| | Teresa, I felt the same way as well. Overload! Gladly, though I'll try to break down his dissents into more condensed bits that give the gist of his contention[s].
1. MEANINGWhen Objectivists say that "the meaning of a concept is all of the concretes it subsumes, past, present, and future, including ones that we will never know about," they are failing to distinguish sense and reference. The need for distinguishing the 'sense' of a word from its 'reference' is shown by examples like this: Oedipus, famously, wanted to marry Jocaste, and as he did so, he both believed and knew that he was marrying Jocaste. The following sentence, in other words, describes what Oedipus both wanted and believed to be the case: (J) Oedipus marries Jocaste.
However, Oedipus certainly did not want to marry his mother, and as he did so, he neither knew nor believed that he was marrying his mother. The following sentence, then, describes what Oedipus did not want or believe to be the case:
(M) Oedipus marries Oedipus' mother.
But yet Jocaste just was Oedipus' mother. That is, the word "Jocaste" and the phrase "Oedipus' mother" both refer to the same person. Therefore, if the meaning of a word is simply what it refers to, then "Jocaste" and "Oedipus' mother" mean the same thing. And if that is the case, then (J) and (M) mean the same thing. But then how could it be that Oedipus could believe what (J) asserts without believing what (M) asserts, if they assert the same thing?
[...........]
Thus, where Rand says, "a concept means all the concretes it subsumes..." I say, "a concept refers to all the concretes it subsumes." So we have to distinguish the sense of a word from its reference. And furthermore, there is no reason not to make this distinction. The only reason I can think of why Objectivists refuse to recognize this distinction, is that they think in declaring the sense of a word to be something other than the objects the word refers to, that I am saying that a word refers to something other than the objects it refers to - i.e., they just don't understand the distinction. And most of the time when one speaks of the "meaning" of a word, one means its sense
2. ANALYTIC & SYNTHETICObjectivism's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on the failure to distinguish the sense and the reference of a word. An analytic statement is defined to be one that is true in virtue of the meanings of the words involved. Peikoff shows in his article on the analytic/synthetic distinction (in ITOE) that, from his theory of meaning, it would follow that no truth can be synthetic. Take an example of a typical, allegedly synthetic statement: (A) All bachelors are less than 8 feet tall.
and suppose that it is true. Then, since the meaning of "bachelors" includes all the bachelors in the world, including all of their characteristics, including their various heights, including (by hypothesis) the fact that they are all less than 8 feet, to say that there is a bachelor more than 8 feet tall would contradict the meaning of "bachelor". Hence, (A) is analytically true.
Having made the sense/reference distinction, however, we see this is wrong. (A) is analytic only if it is true in virtue of the senses of the words involved (not their reference). Of course, every true sentence is true in virtue of the reference of the subject and the predicate (e.g., the object that the subject refers to having the property that the predicate refers to). (A) is analytic only if the concept of being less than 8 feet tall is contained in the concept of a bachelor. And this is not the case, since it is possible to think of a 9-foot-tall bachelor. Note that I am not arguing that since you can imagine a 9-foot-tall bachelor, therefore there might be one. I am not saying this proves anything about how the external world is. I am only saying it proves something about our ideas, which is the only thing at issue in deciding whether a judgement is 'analytic' or 'synthetic': it proves that the idea of a bachelor doesn't contain the idea of being under 8 feet.
3. A PRIORI KNOWLEDGEBy an item of "empirical knowledge" I mean something that is known that either is an observation or else is justified by observations. A priori knowledge is that which is not empirical - i.e., an item of knowledge which is not an observation and which is not justified by observations. Note the word "justified". I do not say that a priori knowledge does not depend causally on observations. I do not say that the concepts required to understand it are innate or formed without the aid of experience. I only maintain that a priori knowledge is not logically based on observations. In other words, if x is an item of a priori knowledge, then there is no observation that is evidence for the truth of x - but we still know x to be true. This distinction is crucial. Perhaps some experiences have caused us to form certain concepts. And perhaps having these concepts enables us to understand the proposition, x. So our ability to understand the proposition depends on observation. But understanding a proposition is very different from being justified in believing it. You can understand something and still not be justified in believing it. For instance, I understand what it means to say "there is life on Mars" - but I have no justification for thinking it to be true. The question of whether our experiences justify a proposition is, therefore, different from the question whether our experiences enable us to understand it. What I have offered above is what nearly all philosophers mean by "a priori knowledge." I take it that Objectivists deny that there is any a priori knowledge in exactly the sense just defined.
3.1. LOGIC IS A PRIORIBy "the principles of logic" in this argument, I will mean exclusively principles of inference: that is, principles stating what is and is not a valid or cogent argument. For example, "Modus ponens is valid" is a principle of logic, and it's one that we know. How do we know these things? (1) Principles of logic are not observations. You do not perceive, by the senses, the logical relation between two propositions. You may be able to perceive that A is true, and you may be able to perceive that B is true; but what you can not perceive is that B follows from A. You can also, perhaps, observe by introspection (I take introspection to be empirical knowledge) that you actually infer B from A. But again, you do not thereby observe that it was valid to do so. Validity is not something literally visible, audible, tangible, etc. (2) The principles of logic can not in general be known by inference. Some principles of logic might be knowable by inference - if they could be supported by reference to other principles of logic. But it couldn't be the case that all principles of logic are known by inference, because this would require circular reasoning. The principles of logic say what is and isn't a valid inference. If we didn't know the principles of logic at least implicitly, then we would not be in a position to find out anything by inference, since we wouldn't know which inferences were valid. For example, to try to infer that modus ponens is valid by using modus ponens would beg the question. To try to infer it by some other kind of inference, would just push the question to how we know that other kind of inference to be valid. And so on. If we are to avoid either circularity or infinite regress, some principles of logic must be foundational. Now it follows from (1) and (2) that: (3) The principles of logic are known a priori. For they are not observations (1) and they are not inferred from observations (2), but they are known. This is the definition of a priori knowledge.
3.2. MATHEMATICS IS A PRIORIConsider the proposition (B) 1 + 1 = 2,
which I know to be true. Is this proposition based on any observations? If so, what observations?
In order to learn the concept '2', I probably had to make some observations. I might have been shown a pair of oranges and told, "This is two oranges." I might then have been shown two fingers and told, "Here are two fingers." And so on. This might have spurred me to form the concept 'two'. And if not for the observations of the oranges, the fingers, etc., I might never have been able to form that concept. I mention this, however, only to explain why it is irrelevant. As I previously explained, the issue is not whether observations were necessary in my coming to understand the equation (B) but whether any observation justifies the proposition, i.e., provides evidence of its truth. How about this, then: I see one orange, over here. Then I see another orange, over there. I put the two oranges together. I count them, and get the result "2". I therefore conclude that 1 orange plus 1 orange = 2 oranges. Perhaps by doing this experiment with a lot of different kinds of objects, I eventually conclude (inductively) that 1 + 1 = 2, regardless of what type of objects are being counted. Thus, observation has confirmed (B). Perhaps by also confirming a lot of other equations, I might also be able to inductively support the axioms of arithmetic.
3.3. ETHICS IS A PRIORIThat knowledge of moral principles is also a priori follows from the following two theses: (1) Moral principles are not observations. The content of every observation is descriptive. That is, you do not literally see, touch, hear, etc. moral value. The only possible objection I can think of would be if one thought that the sensations of pleasure and pain are literally perceptions of moral value and evil. I do not think this is the case, though. No doubt, we generally take things that cause us pleasure to be good, and take things that cause pain to be bad. But I think this is because the pleasure itself is good, and the pain itself is bad, not because they are cognitions of goodness and badness. Pain is just a sensation; it isn't a sensation of anything (as there is a sensation of heat, or a sensation of pressure). Only this explains why, when you're about to undergo an operation, you want an anesthetic (moreover, it is good to have anesthesia). After all, if it isn't the pain itself that is bad, but the pain only makes you aware of something bad, then as long as you know the operation is good for you, the pain involved shouldn't bother you (the pain would then be like a hallucination of badness - but since you know it's just an illusion, you realize nothing bad is really happening). One might reply that although pain is the sensation of badness, serving to make us aware that what causes it is bad, the pain might also be bad in itself. While there's no contradiction in this, it appears ad hoc. Once we've been forced to admit that pleasure is good and pain is bad, the other account of the relationship between pain and badness appears superfluous and probably originally a confusion. Moreover, even if we take this view, we are then forced to the question, How do we know that pain is bad? Do we also observe this, so that there would have to be a second, meta- pain, which is caused by the first pain? (Note that for my argument I only require one evaluative fact to be a priori.)
[He wrote much, much more - but I'm trying my best to keep this as simplified as possible. This guy abuses Crow Epistemology!]
4. UNIVERSALS4.1. WHAT ARE THEY?I have here two white pieces of paper. They are not the same piece of paper, but they have something in common: they are both white. What there are two of are called "particulars" - the pieces of paper are particulars. What is or can be common to multiple particulars are called "universals" - whiteness is a universal. A universal is capable of being present in multiple instances, as whiteness is present in many different pieces of paper. A particular doesn't have 'instances' and can only be present in one place at a time (distinct parts of it can be in different locations though), and particulars are not 'present in' things. A universal is a predicable: that is, it is the kind of thing that can be predicated of something. A particular can not be predicated of anything. For instance, whiteness can be predicated of things: you can attribute to things the property of being white (as in "This paper is white"). A piece of paper can't be predicated of something; you can't attribute the piece of paper as a property (or action or relation) to something else. The piece of paper can only be a subject of judgements; it can never be a predicate. (Incidentally, identity statements of the form "A is identical to B," where A and B are particulars, are not a counter-example to this. A and B are (is?) the subject of the judgement; the relation of identity is the predicate.) The logical subject of a proposition (or sentence or belief) is what the proposition is about. The logical predicate is what is asserted about the subject. One can see, then, that every judgement and so every item of knowledge involves universals, insofar as every judgement has a predicate. "This is white" involves the universal, whiteness. Most words in any natural language refer to universals, and if a language lacked such words, it would be impossible to say anything. One could name particulars, but one could not make any statements about the particulars. All knowledge is the knowledge that something(s) instantiates a certain universal. Also understand that I don't by a "universal" mean a certain kind of word, idea or concept. I mean the sort of thing that you attribute to the objects of your knowledge: Whiteness itself is the universal, not the word "white" and not the concept 'white'. I do not attribute my concept of whiteness to the paper - I do not think that the paper has a concept in it. I attribute whiteness to the paper - i.e., I think the paper is white. Whiteness is not a concept; it is a color. When I have the concept of whiteness in my mind, I do not have whiteness in my mind (no part of my mind is actually white). I say this because the confusion between concepts and their referents is all too common, both inside and outside Objectivist circles - as, for example, when someone says, "Democracy is a nice concept . . ." Democracy is not a concept, it is a form of government! Also notice that, although every universal is a predicable, I did not say that universals can not be subjects of judgements. A universal can also be the subject of a judgement, and universals can possess properties of their own. For example, "White is a color" is a statement in which whiteness is the subject. Now I have said that reason gives us direct awareness of facts about universals: In other words, the knowledge of pure reason is that in which not only the predicate but also the subject is a universal. Observations, in contrast, we defined as direct knowledge in which the subject is a particular (for example, "This paper is white" expresses an observation).
4.2. THE (REAL) PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALSThe philosophical questions about universals are (1) Do universals (as defined above) exist? (2) If not, why does it seem as if they do? (i.e., why do we have all these words and ideas apparently referring to them and knowledge apparently about them?) (3) If they do, does their existence depend on the existence of particulars? The people who answer #1 "Yes" are called "realists", and those who answer #1 "No" are called "nominalists". The nominalists then have to go on to answer #2. How they answer it determines what kind of nominalists they are. The realists have to go on to answer #3. Those who answer #3 "Yes" are called "immanent realists" (Rand: "moderate realists"), while those who answer #3 "No" are called "Platonic realists" or "transcendent realists". That is why the traditional positions on the problem of universals have always been considered to be these three: nominalism, immanent realism, and Platonism. There is no fourth position. This is a simple outcome of the law of excluded middle. In particular, Ayn Rand can not possibly have a position on the problem of universals that is neither nominalist nor realist, unless it is that she either refuses to answer the questions or contradicts herself. Either universals exist, or they don't. If they don't, nominalism is true. If they do, realism is true. And that's that. I am not going to try to refute nominalism here, because it is just obviously false. It is obvious that there is such a thing as whiteness, and that's all I have to say about that. (David Armstrong does a good job on it though in Nominalism and Realism.) It also seems clear to me that universals exist in particulars, and so immanent realism is true. And my primary objection to Rand's theory of concepts (in ITOE) is that she presents it as an answer to the problem of universals, and an anti-realist answer, when in fact it is no such thing.
4.3. RAND THE REALIST?At first it seems as if she is answering question #2, so it seems as if she is a nominalist. Rand starts out by saying that two individual humans do not literally have in common any single attribute; it is not that all people are called "human" because they possess this one quality, 'humanness'. She goes on to explain why it is that we can classify all these different individuals as members of this same category, 'human' (this is where it seems as if an answer to #2 is coming): in essence, she explains that when we group a number of particulars (she calls them "concretes") together, we do so because these objects each possess a value along a certain dimension (a 'measurement' is a thing's place on a certain dimension - as for example "5 feet, 10 inches" is my approximate place on the dimension of length; you can also think of it as the value of a variable). They all possess different values on this dimension (e.g., every person has a different height), but in forming a concept, we abstract away from that, i.e. we mentally isolate only the common characteristic, without paying attention to the specific measurements. I have no objection to this as a realist theory of how concepts are formed. I do object to it as a non-realist theory or as an answer to question #2 above. If a group of concretes are isolated according to a set of dimensions along which they all vary (each taking different values on these dimensions), the next question to ask is, what about the dimension, itself? Example: if one of the common characteristics is 'length', which all of these objects have different amounts of, what about length itself (i.e. the dimension of length): Is this not a universal? It appears it certainly is, for it is predicable of concrete objects, and multiple distinct particulars all share it. An anti-realist answer to the problem of universals, therefore, has not yet been produced: the explanation of how we classify multiple concretes under the same concept must advert to universals, if not in the first stage (i.e., a universal 'humanness') then in the second stage (i.e., a set of universals, the common dimensions along which humans vary). Furthermore, the specific values that things have along certain dimensions are also universals, no matter how specific they are. Take a specific length, like 'exactly 5 feet': that is a universal, not a concrete. You will never encounter a five-foot length all by itself, lying on the sidewalk. If you encounter a 5-foot length, you will encounter it only as the length of some concrete object. It is only another way of stating this to say that '5 feet long' is a predicable, not an ultimate subject. There are two tests for a universal: (1) It can be predicated of concretes. (2) Multiple things could possess it. We've just seen that '5 feet long' satisfies #1. It also satisfies #2: multiple things could be 5 feet long simultaneously. (It does not matter whether multiple things actually are 5 feet long. In fact, probably nothing is exactly 5 feet long, unless you count parts of objects like "the first five feet of the floor." The point is there is no reason in principle why there couldn't be a 5-foot long object, and if there were one, there is no reason why there couldn't be two.) So we see that Rand's theory of concepts adverts to two things that appear to be universals. She does not attempt to explain these things, in turn, in terms of anything else. So it seems that Rand is a realist, specifically an immanent realist, whether she knows it or not. This is not, per se, a problem with her view. I am a realist too, as I think every sensible person should be. There is no way of providing the sort of 'objective basis' for concepts that Rand is trying to provide without talking about the properties that multiple objects fitting under a single concept have in common. Rand has just described what they have in common in a fairly elaborate way. She has not, and could not possibly without making concepts nothing but arbitrary groupings, done away with the notion of there being anything in common to multiple objects.
5.2. RAND'S DERIVATION (?) OF EGOISMSimilar things might be said about the question, "How do we know that we ought to do only what furthers our own lives, as opposed to what furthers the lives of others?" An Objectivist might claim that this too is implicit in the meaning of "ought", and the above objections apply here too. An altruist might counter - as in fact, many of them do - that it is implicit in the meaning of "ought" that we ought to do what promotes the lives of others. How do we determine who is correct in this dispute? I say, of course, that both are wrong. Neither conclusion is implied in the meaning of "ought". It is a synthetic claim that we should promote our own good, just as it is a synthetic claim that we should promote the good of others. But even if I am mistaken, and one of the claims is analytic, I think some argument would be required on the part of one or the other party, to show that it was his view that was analytically true. As far as I know, no ethical egoist has ever offered any non-question-begging argument for the conclusion that we ought only to promote our own interests, with perhaps the one exception of the quasi-argument to be considered immediately below. Perhaps they believe this ethical proposition to be self-evident - a possibility we should return to later. It is important to discuss one, fallacious reason for thinking ethical egoism to be analytically true. It goes something like this: Altruism, as an ethical theory, says that I should sometimes sacrifice my own good for the sake of something else. This means that I should sacrifice my own values for the sake of something else. That is, I should give up something I value, for the sake of something I do not value. That is, I should give up something I believe to be good, to achieve something I do not believe to be good. But this is obviously irrational.
Ayn Rand comes close to offering this argument, when she discusses the meaning of "sacrifice" (in the bad sense of the word). The problem here is that "my good" does not mean the same as "my values". "My good" means that which benefits me. "My values" means that which I believe to be good. I can very well believe what benefits other people but not myself to be good. The issue between altruism and egoism is not over whether you should pursue what you value. It is over what you should value. The altruist says that you should value other people's lives and happiness. The egoist says that you should value only your own life and happiness (and value others' lives, then, only as means to promoting your own, and only insofar as they do promote your own life, just as you would value your car instrumentally). Both, obviously, hold that you should then proceed to pursue that which you value: the altruist, that you should promote the life and happiness of other people, the egoist that you should promote only your own life and happiness. There is no contradiction involved in either of these.
Now, one might propose to redefine egoism as just the view that one should always promote only what one values (or rather, to remove it from the realm of subjectivism, what one is correct in valuing). In this case, egoism becomes analytic. However, the other result of this redefinition, is that no one has ever denied egoism. In particular, the ethics proposed by Jesus, Kant, the Buddha, Mother Theresa, or any of the other people one normally thinks of as proponents of altruism, no longer conflict with 'egoism' in the least. None of these people has been so utterly confused as to say that we should pursue things that we do not correctly hold to be good. They have just proposed that it is good to give money to the poor, help to feed the hungry, and so on, spending a large proportion of our time and resources on these sorts of things. In other words, by thus making egoism analytic, one trivializes the thesis to the point where any action whatsoever is potentially consistent with the dictates of egoism taken just by itself, including all the things we usually call "altruistic". One can then redefine "altruism" as well, so that those actions are no longer called 'altruistic', or one can allow that altruism is consistent with egoism. As a result, while one thus gets an easy validation for one's ethical theory, the ethical theory has become useless: it can not be used to determine whether a given action is right or wrong, because "selfish" will just mean "promotes whatever is good" - we don't any longer have a standard of what is good, which we originally thought that egoism was. If dying to save your community is morally good (or rather, the agent correctly believes it to be morally good), then that will count as "selfish", and any ethical theory whatsoever will count as a form of egoism. And if this is how one is going to use the word, then I certainly agree with 'egoism'. One common thread in most discussions of ethics, especially amongst Objectivists, is the attempt to get something for nothing - i.e., the attempt to get substantive, action-guiding moral principles, principles that will tell you some particular action was right or wrong, that some moral principles advocated by some other philosophers were wrong; out of nothing more than judicious definitions of words and the manipulation of language. This attempt is as delusory in ethics as it is in economics. You can't make a tuna sandwich without any tuna (and it won't help to redefine the word "tuna"), you can't construct a geometrical system without laying down any geometrical axioms, and you can't get a moral conclusion out of an argument without moral premises.
5.3. IS EGOISM SELF-EVIDENT?If egoism is self-evident, that would be a reason for egoists' not offering any argument in favor of it. Unfortunately, if this is the case, there is not much one can say about it - one might be unable to show that it really is self-evident, to those who do not find it so, or to explain why it is true; while those who are unable to perceive this truth also may be unable to explain why they do not see it. I do not find egoism self-evident. I do not even find it the least bit plausible prima facie. From what I can tell (based on what they say), few other people find it plausible, and very few if any find it self-evident. This does not prove that the Objectivist who considers egoism to be obvious on its face is wrong (perhaps it is obvious to him, and perhaps he thereby knows it to be true; and perhaps the other people's mental faculties are defective), but it seems to leave us in at best some kind of stalemate, unless one of us can find arguments to settle the issue. How do we resolve a dispute when one person says that p is self-evident, and another says that the denial of p is self-evident? (I am not saying an Objectivist egoist would appeal to self-evidence; I am just considering the possibility.) One way is to test the principle in specific cases. That is, by examining certain more concrete examples of the principle, we can get a better view of what it entails. When we do this, it might no longer seem evident. Another way would be to draw out the logical relations of the principle to other principles that we hold. If a general principle that is in question is shown to conflict with other principles that are plausible, that is reason to reject it. By the same token, of course, if it is shown to follow from other, plausible principles, that is reason to accept it. Both of these methods may be applied to the issue of egoism. As far as I know, they are the only ways to test the thesis of ethical egoism.
5.3.2. THE CASE OF THE HURRIED OBJECTIVISTSuppose that I am in a hurry to get somewhere. I am walking to work, and if I am late, my boss gets mad at me. Furthermore, I like to get to work on time, because I have a lot of work that I want to get done. It is in my interests to get to work on time, but I am running a little bit late this morning. I presume no Objectivist will object to this so far - i.e., surely it will be granted that it is in my interests to get to work on time. Otherwise, there would be no reason for setting my alarm clock or walking quickly. Now as I walk down the street, there are a lot of people in my way, slowing me down. I just happen to have in my pocket a hand-held disintegrator ray, though. The gun will quickly disintegrate any person I aim it at. It is believed that victims of disintegration suffer brief but horrible agony while being disintegrated, but after that, no trace of them is left. I hold back on disintegrating the people in my path, though, because some of them might be potential clients for my business. But then I see this homeless guy ahead, just wandering down the street. He is not threatening me, and I could go around him, but that would take a second or two longer, and I'm in a hurry. So I pull out the gun and disintegrate him, and then continue on my way. Assume that I live in a society in which homeless people are so little respected that my action is both legal and socially acceptable. Homeless people are regularly beaten up, set on fire, etc., with impunity. Passers-by even regard it as an amusing entertainment. So I will not be punished for my action. Assume further that I dislike homeless people and don't like to see them on the street. So I do not feel bad about seeing the homeless guy disintegrated. In fact, it amuses me. Nor will my conscience bother me, because I am an ethical egoist, and so I believe that my action was morally virtuous. Therefore, after destroying the homeless guy, I should feel proud, not guilty. The question is: Was my action morally right? If egoism is true, it was. I saved some time and mildly entertained myself, just as if I had disintegrated a pile of trash that was lying on the sidewalk getting in everyone's way. The other people in my society, who are themselves also egoists, will thank me for performing this public service, just as they would thank me for removing any other kind of useless clutter from the street. On the egoistic view, a person who does not serve my interests either directly or indirectly is just that - a piece of useless clutter, getting in my way.
5.3.3. EGOISM VS. RIGHTSEthical egoism is inconsistent with the idea that individuals have rights, for the same reason that utilitarianism is. The reason is that any principle of rights, properly so called, functions as a moral side constraint on action, not a moral goal. (The terminology is from Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.) A moral goal is some good thing that our actions ought to aim at. Actions are judged, under a moral goal, by how much of this good they produce (if it comes in degrees), or by whether they produce the good or not. For example, the imperative of the hedonist, "Maximize pleasure," expresses a moral goal. So too the imperative of the utilitarian ("Produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number"). Rights are not like that. They do not identify a goal to aim at. Instead, they identify constraints on the permissible ways of pursuing your goals: "Pursue your goals without violating constraint C." Thus, for example, "Never kill" would be a side constraint. "Minimize the number of killings that occur" would be a moral goal. Notice that these are different: the latter, but not the former, would permit you to sometimes kill people, if doing so was an efficient means to decreasing the overall number of killings in the world. Now let's define "consequentialism" (a technical term from contemporary moral philosophy) as the view that says that only moral goals exist. That is, according to consequentialism, the only thing that is ever relevant to assessing whether an action is right or wrong is how well it promotes certain goals. Whatever means are most efficient for promoting the desirable goals are what ought to be done. (Of course, consequentialists can differ with one another over exactly what goals are legitimate.) This is the meaning of the slogan, "The ends justify the means." The contrary view, that the ends don't justify the means, holds that there exist constraints on the permissible means you can take, even for the pursuit of legitimate goals. Egoism is a consequentialist view. It says that the sole factor relevant to the rightness of an action is how much it benefits the agent. Hence, an agent ought always to aim at this one goal, and he should do whatever best promotes it, without qualification. The principles of individual rights are side constraints - they do not say, for instance, "Do not steal someone else's property, unless it's in your interests to do so." They just say, "Do not steal." That is why it is not an adequate defense, if you are brought on trial for theft, to explain that you expected to benefit by taking the victim's property. Courts do not even listen to that kind of 'defense', nor should they. Again, the non-initiation of force principle does not say, "Exercise force if and only if you can get some benefit by doing so." Rather, whatever benefits you are seeking for yourself, you have to do it within the constraints imposed by other people's rights.
5.3.4. EGOISM VS. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF THE INDIVIDUALEgoism is inconsistent with the idea that individuals are ends in themselves. My saying this will surprise some Objectivists, because they usually think that egoism either follows from or entails the proposition that individuals are ends in themselves. Here is why I say this: If egoism is true, then the sole justification for my doing or refraining from doing anything is that it serves my interests. By the same token, it must be said that the sole justification for any other person's doing A or refraining from A is that it serves his interests. Now how do rights fit in here? To say that I have a right to A, where A is something I can either do or have (as in "I have a right to free speech" or "I have a right to own a gun") is to say that it is morally wrong for others to forcibly interfere with my doing or having A. It is to say something about what is morally right for other people to do with respect to me. (It doesn't constrain my actions; if I have a right to do A, I may still interfere with my own doing of A.) Now how can I defend my rights intellectually? How do I show that I have a right to do something? If egoism is true, in order to show this, I would have to show that it is in the interests of other people to allow me to do A! This seems outrageous from an individualist ethics point of view, but the consequence strictly follows: if egoism is true, the only possible justification for claiming that other people should do X would be that it serves their respective interests to do X; so the only justification for claiming that other people should not interfere with my doing A is that it is in others' interests not to interfere with my doing A.
Why do Objectivists think that the opposite is the case; why do they think that egoism coheres with the principle that individuals are ends in themselves? Well, because they only look at one side of it: they see that egoism means that the justification of my own actions is always that they serve myself. My actions do not need to serve others. However, the other side of the coin is that other people's actions or inactions need take no account of my good and in fact they should not. So while I get to regard my existence as an end in itself, and as serving no one and nothing other than me, other people get to equally legitimately, if egoism is true, regard my life as merely a potential resource serving them, just as they should regard everything in the world. That is, from the point of view of my next door neighbor, my life is only good insofar as it serves my next door neighbor. From the point of view of Mikhail Gorbachev, my life is only significant insofar as it furthers Mikhail Gorbachev's interests. And so on. While this result sounds paradoxical, perhaps even contradictory, it is justly drawn from the theory. What matters to each person is solely what serves that person's interests.
5.3.6. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION OF EGOISMG.E. Moore identified the following as the fundamental contradiction of egoism (Principia Ethica, section 59): The egoist says that each person ought rationally to hold, "My own happiness is the sole good": "What egoism holds, therefore, is that each man's happiness is the sole good - that a number of different things are each of them the only good thing there is - an absolute contradiction!" (emphasis Moore's). This is a criticism that still seems to me, as it did when I first read it, exactly on the mark. Let's look at it more closely, though. The ethical egoist is one who believes that he ought to aim only at promoting his own happiness (it does not matter if we substitute "interests" or anything else for "happiness"). Certainly, then, he thinks that it is good that he should be happy. What does he think everyone else should do? He might maintain, "Everyone else also ought to serve my interests," but this would be implausible. Then he would have to answer "What's so special about you?" Unless he thinks he himself has some kind of special status, some characteristics that no one else in the world has, he must grant that, if his happiness is good, the happiness of others is also good. Therefore, to maintain the plausibility of his theory, the egoist has to say that everyone's happiness is good, and that each person ought to aim at that person's own happiness. But if other people's happiness is also good, then the egoist must be hard put to explain why he does not aim at it in the same way he aims at his own. In other words, how can he justify acting as if his own happiness were the only good thing there is, given that he grants that every other person's happiness is good in just the same way that his own happiness is?
Okay. I left out all of Chapter 6, primarily because it was "another free-will vs determinism debate", and a few other sections as well.
I tried my best to "condense" his dissents, but it proved to be a little difficult - but at least it's much easier on the eyes without the yellow text and dark background.
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