because the former acts against rational self-interest, the latter is in our rational self-interests.

there is no implication that when I implicitly consent to your use of my bathroom after having invited you to dinner this resembles in any way at all the alleged implicit consent to having my resources extorted from me via taxes.

When a guest of your home uses your bathroom, you willingly permit this guest to do this. But it remains your choice to not permit your property to be used in this manner. A criminal does not willingly accept his punishment. He tries to evade capture, his counsel tries to get his charges dropped on a technicality or mitigate the punishment, in no way can one characterize this as willingly accepting an arrangement.

(Edited by John Armaos on 6/09, 12:04pm)

Post 36

Thursday, June 9, 2011 - 12:28pm

Fred,

You wrote, "...as we continue to accept benefit from that political context, we have an ethical obligation to pay for it. Our consent is our presence here as adults more than able to leave it."

I agree that there is a form of ethical obligation, but maybe not the same one you had in mind. I think that the only obligation is the simple recognition that there is no free lunch, that freedom is a condition that doesn't grow wild in nature, that there are costs associated with its creation and maintenance. But that doesn't generate an obligation that rises to a level where something could be enforced. There are no other actions involved that one must take as if a contract existed. It is only a stricture against illogical thinking. If we, collectively, choose to not support freedom, we will pay the price. If we, collectively, act to choose better politicians, we will reap the rewards. If we choose to recieve the benefits of freedom but not make any contributions, we will suffer psychologically.... The price paid will be the damage to the self-esteem that comes to anyone who throws their own integrity under the bus. Everyone is free to be freeloader in this context, but not free to escape the consequences.

That old Spanish proverb applies... "Take what you want," said God, "and then pay for it."
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I disagree with the statement that our presence here, as adults, constitutes consent. I think Bill wrote at one point something to the effect that staying in the presence of a mugger is not consent to be mugged. My presence here, in the absence of anything forcing me to stay, is only my consenting to be here - my physical presence - and not a sanction or agreement with what others are doing, be they private citizens or government agents.
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You wrote, "The issue with consent in a pluralistic nation -- even one with a fealty to free association -- is that there is an implied forced association with whatever the state does as 'the state.' And so, what the state does must be fettered under some principles of freedom."

You are clearly on target here with the idea that some principle must govern what the state can and cannot do since the state, by definition, acts with force. As Objectivists, we have nailed that one right on the head: Individual rights. That is the dividing line. That takes us hard up against the following two facts: 1.) The fact that defense of individual rights needs no consent, and, 2.) the fact that consent cannot be given to excuse the violation of individual rights. This settles the whole issue of 'consent of the governed' - there can never be such a thing - it is a well-intended misunderstanding. Consent simply doesn't apply to anything in the arena where we are applying force. The force is either being applied properly (in accordance with individual rights) or not.

Post 37

Thursday, June 9, 2011 - 1:39pm

Steve:

I've got to think on that. We agree that it creates an ethical obligation, but possibly not that it can be enforced by a state supportive of freedom.

So, let me inject an alternative, and examine it.

Suppose all contributions to public actions by the state were:

1] Purely voluntary
2] Purely directable as to purpose
3] Pubicly disclosed/available to your socious. IOW, you would know, or could know if you choose, to know what your candidate socious voluntarily contributed to state action, and for what purpose. You would be free to associate, to judge, and even discriminate your choice of socious based on that knowledge-- for both public and private acts. Or, if you chose, you could care less.

The reason being, to provide a basis for ethical relations between peers. Literally, to judge your free association with others, based on their handling of that at acknowledged ethical obligation.

Does that hypothetical violate some 'right to privacy' in matters public? Is there an inherent right to ... freeload?

Is a state supportive of freedom bound to protect our privacy with regard to our handling of this matter of public/state ethical obligation, or is it bound to disclose that information, to support a basis for discrimination in forming free association?

regards,
Fred

Post 38

Thursday, June 9, 2011 - 2:18pm

Fred,

I don't know for sure how to answer your question.

If we take those three criteria of yours as applying across the board, then it is like a line-item veto power available to the people. That is, if they all (or mostly) don't like a particular thing, then they don't contribute to it. No money, no function.

It costs money to maintain and publish the contributions to fund government functions by type, amount, and contributor. If enough people don't make at least a tiny contribution to this function, then it won't exist.

So, in that sense it is a democratically decided issue. There is no violation of individual rights (no force involved, volutary funding, etc.) so the state would be right, under those circumstances to release or not release the info. I don't see a requirement arising out individual rights that would call for either privacy or transparency.

Would it be more in line with a state supportive of freedom to provide privacy or to disclose to support our need/desire for this information? The state isn't obligated, or even allowed, to require that private organizations disclose who funds them (or, it shouldn't be allowed to issue that kind of regulation) - so it clearly isn't our needs/desires that determine this, meaning that it still isn't answerable in my mind.

Practically, that which is not anonymous is often more ethical. If everyone had to use their real names on the internet there would be more civil discourse, and more honesty. That isn't an adequate reason to force private organizations to only accept content under real names - which would violate rights - but that the internet would improve in many ways is fact. And practically speaking, given that the government has no rights of its own, total disclosure to public-funding would cause an increase in funding (freeloaders would be visible and that would cause some to stop freeloading) and there would be less discrepency between what people say should be supported and what is actually supported.

I would make a voluntary contribution to the funding of the public disclosure process. I think that as long as it was a very tiny portion of the total costs of government it would pay for itself in bringing in more revenues. But it would probably not get enough suppport. Do I get my money back?

Post 39

Sunday, June 12, 2011 - 8:06am