Someone else's dissents

Huemer wrote an entire book on a priori ethics, sadly. It must be painful.

Post 21

Monday, February 13, 2006 - 6:27pm

Ethan Dawe wrote:

Huemer wrote an entire book on a priori ethics, sadly. It must be painful.

I guess you could say it's an a priori ethics, but Huemer describes his position as "ethical intuitionism." His book of the same title is forthcoming.

Huemer wrote an article "Is Benevolent Egoism Coherent?", which claimed that ethical egoism and the notion of individual rights are incompatible, and defended it at TOC's Advanced Seminar in 2001. He described himself as an "ethical intuitionist" then. His article of the same title was published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Volume 3, No. 2 - Spring 2002

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 2/13, 6:52pm)

Post 22

Monday, February 13, 2006 - 6:28pm

Much Ado about Nothing. - that was the title, wasn't it? ;-)

Post 23

Tuesday, February 14, 2006 - 4:16pm

I'm going to skip Huemer's discussion of universals and continue with his discussion of egoism, since it relates to his view of ethics as a priori, which I've already addressed in my previous post. Huemer doesn't understand how Objectivism arrives at egoism, because he views the foundation of ethics as something that cannot be grasped from direct experience, which prevents him from recognizing that the moral agent values his or her own happiness an end in itself. A person's own happiness is experienced as a self-evident value and therefore as the foundation of other (instrumental) values. To argue, in the face of this recognition, that the moral agent ought nevertheless to pursue something other than his own happiness as an end in itself (e.g., the happiness of others) is a non sequitur. As Rand puts it so eloquently in Atlas Shrugged:

Why is it moral to serve the happiness of others, but not your own? If enjoyment is a value, why is it moral when experienced by others, but immoral when experienced by you? If the sensation of eating a cake is a value, why is it an immoral indulgence in your stomach, but a moral goal for you to achieve in the stomach of others. Why is it immoral for you to desire, but moral for others to do so? Why is it immoral to produce a value and keep it, but moral to give it away? And if it is not moral for you to keep a value, why is it moral for others to accept it? If you are selfless and virtuous when you give it, are they not selfish and vicious when they take it? Does virtue consist of serving vice? Is the moral purpose of those who are good, self-immolation for the sake of those who are evil?

As for Huemer's argument that egoism is incompatible with rights, because it condones the sacrifice of others to self (the so-called "prudent predator" argument), there is no principle that allows me to sacrifice your interests, but does not allow you to sacrifice mine. For people to achieve their values in a society of other human beings, they must follow certain principles of conduct that make that possible. "Rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival." It is in one's interests to respect the rights of others, if one wishes one's own rights to be recognized and respected.

Nevertheless, Huemer presents the following argument:

Egoism is a consequentialist view. It says that the sole factor relevant to the rightness of an action is how much it benefits the agent. Hence, an agent ought always to aim at this one goal, and he should do whatever best promotes it, without qualification. The principles of individual rights are side constraints - they do not say, for instance, "Do not steal someone else's property, unless it's in your interests to do so." They just say, "Do not steal." That is why it is not an adequate defense, if you are brought on trial for theft, to explain that you expected to benefit by taking the victim's property. Courts do not even listen to that kind of 'defense', nor should they. Again, the non-initiation of force principle does not say, "Exercise force if and only if you can get some benefit by doing so." Rather, whatever benefits you are seeking for yourself, you have to do it within the constraints imposed by other people's rights.

This is an intrinsicist view of rights, according to which one should respect the rights of others, not because one has anything to gain by it, but just because it is the right thing to do. But if rights are based on egoism, as they should be, then the principle is not intrinsicist but consequentialist. Contrary to Huemer, a principle of rights that is properly based on egoism does indeed say, "Do not steal someone else's property, unless it's in your interests to do so." The point is that it's not in your interest to do so, at least under normal circumstances, although it may be in an emergency. Does Huemer seriously think that faced with starvation, it would be wrong to steal someone else's food (and pay it back later)--that starvation would be preferable?! The principle of rights is based on the premise that under normal conditions, it's clearly not in our interests to steal each other's property, because we have nothing to gain by living in a predatory society. We profit far more by establishing a system of voluntary exchange, harmonious relations and peaceful interaction. But that can only be done by adopting a principle of rights and faithfully adhering to it. The alternative is a Hobbesian war of all against all in which human life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."

In keeping with his intrinsicist view of ethics, Huemer argues that egoism is inconsistent with the "intrinsic value of the individual" (his phrase), which he takes to be the meaning of Rand's statement that "man is an end in himself." But this is a Kantian construction of Rand's statement that is entirely at odds with what Rand meant by it. It was Kant who argued that "man is an end in himself" in the sense that others have a categorical obligation to treat him as such. What Rand meant by her statement that "man is an end in himself" is that one's own happiness is one's highest moral purpose--that the moral agent's own interest is an end in itself, not the interests of others. This is born out by her following statement:

Man�every man�is an end in himself, not the means to the ends of others. He must exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself. The pursuit of his own rational self-interest and of his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his life. (From "Introducing Objectivism" by Ayn Rand)

As we have seen, sacrificing others to oneself is not in one's interest (under normal circumstances) and that is the sole justification for not doing it. Rand's ethics are egoistic through and through. What Kant argued is that one should treat others always as an end and never as a means. When Rand said that man is an end in himself not a means to the ends of others, she was referring to the proper ends of the moral agent's own actions--that he should treat himself as an end and not as a means to the ends of others.

Finally, Huemer trots out G.E. Moore's ridiculous argument against egoism, which is based on a complete misunderstanding of what the theory says. It's amazing how an incompetent critique of this kind by a professional philosopher could acquire a reputable standing in the philosophic community. But it has. It's less surprising that Huemer would adopt it as part of his arsenal. He writes:

5.3.6. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION OF EGOISM

G.E. Moore identified the following as the fundamental contradiction of egoism (Principia Ethica, section 59): The egoist says that each person ought rationally to hold, "My own happiness is the sole good": "What egoism holds, therefore, is that each man's happiness is the sole good - that a number of different things are each of them the only good thing there is - an absolute contradiction!" (emphasis Moore's). This is a criticism that still seems to me, as it did when I first read it, exactly on the mark. [Amazing!] Let's look at it more closely, though. The ethical egoist is one who believes that he ought to aim only at promoting his own happiness (it does not matter if we substitute "interests" or anything else for "happiness"). Certainly, then, he thinks that it is good that he should be happy. What does he think everyone else should do? He might maintain, "Everyone else also ought to serve my interests," but this would be implausible. Then he would have to answer "What's so special about you?" Unless he thinks he himself has some kind of special status, some characteristics that no one else in the world has, he must grant that, if his happiness is good, the happiness of others is also good. Therefore, to maintain the plausibility of his theory, the egoist has to say that everyone's happiness is good, and that each person ought to aim at that person's own happiness. But if other people's happiness is also good, then the egoist must be hard put to explain why he does not aim at it in the same way he aims at his own. In other words, how can he justify acting as if his own happiness were the only good thing there is, given that he grants that every other person's happiness is good in just the same way that his own happiness is?

And there you have it--out of the mouths of the clueless! Once again, Huemer's hutzpah is remarkable. I would have thought that anyone who decides to undertake a detailed critique of Objectivism would have bothered to acquire at least a passing familiarity with its arguments and theories. If Huemer had done so, he would have seen through this critique in a New York minute. The flaw in it should be obvious to any knowledgeable Objectivist. There is no such thing as "the sole good" divorced from beneficiaries. The obvious question is, good for whom? It is only by disregarding this elementary consideration that Moore is able to concoct such an argument, and Huemer buys into it hook, line and sinker. Why am I not surprised? And then he says, "Let's look at it more closely, though." Just how closely do you have to look at it, Michael? The argument is nonsense on its face. Had Huemer bothered to read "The Objectivist Ethics," he would have seen Rand's position spelled out in spades:

The concept "value" is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? (VOS, p. 15)

But he didn't. Why not? I can only conclude that he isn't interested in understanding Objectivism; only in attacking it. But then, of course, he can't expect his attack to have any force or plausibility--which, as we have seen, it doesn't.

- Bill

Post 24

Tuesday, February 14, 2006 - 5:56pm

Well done Bill........

Post 25

Tuesday, February 14, 2006 - 6:07pm

-=Clap Clap Clap=-

I'm thoroughly impressed and am very thankful to know someone as perspicacious and sharp as Bill, and with a remarkable amount of patience. I understand I'm probably not the only person learning a thing or two from Bill's adroit refutations, so on behalf of us O'ists, I once more, thank you!

Post 26

Wednesday, February 15, 2006 - 7:42pm

In his discussion of UNIVERSALS, Huemer writes:

I don't by a "universal" mean a certain kind of word, idea or concept. I mean the sort of thing that you attribute to the objects of your knowledge: Whiteness itself is the universal, not the word "white" and not the concept 'white'. [The word "white" symbolizes the concept 'white,' which is indeed a universal. There is no such particular as a white; there are only white things--white paper, white shirts, white cars, etc]. I do not attribute my concept of whiteness to the paper - I do not think that the paper has a concept in it. [Of course, the paper doesn't have a concept in it; the concept is in one's mind.] I attribute whiteness to the paper - i.e., I think the paper is white. Whiteness is not a concept; it is a color. [Oh, for Pete's sake! The color "white" (or "whiteness," which is the quality of being white) is a concept. What's in the paper is a particular shade of white.] When I have the concept of whiteness in my mind, I do not have whiteness in my mind (no part of my mind is actually white). I say this because the confusion between concepts and their referents is all too common, both inside and outside Objectivist circles - as, for example, when someone says, "Democracy is a nice concept . . ." Democracy is not a concept, it is a form of government! [Like a form of government is NOT a concept?? Hello! What is not a concept is a particular democratic government.]

Huemer continues,

The philosophical questions about universals are (1) Do universals (as defined above) exist? (2) If not, why does it seem as if they do? (i.e., why do we have all these words and ideas apparently referring to them and knowledge apparently about them?) [They exist in our minds, and are classifications of particulars, according to the latter's similarities and differences. It might help if Huemer actually read ITOE]. (3) If they do, does their existence depend on the existence of particulars? The people who answer #1 "Yes" are called "realists", and those who answer #1 "No" are called "nominalists". The nominalists then have to go on to answer #2. How they answer it determines what kind of nominalists they are. The realists have to go on to answer #3. Those who answer #3 "Yes" are called "immanent realists" (Rand: "moderate realists"), while those who answer #3 "No" are called "Platonic realists" or "transcendent realists". That is why the traditional positions on the problem of universals have always been considered to be these three: nominalism, immanent realism, and Platonism. There is no fourth position. This is a simple outcome of the law of excluded middle. In particular, Ayn Rand can not possibly have a position on the problem of universals that is neither nominalist nor realist, unless it is that she either refuses to answer the questions or contradicts herself. Either universals exist, or they don't. If they don't, nominalism is true. If they do, realism is true. And that's that. [There is absolutely no reason to assume, as Huemer does, that these pre-existing categories are carved in stone. It is perfectly conceivable that someone could reject both of them, as Rand in fact does, because he or she has an alternative theory that doesn't fit neatly into either of these little boxes.] I am not going to try to refute nominalism here, because it is just obviously false. It is obvious that there is such a thing as whiteness, and that's all I have to say about that. [It's obvious that there is such a thing as whiteness in reality?? If that's what Huemer is saying, then he's clearly mistaken. There is no such thing as whiteness in particular objects; there are only particular shades of white. Whiteness is an abstraction.] (David Armstrong does a good job on it though in Nominalism and Realism.) It also seems clear to me that universals exist in particulars, and so immanent realism is true. [So Huemer is what Rand refers to as a "moderate realist," someone who subscribes to Aristotle's theory of abstractions.] And my primary objection to Rand's theory of concepts (in ITOE) is that she presents it as an answer to the problem of universals, and an anti-realist answer, when in fact it is no such thing. [Amazing! It is an anti-realist answer. Rand doesn't believe that abstractions exist within concretes any more than she believes that they exist as Platonic archetypes in another dimension.]

Huemer then gives his reasons for thinking that Rand is a realist, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. He writes,

4.3. RAND THE REALIST?

At first it seems as if she is answering question #2, so it seems as if she is a nominalist. Rand starts out by saying that two individual humans do not literally have in common any single attribute; it is not that all people are called "human" because they possess this one quality, 'humanness'. She goes on to explain why it is that we can classify all these different individuals as members of this same category, 'human' (this is where it seems as if an answer to #2 is coming): in essence, she explains that when we group a number of particulars (she calls them "concretes") together, we do so because these objects each possess a value along a certain dimension (a 'measurement' is a thing's place on a certain dimension - as for example "5 feet, 10 inches" is my approximate place on the dimension of length; you can also think of it as the value of a variable). They all possess different values on this dimension (e.g., every person has a different height), but in forming a concept, we abstract away from that, i.e. we mentally isolate only the common characteristic, without paying attention to the specific measurements. I have no objection to this as a realist theory of how concepts are formed. I do object to it as a non-realist theory or as an answer to question #2 above. If a group of concretes are isolated according to a set of dimensions along which they all vary (each taking different values on these dimensions), the next question to ask is, what about the dimension, itself? Example: if one of the common characteristics is 'length', which all of these objects have different amounts of, what about length itself (i.e. the dimension of length): Is this not a universal? [Yes, but what is meant here is that these concretes all have different particular lengths, not that they all have the universal "length" imbedded in them.] It appears it certainly is, for it is predicable of concrete objects, and multiple distinct particulars all share it. [No, he doesn't get it!] An anti-realist answer to the problem of universals, therefore, has not yet been produced: [It has; he just doesn't understand what Rand is saying.] the explanation of how we classify multiple concretes under the same concept must advert to universals, if not in the first stage (i.e., a universal 'humanness') then in the second stage (i.e., a set of universals, the common dimensions along which humans vary). Furthermore, the specific values that things have along certain dimensions are also universals, no matter how specific they are. Take a specific length, like 'exactly 5 feet': that is a universal, not a concrete. [Yes, 'exactly 5 feet' is a universal, but this particular 5 feet is not. And for the precisely the reason he states: You will never encounter a five-foot length all by itself, lying on the sidewalk. If you encounter a 5-foot length, you will encounter it only as the length of some concrete object. It is only another way of stating this to say that '5 feet long' is a predicable, not an ultimate subject. There are two tests for a universal: (1) It can be predicated of concretes. (2) Multiple things could possess it. [No, multiple things cannot "possess" the universal '5 feet long.' They possess their own particular 5-foot lengths. To say that '5 feet long' can be predicated of concretes simply means that these concretes can be classified according to a certain abstract length; it doesn't mean that the abstract length must somehow inhere in the concretes.] We've just seen that '5 feet long' satisfies #1. It also satisfies #2: multiple things could be 5 feet long simultaneously. (It does not matter whether multiple things actually are 5 feet long. In fact, probably nothing is exactly 5 feet long, unless you count parts of objects like "the first five feet of the floor." The point is there is no reason in principle why there couldn't be a 5-foot long object, and if there were one, there is no reason why there couldn't be two.) So we see that Rand's theory of concepts adverts to two things that appear to be universals. She does not attempt to explain these things, in turn, in terms of anything else. So it seems that Rand is a realist, specifically an immanent realist, whether she knows it or not. This is not, per se, a problem with her view. I am a realist too, as I think every sensible person should be. There is no way of providing the sort of 'objective basis' for concepts that Rand is trying to provide without talking about the properties that multiple objects fitting under a single concept have in common. Rand has just described what they have in common in a fairly elaborate way. She has not, and could not possibly without making concepts nothing but arbitrary groupings, done away with the notion of there being anything in common to multiple objects. [To say that multiple objects have something "in common" simply means that they are grouped together according to their similarities as against a background of difference with the group symbolized by a name, which can then be applied to any member of the group. E.g., human beings are grouped together because they bear a greater similarity to each other than they do to the animals from which they are being differentiated. But that doesn't mean that the grouping is arbitrary, because the similarities and differences are real. There is an objective basis for the classification. Rand is not a nominalist, nor is she a moderate realist or a Platonist. She can't be pigeon holed in this manner by being straightjacketed into these traditional but erroneous classifications. She has her own unique theory of concept formation. Why can't Huemer accept that, and make at least a minimal effort to understand what she is saying?! This reminds me of Howard Roark's designs being rejected, because they didn't conform to traditional architectural standards. Even when she was writing The Fountainhead, Rand apparently realized that she had something to offer that was unique and unprecedented in the realm of philosophy, just as her hero, Howard Roark, did in the realm of architecture.

- Bill

Post 27

Wednesday, February 15, 2006 - 11:01pm

=================
Why is it immoral to produce a value and keep it, but moral to give it away? And if it is not moral for you to keep a value, why is it moral for others to accept it? If you are selfless and virtuous when you give it, are they not selfish and vicious when they take it? Does virtue consist of serving vice? Is the moral purpose of those who are good, self-immolation for the sake of those who are evil?
=================

I just love that anti-altruist quote. I just love it.

Thanks Bill!

Ed

Post 28

Wednesday, February 15, 2006 - 11:25pm

Bill, you are doing just great! I LOVE how you are philosophically raking Huemer over the coals (his work deserves this criticism)! But even still, you've just hit upon a speciality of mine, so I will "attempt" to sharpen even "your" view (while joining in on the lambasting of that mediocre-minded Huemer, of course!) ...

Key
Red: Huemer
Black: Dwyer
============================
The philosophical questions about universals are (1) Do universals (as defined above) exist? (2) If not, why does it seem as if they do? (i.e., why do we have all these words and ideas apparently referring to them and knowledge apparently about them?) [They exist in our minds, and are classifications of particulars, according to the latter's similarities and differences. It might help if Huemer actually read ITOE]. (3) If they do, does their existence depend on the existence of particulars?
============================

First of all, Huemer, there are 4 (not 3) philosophical questions about universals, because there are 4 possible positions on the matter ( http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/GeneralForum/0170.shtml#0 ) ...

============================
The possible positions are summarized below:

A. No existence of shared features (no universals): "nominalism"
B. Shared features in the ontological sense (extra-mental; entity-instantiated): "realism"
C. Shared features in the subjective (objects in the mind) sense: "classical conceptualism"
D. Shared features in the intentional (objective) sense: "intentional conceptualism"
============================

The 4 questions are ...

1. Do universals exist?
2. Are universals extra-mental (an existence independent of thought)?
3. Are universals located in the mind (as the "content" of cognition)?
4. Are universals merely the form in which humans conceptualize (as the "mode" of cognition)?

So, you see Bill, claiming an "existence" in our minds is somewhat of a dubious statement, unless qualification is made regarding how in the hell these universals got there (ie. as abstractions from perceptual instantiations). One way is to say they're rationalistic mental constructions -- what I call "classical conceptualism" -- and the other is to say that they're abstractions from perceptual instantiations -- what I call "intentional conceptualism."

I actually think you'd agree, and that you've merely mentioned the mental existence of the universals, but without specifying that they are, always and everywhere, contingent on there being a consciousness attempting to categorize extra-mental existence (ie. that universals "come into existence" when intellects act to understand the world -- that they are inherent to our particular mode of intellectual understanding of things).

Ed

Post 29

Thursday, February 16, 2006 - 8:22am

Ed, thanks for your ancillary analysis and for the nice words. This is the most difficult area of Rand's philosophy that Huemer addressed, and I do not, by any means, have it nailed down. But I agree with what you said. Also, I have a question for you. I wonder if I didn't err in saying that democracy is a concept. It's not a particular, that's for sure, which is how I was approaching the issue (if it's not a particular, then it's a concept) but I'm thinking that it may not be a concept either. A proposition is not a particular, but it's also not a concept. It's an organization of concepts which expresses a complete thought. And we could say, in a similar fashion, that a theory or methodology is an organization of propositions. Right? I'm wondering if democracy can be viewed this way--as a methodology of governance. Huemer says that it isn't a concept; it's a form of government, which is true, but to say that it's a "form" of government does not mean that it's a concept, which is how I was viewing it. So it looks like Huemer may be correct here. What do you think? I realize that this is a relatively minor point in his analysis that does not bear on the main thrust of his critique, which, as we have seen, is irredeemably flawed, but it's still something that's worth considering.

Awhile ago on the Atlantis list, we discussed the epistemological status of a philosophy. Objectivism is particular philosophy, but it's not a particular in the sense of a concrete, because it is an organization of propositions, which, in turn, are organizations of concepts. The relationship of concepts to other kinds of abstract entities like propositions, theories and philosophies still remains to be addressed by Objectivist philosophers. David Kelley has written on propositions, but as far as I am aware, has not published anything on them.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 2/16, 8:50am)

Post 30

Thursday, February 16, 2006 - 11:22am

Bill,

I'd say that democracy, like "justice," is an abstraction -- and then I'd take the next logical step and classify it as a concept (just like the concept of "justice"). I'd define this concept with the following genus and differentia ...

Genus: Form of government (ways to implement force in societal structures)
Differentia: Rule of, by, and for the people

It's because our understanding is, inherently, conceptual -- that we require conceptual differentiation of everything abstract (ie. in order to think straight).

To bring it all together then, we can appear to "think" of perceptual instantiations (e.g. recalling what something looked like), by using our memory (one of our perceptual powers of awareness). But the moment we go beyond that which is present to our perceptual awareness (perception, memory, or imagination) -- like when we "discern" various forms of government from one another! -- at that moment, we are using the concepts of those forms.

Also, when conceptualizing, concepts aren't THAT WHICH we are thinking of, they are that BY WHICH we think (whenever going beyond the mental awareness afforded by immediate perception, memory, or imagination). Concepts are simply the human tool of understanding. Like hammers are the carpenter's tool of nail-driving. They're instrumental to our understanding anything (rather than perceiving, remembering, or imagining something).

All human understanding is conceptual (anything understood, is understood AS a concept).

Caveat ...
"Familiarity," which folks often conflate with an "intellectual understanding," can be completely perceptual though. Face or symbol recognition doesn't require concepts. A familiarity with felt pain doesn't require conceptual awareness either (just feelings and memory).

Ed

Post 31

Thursday, February 16, 2006 - 12:09pm

If ye gonna do it that way Ed, mark - differentia practicalica : mob rule......;-)

Post 32

Thursday, February 16, 2006 - 1:22pm

Right Rev!

Rule of, by, and for the mob!

Sorry, I had forgotten what intractably happens whenever democratic governments aren't chained down like petty handmaidens, by the twin-chains of individual rights and a transparent rule of law.

My bad.

:-)

Ed

Post 33

Thursday, February 16, 2006 - 7:16pm

Ed, Bill,

Information is the state of something that can have more then one state through time.

Knowledge is information that a life form performs operations on.

A percept is information, it is the state (or new state) of your senses, or stored senses, they are very simple raw forms of information that result from one's body (a part of reality) interacting with the rest of reality (another part of reality). A percept is general use is a sense that has gone through few or no operations.

A concept is information, it is the state (or new state) of your logical faculty, or stored logical output, or simular forms of information that are the result of many operations.

A percept and a concept need not currently be knowledge-- they could exist on paper or a rock etc that is currently unknown to any man. Einsteins theory of relativity is a concept, a man can identify it as such even if he doesn't know the concept. The light coming from scissors can change the state of my eyes, I can remember the sight, I can describe it with words, I could draw it, I could take a picture and send it to you or simply leave it in my camera. My scissors have light blue plastic handles, and stainless steal levers/blades. It is ergonomic for my right hand, three lower finders fit through the oblong loop of the bottom handle, my pointer finger rests outside of the loop. My thumb fits through a large circular loop in the top handle.

Bill, I'm not sure what you mean by "proposition", I think what you mean is "a plan suggested for acceptance". A plan is a collection of specific actions, some of them may have dependencies on the context. A plan is information and a plan is a concept. Adding the attribute "suggested for acceptance" differentiates it between a plan that hasn't been suggested yet, adding the attribute adds more information.

A particular is a part of reality. Something currently exists. It is a particular. Everything that currently exists is a particular.

A concept and a percept are information. Information is the state of something that can have more than one state. Information exists. A concept itself is a particular. A percept itself is a particular. (What the concept and percept refer to) may or may not exist, may or may not be a particular, depending on whether (the concept and percept) are consistent with what exists. The most raw percepts (ones that are not the result of simple or few operations, but are the most basic resulting states of the sensations) are consistent with what exists.

Democracy can be a concept, a percept, and a particular. I can look at the voting process in the US (percept-- but right, I'm not understanding what the purpose of voting is etc, I just see people going through the motions). I can think about how all of the individuals that are a part of a democracy have a semi-evenly distributed amount of decisive factor in the use of force (this is a concept). The US itself has individuals which have a semi-evenly distributed amount of decisive factor in the use of force (it is a particular).

Concepts and percepts do not complete the set of information that is a man's knowledge. There is sensory information from internal organs and processes. There is practically random idea/information/relationship generation by our logical faculty.

-Dean

Post 34

Thursday, February 16, 2006 - 7:51pm

Dean,

==========
(What the concept and percept refer to) may or may not exist, may or may not be a particular, depending on whether (the concept and percept) are consistent with what exists.

The most raw percepts (ones that are not the result of simple or few operations, but are the most basic resulting states of the sensations) are consistent with what exists.
==========

First of all Dean, there's 3 ways for something to exist (3 modes of existence). You got yer' plain ole', everyday, run-o-the-mill extra-mental existence ... then you got yer' plain ole', everyday, run-o-the-mill subjective mental existence ... and then, finally, you got yer' new fangled, bells and whistles, intentional existence.

So, when you say referents might not exist -- which mode of existence are you using?

As far as a (conceptual or perceptual!) referent possibly not being a particular (a differentiated part from an encompassing totality), I think that we currently disagree.

Also, I disagree re: "raw percepts" -- ALL percepts are consistent with what exists. Misperceptions are just disguised misconceptions -- like the bent-stick-in-water illusion is.

You mentioned the "perception" of "democracy" ...

The democracy-as-percept argument seems to me to be out on a limb. If you took a nonconceptual being, like a little pet gerbil, and brought him to the polls with you (keeping him in your pocket, with his head sticking out) -- that little furry fuzzball would also see voters voting. But would the little rascal rodent be perceiving "democracy?" I say we should take a vote!

:-)

And my vote is: nay

=====================
Concepts and percepts do not complete the set of information that is a man's knowledge. There is sensory information from internal organs and processes. There is practically random idea/information/relationship generation by our logical faculty.
=====================

Ooooooo, an accurate and philosophically-profitable response to this line of reasoning requires a little more depth than I can currently muster. Besides, I' gotta' leave sumthin' for Bill to tangle with, right?!

Bill, would you take this up, please? I'd be interested in your response.

Ed

Post 35

Thursday, February 16, 2006 - 10:16pm

Dean, I would like to engage you in some banter ...

====================
Information is the state of something that can have more then one state through time.
====================

Well, if that were true, then axioms wouldn't be informative ... (I'm playing a devil's advocate here now) ...

====================
Knowledge is information that a life form performs operations on.
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Lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllike it! :-)

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A percept is information ...
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Lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllike it! :-)

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... it is the state (or new state) of your senses, or stored senses ...
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Lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll ... ohp, disagreed. But, instead of answering you with my own thoughts -- let me "channel" JJ Gibson on the matter. I'll bet he has a dozen or 2 relevant points to make. I have to warn you though, I'm not yet good at these mystical machinations, so, some of this may come out a little "garbled" ... [lights candles, puts on robe, you know the drill] ...

1. perception depends entirely upon information in the "stimulus array" rather than sensations
2. the ambiant array includes invariants ... that determine what is perceived
3. awareness of the environment derives from how it reacts to our movements
4. perception is the process of maintaining direct contact with the world
5. "invariance" of perception, whereby the environment provides an active organism with a continuous and stable flow of information to which it can respond
6. we do not visually perceive "space"
7. we do not perceive "time" as such, but we do perceive changes or varying properties of the world, which are spatio-temporal
8. the term perception is reserved for the environment, and detection or registration is applied to the self
9. affordances are ecological, in the sense that they are properties of the environment relative to an animal
10. to perceive that a surface is level and solid is also to perceive that it is walk-on-able. Thus we no longer have to assume that, first, there is a sensation-based perception of a thing and that, second, there is the accrual of meaning to the primary percept (the "enrichment" theory of perception, based on innate sensations and acquired images).
11. humans perceive objects against backgrounds in the real world by perceiving invariant relationships among the features of the figure and ground
12. an event is specified by a local change in the ambient array, while locomotion is specified by a global change in the ambient array
13. a perceiver picks up information about the layout of the environment directly, and does so the more readily when the object moves or when he himself moves
14. the essential feature of learning is the resonating of the nervous system to the invariant properties of the stimulus flux over objective time
15. the crux of the theory ... is the existence of certain types of permanence and underlying change. These invariants are in the stimuli

Whoa. What a rush! This channeling stuff can be a real wild ride, man. Whew. Okay, where was I? Oh yeah, I was about to define Particular, Perception, and Knowledge. Here goes ...

Material objects = that which have spatio-temporal continuity
Particular objects = that which have self-referential continuity, ie. identity
Perception = direct pickup -- by an organism -- of the contrasts or variances (and therefore, of the invariances) in that organism's environment. We don't perceive identities, but properties. Identities are conceived of when we reach conceptual awareness and classification of all the property perceptions we are having and have ever had (and still hold in memory).
Knowledge [human (transmittable) knowledge] = contextually sufficient discernment of existents from other existents [the 4 types of existents are: entities, attributes (phenomena), actions (events), and relations].

Whew! Gotta' take a break now; this thick stuff has to be taken in bites, you know what I mean? ...

:-)

Comments welcome,

Ed

Post 36

Friday, February 17, 2006 - 2:50pm

Dean,

You wrote,

Bill, I'm not sure what you mean by "proposition", I think what you mean is "a plan suggested for acceptance". A plan is a collection of specific actions, some of them may have dependencies on the context. A plan is information and a plan is a concept. Adding the attribute "suggested for acceptance" differentiates it between a plan that hasn't been suggested yet, adding the attribute adds more information."

This is an entirely different sense of the term "proposition." I'm not talking about "proposition" in the sense of a proposal; I'm using the term in the epistemological sense. As I said in Post 29, "A proposition is not a particular, but it's also not a concept. It's an organization of concepts which expresses a complete thought." Any meaningful sentence is a proposition.

In other words, I am using the term in the same sense as David Kelley in his (unpublished) essay "Concepts and Propositions," wherein he writes:

I am using the term "proposition" in the logical sense: A proposition is the content of an assertion or judgment. It is the complete thought expressed by a grammatical sentence. It may serve as the premise or the conclusion of an inference. That man is a rational animal, that I am a philosopher, that the movie I saw last night was terrible, that some people hate politicians, that O.J. Simpson killed Nicole Brown, that a comet struck the Earth about 70 million years ago, that charity is not a proper function of government--all of these are discrete propositions.

Clear?

- Bill

Post 37

Friday, February 17, 2006 - 8:22pm

I figured it out Dean ...

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Concepts and percepts do not complete the set of information that is a man's knowledge. There is sensory information from internal organs and processes. There is practically random idea/information/relationship generation by our logical faculty.
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These others are part of our powers of perceptual awareness.

The "sensory information from internal organs and processes" is what Gibson called detection or registration, it's sort of a perceptual introspection, so to speak. And "random idea/information/relationship generation by our logical faculty" boils down to combining logic with both imagination and memory, 2 perceptual powers of awareness. So there's conceptual and then there's perceptual, and there's nothing else. There is no other "way" to know things.

Ed

Post 38

Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 12:13pm