NickOtani'sNeo-Objectivism

Basically, Objectivism is a lot like Realism in that it is assumed that reality exists independent of the perceiver. It is discovered rather than created, and it exists pretty much as it is perceived, but reason is also a tool which we use to integrate facts of our perception. According to Rand, A is A, and the law of causation is a corollary. She doesn't recognize all the problems with perception that more rigorous philosophers talk about, and she doesn't see that an immovable, objective reality conflicts with the idea of freedom for human beings. If we all have common essences and reality is not something we can control, then we are slaves to it or like pieces of clay shaped and molded by external forces beyond our control. Behaviorists and other determinists love to make this point, that freedom is only an illusion. Existentialism, however, sees reality as more of a human creation, at least we participate in making ourselves and our reality. It's not just external to us and beyond our control, forcing us to be what we are. We have freedom, but with freedom comes responsibility. We can't just blame things that happen to us on an external reality beyond our control. We can't just be victims. Since we create ourselves and our reality, we also bring about that which happens to us. In psychology, if the behaviorist is the objectivist (Of course Rand, herself, rejected Skinner as she rejected anyone who didn't agree entirely with her.), then the humanist would be the existentialist or subjectivist.

Now, my philosophy is Neo-Objectivism. I try to combine the best of Objectivism with the best of Existentialism to keep the best of two worlds while off-setting the weaknesses of each. Too much objectivism clashes with freedom, but too much subjectivism ignores facts of survival which are pretty much objective. I believe there is an essence of humanness such that humans long ago and humans in other parts of the world are substantially the same as I. There is some natural law which is universal, so that we can have an objective morality based on human survival. However, we also have freedom within those objective parameters. We couldn't have morality if we didn't have this freedom, but unbounded freedom also eliminates the need for prescription. So, there are certain facts about reality and human existence which are objective, universal, as true for one person as for another, but we also have freedom within those objective parameters to forge our own paths, to create ourselves and reality.

Rand would disapprove of me big time. She has said that Existentialism is a philosophy for barefoot savages. She doesn't like anyone tampering with her system. It's all or nothing. Well, I respect her originality and individualism, but I can't be original and my own individual if I am just her blind follower. I still respect many aspects of her philosophy, but I think my version is better.

Writings on my website and messageboard go into further detail of my philosophy, comparing and contrasting it with others and continuing to explain and defend it.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 1

Monday, July 3, 2006 - 6:18pm

Welcome, Nick.

It's good to see you've been thinking hard about philosophy. Due to the propositions you've stated, however, I think that your first post deserves a constructively-critical analysis.

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Basically, Objectivism is a lot like Realism in that it is assumed that reality exists independent of the perceiver.
================

Though I'd normally take issue with your verb "assumed" -- there is probably something more beneficial to highlight here: there are 2 senses in which one can be a Realist. There is the metaphysical realist (even Aristotle was one of those) and then there is the epistemological realist (best illustrated by Plato and the Scholastics).

Metaphysical realism is as simple as you say: an independently existing reality. But epistemological realism says that there are mind-independent universals (ie. essences) of things. This is not true, and it is not Objectivism. In Objectivism, essence is an epistemological thing, not a metaphysical one.

The reason I mention this is that the rest of your post leads me to believe that you were unaware of this distinction when you had written. If not, then simply respond to make note -- and then I'll alter my responses accordingly.

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It is discovered rather than created, and it exists pretty much as it is perceived, but reason is also a tool which we use to integrate facts of our perception.
=================

Nick, what would you say to the proposition that reality exists EXACTLY as it is perceived -- though humans are capable of judgmental errors (eg. "believing" that a submerged stick "is" bent, for instance)?

The reason that the bent-stick illusion is EXACTLY reality -- is because we're seeing effects of water (a real thing) bending light (another real thing) reflected from the submerged stick (another real thing). JJ Gibson called this (the perceived reality) the ambient optic array.

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She doesn't recognize all the problems with perception that more rigorous philosophers talk about,
=================

This proposition seems somewhat flippant and aloof (though, perhaps it wasn't meant to be). She did recognized talked about problems, and she was rigorous (but perhaps, for now, we can agree to disagree on this point).

As to perception, there are 2 main kinds: direct perception & indirect perception -- and talked about problems of perception are overwhelmingly problems with indirect perception. Rand was a direct perceptionist. Here are other folks demonstrating that direct perception is the superior theory here (caps replace italics)...

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... realism and idealism both go too far, ... it is a mistake to reduce matter to the perception which we have of it, a mistake also to make of it a thing able to produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they. ... an existence placed half-way between the 'thing' and the 'representation'.
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Here, Henri Bergson (in: Matter and Memory) is introducing the possibility that perceptions aren't external things, and that perceptions aren't even internal representations of external things -- but that perceptions are 'things-as-perceived'.

I call this phenomenon: intentional existence, and it is something that requires that consciousness exists (ie. it doesn't exist without consciousness).

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But by an OBJECT of a thought I meant what it is that the thought is about, whether or not there is anything outside the mind corresponding to the thought.

It has never been my view that the IMMANENT object is identical with 'OBJECT OF THOUGHT'. What we think about is THE OBJECT or THING and not the 'object of thought.

If, in our thought, we contemplate a horse, our thought has as its immanent object -- not a 'contemplated horse', but a HORSE. And strictly speaking only the horse -- not the 'contemplated horse' -- can be called an object.

The 'contemplated horse' considered as object would be the object of introspection which the thinker perceives whenever he forms a correlative pair consisting of this 'contemplated horse' along with his thinking about the horse; for correlatives are such that one cannot be perceived or apprehended without the other.

But what are experienced as primary objects, or what are thought universally as primary objects of reason, are never themselves the objects of introspection.
==================

Here, Franz Brentano (in: The True and the Evident) reminds us not to confuse 'thought' with 'things'. He lets us in on the dirty little secret that we are not directly aware of the ideas in our heads (qua ideas) -- but that we are directly aware of THAT WHICH these ideas refer to (ie. what it is that the ideas are ABOUT).

This, again, is intentional existence.

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Those very things which from one standpoint we conceive as phenomenally propertied we conceive from another as constituted in a way which can only be described in what are, from the phenomenal point of view, abstract terms.

'This smooth, green, leather table-top', we say, 'is considered scientifically, nothing but a congeries of electric charges widely separated and in rapid motion.' Thus we combine the two standpoints in a single sentence. ...

Once relativity of description to standpoint is recognised, the sentence is seen to contain no contradiction; and if it contains no contradiction, the problem of identification is solved.
====================

Here, P.F. Strawson (in: 'Perception and its Objects') solved the popular '2-tables' problem. As all perceptions originate in perceivers, propositions must merely be qualified to reflect the appropriate type of perceiver.

For scientists, whirling electrons are 'fundamental' to what it is that tables are -- and, for regular folks, solid objects we can eat off of, are what it is that we mean, when we say: table. In both cases, we speak of the same thing, but only in 2 different senses.

====================
In their 1984 article "Can Indirect Realism be Demonstrated in the Psychological Laboratory?," Stephen Wilcox and Stuart Katz utilize the organizational structure of a clever reductio ad absurdum argument (first provided by E.B. Holt, 1914) to demolish the internal logic of the old "representative" doctrine of indirect realism.

More importantly, the article also indicates that modern adherents of indirect perception theories are equally vulnerable to the reductio because they assume the same underlying self-contradictory 'double epistemology' (i.e., that while psychological researchers have unhindered access to their empirical apparatus and can make judgments about the veridicality of knowledge, their subjects are claimed to have no such direct access).

"the psychologist is now juggling with two epistemologies, not one: an indirect realism for the perceiver who cannot know the world directly, and a direct realism for himself who can.

This has two important consequences. First, it refutes the thesis that indirect realism is an empirical matter, and second, it shows that the thesis is ultimately paradoxical" (p. 153).

The main argument presented in the article is that direct realism stands on its own philosophical merits as an epistemological position (for the very reason that all indirect realist positions are self-refuting).

The authors do acknowledge, however, that James J. Gibson's Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1979) presents a psychological theory (of direct perception) which is both consistent with direct realism (philosophically speaking) and accounts for "how the ambient [visual] array specifies the environment"

====================

Here, Paul Ballantyne (http://www.comnet.ca/%7Epballan/W&K(1984).htm) is showing -- through an article published by Stephen Wilcox and Stuart Katz (who draw from E.B. Holt) -- that indirect perception is self-refuting.

Nick, noting that this post is getting long now, I'll stop there -- as to break up this constructive criticism into easily manageable parts.

Do you have any comments so far?

Ed

Post 2

Monday, July 3, 2006 - 10:51pm

Nick,

=================
and she doesn't see that an immovable, objective reality conflicts with the idea of freedom for human beings.
=================

What you speak of here is physicalism (ie. physical determinism). The error of physicalism (physical determinism) is the adoption of event-causation (rather than entity-causation).

If only events caused events -- then free will would, indeed, be meaningless. But this is not true. It is not events, but entities, that cause events. For instance, it is the relative humidity in the air, in combination with the ambient temperature -- that causes rain. The humidity is an entity -- not an event.

=================
Existentialism, however, sees reality as more of a human creation, at least we participate in making ourselves and our reality.

Since we create ourselves and our reality, we also bring about that which happens to us.
=================

Existentialism (where you get to 'create' your 'reality') is wrong. Existentialism is a combination of pragmatism or positivism (ie. no absolute principles) with wishful thinking. This is not Objectivism, which states that they'll be necessary principles to bow one's head to.

=================
(Of course Rand, herself, rejected Skinner as she rejected anyone who didn't agree entirely with her.)
=================

Skinner can be rejected for his denial of free will. It's not necessary to bring a postulated insecurity of Rand into this. Instead, one can evaluate Skinner on his merits -- and one SHOULD do so (rather than to engage in this kind of sophomoric rhetoricism).

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Too much objectivism clashes with freedom
=================

You've merely stated this, without demonstration. Do you expect rational agents to accept you at your word?

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There is some natural law which is universal, so that we can have an objective morality based on human survival.
=================

Agreed.

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We couldn't have morality if we didn't have this freedom, but unbounded freedom also eliminates the need for prescription.
=================

But there is no such thing as "unbounded" freedom (ie. freedom FROM your identity). Folks championing "unbounded" freedom are idiotic and wrong.

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Well, I respect her originality and individualism, but I can't be original and my own individual if I am just her blind follower. I still respect many aspects of her philosophy, but I think my version is better.
=================

Does ANYTHING Rand wrote suggest that she would invite or sanction "blind" following? I'm not sure you've read Rand well.

Ed

Post 3

Monday, July 3, 2006 - 9:45pm

Though I'd normally take issue with your verb "assumed" -- there is probably something more beneficial to highlight here: there are 2 senses in which one can be a Realist. There is the metaphysical realist (even Aristotle was one of those) and then there is the epistemological realist (best illustrated by Plato and the Scholastics).

Metaphysical realism is as simple as you say: an independently existing reality. But epistemological realism says that there are mind-independent universals (ie. essences) of things. This is not true, and it is not Objectivism. In Objectivism, essence is an epistemological thing, not a metaphysical one.

The reason I mention this is that the rest of your post leads me to believe that you were unaware of this distinction when you had written. If not, then simply respond to make note -- and then I'll alter my responses accordingly

I think both Aristotle and Plato were realists in the sense that they both divided reality into material and mental. Plato merely stressed the mental as the real while Aristotle stressed the material. This gives Plato the label of idealist. And, I think both were essentialists in that they believed that things had specific natures, essences. I don�t see what value there is in saying one thing is metaphysical while the other is epistemological. �Metaphysical� has to do with the nature of reality, and �epistemological� has to do with the nature of truth, but both have to do with the known and knowing.

Nick, what would you say to the proposition that reality exists EXACTLY as it is perceived -- though humans are capable of judgmental errors (eg. "believing" that a submerged stick "is" bent, for instance)?

The reason that the bent-stick illusion is EXACTLY reality -- is because we're seeing effects of water (a real thing) bending light (another real thing) reflected from the submerged stick (another real thing). JJ Gibson called this (the perceived reality) the ambient optic array.

There are many more problems with perception than the bent-stick illusion. The reality we see differs, to some extent, in the eye of each beholder. This is because there are times when we adjust our perceptions by taking mental leaps. Nobody has ever seen a perfectly square box, yet we still attribute squareness to certain objects. We ignore the slight imperfections of an otherwise square object. We ignore a small blemish on an otherwise pretty face. (Unless we don't like the person. Then the blemish becomes larger.) We fill in our incomplete picture of reality with our own details. More than this, we sometimes impose our ideas onto that which surrounds us. We cannot discover everything, therefore we create certain things.

Ed, I like your quotes by Bergson and others. They do illustrate that perception is not as simple as what either the realists or idealist say, but we are still working things out.

One of my professors at USC, William F. O�Neill, listed the kinds of knowledge philosophers recognize:

At basis, most philosophers recognize four possible sources of metaphysical knowledge (abstract philosophical truth).

1) Knowledge for underlying reality many be communicated directly and actively from a metaphysical source in the form of personal revelation.

2) Ultimate knowledge may be derived from experience though the process of abstraction (as it is in Aristotle's philosophy). Such knowledge is only indirectly essential (absolute), because it is necessarily contingent upon the abstractive process itself which is, in turn, a secondary manifestation of prior sense-perceptual experience. Such knowledge is, then, necessarily mediated by personal awareness.

3)Such knowledge may not be acquired at all but may preexist within the organism itself as inherent truth which is only subsequently recognized as corresponding to (or matching) the underlying nature of encountered reality.

4)Such Knowledge may be derived pre-rationally on the basis of the earliest sort of motor-emotional behavior during the first months and years of childhood and may therefore only subsequently (if ever) be "rationalized" as explicit knowledge

Yes, the first path is supernaturalism, and the fourth is intuition. Rand is opposed to both of those in principle. She praises Aristotle and denounces Plato, for his idealism, his mysticism. However, according to O�Neill, Rand�s account of essential truth as a process of identification is more compatible with Plato�s view, that truth is innate and not subject to life experiences, than it is to Aristotle�s view, that truth is an abstract description of qualities within experience. (Other Objectivists on this forum may disagree.)

For Rand, certain truths are self-evident, implicit within experience itself. They cannot be chosen, subjective, or derived from context, relative. They are implicit in the nature of man as man.

For Rand, man�s culpability is not that he doesn�t know but that he denies what he knows.

Are we getting off track, Ed?

Bis bald,

Nick

Post 4

Tuesday, July 4, 2006 - 9:01am

Nick,

===================
I think both Aristotle and Plato were realists in the sense that they both divided reality into material and mental. Plato merely stressed the mental as the real while Aristotle stressed the material. This gives Plato the label of idealist. And, I think both were essentialists in that they believed that things had specific natures, essences. I don�t see what value there is in saying one thing is metaphysical while the other is epistemological.
===================

This is the primary problem. If you do not hold in your mind the stark contrast of that which is metaphysical, to that which is epistemological -- then, confusing 'thought' with 'things' -- you will be caught up in the conundrums that you, here, go on to illustrate.

===================
�Metaphysical� has to do with the nature of reality, and �epistemological� has to do with the nature of truth, but both have to do with the known and knowing.
===================

While you've pegged 'metaphysical' on the button, I'd re-word the 2nd part to: 'epistemological' has to do with the nature of knowing (truth). While metaphysical things can become known, the mere 'fact' of them being known (or not), is inconsequential to their existence. This is just another way of saying that things exist independently.

===================
Nobody has ever seen a perfectly square box, yet we still attribute squareness to certain objects. We ignore the slight imperfections of an otherwise square object.
===================

I call this the Fallacy of Infinite Precision (or the Heisenberg Fallacy) -- where infinite (ie. super-contextual) precision is thought to be the appropriate standard (rather than a contextual or relational standard). It's Platonic.

The reason we attribute squareness to imperfectly-square things, is because it is logical to do so. These imperfectly-square things are more square-er than are other things (like circles and triangles, for instance).

In calling them square, we are noting that they are of a particular type (as against other types of things) -- a type that has some essential characteristics (4 sides/4 corners, etc). The purpose of definition is successful differentiation.

We don't need to see a 'perfect square' -- in order to successfully differentiate it from a circle, or triangle, for that matter. In short, an appeal to perfection is rationally unfounded.

To be 100% accurate in a given context (eg. say, to be able to differentiate squares from triangles), we only require the precision needed in the given specific context (we don't ever require a 'super-contextual' precision).

If a carpenter orders some 10-meter planks, he doesn't require them to be EXACTLY 10 meters. It is only necessary that they be '10 meters (plus or minus 5 millimeters, or so)'. His planks, if within 5 millimeters of 10 meters, are properly called 10-meter planks. Reality never demands more precision than this (more than the context) for accuracy.

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More than this, we sometimes impose our ideas onto that which surrounds us.
===================

This is not a problem with perceptual awareness, it is a problem with conceptual awareness.

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We cannot discover everything, therefore we create certain things.
===================

Please elaborate on how this could lead to human inaccuracy.

===================
At basis, most philosophers recognize four possible sources of metaphysical knowledge (abstract philosophical truth). ...

2) Ultimate knowledge may be derived from experience though the process of abstraction (as it is in Aristotle's philosophy).

Such knowledge is only indirectly essential (absolute), because it is necessarily contingent upon the abstractive process itself which is, in turn, a secondary manifestation of prior sense-perceptual experience. Such knowledge is, then, necessarily mediated by personal awareness.
===================

Here, your professor uses terms like 'essential' and 'absolute' -- when referring to knowledge. This is a mistake. Knowledge is, by nature, contextual and relational.

As I said above, the carpenter is not required to 'know' whether his 10-meter planks are within, say, 1-2 microns of 10 meters -- in order to 'know' whether they are 10-meter planks, or not. His knowledge is related to the context he works within. All knowledge is.

===================
However, according to O�Neill, Rand�s account of essential truth as a process of identification is more compatible with Plato�s view, that truth is innate and not subject to life experiences, than it is to Aristotle�s view, that truth is an abstract description of qualities within experience. (Other Objectivists on this forum may disagree.)
===================

See above.

===================
For Rand, certain truths are self-evident, implicit within experience itself. They cannot be chosen, subjective, or derived from context, relative.
===================

These are the axioms (true in all contexts), and it is proper to call them the base of all knowledge.

===================
Are we getting off track, Ed?
===================

No. You've laid down a track -- and we are still on it.

:-)

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 7/04, 9:02am)

Post 5

Tuesday, July 4, 2006 - 12:15pm

(Nick)I think both Aristotle and Plato were realists in the sense that they both divided reality into material and mental. Plato merely stressed the mental as the real while Aristotle stressed the material. This gives Plato the label of idealist. And, I think both were essentialists in that they believed that things had specific natures, essences. I don�t see what value there is in saying one thing is metaphysical while the other is epistemological.

(Ed)This is the primary problem. If you do not hold in your mind the stark contrast of that which is metaphysical, to that which is epistemological -- then, confusing 'thought' with 'things' -- you will be caught up in the conundrums that you, here, go on to illustrate.

(Nick)Why do we have to say that the independent existence of things is a metaphysical issue while the nature or essence of things is an epistemological issue? If it is true that Objectivism holds both, that things are independent of the perceiver and have specific natures, essences, and both are held by Aristotle�s realism, then I was not incorrect in my initial statement. Later, when I refer to A is A and other logical principles, I can see the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology. Logic is more about how we come to know and work with truth, and, yes, I see how A is A can be related to �things have specific natures; they are as they are.�

(Nick)Nobody has ever seen a perfectly square box, yet we still attribute squareness to certain objects. We ignore the slight imperfections of an otherwise square object.

(Ed)I call this the Fallacy of Infinite Precision (or the Heisenberg Fallacy) -- where infinite (ie. super-contextual) precision is thought to be the appropriate standard (rather than a contextual or relational standard). It's Platonic.

The reason we attribute squareness to imperfectly-square things, is because it is logical to do so. These imperfectly-square things are more square-er than are other things (like circles and triangles, for instance).

In calling them square, we are noting that they are of a particular type (as against other types of things) -- a type that has some essential characteristics (4 sides/4 corners, etc). The purpose of definition is successful differentiation.

We don't need to see a 'perfect square' -- in order to successfully differentiate it from a circle, or triangle, for that matter. In short, an appeal to perfection is rationally unfounded.

To be 100% accurate in a given context (eg. say, to be able to differentiate squares from triangles), we only require the precision needed in the given specific context (we don't ever require a 'super-contextual' precision).

If a carpenter orders some 10-meter planks, he doesn't require them to be EXACTLY 10 meters. It is only necessary that they be '10 meters (plus or minus 5 millimeters, or so)'. His planks, if within 5 millimeters of 10 meters, are properly called 10-meter planks. Reality never demands more precision than this (more than the context) for accuracy.

(Nick)Yes, we sometime fill in the blanks to make a design. Our minds do this. We remember things better when there is a pattern. So, when a light is missing in a neon sign, we fill it in. However, this means we do not perceive it accurately. And, this is relational, relative. If we like the person with a small blemish, we don�t see it. However, if we do not like this person, the blemish becomes bigger and more noticeable.

Yes, the carpenter needs only to have workable accuracy for his or her needs. However, not everybody automatically adjusts to the appropriate level of accuracy. A bigot does not perceive things the same as a non-bigot. So, I there is a disagreement between the bigot and the non-bigot on whether or not the blemish is noticeable or not, something other than perception has to be appealed to.

(Nick)More than this, we sometimes impose our ideas onto that which surrounds us.

(Ed)This is not a problem with perceptual awareness, it is a problem with conceptual awareness.

(Nick)It is still a problem. We project images onto cloud formations and inkblots. Our thoughts impact what we sense.

We cannot discover everything, therefore we create certain things.

(Ed)Please elaborate on how this could lead to human inaccuracy.

(Nick)See above. What one person creates is not what another creates. This is why there are many different interpretations of the Bible. It s subjective, not objective, not true independent of human perception.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 6

Tuesday, July 4, 2006 - 12:22pm

�At basis, most philosophers recognize four possible sources of metaphysical knowledge (abstract philosophical truth).

2) Ultimate knowledge may be derived from experience though the process of abstraction (as it is in Aristotle's philosophy).

Such knowledge is only indirectly essential (absolute), because it is necessarily contingent upon the abstractive process itself which is, in turn, a secondary manifestation of prior sense-perceptual experience. Such knowledge is, then, necessarily mediated by personal awareness.�

(Ed)Here, your professor uses terms like 'essential' and 'absolute' -- when referring to knowledge. This is a mistake. Knowledge is, by nature, contextual and relational.

As I said above, the carpenter is not required to 'know' whether his 10-meter planks are within, say, 1-2 microns of 10 meters -- in order to 'know' whether they are 10-meter planks, or not. His knowledge is related to the context he works within. All knowledge is.

(Nick)By that same logic, we can say that the bigot is not required to know that white people are no more or less superior than black people. Rand takes issue with Kant for saying that we can never get to real knowledge, the �noumena� behind the phenomena. If we can still get to the knowledge we need, the contextual knowledge, why should she care if it is not more than appearances?

(Nick)For Rand, certain truths are self-evident, implicit within experience itself. They cannot be chosen, subjective, or derived from context, relative.

(Ed)These are the axioms (true in all contexts), and it is proper to call them the base of all knowledge.

(Nick)They seem to be axioms by Rand�s edict. I understand the need for some self-evident truths. We would have infinite regress if everything needed justification. However, Rand seems to use axioms as wild cards. When she can�t prove something, she can declare it self-evident. That means it need not be proven because rational people already know it and are immoral if they deny it.

(Nick)and she doesn't see that an immovable, objective reality conflicts with the idea of freedom for human beings.

(Ed)What you speak of here is physicalism (ie. physical determinism). The error of physicalism (physical determinism) is the adoption of event-causation (rather than entity-causation).

If only events caused events -- then free will would, indeed, be meaningless. But this is not true. It is not events, but entities, that cause events. For instance, it is the relative humidity in the air, in combination with the ambient temperature -- that causes rain. The humidity is an entity -- not an event.

(Nick)Entities can also be caused to cause things. They are part of the chain of cause and effect, unless they are first causes. This presupposes free-will. Not all entities have free-will. Only humans do, according to Rand and others. However, Rand merely declares that man has free-will. It is self-evident. She doesn�t explain it as well as the existentialists do.

(Nick)Existentialism, however, sees reality as more of a human creation, at least we participate in making ourselves and our reality.

Since we create ourselves and our reality, we also bring about that which happens to us.

(Ed)Existentialism (where you get to 'create' your 'reality') is wrong. Existentialism is a combination of pragmatism or positivism (ie. no absolute principles) with wishful thinking. This is not Objectivism, which states that they'll be necessary principles to bow one's head to.

(Nick)With freedom comes responsibility. The existentialist does not subjugate himself or herself to God, society, or logic. He or she holds his or her head up high, bloody but unbowed, but also recognizes the condition that others be allowed to do the same. Sartre fell back on a version of Kant�s categorical imperative for this, but NickOtani�sNeo-Objectivism says one is free within the parameters of allowing others that same freedom. NickOtani�sNeo-Objectivism is a combination of Existentialism and Objectivism.

(Nick)(Of course Rand, herself, rejected Skinner as she rejected anyone who didn't agree entirely with her.)

(Ed)Skinner can be rejected for his denial of free will. It's not necessary to bring a postulated insecurity of Rand into this. Instead, one can evaluate Skinner on his merits -- and one SHOULD do so (rather than to engage in this kind of sophomoric rhetoricism).

(Nick)Skinner was more consistent than Rand. He stuck with the consequences of a mechanistic model controlled by cause and effect. Rand didn�t. She tried to have it both ways, complete cause and effect, and freedom. This is a big problem in her philosophy.

(Nick)Too much objectivism clashes with freedom

(Ed)You've merely stated this, without demonstration. Do you expect rational agents to accept you at your word?

(Nick)Perhaps there is a problem with your perception.

(Ed)Does ANYTHING Rand wrote suggest that she would invite or sanction "blind" following? I'm not sure you've read Rand well.

(Nick)I�ve read Rand and also the Brandens, Hospers, O�Niell, Shermer, and others. I�ve read Peikoff and Kelley. I�ve seen where Rand got defensive when people challenged her views. I�m pretty sure she would denounce me for using her name while promoting views with which she would be opposed. Do you think she wouldn�t?

bis bald,

Nick

Post 7

Tuesday, July 4, 2006 - 2:42pm

Nick said:

I�ve seen where Rand got defensive when people challenged her views.

Where have you seen this?

Ethan

Post 8

Tuesday, July 4, 2006 - 7:11pm

Often, the "Dissent" section would seem to be better labeled "Comix."

Post 9

Tuesday, July 4, 2006 - 7:44pm

But that's presuming it's funny.......

Post 10

Tuesday, July 4, 2006 - 10:10pm

Well said Ed!

Wednesday, July 5, 2006 - 5:46am

Thanks, John.

Ed

Tuesday, July 4, 2006 - 4:30pm

(Nick)I�ve seen where Rand got defensive when people challenged her views.

(Ethan)Where have you seen this?

(Nick)One place was on the Phil Danahue show. A woman in the audience talked about how she was part of a "cult" who devoured Rand's books in college. Rand interupted and said she was not a "cult."

Then, the woman apologized and said she meant that she and others read Rand's books when she, the woman, was younger, but that she has grown away from Rand's views.

Rand told Phil to just pass her by.

Phil tried to passify her saying, "Other people have their views and you have yours. So what?"

Ayn Rand said, "It's not my problem that she moved away from my views. It's hers. However, she has lots of ways to publish her views. Coming on my show and usng my time to advocate her views is not acceptable to me."

Phil said okay and tried to move on quickly. The other audience members were more complementary to Rand.

This is just one place. The Brandens write about other incidents where Rand would have a fit if someone disagreed with her. People would have to walk on egg shells around her.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 13

Wednesday, July 5, 2006 - 6:03am

Nick,

I have a copy of the both Rand interviews on Donahue. I suggest you revisit them.

Rand hit the nail on the head when she refused to answer a question that started with an insult. I'll get you the exact quote from the questioner when I can replay that part, as you have it a bit wrong I believe. Sure Donahue and the many in the audience didn't see it as an insult, but it was. This wasn't defensiveness. Rand offered to answer the question if someone else asked it without the insult. Like I said, go take another look at it.

As for the Brandens', I put little to no stock in anything they say.

Ethan

Edited for grammar error.

(Edited by Ethan Dawe on 7/05, 9:28am)

Post 14

Wednesday, July 5, 2006 - 6:50am

I just listened to that Donahue spot again. The questioner said something close to:

"fifteen years ago I thought your philosphy was good, but now that I'm older and more educated I don't..."

Rand is noted for her lightning fast ability to reduce an argument to it's underlying meaning. Here she saw the insult up-front. The woman chose to insult first before asking her question. Do you see the insult in this comment?

Ethan

Post 15

Wednesday, July 5, 2006 - 7:10am

Nick Wrote:

However, Rand seems to use axioms as wild cards. When she can�t prove something, she can declare it self-evident. That means it need not be proven because rational people already know it and are immoral if they deny it.

Bingo! The same conclusion I came to when I read Rand. This is a big problem.

Bob

Post 16

Wednesday, July 5, 2006 - 8:23am

It's only a problem if you don't understand what she's saying about axioms.

Post 17

Wednesday, July 5, 2006 - 9:00am

Nick wrote:

(Ed)Here, your professor uses terms like 'essential' and 'absolute' -- when referring to knowledge. This is a mistake. Knowledge is, by nature, contextual and relational.

As I said above, the carpenter is not required to 'know' whether his 10-meter planks are within, say, 1-2 microns of 10 meters -- in order to 'know' whether they are 10-meter planks, or not. His knowledge is related to the context he works within. All knowledge is.

(Nick)By that same logic, we can say that the bigot is not required to know that white people are no more or less superior than black people.

Nick I've read your response over and over again, trying to understand why you would say that is the same logic, and you've completely lost me. I don't think that is the same logic. By any measurable standard we know that white people are no more superior than black people.

(Nick)For Rand, certain truths are self-evident, implicit within experience itself. They cannot be chosen, subjective, or derived from context, relative.

(Ed)These are the axioms (true in all contexts), and it is proper to call them the base of all knowledge.

(Nick)They seem to be axioms by Rand�s edict. I understand the need for some self-evident truths. We would have infinite regress if everything needed justification. However, Rand seems to use axioms as wild cards. When she can�t prove something, she can declare it self-evident. That means it need not be proven because rational people already know it and are immoral if they deny it.

No that won't do. If you are going to make an accusation, back it up with references to Rand's writings. Yourself declaring Rand used axioms as wild cards seems like a wildcard from yourself. Is that an axiom about Rand and we should just accept what your saying Nick as self-evident?

(Nick)Entities can also be caused to cause things. They are part of the chain of cause and effect, unless they are first causes. This presupposes free-will. Not all entities have free-will. Only humans do, according to Rand and others. However, Rand merely declares that man has free-will. It is self-evident. She doesn�t explain it as well as the existentialists do.

Free will is an observable phenomenon. We see that man many times has choices before him, and that each choice of action has a different consequence to them. It is exactly from our own experiences where a similar event comes up, and we may choose to act differently if our last choice did not come up with the desired consequences. The whole idea of "trial and error" is enough to prove there is free will.

(Nick)Existentialism, however, sees reality as more of a human creation, at least we participate in making ourselves and our reality.
Since we create ourselves and our reality, we also bring about that which happens to us.

Well isn't that convenient. So why don't you go jump off a skysrcaper, and will yourself to fly since you can create reality. Come back to this forum and tell us your results.

(Nick)Too much objectivism clashes with freedom

(Ed)You've merely stated this, without demonstration. Do you expect rational agents to accept you at your word?

(Nick)Perhaps there is a problem with your perception.

Ah I see, so as an exhistentialist, we can just will ourselves into changing our perception. Of course, reality is only that which we will it to be, so why not just will yourself correct an all things true? What a wonderful philosophy, I think I'm going to will myself right now a steak dinner, with a bottle of merlot, and the ability to see through walls. I've always wanted that power. Then I'm going to will laser beams shoot out of my eyes to cook the steak, no wait, it's my reality, I'm just going to cook the steak with my mind. Anyone who tells me otherwise, is just trying to take away my freedom! You commie bastards!

Post 18

Wednesday, July 5, 2006 - 8:58am

(Ethan)I have a copy of the both Rand interviews on Donahue. I suggest you revisit them.

(Nick)I tape-recorded the show to which I am referring, but I no-longer have it in my possession. It remains among the things my ex-wife won�t return to me. I�m going on memory, but it is confirmed by what Barbara Branden in her book, The Passion of Ayn Rand, pages 391-392.

(Ethan)Rand hit the nail on the head when she refused to answer a question that started with an insult. I'll get you the exact quote from the questioner when I can replay that part, as you have it a bit wrong I believe. Sure Donahue and the many in the audience didn't see it as an insult, but it was. This wasn't defensiveness. Rand offered to answer the question if someone else asked it without the insult. Like I said, go take another look at it.

(Nick)I think the young woman was trying to be honest. It may have been awkward, but other people have also said that they were enthralled with Rand earlier in their lives but moved away from her views later. Rand, f she were more secure, would have acknowledged this and, perhaps, dealt with it. Instead, she got insulted and yelled at the lady. I can�t imagine Socrates doing this.

(Ethan)As for the Branden's, I put little to no stock in anything they say.

(Nick)I had respect for Barbara Branden and was honored to actually communicate with her on the Objectivist Living forum. However, I noticed that she also communicated with people on that forum with whom I have no respect. This sort of ruined things for me.

(Ethan)Rand is noted for her lightning fast ability to reduce an argument to it's underlying meaning.

(Nick)I still think Rand would disapprove of me, associating myself with her and her Objectivism but advocating views with which she disagreed.

(BTW, Ethan, you should review your apostrophe rules.)

Bis bald,

Nick

Post 19

Wednesday, July 5, 2006 - 9:13am