choice: rationality or human nature (devil's advocate thread)

Tversky and Kahneman are two scientists who've pointed out a lot of mistakes in reasoning that most people tend to make. These mistakes aren't all that little either. They pervade human decision-making. I ask the reader to wiki these researchers and their work if you’re not familiar with them. Based on their research, it would seem that human nature defaults, at last partly, to the irrational. That isn't to say we're doomed to irrationality, only that we need to make a conscious, deliberate effort to be rational.

This, I think, is at odds with Objectivism, which at once espouses rationality and acting fully in accord with one's nature. Although I haven't seen them frame the problem in these terms, it would seem Tversky and Kahneman would have us choose between the two. So what will it be: rationality or human nature?

A brief related point, acting "unnaturally" rational, at least initially, leaves us feeling uneasy, perhaps even less happy than we would've been had we stuck with the irrational but safe decision-making heuristics. This jives with the Objectivist idea that defying one's nature yields unhappiness, but it clashes with the Objectivist idea that acting rationally is always the best bet for yielding happiness.

Two possible weaknesses with the above are as follows.

First, I think Tversky and Kahneman are discussing irrationality in decision-making. But perhaps someone can explain how this is not the case.

Second, I do think this affects “human nature” as Objectivism defines it (rational animal). Under Objectivist epistemology, human nature should be identified by noticing what makes humans different from all other stuff, then what makes them all like one another. Well, not all humans, or even most humans are rational decision-makers, so it is incorrect to identify “human” with “rational.” One response to this might be that we’re rational enough or rational at least where it counts, but I haven’t seen convincing demonstrations of this. Perhaps someone could offer one up.

Please understand, this is a Devil’s Advocate thread. I’m sympathetic to and agree with much of Objectivism. I’m just assuming the position of dissident, at least for now, for the sake of growth in understanding.

Jordan

Post 1

Saturday, April 21, 2007 - 9:59am

Rationality - by its nature - IS a continual matter of choice.... rationality is NOT roboticness......

And - rationality - also by its nature - must be learned.... it is, tho of a necessity, not an ingrained...

(Edited by robert malcom on 4/21, 10:01am)

Post 2

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 1:35pm

The argument accounts for that. Rationality is chosen and learned, but many individuals don't or can't learn rationality. Either they're not human or rationality is not human nature.

Jordan

Post 3

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 2:52pm

To learn it, one must be aware of its value - and despite the lipsaying of its use, most teaching rate it only as a limited necessity, a 'necessary evil' so to speak, and relegate it as 'common sense' instead of the learnedness it actually is, involving non-contradictory identificating.... hence, many are irrational, not knowing or having discovered the value of thinking as a human, not cultural, deal, and suffer the consequences.... if the nature of thinking was taught at an early age, there would be far less irrationality about, because that would be seen as less-than-human...

To say that those who are not rational, who "don't or can't think", are not human or is "not their nature" is to claim a roboticness, as rationality, by its nature, is a matter of choice - even if the choosing is to have others do the thinking instead of oneself... or the converse, allowing oneself to think for others.....

(Edited by robert malcom on 4/23, 2:58pm)

Post 4

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 10:37pm

First part was fine but off point. Second part made no sense.

People who aren't or can't be rational aren't necessarily robotic; they're just irrational or non-rational. And that's most people. I think it'd be pretty goofy to say these non-rational/irrational folks are non-human. The question I posed was whether we ought to defy rationality in favor of a new view of human nature, one that accounts for Tversky's and Kahneman's research, i.e., one other than "rational animals -- or should we defy that human nature and opt for rationality instead?

Devil's Advocate,
Jordan

Post 5

Tuesday, April 24, 2007 - 5:14pm

Jordan,

I have argued repeatedly that this "irrationality" and "human nature" of which you speak is, indeed, as you so correctly identify, the opposing duality to all objectivity.

However, I use a more precise terminology to encapsulate this issue. I characterize the "irrationality"/"human nature" as an all-encompassing animal nature that I simply refer to as narcissism. In other words, all living things exist, grow, and sustain themselves through a reflexive and insatiable process of "muscle flexing" and "showing off" as a means to their survival.

Independent of this (and very often at odds with it) is objectivity and logical honesty. In other words, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, regardless of what any living creature would like or need it to be.

It's nice when a living creature's narcissistic needs and objective reality both are in synch. However, there are clearly times when the full truth about reality would embarrass or humiliate the individual, and that's when sanity usually takes a back seat to vanity.

In short, the phrase "vanity versus sanity" is my own encapsulation, and it basically sums up the core dilemma of all halfway intelligent creatures at all times, myself no doubt included. I happen to think it's even a core struggle within the fundamental structure of Objectivism itself, which, even in Ayn Rand's own writing, seems to constantly be torn between worshipping the pursuit of full, unvarnished truth, and worshipping the pursuit of one's own narcissistic grandiosity.

(Edited by Jeremy M. LeRay on 4/24, 5:16pm)

Post 6

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 - 1:14am

Jordan, you said,

Rationality is chosen and learned, but many individuals don't or can't learn rationality. Either they're not human or rationality is not human nature.

Rationality is a virtue and irrationality is a vice. But they are both human. The ability to choice to be rational or not is the key property of human nature. We are faced with the choice almost moment by moment. The only people who are NEVER rational for even a moment are the severely psychotic or catatonic and they don't change the definition of human nature.

You said, in your first post,

it would seem that human nature defaults, at last partly, to the irrational. That isn't to say we're doomed to irrationality, only that we need to make a conscious, deliberate effort to be rational.

That is absolutely correct but 'defaults' isn't the best word. Our faculty has emotion and reason and each of us has to learn to identify what is going on inside and learn how to operate our minds and then, in accordance with our understanding, we choose to focus or not - instant by instant. And mistakes are not unnatural.

You say,

Well, not all humans, or even most humans are rational decision-makers, so it is incorrect to identify “human” with “rational.”

You are using the word "rational" in two different ways. You are using it as an adjective to separate a reasonable decision from an unreasonable decision and then referring to "rational" as the faculty - the ability - the capacity to choice that defines humans.

Rationality and irrationality both arise from the rational faculty.

Post 7

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 - 10:46pm

Well put, Steve.

Ed

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 - 11:12pm

Steve,

The only people who are NEVER rational for even a moment are the severely psychotic or catatonic and they don't change the definition of human nature

That doesn't jive with Objectivist epistemology, which requires a definition to identify a trait that each and all, not just some, of its referents to possess. Of course, it would save the definition if you booted psychos and catatonics from the realm of human, but I think that's a bad idea.

And mistakes are not unnatural.

Fair enough, but mistakes aren't rational either, are they?

The ability to choice to be rational or not is the key property of human nature.

Then we should say to be human is to be a kind of volitional animal, particularly one that could choose to be rational (given that none others can). But like I said to Malcolm, the choice or ability to be rational is not the same as actually being rational. So human nature as rational animal is still inadequate.

And I don't mean to use the term "rational" in two different ways. I mean it only as a reasonable process of decisionmaking (very close to your first definition), which is how I think Objectivism uses it. I don't think "rational" means "ability to be rational" anymore than "[insert adjective]" means the "ability to be [insert adjective]."

Thank you for the comments, all.

DA, but going on a small vacation for now,
Jordan

Post 9

Thursday, April 26, 2007 - 1:48am

Jordan misses the point. An automobile is still an automobile when it's wheels are off. Psychos and catatonics are like people with their wheels taken off (they have the part, but it isn't working).

When I pointed out that mistakes are natural - humans make mistakes. Jordan says, yes, but mistakes aren't rational. He keeps making the same mistake of using the word rational in two different ways. We use our rational faculty but no one is guaranteed they won't make a mistake. Some mistakes are the irrational results of applying irrational methods in the exercise of our rational faculty. We don't have another faculty - all we have are different ways to use it.

Jordan says,

And I don't mean to use the term "rational" in two different ways. I mean it only as a reasonable process of decisionmaking

He just did it again by having "process of decisionmaking" as the stand-in for using our rational faculty and "reasonable" as the stand-in for rational - so his sentence could be re-written as "I mean it only as a rational process of using our rational faculty." But no one guarantees that each use of the rational faculty will generate rational results.

I hope that makes it clear that what Jordan is doing is using rational faculty as if it can only be applied correctly and with no irrationality and using it as the product of successful reasoning - using the word in two ways.

Jordan said,

the choice or ability to be rational is not the same as actually being rational. So human nature as rational animal is still inadequate.

Not so. A rational animal is an animal with the ability to be rational - rational is a faculty as well as a way of describing a product of reasoning.

On the definition of man as a rational animal. Jordan said,

Then we should say to be human is to be a kind of volitional animal...

But a rational faculty necessarily includes volition. You can't have one without the other. There are alternatives, and we have to choose between them, we might make mistakes in reasoning, we might be irrational on an occasion, and we aren't guaranteed we will be right. It is all done with our rational faculty.

Post 10

Thursday, April 26, 2007 - 4:33pm

Good points, Steve.

If you take Jordan's argument where it leads, then only John Galt would be human (and he doesn't even exist!). I coined the term -- but others may have beat me to it -- of something called John Galt Syndrome. N. Branden talked about folks who had given themselves a complex -- because they were failing to act perfectly, like John Galt did.

Another time when we're not acting rationally is when we're sleeping. You can't say that someone sleeping has ceased to be a human being -- which would make it okay to dispose of them as one wishes, as long as they were in that transient state wherein they weren't exercising the rational faculty which they possess.

So, a proper definition of (hu)man would have to include the mere potentiality of acting rationally (exercising an existing rational faculty).

(hu)man = potentially-rational individual

For now, this definition effectively differentiates man from every other existent known. And that is what the very purpose of a definition is -- to effectively differentiate something from all else that is known. A definition is a contextually-absolute, factual relationship -- demarcating some known existents from all other known existents.

Now, it can be said that some folks can (or have) acted inhumanly -- and this is true. But if, in their inhuman acts, these dastardly dimwits ceased to "be" a human -- then we couldn't be mad at them (because if they're only sub-human maggots, then we can't expect them to act well). It's simply the difference between a human being and a human being.

;-)

If you are an individual and you've got the potential (for rationality), then you're in. If you ain't got that, you're out. Simple, straightforward, and clear.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 4/26, 4:37pm)

Post 11

Sunday, April 29, 2007 - 9:30am

If a car is still a car when you take away its wheels, then wheels are not a definitive characteristic of a car. Similarly, if a human is a human without rationality, then rationality is not the defining characteristic of human.

I still maintain that I'm not equivocating. I might still be missing Steve's point, but let me elaborate. As I recall, Rand named rationality as the defining characteristic for humans not because we have the option to be rational but because we actually survive by virtue of our rationality. With Tversky and Kahneman, it would seem we don't survive via rationality. Rather, we survive by irrational yet sufficient heuristics. So Rand shouldn't have picked rationality as the defining characteristic.

Again, when I say rationality, I mean it as a reasonable process of decisionmaking. Indeed, within in Objectivism, a reasonable process of decisiomaking implies the presence of the ability to reason, which in turn implies volition. (Sidenote: it's wrong to reverse the implication, as Steve suggested. Volition doesn't imply the ability to reason, nor does the ability to reason imply actual reasonable decisionmaking, for that matter. It's feasible that all choices could be limited to irrational decisions, and that the ability to reason never precipitates reasonable decisionmaking.) But that doesn't change the observation that humans, despite having a rational faculty and volition, don't use them to make reasonable decisions such that making reasonable decisions is the primary means by which humans survive.

Per Ed's point, one doesn't need perfection to use rationality as a primary means by which to survive. Mistakes can of course be acceptable. But when mistakes are large and pervasive and dominant and constant, as Tversky and Kahneman have observed, then it's dubious that rationality is our primary survival tool.

I'd like to reiterate as well that actualities, not potentialities, should comprise defining characteristics. It won't help to argue that we actually have the potentiality for rationality. That's like saying an acorn is actually an oak tree because it has the potential of becoming one. Proclaiming "actual potential" is merely to proclaim potential by another name. Objectivist Epistemology seems clear on this point: identify things based on what they are, not what they might be.

As per Steve's comment here:

But a rational faculty necessarily includes volition. You can't have one without the other.

If you mean that in order to choose to be rational, then we need the power to choose, then I think Objectivism agrees with you. But this point hardly elucidates rationality as a defining characteristic.

Jordan

Post 12

Sunday, April 29, 2007 - 1:07pm

We have this 'engine' inside of us that allows us to reason - it, obviously, includes a 'part' that lets us choose since that is what we do after we finish our reasoning on something. Now, our reasoning process can at any time be flawed. A child for example may not have learned to reason properly - they may at times use their engine in an irrational way. We also can make mistakes even when we reason in a rational way - that is when we follow rules of logic in the use of our engine. The product of our deliberations - the result we come up with - that which we choose to believe may be rational or not. Notice that I have used the words reason and rational in three different ways in this paragraph:
      1) to name the 'engine' that we use - our rational capacity
      2) a specific process of using that engine - an example of an action that requires choice to initiate, that examines alternatives, and ends in a choice between the alternative
      3) a description of the end product of a specific process of reasoning. Belief x is rational.

Jordan says,

...if a human is a human without rationality, then rationality is not the defining characteristic of human.

That sentence works, and makes sense if you use meaning #1 for both instances of 'rationality', it doesn't make sense with meaning #2 because sometimes we behave irrationally and sometimes we are asleep, etc., and it doesn't work with #3 because that usage is an adjective that applies to a belief and not a human characteristic. And Jordan keeps using meaning #2 for the first instance and meaning #1 for the second instance.

Jordon says,

As I recall, Rand named rationality as the defining characteristic for humans not because we have the option to be rational but because we actually survive by virtue of our rationality.

Rationality as our defining characteristic is meaning #1. She was quite clear about the fact that we have the option to be rational (#2) or irrational - of using a process of reason or of following a whim. And she was clear that honest mistakes were also a possibility (#3). You are mixing up the use of the meanings (#1 and #2)

Jordan says,

...when mistakes (#3) are large and pervasive and dominant and constant, as Tversky and Kahneman have observed, then it's dubious that rationality (#1) is our primary survival tool. [numbered meanings added]

There are so many problems with statements like that. How ludicrus to claim that irrationality (#2) is our means of survival. Again, this is mixing up the capacity, the 'engine' with the instances of use. That argument could be turned around to say that the we survive by means of our rational faculty (#1) despite making more irrational than rational (#3) decisions. Or one could ask, if mistakes are "constant" then how did Tversky and Kahneman decide that their theory was not a mistake? And if we can only do mistakes, how will we understand their theory?

Jordan says,

It's feasible that all choices could be limited to irrational decisions, and that the ability to reason never precipitates reasonable decisionmaking.

I'm sorry, Jordan, but that sentence is the kind of irrational gobbledygook that you are stuck with when you throw out reason. Limited by who or what? You have the ability to reason, but you will never be rational? That makes no sense. Am I to take that as a "rational" statement or is it an example of "heuristic irrationality"?

Then Jordan says in reference to Ed's post,

...that actualities, not potentialities, should comprise defining characteristics.

And Jordan goes on to talk of acorns and oaks, but Ed wasn't using the term potential to refer to something that did NOT yet exist, but would. He was using the word to refer to the use of the process. You can be sitting in the car and it can all be there, wheels and everything, but only have the potential for transporting you until you step on the gas to get the actuallity.

Let's take a look at what is proposed in place of rationality and choice:

"With Tversky and Kahneman, it would seem we don't survive via rationality. Rather, we survive by irrational yet sufficient heuristics."

If I wanted to be flip, I would just say, let them speak for themselves. I survive by rationality. If they want to say they are irrational, I won't disagree. But they are claiming to speak for all humans. Do they expect us to pick up their writings and react irrationally but heuristically to them? Did they write them irrationally? What sense does this make?

They are proposing a deterministic view of human nature that also claims the inability to know reality. Does anyone really need to do anymore to defeat that nonsense then to point out that the authors are also human and therefore subject to their own theories? Did they magically step outside of reality or borrow some alien rational process to paint their picture of human-irrational-by-nature? Are they going to explain how the word irrational can have any meaning to us if we can never, by nature, achieve rationality (think "stolen concept")? How many confused, muddled concepts are we supposed to take seriously?

Jordan, if you can't find your examples of equivocation after all of my attempts to point them out, if you can't see the stolen concept of rationality in the claim that we are irrational by nature, if you are comfortable with a deterministic view of human nature, if you are okay with taking in the view that man is incapable of knowing reality, and if you still think this is worth pursuing, then I doubt that I could say anything that ever would change your mind. But that's okay, you are permitted, by nature to be irrational and I, by nature, am permitted to be rational. Like the old Spanish proverb, "Take whatever you wish, said God, and then pay for it."

Post 13

Tuesday, May 1, 2007 - 5:28pm

Steve,

I figured someone would bring up the notion of stolen concepts. As I explained at the beginning, Tversky's and Kahneman's results don't doom us to bad decisionmaking processes ("irrationality," as I use the term). I'm sure they, like Objectivists, think it's possible to have good decisionmaking processes. They just point out that most people, not necessarily themselves, have bad decisionmaking processes. No stolen concept there.

And I think you're wrong about my equivocating because you're wrong about Rand's definition of "human." You said:

Rationality as our defining characteristic is meaning #1. She was quite clear about the fact that we have the option to be rational (#2) or irrational - of using a process of reason or of following a whim. And she was clear that honest mistakes were also a possibility (#3). You are mixing up the use of the meanings (#1 and #2)

Not that I want to perform exegesis, but I don't think Rand thought our defining characteristic was rational capacity. In Objetivist Ethics, she thought what defined us was our primary reliance on good decisionmaking processes for survival. She talks about how we're not automatic like animals, how we need to figure out how to live, how the more we figure -- i.e., the better our decisionmaking process is -- the better we are. It's possible that we make honest mistakes and opt for bad decisionmaking processes, but we're worse off for it, according to her.

The problem, in light of Tversky and Kahneman, is the notion that good decisionmaking is our primary survival tool.

So as to be clear that I'm not equivocating, I'll reword my sentence you referred to:

when [bad decisionmaking processes] are large and pervasive and dominant and constant, as Tversky and Kahneman have observed, then it's dubious that [good decisionmaking processes] are our primary survival tool.

Moving on...

It's feasible that all choices could be limited to irrational decisions, and that the ability to reason never precipitates reasonable decisionmaking.
I'm sorry, Jordan, but that sentence is the kind of irrational gobbledygook that you are stuck with when you throw out reason. Limited by who or what? You have the ability to reason, but you will never be rational? That makes no sense. Am I to take that as a "rational" statement or is it an example of "heuristic irrationality"?

All I meant is we could feasibly always use a bad process of decisionmaking when making a choice. It won't kill us if the end result is "good enough." And it makes perfect sense to say one has the ability to use good decisionmaking processes because he has the engine for it but keeps using bad decisionmaking processes instead. It doesn't make sense to say just because he has the engine, he is certain to occasionally use it properly.

Jordan

Post 14

Tuesday, May 1, 2007 - 9:13pm

I take it back. After checked some sources. Rand equivocated, which is what's causing some confusion. She noted a couple of different distinct characteristics of humans. Sometimes she'll say our ability to reason is what makes us human (which is what Steve is saying), and other times she'll say our volition is what makes us human, and other times she'll also says that human nature entails rational judgment, that to the extent we don't use such judgment, we're going against our human nature, i.e., we're not being human. There you have it.

I'm soon to stop my Devil's Advocacy.

Jordan

Post 15

Saturday, June 9, 2007 - 10:19am

On April 21st, Jordan wrote,

versky and Kahneman are two scientists who've pointed out a lot of mistakes in reasoning that most people tend to make. These mistakes aren't all that little either. They pervade human decision-making. I ask the reader to wiki these researchers and their work if you’re not familiar with them. Based on their research, it would seem that human nature defaults, at last partly, to the irrational. That isn't to say we're doomed to irrationality, only that we need to make a conscious, deliberate effort to be rational.

This, I think, is at odds with Objectivism, which at once espouses rationality and acting fully in accord with one's nature. Although I haven't seen them frame the problem in these terms, it would seem Tversky and Kahneman would have us choose between the two. So what will it be: rationality or human nature?

What it means to say that we are rational animals "by nature" is not that we are always rational (always correct) in our thinking, but that (unlike the lower animals) we possess a rational faculty, which means the capacity to guide our lives by a process of reason. Part of that process is learning how to think correctly and to avoid errors in reasoning. To choose to act according our nature is to recognize that our survival depends on the use of reason and to act accordingly.

A brief related point, acting "unnaturally" rational, at least initially, leaves us feeling uneasy, perhaps even less happy than we would've been had we stuck with the irrational but safe decision-making heuristics. This jives with the Objectivist idea that defying one's nature yields unhappiness, but it clashes with the Objectivist idea that acting rationally is always the best bet for yielding happiness.

I don't know why correct thinking should leave one feeling uneasy, but even if it did, that wouldn't mean that it is inconsistent with the pursuit of happiness. According to Objectivism, happiness is not to be achieved by doing whatever one feels like at any given moment; it is to be achieved by satisfying one's survival requirements. Chief among these is the use of reason, because it is only by means of reason that one can identify the values that one's life requires.

Moreover, what does it mean to "act irrationally"? It can only mean to act contrary to what one recognizes to be in one's interest. It is thus an oxymoron to argue that acting irrationally will make one happier than acting rationally. If an action were more conducive to happiness than the alternatives, the action would be rational, not irrational. The idea that one can achieve happiness by acting irrationally is a non-sequitur.

- Bill

Post 16

Saturday, June 9, 2007 - 10:25pm

Most of the mistakes in reasoning people tend to make pointed out by Tversky and Kahneman involve probabilities. Since many people -- probably a large majority -- have no education in probability and statistics, their making mistakes shouldn't be surprising.

Post 17

Saturday, June 9, 2007 - 11:57pm

Bill,

It would help if you read through the thread, but I'll rehash.

What it means to say that we are rational animals "by nature" is not that we are always rational (always correct) in our thinking, but that (unlike the lower animals) we possess a rational faculty, which means the capacity to guide our lives by a process of reason.

Earlier on this thread I came to realize that Rand equivocated on "our nature." She does say that "our nature" lies in our rational faculty, but she also says "our nature" lies in using reason as our primary tool of survival. I suggested the Tversky's and Kahneman's research indicate that reason is not the primary tool because most people predominantly rely on irrational heuristics and survive by virtue of those heuristics simply being "good enough."

I don't know why correct thinking should leave one feeling uneasy...

Probably because people have formed irrational habits, and it's often uncomfortable to break habits.

....happiness....is to be achieved by satisfying one's survival requirements. Chief among these is the use of reason, because it is only by means of reason that one can identify the values that one's life requires.
.....
To choose to act according our nature is to recognize that our survival depends on the use of reason and to act accordingly.

I challenged these ideas earlier in this thread, too. People can and do achieve happiness (i.e., satisfy their survival requirements, if you like) via those irrational "good enough" heuristics. (Maybe they could achieve more happiness via reason, but that shouldn't undermine my point.) People satisfy their life requirements all the time via these heuristics. You might say they approach reason but don't quite get there. Still, it's enough to keep these people content, breathing, and reproductive. In light of these observations -- courtesy of Tversky and Kahneman -- it's dubious for many people that their survival depends primarily on the use of reason and according acts.

Moreover, what does it mean to "act irrationally"? It can only mean to act contrary to what one recognizes to be in one's interest.

As I see it, to be irrational is simply to employ an erroneous process of decisionmaking. Some irrationality is wilful, some is honest mistake.

It is thus an oxymoron to argue that acting irrationally will make one happier than acting rationally. If an action were more conducive to happiness than the alternatives, the action would be rational, not irrational.

Rationality doesn't guaranty happiness. People can still go through a correct process of reasoning and be stuck with bad outcome, or an incorrect process of reasoning and get aces.

Merlin,

Most of the mistakes in reasoning people tend to make pointed out by Tversky and Kahneman involve probabilities. Since many people -- probably a large majority -- have no education in probability and statistics, their making mistakes shouldn't be surprising

Agreed. But these errors in probability and statistics are irrational and dominant in a great many people who live long and apparently happy lives...to the point where we might conclude that rationality is not their primary tool for survival.

Little weary of devil's advocacy, but ok.
Jordan

Post 18

Sunday, June 10, 2007 - 5:01am