Peikoff and Agnosticism

J.L. Mackie, "Evil and Ominipotence"

Mackie attempts to show not only that religious arguments lack rational support but that they are downright irrational. The problem of evil conflicts with a God who is omnipotent and wholly good. (Of course he notes that there must be additional premises for the contradiction to arise: 1. good is opposed to evil. 2. good eliminates evil as far as it can. 3. omnipotent means no limits on what a thing can do.)

Some theists state that good cannot exist without evil. Mackie claims this to be a fallacious solution to the problem of evil because, first, it sets a limit on what God can do, that he cannot make good without setting it against evil. This means God is not omnipotent. He is limited by logic. And, second, if good and evil are counterparts in this way, they are not such that good eliminates evil, our second additional premise. If evil is an opposite of good in the way that great is the opposite of small, more explanation is needed. Greatness and smallness are relative terms and need not exist as necessary counterparts. Everything could be small. Non-redness need not exist for redness to exist. Everything could be red. We just wouldn't notice because we would have nothing to contrast it with. Finally, it does not do any good to say only enough evil exists to serve as a counterpart to good. There seems to be much more evil than would be needed for that. After-all, only a minute bit of non-redness would be necessary for redness to be recognized.

Just as logic limits God, cause and effect are limits. If evil is a necessary means to good, then God is restricted by cause and effect. This should not be comforting to theists who want to think of god as omnipotent, as the creator of logic and causality.

There is the intriguing argument that evil is a necessary means to good, that a world without evil would be static, cold, and sterile. A little evil would make possible heroism and courage. Things would be more alive and exciting.

In the course of responding to this claim, Mackie distinguishes between "first-order goods" and "second-order goods." First order goods contrast with first order evil, pain and misery. First order goods are pleasure and happiness. Second order good is the heightening of happiness by contrast with misery. It is sympathy, heroism, and all the goods associated with overcoming evil.

Some could argue that second order goods are merely derivative from evil, but a stronger argument could be that God is not so much concerned with minimizing evil (1) but promoting good (2). This might be disturbing to some theists.

The fatal objection is that just as this makes second order good possible, it also makes possible second order evil, malevolence, cowardice, cruelty, coldness etc. It makes possible states in which good (1) decreases as evil (1) increases. God, if He were wholly good and omnipotent, would eliminate this situation. Yet, it doesn't seem to be happening.

Now, there can also be an attempt to match all the evil with the possibility of more good, higher and higher levels, but this can result in an infinite progression.

Many theists will insist that evil is due to human free-will, not God at all. They explain that giving man a choice and allowing him to err is better than keeping him an automaton, acting in only a determined way.

(I can see how human err can cause pollution and lots of suffering, but there are also natural disasters which have nothing to do with humans. Forrest fires can be started by lighting and volcanoes can happen which cause suffering. To say this is because of human sin is as silly as Billy Graham blaming his cholesterol problems on sin rather than his eating and drinking habits when he was young.)

Mackie does not think freedom of the will is coherent and does not spend time on this. He just questions why God could not have made man to freely choose the good rather than sometimes the good and sometimes the evil. it could be argued that an omnipotent God should be able to figure some way to do this.

Mackie wonders, if freedom requires randomness, how can it be associated with will? How can it be the most important good? Is freedom more valuable than the evil to which it may sometimes lead?

bis bald,

Nick

Post 21

Sunday, July 23, 2006 - 11:10am

Very well Mr. Nicholas Neal Otani. I have to admit, I should have thought more about my own purpose in previous posts.

First, about the nature of God. I do not believe in the typical Catholic/Christian version of God, as you noticed Nick. I mentioned earlier that I am frustrated by people who just think "Oh, I know this argument. He's talking about God, just like the last guy." and respond accordingly, without even considering any points. Thanks for that example, Ed, which I'm sure you gave so that everyone could see what I mean. *cough*

God is not, as some have said, everywhere and nowhere. He is in one place at one time, with definite shape and size. It is sometimes misleading when we say he created us, or created the earth. This is no different from when I create a thread or create a house. We shouldn't suppose that this means anything came from nothing, or that he just pulled matter out of nowhere and put us together.

Certainly evil exists. Just like cold exists, and has definite and unique causes and effects. It is odd to think of it as an object, as some seem to do, rather than an abstraction, like good, justice, peace, etc. I think your example of pain is backwards, though. We do not need to assume that everything good and preferable is on one side of the spectrum. Pain may be abstractly infinite, like heat, but the absece of pain we haven't bothered to even make a word for.

I'm a fan of simplicity in discussion, so lets make it simple. The real question that one must ask is "why does he allow people to suffer?" If he is good, and benevolant, and able to intercede, why doesn't he? I might mention that the conclusion "God does not exist," is misleading. It should be said that such a kind, perfect, omnipotent God does not exist.

I was half way through this part, but I've got to go now. You can either wait for the exciting conclusion, or go on what I've already posted.

Post 22

Sunday, July 23, 2006 - 12:30pm

God is not, as some have said, everywhere and nowhere. He is in one place at one time, with definite shape and size.

Where? Show me.

Post 23

Sunday, July 23, 2006 - 12:47pm

Certainly, you can continue, Joseph S., but if this conditional god created us, even out of pre-existing matter, then we are the objects of his design. I don't want to be an object of anyone's design other than my own. A giant subject which acts on me threatens my freedom. Even if I could be convinced that such a god exists, I would rebel. I'd rather be the master of my fate, the captain of my soul.

It is my life. I want to make something out of it, not subjugate myself to something or someone, even if it is not all good and all powerful.

bis bald,

Nick

(Edited by Mr. Nicholas Neal Otani on 7/23, 12:50pm)

Post 24

Sunday, July 23, 2006 - 6:28pm

Show you? That's the oldest form of not wanting to believe in the book. Are we practicing pure empiricism? Don't be rediculous. Are you aware that no one has ever "seen" a black hole? So how do we know they exist? There is evidence, from which we can draw a very likely conlusion.

"Even if I could be convinced that such a god exists, I would rebel."

Interesting. That's the second time you've said that. I can see old William James, chuckling at us now, "Truth happens to an idea." Yet I think you misunderstand the purpose of God, or at least as I view him. You do not like the concept of commandments, do not like being subject to another, and you value your freedom. I admire that. I mention James, because he said that people need a reason to believe in something before they will even care to consider it. It's certainly interesting psychologically at this point.

Anyway, let me further distance myself from contemporary relgion here. I do not think God wants subjects, or servants. I do not think he wants people to mindlessly follow his commandments. He's far too reasonable for that. Before I get on with anything else, let's look at this.

When you command someone to do something, what are you really saying? You aren't really saying that they have no choice but to follow you, because you know that they are free not to. We really mean, typically, "do this, or else." It is more of a threat than anything. The problem with most religions is that they have this God who says, "Don't steal, or else I'm going to punish you in the next life."

The way I see it, it goes more like "Don't steal, or else this will happen." A commandment, as it has been called, is a guide to happiness. I don't mean that you should accept it out of blind trust. Consider it until you find reasons for or against it. Consider whether it is really benificial to you. If you're in the habit of doing this already, chances are that your standard of morality is similar to mine. If you follow what you come up with, using honest reason, then you're probably as moral or more moral than any theist by that alone.

You may think I throw in a twist with the afterlife and judgement, but I think it changes very little. As I understand Objectivism, Rand did not consider anything as being innately right or wrong, like Kant did. You consider things based on their outcome or effect. In order for metaphysics to be related to morality, I find that this is the only acceptable answer.

Why is a sin wrong? Because it has negative effects, short and long-term, on us. All sins are crimes against reason. That is to say, when you act against something when you are convinced that there is a better way, or deny reality. Well, that is very similar to Objectivist ideas, but with a more final consequence. When we do so, we do what religious people (should) call sinning.

Now, we can choose something which we think will have the most benificial effects for us, yet it actually does not, correct? This is where what God says comes in handy. That aside, is it actually wrong? Example: if we told someone a mistruth unknowingly, believing rationally that it was true, is it the same as telling someone a mistruth knowingly (lying)? Well I don't think reasonable people would feel guilt, nor blame you if the first occured.

The reason I'm going over this is that we need to break right and wrong down a little more. Otherwise, someone could do right in doing wrong, and vica versa... which is unnacceptable. For example, "good and bad" could refer to the outcome of the action, and "right and wrong" refer to the intent - like the crimes against ourselves and our reason. The reason I say this, is because we can do good, but unless we do it knowingly and rationally, we do wrong. Agreed?

The reason that we cannot be "saved" if we do wrong, is that we would be miserable in God's presence, knowing that we knew better, that he tried to tell us so, and we still persisted against him and our reason. We like to hang around people who are like us, after all.

Now, Mr. Nicholas Neal Otani, perhaps you can further enlighten me on the above points, since you've read many books that I have not. I realize I still need to deal with the problem of evil that we mentioned earlier. I did this first, because I'm not interesting in even proving the logical possibility of a God that sentances people to eternal suffering because they weren't his blind slaves.

Post 25

Sunday, July 23, 2006 - 8:41pm

(Joseph S.) Interesting. That's the second time you've said that. I can see old William James, chuckling at us now, "Truth happens to an idea." Yet I think you misunderstand the purpose of God, or at least as I view him. You do not like the concept of commandments, do not like being subject to another, and you value your freedom. I admire that. I mention James, because he said that people need a reason to believe in something before they will even care to consider it. It's certainly interesting psychologically at this point.

(Nick)It�s interesting that you mention William James. I�ve done much research on him and written a paper on how Russell, Kaufmann, and Martin criticize him for how he criticized William Clifford for criticizing people who believe things on insufficient evidence. James was a theist. He knew there were gaps in the evidence supporting such a belief, but he chose to fill them with God. He called Clifford a coward for not filling the gaps. Russell, Kaufmann, and Martin basically think James is a little slip-shod as a philosopher. (I�ll post this paper if anyone is interested.)

(Joseph S.)Anyway, let me further distance myself from contemporary relgion here. I do not think God wants subjects, or servants. I do not think he wants people to mindlessly follow his commandments. He's far too reasonable for that. Before I get on with anything else, let's look at this.

(Nick)Actually, it�s his object that I don�t want to be. If he created me, I cannot be equal to him, as a subject to a subject. I would be the object of his design, just as a hand tool I fashion for some use would be an object of my design.

(Joseph S.)When you command someone to do something, what are you really saying? You aren't really saying that they have no choice but to follow you, because you know that they are free not to. We really mean, typically, "do this, or else." It is more of a threat than anything. The problem with most religions is that they have this God who says, "Don't steal, or else I'm going to punish you in the next life."

The way I see it, it goes more like "Don't steal, or else this will happen." A commandment, as it has been called, is a guide to happiness. I don't mean that you should accept it out of blind trust. Consider it until you find reasons for or against it. Consider whether it is really benificial to you. If you're in the habit of doing this already, chances are that your standard of morality is similar to mine. If you follow what you come up with, using honest reason, then you're probably as moral or more moral than any theist by that alone.

(Nick)Plato dealt with this in the Euthyphro dilemma. If god tells us what is right or wrong, is it right or wrong because god says it is or does god say it is right or wrong because it is, by some independent standard. If it is right or wrong by an independent standard, like reason, then perhaps man can avail himself of that standard directly, not through an intermediary like god. If, on the other hand, it is right or wrong because god says it is, then if god says killing babies is wrong, it is. It means we have no independent judgment. (I�ve also written extensively on the Euthyphro dilemma.)

(Joseph S.)You may think I throw in a twist with the afterlife and judgement, but I think it changes very little. As I understand Objectivism, Rand did not consider anything as being innately right or wrong, like Kant did. You consider things based on their outcome or effect. In order for metaphysics to be related to morality, I find that this is the only acceptable answer.

Why is a sin wrong? Because it has negative effects, short and long-term, on us. All sins are crimes against reason. That is to say, when you act against something when you are convinced that there is a better way, or deny reality. Well, that is very similar to Objectivist ideas, but with a more final consequence. When we do so, we do what religious people (should) call sinning.

(Nick)Objectivists do not base their decisions on a life beyond the grave. They base them on their best estimation of life on earth. NickOtani�sNeo-Objectvists think this way too.

(Joseph S.)Now, we can choose something which we think will have the most benificial effects for us, yet it actually does not, correct? This is where what God says comes in handy. That aside, is it actually wrong? Example: if we told someone a mistruth unknowingly, believing rationally that it was true, is it the same as telling someone a mistruth knowingly (lying)? Well I don't think reasonable people would feel guilt, nor blame you if the first occured.

The reason I'm going over this is that we need to break right and wrong down a little more. Otherwise, someone could do right in doing wrong, and vica versa... which is unnacceptable. For example, "good and bad" could refer to the outcome of the action, and "right and wrong" refer to the intent - like the crimes against ourselves and our reason. The reason I say this, is because we can do good, but unless we do it knowingly and rationally, we do wrong. Agreed?

(Nick)Yes, but we depend on ourselves and take responsibility if we are wrong. We don�t look for a safety net.

(Joseph S.)The reason that we cannot be "saved" if we do wrong, is that we would be miserable in God's presence, knowing that we knew better, that he tried to tell us so, and we still persisted against him and our reason. We like to hang around people who are like us, after all.

Now, Mr. Nicholas Neal Otani, perhaps you can further enlighten me on the above points, since you've read many books that I have not. I realize I still need to deal with the problem of evil that we mentioned earlier. I did this first, because I'm not interesting in even proving the logical possibility of a God that sentances people to eternal suffering because they weren't his blind slaves.

(Nick)I�m not trying to be saved. My ultimate goal is flourishing survival on earth.

Bis bald,

Nick

Post 26

Monday, July 24, 2006 - 6:06am

There is evidence, from which we can draw a very likely conlusion.

What evidence is there for your statement about god? If "he" is in one place and one time as you claim, that suggests something you have seen rather than just infered from other evidence. You also claim he has a definite shape and size. Well, I'm listening, tell me how you know this. In what way do you know this.

Ethan

(Edited by Ethan Dawe on 7/24, 9:31am)

Post 27

Tuesday, July 25, 2006 - 8:35pm

Joseph,

==================
I mentioned earlier that I am frustrated by people who just think "Oh, I know this argument. He's talking about God, just like the last guy." and respond accordingly, without even considering any points. Thanks for that example, Ed, which I'm sure you gave so that everyone could see what I mean. *cough*
==================

My pleasure, Joseph.

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God is not, as some have said, everywhere and nowhere. He is in one place at one time, with definite shape and size.
==================

Assuming this proposition true, can -- in your hypothesis about God -- can these things be discovered by man (ie. Her size, shape, etc.)?

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Pain may be abstractly infinite, like heat, but the absece of pain we haven't bothered to even make a word for.
==================

Au contraire, pleasure and comfort are logical antonyms to pain.

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It should be said that such a kind, perfect, omnipotent God does not exist.
==================

So, we're ruled by a higher (but imperfectly kind and non-omnipotent) power? Serious question: Are you, Joseph, an alien-worshipping Scientologist?

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Are you aware that no one has ever "seen" a black hole? So how do we know they exist?
==================

We don't. Black holes are educated guesses, strong hypotheses not yet adequately tested (adequately tested hypotheses -- hypotheses that appear robust after comprehensive attempts at their refutation -- become theories).

Joseph, Ethan's crucial question (How do you know these things about God?) is highly relevant. I wait in anticipation for your answer.

Ed

Post 28

Tuesday, July 25, 2006 - 10:28pm

I guess nobody really cares about William James or the Euthyphro dilemma.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 29

Wednesday, July 26, 2006 - 9:16am

Nick, these things seem too self-evident for thorough discussion.

William James took Pascal's Wager (he was a coward who called alternate positions cowardly).

And the Euthyphro dilemma shows (to the astute mind) that things are good for folks because of metaphysical relations (primacy of existence), not because of a supernatural dictaphone (primacy of consciousness).

Ed

Post 30

Wednesday, July 26, 2006 - 9:33pm

Well, if Joseph S. isn't coming back, does anyone have an opinion on my intial post? Is Peikoff wrong about agnosticsm?

bis bald,

Nick

Post 31

Friday, July 28, 2006 - 10:39pm

Nick,

Be more clear (nowhere in your initial post -- besides the title -- do you mention Peikoff).

You can never get too much clarity.

Ed

Post 32

Friday, July 28, 2006 - 11:27pm

Oh my! I do too mention Peikoff several times and quote him. What post are you reading?

Post 33

Saturday, July 29, 2006 - 9:40am

Oops, I did it again (eat your heart out, Brittany Spears).

Nick, you're never going to believe this (because I'm so smart and on top of things, in so many other important areas of human life on Earth), but -- in seeking the "original post" -- I merely scrolled up to the top one. The top post ... of PAGE 2, that is (where you're talking about Mackie).

Well, at least I'm such a big man as to readily and thoroughly admit when I'm in error. At least I've got THAT going for me.

;-)

Ed
[more, on Peikoff, later]

Post 34

Saturday, July 29, 2006 - 9:52am

That's what I thought. Mackie is one of three articles I posted on the problem of evil, which Joseph S. seemed to want to talk about, but he hasn't returned. The first post in this thread, Peikoff and Agnosticism, takes issue with Peikoff's strawman version of agnosticism and goes through other definitions based on a distinction between knowledge and belief, and it shows which positions have burden of proof.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 35

Saturday, July 29, 2006 - 10:54am

Peikoff on Agnosticism: An Objectivist's Perspective

In OPAR (p 163-) [caps for italics], Peikoff takes up the subjects of arbitrariness, truth and falsity, and the suspension of judgement.

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An arbitrary claim is one for which there is no evidence, either perceptual or conceptual. It is a brazen assertion, based neither on direct observation nor on any attempted logical inference therefrom.
=================

Peikoff goes on to explain how it is impossible -- not merely improbable -- to rationally deal with arbitrary (ie. evidence-less) assertions, citing an example of the assertion that there's a convention of gremlins "studying Hegel's Logic on the planet Venus."

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... an arbitrary claim is automatically invalidated.
=================

Here, Peikoff is relating the limited human use of the power of the mind (in both time and energy) to the virtually unlimited possibilities of assertions that can, arbitrarily, be thought of. If the purpose of the mind is to deal well with reality, then it is a (sometimes devastating) misuse of the human mind to deal with the arbitrary.

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Since the statement is detached from the realm of evidence, no process of logic can assess it.
=================

Here, Peikoff is relating logic to evidence, bridging the arbitrarily-imagined gap between the analytic and the synthetic (eg. between logic and experience). As it turns out, logic is based on (or rooted in) experience.

Even before you can get to the method of mathematics, for example, you must first become conceptually aware of different numbers of things in the world (all proper thought is based, ultimately, on experience). To speak of using math, without ever learning a number, is absurd.

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Since it has no place in a hierarchy, no reduction is possible, and thus no observations are relevant.
=================

Here, Peikoff notes that human knowledge is, inherently, hierarchical. That we build it up from basic perceptions, and all of our non-contradictory concepts are supported by this base (though contradictory concepts, what Rand called "anti-concepts" -- don't require a base, but merely an undisciplined mind, for THEIR existence).

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... it cannot be described as "possible," "probable'" or "certain."
=================

Here, Peikoff notes how -- without any relation to the hierarchy of human knowledge -- what is arbitrary cannot even be evaluated in terms of probability (0-100%).

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The false does not destroy a man's ability to know; it does not nullify his grasp of objectivity; it leaves him the means of discovering and correcting his error. The arbitrary, however, if a man indulges in it, assaults his cognitive faculty; it wipes out or makes impossible in his mind the concept of rational cognition and thus entrenches his inner chaos for life.
=================

Here, Peikoff notes that a persistent dismissal of all that is arbitrary -- is a crucial factor in proper self-preservation (in living happily).

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It is impossible to "prove a negative," meaning by the term: prove the nonexistence of an entity FOR which there is no evidence. ...

... All thought, argument, proof, refutation must start with that which exists. No inference can be drawn from a zero.
=================

Here, Peikoff reminds us that knowledge is contextual, hierarchical, and relational. It has a genesis, and it has support, and it has crucial meaning in our lives.

Now, let's watch Peikoff set out the issue of agnosticism (the necessary cognitive boundaries and hurdles) and see where that takes us ...

=================
For the sake of full clarity, I must add the following. One can infer from any truth the falsity of its contradictories. For example, from "X was in New York during the Dallas shooting of Y" one can infer the falsehood of "X shot Y." Thus one CAN disprove a claim or "prove a negative" ("X is not guilty" [of shooting Y])--but only by demonstrating that the claim contradicts established knowledge: ie. only by relating the claim to a positive cognitive context, when this is available. ...

One establishes the false by reference to the true, not by reference to nothing.
=================

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Objectivism's refutation of theism, to take another example, is not a case of "proving a negative" in the sense vetoed by the onus-of-proof principle. Ayn Rand does not start with a zero and seek to discover evidence of God's nonexistence. She starts with reality, i.e., with (philosophically) known fact, then denies a claim that clashes with it.
=================

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Nor, as I have made clear, does she expect any such refutation to be accepted by apostles of the arbitrary. These individuals will merely reformulate the claim so as to protect it from evidence, then insist again: "Prove that it is NOT so."

To this demand, there is only one valid response: "I refuse even to attempt such a task." An assertion outside the realm of cognition can impose no cognitive responsibility on a rational mind, neither of proof nor of disproof.
=================

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To dismiss a claim as "arbitrary" is not the equivalent of pleading ignorance or confessing indecision or suspending judgment. It is not the same as saying "I don't know" or "I haven't made up my mind" or "I have no opinion." These responses presuppose that an issue has a connection to human cognition; they presuppose that there is some evidence pertaining to the issue and, therefore, that it is legitimate to consider, even though one may be unable for various reasons to untangle it.
=================

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If someone asks a man whether there are gremlins on Venus, however, there is no justification for the reply "I don't know." What doesn't he know? What evidence has he failed to study or been unable to clarify? What is the basis to believe that there IS anything to learn on this subject? If the gremlin claim is arbitrary, there is no such basis. In this situation, the proper response is: "I DO know. I know that any such claim is to be thrown out as inadmissible."
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Agnosticism is not simply the pleading of ignorance. It is the enshrinement of ignorance. It is the philosophic view-point that demands such pleading--in regard to effusions that are disconnected from evidence.
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The agnostic miscalculates. Typically, he believes that he has avoided taking any controversial position and is thus safe from attack. In fact, he is taking a profoundly irrational position.

In struggling to elevate the arbitrary to a position of cognitive respect, he is attempting to equate the arbitrary with the logically supported. This is not merely an affirmation of ignorance: it is an EPISTEMOLOGICAL egalitarianism intent on obliterating an essential distinction.

Such an attitude is incomparably more destructive than any error committed by a man devoted to reason who takes definite stands on the basis of mistaken arguments.
=================

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A passion for the arbitrary does not derive from concern for logic. Its root is a feeling that has been given precedence over logic. In some agnostics, the feeling is cowardice, the simple fear that a stand on contentious issues will antagonize people. In other agnostics, the feeling is more convoluted. It is akin to glee, the malicious glee of subverting all ideas and thus of baiting the men who have integrity required to hold convictions. This is the glee of the destroyer, the mind-hater, the nihilist. ...

To pursue truth implies that one wants to find it.
=================

Here, Peikoff notes that the agnostic (one who "admits" of ignorance of the arbitrary, rather than one who refuses to spend cognitive time and energy on the arbitrary) is someone who is at least a little less mentally-healthy than the rest of us. Someone whose accepted hierarchy of values is counterproductive to the fulfillment of a happy human life.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 7/29, 10:58am)

Post 36

Saturday, July 29, 2006 - 2:57pm

Well said, Ed...

Saturday, July 29, 2006 - 3:04pm

Gee, Ed, I still don't think you read my post. Most of your rambling here is non-responsive to it. You don't deal with the agnostic position which rejects belief in God but makes no knowledge claim, putting the burden of proof on those who make the knowledge claim. Making no knowledge claim is not the same as saying "I don't know." It is saying, "If someone says this is true, or not true, they have to prove it." Just because someone can't prove somethng is true, it doesn't mean it isn't. And, just because someone can't prove something isn't true, and (I'll accept that proving that something is contradictory or conflicting with known evidence is proving that it can't exist.)it doesn't mean it does. If someone asks me if there are gremlins on Venus, I'll say, "I don't believe there are, but if you know this to be true, please prove it." This is an agnostic postion, but not the strawman position Peikoff knocks down.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 38

Saturday, July 29, 2006 - 6:38pm

Nick,

===============
Gee, Ed, I still don't think you read my post. Most of your rambling here is non-responsive to it.
===============

The reason that my "rambling" (nice "compliment", by the way -- you're "too kind" Nick) the reason this all seems non-responsive to YOU, is that you still don't "get it." The only sense of a-theism operable in the Objectivist sense, is the absence of any belief in God (because it is not rational to have any "belief" about God).

Not in possession of a more global understanding of the arbitrary, truth and falsity, and cognitive judgment -- you might mistake this for agnosticism, or psychological fence-sitting.

But the point is not to waste valuable cognitive time and energy on the arbitrary. The point is not to take time and energy to wrestle with detail -- in order to find out where you sit on a belief-continuum with regard to what is arbitrary.

Get it, now?

Ed

Post 39

Saturday, July 29, 2006 - 8:11pm