Success in a vacuum

Edward wrote,

Why do others share this same moral obligation? We know it's not entirely because of direct state coercion, as you necessarily admit, and as I wholeheartedly agree.

It’s not at all because of state coercion. If the reason I respect your rights is that I’m forced to, my action is taken not out of a respect for the principle, but simply out of a desire to avoid punishment.

You might, then, try to backpedal from your description of this obligation as a "moral" one by emphasizing the “rational self interests” individuals have in the "bargain": we "trade" respect for our own selfish reasons.

But a proper morality is based on rational self-interest; what is moral is what is in our rational self-interest; what is immoral is what is against it. Our obligation to respect the rights of others exists because it’s in our rational self-interest to have a principle of rights and to follow it.

But what if I have no interests to protect? What if my existence is miserable because I lack physical necessities such as adequate heat and food? Will my "investment" in the deal be high? It will not. What do I have to lose?

Your self-respect as well as your fidelity to a principle upon which your very survival depends. If you are justified in violating other people's rights in order to gain material values (other than in a dire emergency), then others are justified in violating your rights for the same reason. Once you adopt that policy, you become a criminal, and can no longer complain when you are victimized by criminals.

Poor uneducated people commit violent crimes more often than the affluent and educated.
Which keeps them poor.
My diminishing investment makes me more likely to "breach" our bargain by not respecting your rights, a lack of respect for the criminal justice system cannot prevent if presented on a massive scale.

This is a rationalization for the higher crime rate in poor neighborhoods. Contrary to the standard leftist rhetoric, it is not material poverty that causes crime, but a poverty of values.

In 1903, when people were much poorer than they are today, the homicide rate was about 1 per hundred thousand people. In 1990, when people were far better off economically, it was over 10 per hundred thousand. From 1933 to 1941, a period of high unemployment and low economic growth, crime rates declined, whereas during the 1960's and early '70's, a period of rising prosperity, crime rates rose. In 1961, with 22% of Americans below the current poverty line (as measured in constant dollars), the homicide rate was 4.7 per hundred thousand. By 1974, when the number of Americans below the poverty line had fallen to 12%, the homicide rate had more than doubled, to 10.2 per hundred thousand. Similarly, between 1960 and 1978, as poverty declined, reported robberies more than tripled, auto thefts more than doubled, and burglaries nearly tripled.

Does it follow that the poorer an ethnic group, the higher its crime rate? During the 1960's, San Francisco's Chinatown had the lowest income, the highest unemployment rate, the least education, the highest rates of tuberculosis and the most substandard housing of any area of the city. Yet in 1965, there were only five Chinese in prison in the entire state of California. Black scholar Ira Reid notes that during the 1930's, black West Indian immigrants lived in the same inner-city poverty as American blacks, yet were underrepresented among prison inmates while American blacks were three to seven times overrepresented.

Furthermore, the crime rate of blacks relative to whites was increasing even as black poverty -- both absolutely and relative to whites -- was declining. In 1932, blacks were four times more likely than whites to be in prison, by 1979, blacks were eight times more likely. Similarly, during the heavily racist 19th century, the black homicide rate in Philadelphia was 3 times higher than for whites, but had risen to 12 times higher by the middle of the 20th century, and by 1970 was 20 times higher. Yet is preposterous to think that blacks were poorer or less equal to whites in 1970 than they were in the 19th century.

If poverty is not a viable explanation for the escalating crime rate, then what is? The answer is: an increase in public welfare, illegitimate births, and a culture of irresponsibility. Between 1961 and 1971, the number of single, black teenage mothers on welfare in Washington D.C. increased 800 percent, along with a corresponding increase in illegitimate births. In 1950, only 9 percent of black families were headed by one parent. By 1965, the number was 28 percent, and by 1970 it was 33 percent. By 1990 fully half of all black families with children are headed by a single parent. In 1959, only 15 percent of black births were illegitimate. In 1988, 61 percent were, and by 1992, the figure was approaching 70 percent. It is well documented that children with less than two parents are more likely than other children to become involved in crime. Seventy percent of children in state reform institutions have less than two parents, and the best single predictor of violent crime among boys is the absence of a father.

It is not material poverty, but dysfunctional values that cause crime, and only a change in these values can reduce or eliminate it.

- Bill

Post 61

Thursday, June 7, 2007 - 11:23pm

Edward wrote,

What is needed [to prevent crime] is to instill in people internal mechanisms like the "moral obligation" to which you admit you're bound.
As I indicated in my previous post, I agree.
To instill in them the belief that they are parties to the social contract.
Again, there is no “contract” here, social or otherwise; there is simply a recognition that people have individual rights which should be respected if they want the advantages of living in a civilized society.
How is this done? Well, good parents for one, but are they common? Not common enough. Education does this (with a debatable amount of efficacy). But does government have to educate? As an empirical matter, to say that instilling such values in individuals can realistically be achieved through purely private means is naive.

Nonsense! What is naive is the idea that instilling such values can realistically be achieved through government coercion, since the method contradicts the message: telling people to respect the rights of others, when the government violates those rights by robbing Peter to educate Paul. Furthermore, who decides the content of public education? A Department of Education subject to the corruption and influence of ideological pressure groups? If the government has a monopoly on education, it can function as a vehicle of state indoctrination.

Suppose, for example, that the religious right succeeds in dominating the educational agenda, outlawing the teaching of evolution, and mandating that Christian values be taught as part of the curriculum. What alternatives do parents have, if they are being heavily taxed to support such indoctrination? Very few. If, however, they are free to spend their tax money on a private school of their choice, they can avoid such indoctrination and control the content of their children’s education.

Moreover, if education were privately provided, it would be more responsive to the demands of parents, because it would have to compete for their business. Public education does't have the same incentives, which is why it is such an abysmal failure.

Invariably people won’t be able to afford it.

That’s like Castro’s telling his citizens that the reason he won’t privatize the production and distribution of food is that if food were produced and sold at a profit, people couldn’t afford it and would starve. What a wonderful argument against capitalism! Is your argument against privatizing education any different or any better? Sure, if you tax people to pay for inferior public education, they’ll have less money to spend on private schools. But that doesn’t mean that public schools are therefore superior.

In regard to your definition of "society," I wrote, “Let me be generous and assume that what you were trying to say is that ‘society’ is all the individual members of a community including its government officials? If that's your definition, then it makes your theory of social obligation circular, as well. 'Everyone owes "society"' would then simply mean that 'everyone owes everyone else.' If I owe you what you owe me, then our debts are self-cancelling.”

But as you’ve unknowingly demonstrated, this “self-canceling” is a fallacy. You owe me your respect for my rights, and I owe you the same. This cannot be meaningful if we agree it’s merely a wash, forget about it, and go back to assuming no obligation.

I was referring to a material obligation – owing someone material payment – which is what I thought you meant when you said that society should share in Ford’s profits. Did you simply mean share spiritually in Ford’s profits?

You’re milking the “circular” thing a bit much. I meant to type the “individuals” they represent. Moreover, my definition of “society” is not “shifting.” You forget that the times in which I’ve invoked the concept of “society” are very context specific. Then you turn around and try to say that the narrow manner in which I use the term in a given context represents what I believe is the full and exclusive scope of the term.

Edward, I'm having enough trouble following your argument. Would you do me a favor and stick to one definition of “society,” so I can at least understand what your position is?

For example, . . .
Before, you said that, “by ‘society’ you simply [i.e., only] meant the government.”
I never said that.
I say: “But this isn't about you. It's about society.”

You say: “And I'm not part of society?”

You deduce that what I’m saying is that since you are not the whole of society, then you are not a part of society. This is silly.

That's not what I was saying. I was saying that if it's about society and I'm a part of society, then why isn't it about me? Aren't the parts included in the whole?

Society = the government and those it represents.

“And those it represents”? Well, in that case, I'm not a part of society, because the government does not represent me or my values. I didn’t appoint its officials, I didn’t authorize it to take the actions it does, I didn’t allow it to speak on my behalf, I didn’t approve the laws that it passes, and I didn’t sanction its coercive conduct. So if society is the government and those it represents, then by that definition, I am not part of society, because the government doesn’t represent me or my values. Who, then, does society comprise? Only the government and those who support its policies. The rest of us are not a part of society. Is that your view?

- Bill

Post 62

Saturday, June 9, 2007 - 1:13pm

Let's be clear on the sense of "obligation" we're discussing here. With the obvious exception of our children, I do not admit that we owe others payment of any kind that does not arise out of a contractual obligation (either stated or implied).

Ok, but so what? I wasn't talking about monetary payment, and neither were you when you said you have a "moral obligation" to respect the rights of others. Rather, we were discussing whether you "owe" something—anything—to others. It seems as if you are inexplicably deciding not to view your "obligation" as something you "owe.” If you admit "being obliged," you admit having a "duty," and we're obviously discussing the "duties" to "society" that successful individuals have (and/or whether they have them at all.) If I have a "duty" to give you my respect, I "owe" you my respect.

Again, the obligations that I was referring to as "cancelled out" were those that involved payment or settlement of a debt . . . I was referring to a material obligation – owing someone material payment – which is what I thought you meant when you said that society should share in Ford’s profits.I do, however, admit that we are obligated to respect the rights of others.

Ok, good, so the duties between individuals to respect each others’ rights do not cancel out. They are real duties that must be fulfilled in order for individuals to realize success using their individual rights.

One's obligation to respect the rights of others is not an obligation to pay a debt, unless the debt arises from a contractual agreement involving an exchange of values. My obligation to abstain from mugging you, for example, is not an obligation to pay a debt.

You keep trying to ignore the elephant in the living room—that the term “debt” on its face means more than just the contractual obligation to make a monetary payment. Up until recently, you were following my argument by at least asking what I meant by “moral debt,” which you implicitly stated you understood by describing the moral obligation you have to respect the rights of others. I won't agree to suddenly restrict the meaning of "debt" to an invoice. Just as the use of the term “debt” is not restricted to such a narrow meaning in the everyday world (e.g., "debt of gratitude") it certainly has not been so limited in this thread, as you've known all along that the term "debt" has been employed in this discussion to mean more than a duty to pay cash.

I said

“Rather, you rely on the fact that others will feel morally bound to the principle of reciprocity as you do.” Then I described you, based on your moral obligation, as a party to a social contract.

You responded,

[T]here is no “contract” here, social or otherwise; there is simply a recognition that people have individual rights which should be respected if they want the advantages of living in a civilized society.

Mr. Dwyer, that’s the very definition of a social contract. I think you’re confusing legal (formal) contracts with the social contract by stating . . .

[T]he reason is that since the obligation to keep one's contracts is predicated on a respect for rights, a respect for rights cannot be predicated on a contract. Contracts presuppose a willingness of the respective parties to keep the contract, which in turn is based on their acceptance of individual rights. What justifies a respect for other people's rights is not a contract, but the recognition that without such a principle no one could be trusted to keep their contracts.

The qualifier “social” obviously indicates that a social contract is not a traditional legal contract. We don’t need traditional legal contracts in order to protect our basic rights, because our obligation to respect each others’ rights is “implied in law.” Legal (formal) contracts, therefore, give rise to new rights not implied in law (which incidentally renders false your statement that “a respect for rights cannot be predicated on a contract.”)

It is the very “presupposition” you mention above that is the social contract. It’s implied to exist between those who agree to be members of a civilized society. People continue to comply with contracts into which they enter either because the contract remains beneficial to them or because they fear the result of breach—an accounting for the undeserved benefit the breaching party has gained. In a lawsuit, the accounting comes in the form of damages. In the social context, we're talking about the threat the breacher faces from those whose rights he has violated (or punishment by the state.)

What justifies a respect for other people's rights is not a contract, but the recognition that without such a principle no one could be trusted to keep their contracts.

Right. The value of reciprocity, a value which you paradoxically disagreed was the basis of your moral obligation, even though you admit that what makes it “moral” is that it serves your rational self interest.

What's really interesting about your contract comments is that they undermine each other. For example, I say . . .

"[Y]ou rely on the fact that others will feel morally bound to the principle of reciprocity as you do."

You say "[n]ot true," and stress that what motivates proper behavior in this context is an abstract respect for individual rights regardless of reciprocity. But THEN you repeatedly say things like . . .

"What justifies a respect for other people's rights is not a contract, but the recognition that without such a principle no one could be trusted to keep their contracts."

and

"If most of us didn't choose to respect the rights of others, there wouldn't be enough police to handle the ensuing crime, which is why individual morality is so important."

and

"If you are justified in violating other people's rights . . . [you] . . . can no longer complain when you are victimized by criminals."

and

"Our obligation to respect the rights of others exists because it’s in our rational self-interest to have a principle of rights and to follow it."

In other words, you repeatedly imply that "you rely on the fact that others will feel morally bound to the principle of reciprocity as you do" right after saying you don't. You fear others' breach, which is what "justifies respect for other people's rights" in your own words.

So, based on what you’ve admitted so far, here’s what we’ve established:

You are able to make the most of your rights only because others respect them.
If you don’t respect the rights of others, you can’t expect others to respect your rights; thus
Others respect your rights because you respect theirs.
In using your rights to produce success, you owe others your respect for their rights, and they owe you theirs.
Since you can’t expect others to respect your rights if you don’t respect theirs, others’ willingness to respect your rights arises only from the reciprocity inherent in the agreement; thus
Congratulations, you are a proud party to the social contract!

Further . . .

What is moral is what is in one’s rational self interest; thus
If it’s no longer in an individual’s rational self interest to respect your rights, there is no longer a “moral obligation” to respect your rights; thus
The reciprocity on which your success relies depends on others’ continued belief that they are parties to the contract.

Thus, to the extent you believe society must instill in individuals the belief that they are parties to the contract, you owe society . . . the question then becomes whether the society must instill these values at all. You believe they do not, and therefore, to the extent that the government assumes that role using your tax dollars, you don’t “owe” society but rather society, through the government, “robs” from you to pay Paul. I disagree. Therefore, the debate shifts to empirical matters . . .

With regard to your argument about crime and poverty, I think that, in the midst of quoting statistics, you miss the point.

Would you conclude that if I wrote "HIV causes death," that means I'm asserting "one cannot die if they don't contract HIV?"

I do not argue that the relative absence of poverty will necessarily cause less crime. I can't argue that, as we know that's not true. Other factors come into play, like, as you discuss, cultural degeneration that undermines individual responsibility and values. I agree with you on that. But certainly you don't deny, do you, the basic observation of the human experience, that, if we had to pick the single most common point of tension between humans throughout history, it would be resources? Do you honestly believe that, all other things being equal (including values,) individuals from group one, which lacks resources, would be no more likely to violate your rights that individuals from group two, who are privileged?

Nonsense! What is naive is the idea that instilling such values can realistically be achieved through government coercion, since the method contradicts the message:

I’m trying to isolate your arguments a bit. Let me ask you this: if evidence demonstrated that such could not be achieved through private means, would you support achieving it through public means? That is, with tax payer dollars? Or you would you say “screw it. I’m sticking to the theory of rugged individualism regardless of the consequences?”

I say: Invariably people won’t be able to afford it.

You say: “That’s like Castro’s telling his citizens . . . .”

To illustrate, you (or I originally) focus on education. But you admit that anything that is privatized will not be available to some because they cannot afford it, correct? If making sure that poor individuals respect your rights is in your rational self interest, and is therefore a “moral obligation,” how do you do this if they cannot afford an education, which presumably you believe is necessary or important in instilling proper values?

Leaving the big picture arguments, you jump to alleged specific weakness inherent in public education its their tendency to “indoctrinate,” etc. I don’t buy a lot of what you say here, but I want to stay focused on the availability of mechanisms which, when working properly, help mold ideal parties to the social contract.

Edward, I'm having enough trouble following your argument. Would you do me a favor and stick to one definition of “society,” so I can at least understand what your position is?

For the third time: Society = the government and those it represents. What is it about this you don’t understand?

“And those it represents”? Well, in that case, I'm not a part of society, because the government does not represent me or my values. I didn’t appoint its officials, I didn’t authorize it to take the actions it does, I didn’t allow it to speak on my behalf, I didn’t approve the laws that it passes, and I didn’t sanction its coercive conduct. So if society is the government and those it represents, then by that definition, I am not part of society, because the government doesn’t represent me or my values. Who, then, does society comprise? Only the government and those who support its policies. The rest of us are not a part of society. Is that your view?

I don’t know why you insist on going down this road, and I won’t entertain it for much longer. Most people accept the premise of a republican form of government that the government is the agent of the people, even if they don’t support all of the government’s policies. If you don’t, I really don’t care. I don’t care if you believe you’re not represented by the government. It makes no difference in the argument, and I’m beginning to believe you see this picayune “society” issue as a rabbit trail down which you can escape. If my argument is that you owe others, what difference does it make whether or not you are a part of the group I feel you owe?

(Edited by Edward Cantu on 6/09, 2:23pm)

Post 63

Saturday, June 9, 2007 - 1:59pm

Edward: I'm impatient and don't have the energy to read all the lengthy posts of both you and Bill, but just what action — mental or physical, are you advocating that big material winners in society, exemplified by Henry Ford, should undertake to acknowledge and discharge what they "owe?"

Sam

Post 64

Saturday, June 9, 2007 - 3:20pm

Sam,

The answer is in Edward’s post 33:

Bill asked, “Moreover, if Ford "owes" something to "society" for being able to carry out his economic activities free of interference, to whom does he owe it?”

Edward answered, “Ok, here goes. Are you ready? Get your vomit bags ready: The social system. And the social system is repaid through either charity or government programs.”

Post 65

Saturday, June 9, 2007 - 6:18pm

Jon: Thanks, but I really didn't want to know that. Do you think that Henry Ford would have embarked on his enterprises if he thought he would incur such a burden? Why shouldn't this just be up front? "Society" should advertize specific moral obligations — for example, if you net over $10 million per year you will be castigated, pilloried and shunned if you don't donate $3 million over and above what you are taxed. Otherwise, it would be like tipping — unless there is some de facto standard one never knows how much or little is acceptable.

As a counter measure, perhaps an agency could be set up to evaluate all the benefit to "society" and credit his balance with it.

Gawd, this whole subject is obscene. Unless something else irritates me beyond tolerance, I'll bow out.

Sam

Post 66

Saturday, June 9, 2007 - 8:59pm

offending anagram deleted

(Edited by Ted Keer
on 6/10, 1:52pm)

Post 67

Sunday, June 10, 2007 - 11:59am

I'm with Sam. As for Edward Cantu,
I'm tired of seeing this c^nt awarded.

This comment is inappropriate -- especially on a Dissent Forum. It is not only an insult to Mr. Cantu; it indirectly disparages women as well. I don't know what is meant by saying that you're tired of seeing him "awarded." Who's awarding him? So far, he's received nothing but criticism.

- Bill

Post 68

Sunday, June 10, 2007 - 12:39pm

Bill, someone keeps sanctioning Cantu's posts. He already has two Atlas icons. I call this "the inflation of the sanction."

I agree that dignifying Cantu with the term "c^nt" disparages women.

The women here have generally had the sense not to advance the kinds of arguments that Cantu has advanced.

Post 69

Sunday, June 10, 2007 - 1:18pm

I wrote, "[T]he reason [that rights cannot be based on a contract, social or individual] is that since the obligation to keep one's contracts is predicated on a respect for rights, a respect for rights cannot be predicated on a contract. Contracts presuppose a willingness of the respective parties to keep the contract, which in turn is based on their acceptance of individual rights. What justifies a respect for other people's rights is not a contract, but the recognition that without such a principle no one could be trusted to keep their contracts."

The qualifier “social” obviously indicates that a social contract is not a traditional legal contract.

It doesn’t matter. The point is that rights cannot be based on any kind of contract, social or legal, because a contract is an agreement, and without rights we'd have no obligation to keep our agreements.

People continue to comply with contracts into which they enter either because the contract remains beneficial to them or because they fear the result of breach—an accounting for the undeserved benefit the breaching party has gained. In a lawsuit, the accounting comes in the form of damages. In the social context, we're talking about the threat the breacher faces from those whose rights he has violated (or punishment by the state.)

But that’s not the primary reason they should keep their contracts; the primary reason they should keep them is out of respect for the rights of the other party.

I wrote, "What justifies a respect for other people's rights is not a contract, but the recognition that without such a principle no one could be trusted to keep their contracts."

Right. The value of reciprocity, a value which you paradoxically disagreed was the basis of your moral obligation, even though you admit that what makes it “moral” is that it serves your rational self interest.

Fine, if what you mean by reciprocity is simply a mutual respect for each other's rights.

What's really interesting about your contract comments is that they undermine each other. For example, I say . . .

"[Y]ou rely on the fact that others will feel morally bound to the principle of reciprocity as you do."

You say "[n]ot true," and stress that what motivates proper behavior in this context is an abstract respect for individual rights regardless of reciprocity.

I wasn’t saying that our acceptance of the principle isn’t based on its reciprocal advantage – on the idea that we benefit from others’ respect for our rights, just as they benefit from our respect for theirs. I was saying that a person’s moral obligation to respect the rights of others isn’t justified on the basis of expediency; it isn’t justified out of fear of what will happen to him as a direct result of his not respecting them.

But THEN you repeatedly say things like . . .
"What justifies a respect for other people's rights is not a contract, but the recognition that without such a principle no one could be trusted to keep their contracts."
and
"If most of us didn't choose to respect the rights of others, there wouldn't be enough police to handle the ensuing crime, which is why individual morality is so important."
and
"If you are justified in violating other people's rights . . . [you] . . . can no longer complain when you are victimized by criminals."
and
"Our obligation to respect the rights of others exists because it’s in our rational self-interest to have a principle of rights and to follow it."
In other words, you repeatedly imply that "you rely on the fact that others will feel morally bound to the principle of reciprocity as you do" right after saying you don't. You fear others' breach, which is what "justifies respect for other people's rights" in your own words.

No, this is a misunderstanding of what I was saying. It isn't that I feel obligated to respect the rights of others, because I'm afraid that if I don't, they won't respect mine. Even if they would continue to respect my rights, I would still feel obligated to respect theirs. The reason is that it's only by following such a principle faithfully that we can ensure the protection of our mutual self-interests.

So, based on what you’ve admitted so far, here’s what we’ve established:

You are able to make the most of your rights only because others respect them. If you don’t respect the rights of others, you can’t expect others to respect your rights
Just to be clear, by "expect" I meant "morally expect." In other words, if you don't respect rights, you can't morally expect (i.e., demand) that others respect them. I didn't mean "expect" in the sense that if you don't respect rights, you can't expect that others will respect them.
thus Others respect your rights because you respect theirs.
They may respect my rights because I respect theirs, but again that's not the point. The point is that I can't demand that others respect my rights if I'm unwilling to respect theirs; nor can they demand that I respect their rights if they're unwilling to respect mine.
In using your rights to produce success, you owe others your respect for their rights, and they owe you theirs.

No, that's not the reason that I owe respect for their rights. Even if I didn't use my rights to produce success -- even if I was a slacker and an underachiever, say -- I would still owe respect for their rights.

Since you can’t expect others to respect your rights if you don’t respect theirs, others’ willingness to respect your rights arises only from the reciprocity inherent in the agreement

But, don’t you see, it's not an agreement. Even if someone doesn't agree to be bound by a "social contract," he is still obligated to respect my rights. Why? Because he is not entitled to forswear his moral obligations, whereas he is entitled to refuse to make an agreement or to sign a contract.

What is moral is what is in one’s rational self interest; thus If it’s no longer in an individual’s rational self interest to respect your rights, there is no longer a “moral obligation” to respect your rights;
I agree -- "if" it's no longer in one's rational self-interest, but that's a big "IF."
thus
The reciprocity on which your success relies depends on others’ continued belief that they are parties to the contract.

It has nothing to do with being parties to a contract! Contracts and agreements depend on individual rights, not the other way around.

Thus, to the extent you believe society must instill in individuals the belief that they are parties to the contract, you owe society

Owe society what? I owe nothing to society qua society; my only obligation to others is to respect their rights. I do believe that parents should instill in their children a respect for the rights of others, but that does not mean that I owe them something for doing so. That is their job as parents.

. . . the question then becomes whether the society must instill these values at all. You believe they do not, and therefore, to the extent that the government assumes that role using your tax dollars, you don’t “owe” society but rather society, through the government, “robs” from you to pay Paul. I disagree. Therefore, the debate shifts to empirical matters . . .

Not so fast. Before you "shift to empirical matters," please tell me how the government can presume to instill the value of respecting people’s rights when it does so through a coercively run state educational system – i.e., when it violates those selfsame rights in the very process of endorsing them?

With regard to your argument about crime and poverty, I think that, in the midst of quoting statistics, you miss the point.

Would you conclude that if I wrote "HIV causes death," that means I'm asserting "one cannot die if they don't contract HIV?"

No, I realize you’re asserting that poverty causes crime, not that crime cannot occur for other reasons as well. But I gave you evidence of groups who were very poor (e.g., Chinese and black West Indian immigrants) whose crime rates were lower than other groups who were better off. If poverty causes crime, why were their crime rates lower than for wealthier people? I also gave you evidence of how, for African Americans, the correlation of poverty and crime was in the opposite direction. The wealthier they became, the more crime they committed.

I do not argue that the relative absence of poverty will necessarily cause less crime. I can't argue that, as we know that's not true. Other factors come into play, like, as you discuss, cultural degeneration that undermines individual responsibility and values. I agree with you on that. But certainly you don't deny, do you, the basic observation of the human experience, that, if we had to pick the single most common point of tension between humans throughout history, it would be resources? Do you honestly believe that, all other things being equal (including values,) individuals from group one, which lacks resources, would be no more likely to violate your rights that individuals from group two, who are privileged?

You say, “including values,” but how does one control for values, since action is itself a reflection of values?! The only way you could know that their values are the same is if their action is the same. Furthermore, even if we assume the same values, it doesn’t follow that the poor are more likely to violate the rights of the privileged, if the privileged have the power, and can more easily get away with violating the rights of the poor. Throughout history, the privileged classes have maintained their position by violating the rights of the underprivileged; the upper classes, by exploiting the lower classes; the government, by plundering the governed. Until modern times, slavery was almost universal, which is a classic case of the haves exploiting the have-nots, even if we assume that, given the opportunity, the have-nots would have exploited the haves. So why would you think that the underprivileged are more likely to violate the rights of the privileged instead of the other way around?

By far, the biggest exploiters and worst violators of rights in history have been the people in power, i.e., governments. As historian R.J. Rummel puts it, "Mass murder by emperors, kings, sultans, khans, presidents, governors, generals, and other such rulers of their own citizens or of those under their protection and control is very much a part of our history.” The Soviet Gulag State murdered 61.9 million; the Chinese Communists, 35.2 million; the Nazis, 20.9 million; the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, 10.2 million; the Japanese military 5.9 million; the Khmer Rouge, 2 million, Turkey's genocidal purges, 1.8 million; Vietnam, 1.6 million; Poland's ethnic cleansing, 1.5 million; and Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito, 1 million. It is suspected that North Korea murdered 1.6 million, that Mexico in the first two decades of the 20th Century murdered 1.4 million, and that feudal Russia murdered 1 million. If you add up all of these murders by governments during the 20th Century, it comes to over 147.3 million deaths. Any crimes committed by indigent people seeking to acquire the necessities of life pale by comparison to these democidal figures.

To be continued . . .

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 6/10, 8:20pm)

Post 70

Sunday, June 10, 2007 - 2:35pm

Delete

(Edited by Edward Cantu on 6/10, 2:37pm)

Post 71

Sunday, June 10, 2007 - 4:06pm

Edward wrote,

I’m trying to isolate your arguments a bit. Let me ask you this: if evidence demonstrated that such could not be achieved through private means, would you support achieving it through public means? That is, with tax payer dollars? Or you would you say “screw it. I’m sticking to the theory of rugged individualism regardless of the consequences?”

Just so you know, the term "rugged individualism" is a leftist catchphrase that has no place in my vocabulary! I believe in individualism, not in "rugged" individualism, which is presumably the idea that only rugged or hardy individuals would survive under capitalism. In fact, it's just the opposite. By virtue of its superior productivity, Capitalism benefits unrugged individuals more than does any other politico-economic system. But to answer your question, it is my view that teaching respect for individual rights can only be achieved through private means, because doing so through public means would involve forcing unwilling taxpayers to subsidize it, which would amount to supporting government theft as a means of teaching people that theft is immoral. That, I submit, is a preposterous idea, and it wouldn't work anyway, because the hypocrisy would be too obvious. And even if, in some altered universe, it did work, I still wouldn't support it, because the end does not justify the means. Let me ask you this: If evidence demonstrated that incarcerating innocent people could reduce crime, would you support it? No, of course, you wouldn't, because . . .? Because . . . the end doesn't justify the means!

You say, "If evidence demonstrated that such could not be achieved by private means . . ." Evidence as judged by whom? Individual parents and taxpayers or government bureaucrats in the role of social engineers? In other words, what prevents the government from declaring, in effect, "We've judged that X cannot be achieved by private means (even if in fact it could); therefore, we're going to socialize it and force you to pay whatever we think its worth."? Under your system, absolutely nothing. Nor would the fact that the subsidized program turns out to be an infamous failure cause them to consider privatizing it. They'll simply use the failure as an excuse to increase funding for it, thereby fleecing hapless taxpayers of even more of their money and adding insult to injury.

I say: Invariably people won’t be able to afford it. You say:
“That’s like Castro’s telling his citizens . . . .”
To illustrate, you (or I originally) focus on education. But you admit that anything that is privatized will not be available to some because they cannot afford it, correct?

Not necessarily. Why do you assume that? There are plenty of goods and services that are privately produced that are available to virtually everyone, because the price is low enough for them to afford it. Food is one; television sets are another, automobiles are another. Yes, there are homeless, but that doesn't mean that we turn the housing market over to the government. In fact, homelessness is made worse by government regulations such as rent control, zoning laws and environmental restrictions on development, which limit the supply of affordable housing.

So, what about private education? Can the poor afford it? Well, they can afford it in developing countries, so I don't see why they couldn't afford it here? The majority of poor children in developing countries attend private schools, which are run as businesses not charities. And these schools are generally superior to the public schools both in their instruction and in their facilities. Poor children in these private schools outperform their public school counterparts on math and reading tests. If the poor in underdeveloped countries can afford private education, then the poor in a rich country like the United States certainly could, especially if they were to make it a priority.

Consider this: Of those households classified as "poor" in the United States, ninety-seven percent have a color television. In fact, over half own two or more color televisions, and nearly three-quarters own a car, with thirty percent owning two or more cars. Forty-six percent of all poor households own their own homes. The average home owned by persons classified as poor by the Census Bureau is a three-bedroom house with one-and-a-half baths, a garage, and a porch or patio. Seventy-six percent of poor households have air conditioning. Only 6 percent of poor households are overcrowded, and over two-thirds have more than two rooms per person. The average poor American has more living space than the average person living in Paris, London, Vienna, Athens, and other cities throughout Europe. (These comparisons are to the average citizens in foreign countries, not to those classified as poor.) Seventy-eight percent of poor people have a VCR or DVD player; sixty-two percent have cable or satellite TV reception. Seventy-three percent own microwave ovens, more than half have a stereo, and a third have an automatic dishwasher.

If poor Americans can afford all this, then with a little foresight and careful budgeting, they could afford private education for their children as well, especially, if they weren't taxed to support the public schools.

If making sure that poor individuals respect your rights is in your rational self interest, and is therefore a “moral obligation,” how do you do this if they cannot afford an education, which presumably you believe is necessary or important in instilling proper values?

First of all, it is not my moral obligation "to make sure" that poor individuals respect my rights. How could I ever do that in any case? Nevertheless, in modern America, very few people lack the resources to educate their children. I gave the Castro example as a reductio ad absurdum. Obviously, the private production and distribution of food has not prevented poor people from affording it. In fact, they have access to more and better food than under a socialist system. Neither would privatizing education prevent poor people from affording it; in fact, it would almost certainly improve the quality of their education. What good are public schools if they don't educate their students? In Oakland, California last year, 55% of the public school students failed the math and reading portions of the exit exam.

But even if certain people couldn't afford private education, public education is not the answer, any more than if certain people couldn't afford to buy enough food to feed their families, state control over the production and distribution of food is the answer. The answer in that case is for those who believe in helping the poor to subsidize their education voluntarily through various scholarships and charitable organizations, not to rob unwilling taxpayers in order to finance a poorly run public school system. It makes no more sense to corrupt education by socializing it than it does to corrupt the production and distribution of food by socializing it.

Besides, if a couple doesn't have enough income to raise a family on their own, then they shouldn't be having children in the first place. They have no right to irresponsibly reproduce and then demand that other people take care of their kids. It is the parents who are responsible for supporting and educating their own children, not the taxpayers!

And even if some children didn't get a formal education in private schools, there would be enough who did who would become writers, journalists and professional intellectuals capable of influencing the broader culture. Poor parents, who are the consumers of the ideas disseminated through the mass media, would thus be exposed to the opinions of journalists and professional intellectuals, and could form their own judgments based on that exposure.

Leaving the big picture arguments, you jump to alleged specific weakness inherent in public education its their tendency to “indoctrinate,” etc. I don’t buy a lot of what you say here, but I want to stay focused on the availability of mechanisms which, when working properly, help mold ideal parties to the social contract.

Do you really think that the ideas promulgated in the public schools today are ones that I or other Objectivists would support? Education is overwhelmingly the product of a left-liberal bias, which goes hand in hand with the coercive financing used to support it.

I wrote, "Edward, I'm having enough trouble following your argument. Would you do me a favor and stick to one definition of 'society,' so I can at least understand what your position is?"

For the third time: Society = the government and those it represents. What is it about this you don’t understand?

You had given other definitions than that one, so it wasn't obvious to me what your position was. But it looks like you're now committed to the latter definition. I appreciate the clarification.

I wrote, “And those it represents”? Well, in that case, I'm not a part of society, because the government does not represent me or my values. I didn’t appoint its officials, I didn’t authorize it to take the actions it does, I didn’t allow it to speak on my behalf, I didn’t approve the laws that it passes, and I didn’t sanction its coercive conduct. So if society is the government and those it represents, then by that definition, I am not part of society, because the government doesn’t represent me or my values. Who, then, does society comprise? Only the government and those who support its policies. The rest of us are not a part of society. Is that your view?"

I don’t know why you insist on going down this road, and I won’t entertain it for much longer.
Well, if you don't want to entertain it much longer, then you might consider addressing it.
Most people accept the premise of a republican form of government that the government is the agent of the people, even if they don’t support all of the government’s policies.

And most people believe in God; that doesn't mean that one exists. Here you're committing a common logical fallacy called "appeal to majority." I've got news for you: Fifty million Frenchmen can be wrong! As I've said before, true agency must be voluntary. You are not my agent if you have the right to force me to do your bidding, majority opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. The agency view of government which you call "republican" is one that is based on the social contract theory that you've been endorsing throughout our exchange -- a contract that I didn't voluntarily consent to. Just because I happened to be born into a certain political system does not mean that I consented to be bound by whatever laws its legislators decide to pass. It's not as though the government is a homeowner's association that I joined voluntarily. As it exists now, its a coercive institution that plunders its citizens in order to finance its activities. You can say that the "majority" supports the plunder, but even if they do, that doesn't justify it? If the majority voted to enslave the minority, would your social contract justify it, and would you then say that the slavemasters were the agents of the slaves? My question is, what, in the name of society, does the government not have a right to demand of its citizens? What could it possibly do to those whom you claim it "represents" that would violate their rights? Is anything the majority authorizes the government to do permissible? And if not, why not?

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 6/10, 7:24pm)

Post 72

Monday, June 11, 2007 - 3:36pm

I agree that dignifying Cantu with the term "c^nt" disparages women.

Wow.

Post 73

Monday, June 11, 2007 - 7:30pm

The underlying source of personal morality is psychological, not material.

Premise 1: A major source of satisfaction with life comes from the psychological visibility that comes when our actions produce results consonant with our intent.

As Rand put it (paraphrasing), if you were only concerned with bruty physical survival, then a hunk of meat, a fire and a cave will do fine. We have gone a long ways past that stage, and the main underlying motivation that took us out of the stone age and to the 21st century has been the need, desire and satisfaction of taking our visions, ideas and basic sense of life and making it real in the physical world.

Thus, people work themselves literally to death to build great buildings, write terrific novels, or accomplish whatever heroism is within their capability, way, way beyond the needs of mere survival. They do it because the mind is set up that way. From finger touching thumb in the womb, our nervous system and our later conceptual structure are based on feedback and constant testing.

The nerves and patterns of response that successfully touched finger to thumb in the womb were the ones that survived via reinforcement. The concepts, whether of physics or ethics, that survive as motivating factors in our minds and spirits are those that we are able to see reiffied in the real world, or the "aha!" moment when we suddenly see the solution to a problem.

Premise 2: Due to potential conflicts and misidentifications, we are capable of sabotaging our ability to get this vital feedback.

The conceptual level of consciousness is subject to error, particularly the errors of improper focus, as in the failure to recognize what is important, which often happens when we go for extended periods without essential feedback to reinforce our sense of priorities. This is why "perceptual reaffirmation" of our concepts is essential to maintaining motivation and focus. Percepts do not tell us "what" something is, but only "that" it is. Thus, we can misidentify the object perceived on the conceptual end, but the percept itself has to be trusted.

Premise 3: The only way we can perceive ourselves as a conscious being is through emotional interaction with another conscious being.

We can infer our consciousness and our concept of personal identity from the things we do and create in the world around us, or inside our own minds. However, the inference itself implies that we are employing the conceptual level, which we have already noted is subject to error. We can imagine that we are Superman, but this does not in any way make it so.

Only through a non-conceptually mediated perception can concepts, particularly our essential concepts of self be reinforced through perceptual feedback.

Premise 4: If there are things in our character that we have to edit out, conceal, hide from others or risk rejection, then a full emotional interaction is impossible.

Conclusion: the basis of morality is the need to be able to fully interact with other consciousnesses in order to achieve self-perception.

Supporting comments: a crook or murderer or other parasite or predator on his or her fellow humans cannot reveal his or her nature to a potential lover - romantic love (wherein the parties share the same fundamental values) being the purest form of this kind of self-perception. Note that people are willing to risk or even often give up their own lives to save someone they deeply love. Note all the literature, movies and art focused on the interactions related to love and the deep honesty that it demands.

Note that granting ALL the economic arguments in favor of honesty still leaves the chance that a person will notice that he or she can gain immensely by means of a dishonesty that will be virtually impossible to detect or prevent. And this happens all the time.

Yet most people are still quite honest in any normal society. And the reason could be summed up in the word "honor," which is roughly what I just said above.

Post 74

Tuesday, June 12, 2007 - 8:46am

Ok, I appreciate your willingness to engage in lengthy exchanges, and especially your willingness to use analytical force in responding to my arguments rather than expletive references to the female anatomy. However, I cannot address everything you write because I simply don't have the time. I do what I can . . .

It doesn’t matter. The point is that rights cannot be based on any kind of contract, social or legal, because a contract is an agreement, and without rights we'd have no obligation to keep our agreements.

Your remarks about contracts don't reply to mine. They are just unsupported reassertions that contracts are limited in manners in which they actually are not. Put differently, you wholly ignore my claim that you confuse legal (formal) contracts with social contracts, and you seemingly choose to will the latter out of existence by ignoring them conceptually.

But that’s not the primary reason they should keep their contracts; the primary reason they should keep them is out of respect for the rights of the other party.

Fine, if what you mean by reciprocity is simply a mutual respect for each other's rights.

Ok, so you "rely" on a mutuality of respect for rights. You rely on others' willingness to respect your rights.

I was saying that a person’s moral obligation to respect the rights of others isn’t justified on the basis of expediency; it isn’t justified out of fear of what will happen to him as a direct result of his not respecting them.

But an obligation cannot be "moral," according to you, if it does not serve the obligee's rational self interest; isn't that right? Wasn't this your definition of "moral" behavior?

It isn't that I feel obligated to respect the rights of others, because I'm afraid that if I don't, they won't respect mine. Even if they would continue to respect my rights, I would still feel obligated to respect theirs. The reason is that it's only by following such a principle faithfully that we can ensure the protection of our mutual self-interests.

Compare the first and last sentences of this passage. The contradiction is glaring. You follow the principle "to ensure the protection of our mutual self-interests." How else does fulfilling the "moral obligation" serve mutual self-interests than by helping to ensure that your abstention from violating the rights of others will make others less likely to violate yours?

No, that's not the reason that I owe respect for their rights. Even if I didn't use my rights to produce success -- even if I was a slacker and an underachiever, say -- I would still owe respect for their rights.

Ok, but only because observing this obligation—an obligation you label as a "moral" one—protects your rational self-interest, correct? Otherwise, it wouldn't be moral, right? Do you see the trap you've laid for yourself? Additionally, your sudden use of the term "owe" is interesting.

But, don’t you see, it's not an agreement. Even if someone doesn't agree to be bound by a "social contract," he is still obligated to respect my rights. Why? Because he is not entitled to forswear his moral obligations, whereas he is entitled to refuse to make an agreement or to sign a contract.

It has nothing to do with being parties to a contract! Contracts and agreements depend on individual rights, not the other way around.

But, don't you see that, once again, you are describing a social contract? You want to ignore the import of the term "social"—like it's not there. An understanding does not have to satisfy the standards of a formal contract in order to be a "social" contract; that's the whole point of the qualifier "social." And just because you say it's not an "agreement" doesn't mean it isn't. It's a conscious and morally binding understanding between numerous individuals that cannot manifest its intended result without reciprocation among all "understandees." That's an agreement even if it's not memorialized with legalese on paper.

But I gave you evidence of groups who were very poor (e.g., Chinese and black West Indian immigrants) whose crime rates were lower than other groups who were better off. If poverty causes crime, why were their crime rates lower than for wealthier people?

Different values. Are we in agreement?

You say, “including values,” but how does one control for values, since action is itself a reflection of values?! The only way you could know that their values are the same is if their action is the same.

No. Desperate people sacrifice values to satisfy less abstract obligations—like the obligation to feed their children. If circumstances don't force one person to sacrifice their values, yet do so force another, this does not mean that such individuals have different values. Rather, disparate pressures can trigger disparate behavior among those with common values.

Furthermore, even if we assume the same values, it doesn’t follow that the poor are more likely to violate the rights of the privileged, if the privileged have the power, and can more easily get away with violating the rights of the poor. Throughout history . . . .

By far, the biggest exploiters and worst violators of rights in history have been the people in power, i.e., governments . . . Any crimes committed by indigent people seeking to acquire the necessities of life pale by comparison to these democidal figures.

I don't understand what the point of all of this is.

First, you conflate wealth and political power. A vast majority of the perpetrators you list above committed their crimes by abusing their political power. Sure, wealth often leads to power, but so what? What matters is not how many crimes several powerful people committed, but rather how many powerful individuals committed crimes—do you see the key distinction? You've approached this backwards. You focus on the effects of a few to prove your point. You're arguing that "a huge amount of crime has been committed by powerful people," when what you should be arguing is that a "huge amount of wealthy people commit crimes." The latter you fail to argue because it cannot be seriously maintained.

"[T]o answer your question . . . And even if, in some altered universe, it did work, I still wouldn't support it, because the end does not justify the means.

If it could not be achieved through purely private means, you would rather live in an environment where individuals don't have the values you think are crucial for us to enjoy our rights because "the ends don't justify the means," correct? As a matter of principle?

Not necessarily. Why do you assume that? There are plenty of goods and services that are privately produced that are available to virtually everyone, because the price is low enough for them to afford it. Food is one; television sets are another, automobiles are another.

I don't know why you assume true "privatization" has produced these results. Policy makers have generally understood that capitalism, like democracy, caves in on itself if taken to its extreme—none other than Adam Smith recognized this back before capitalism degenerated from a utilitarian paradigm to a religion. So your argument just re-begs the question: to what extent have government programs helped to ensure that most of the poor do have access to, for example, food and the lesser luxuries?

Contrary to your assumption that, for example, the television industry is "privatized," virtually nothing in America is truly privatized to a degree idealized by absolute free market zealots. Anti-trust laws, for example, help ensure the competition that is needed to keep prices down so some poor can afford televisions. Government programs like welfare subsidies help the poor buy food; Sixteen million Americans use food stamps (whether they deserve them is another matter altogether,) and "overproduction" of staple crops is encouraged by agriculteral subsidies to farmers in effect since the New Deal. You might counter that the subsidies are your money, which is stolen from you to pay Paul. But that's irrelevant for present purposes. You may also argue that such subsidies are not needed because the taxpayer would save money from not having to pay the subsidies and therefore could spend more on food produced by a purely privatized agricultural industry. But the poor pay little to no taxes anyway, so a lack of subsidies would not yield them such a savings.

And most people believe in God; that doesn't mean that one exists. Here you're committing a common logical fallacy called "appeal to majority" . . . .

You misapply the argumentum ad populum concept, Mr. Dwyer. If I were to say, "most people think that the sky is black, and therefore it is black," your point would be well taken. But you yourself argue agency must be voluntary. If most people accept the republican premise—that is, that the government is their agent—then, by definition, such agency is voluntary as to those individuals. In other words, the subjective belief of these individuals absolutely controls the objective result. This is not the case with a real "appeal to the majority" argument. Indeed, in making this argument you ironically commit a mistake in reasoning: You project your belief that the government does not represent you onto others, a necessary step in mounting the ad populum attack.

I so wish I had the time to respond to the remainder of your post, as I have plenty left to write. Perhaps I will have to time to do so later . . . .

(Edited by Edward Cantu on 6/12, 8:49am)

(Edited by Edward Cantu on 6/12, 8:54am)

(Edited by Edward Cantu on 6/12, 7:05pm)

Post 75

Wednesday, June 13, 2007 - 12:37am

I wrote, “The point is that rights cannot be based on any kind of contract, social or legal, because a contract is an agreement, and without rights we'd have no obligation to keep our agreements."

Your remarks about contracts don't reply to mine. They are just unsupported reassertions that contracts are limited in manners in which they actually are not. Put differently, you wholly ignore my claim that you confuse legal (formal) contracts with social contracts, and you seemingly choose to will the latter out of existence by ignoring them conceptually.

Why do you say that I’m confusing a social contract with a legal one, just because I refer to the former as an “agreement”? If a social contract isn’t an agreement, then what is it and why is it called a ”contract”? Moreover, on what grounds do the parties to a “social contract” have an obligation to abide by it, if not on the grounds of a moral obligation to keep their agreements?

I wrote, “ I was saying that a person’s moral obligation to respect the rights of others isn’t justified on the basis of expediency; it isn’t justified out of fear of what will happen to him as a direct result of his not respecting them.”

But an obligation cannot be "moral," according to you, if it does not serve the obligee's rational self interest; isn't that right? Wasn't this your definition of "moral" behavior?

Yes, but self-interest isn’t restricted to respecting people's rights when it's expedient not to violate them; it also depends on fidelity to a principle of conduct that ensures respect for one's rights even when others can get away with violating them. If respect for one's rights were restricted to cases in which violating them isn’t expedient – such as cases in which the perpetrator is likely to be caught and punished – then there'd be no reason for others to respect one's rights on principle. They'd feel free to violate them whenever they thought they could get away with it.

I continued, “It isn't that I feel obligated to respect the rights of others, because I'm afraid that if I don't, they won't respect mine. Even if they would continue to respect my rights, I would still feel obligated to respect theirs. The reason is that it's only by following such a principle faithfully that we can ensure the protection of our mutual self-interests.”

Compare the first and last sentences of this passage. The contradiction is glaring. You follow the principle "to ensure the protection of our mutual self-interests." How else does fulfilling the "moral obligation" serve mutual self-interests than by helping to ensure that your abstention from violating the rights of others will make others less likely to violate yours?

My abstention from violating the rights of others may not make others less likely to violate them (especially if they don’t believe in the principle). But that doesn’t mean that respecting rights is not something that we ought to do for the sake of our mutual freedom and well being. Either it’s in our mutual self-interest to have a principle of rights or it isn’t. If it is – and I believe that it is -- then each person is obligated to follow it. Otherwise, it’s not a principle worth having.

I wrote, “No, that's not the reason that I owe respect for their rights. Even if I didn't use my rights to produce success -- even if I was a slacker and an underachiever, say -- I would still owe respect for their rights.

Ok, but only because observing this obligation—an obligation you label as a "moral" one—protects your rational self-interest, correct?
Correct.
Otherwise, it wouldn't be moral, right?
Right.
Do you see the trap you've laid for yourself?

If you think I’ve laid a trap for myself, then you’ll need to do more than simply assert it as if it were self-evident.

The point is this: If I don’t have a moral obligation to follow the principle, then nobody does, in which case, we no longer have the principle or the benefits accruing from it. On the other hand, if others have an obligation to follow it, then so do I; otherwise, I’m endorsing a double standard. So, if I want the benefits that obtain from adherence to the principle, then I have an obligation to adhere to it as well. It is the benefits of the principle that make it in our mutual self-interest to follow.

To be continued . . .

- Bill

Post 76

Wednesday, June 13, 2007 - 12:02pm

I argued that individual rights are not the product of a social contract or an agreement. "Even if someone doesn't agree to be bound by a 'social contract,' he is still obligated to respect my rights. Why? Because he is not entitled to forswear his moral obligations, whereas he is entitled to refuse to make an agreement or to sign a contract.“ And: “It has nothing to do with being parties to a contract! Contracts and agreements depend on individual rights, not the other way around.” Edward replied,

But, don't you see that, once again, you are describing a social contract? You want to ignore the import of the term "social"—like it's not there. An understanding does not have to satisfy the standards of a formal contract in order to be a "social" contract; that's the whole point of it being a social rather than a formal legal contract.
I didn’t say that it had to satisfy the standards of a formal legal contract. All I said is that if it’s a contract, then it’s an agreement, in which case, the obligation to keep it must be based on individual rights, not the other way around.
And just because you say it's not an "agreement" doesn't mean it is not.
Well, I didn’t agree to it, so on what grounds is it binding on me? I asked this question before, and have yet to receive an answer.
It's a conscious and morally binding understanding between numerous individuals that cannot manifest its intended result without reciprocation amount [among?] all "understandees."

This makes no sense to me. You say that we’re all bound by this so-called “social” contract, because we all have a “morally binding understanding”? What understanding? And how, in Galt's name, is it morally binding on those who don't "understand" or agree to it?!

That's an agreement even if it's not memorialized with legalese on paper.

If there's no written contract, then how do you know who agreed to it and who didn't?

I wrote, “But I gave you evidence of groups who were very poor (e.g., Chinese and black West Indian immigrants) whose crime rates were lower than other groups who were better off. If poverty causes crime, why were their crime rates lower than for wealthier people?”

Different values. Are we in agreement?

Yes, because their actions reflect their values.

I will agree with you that extreme poverty could motivate a person to steal food in order to survive, when he otherwise would not resort to stealing, but much of the crime that is attributed to "poverty" is not of this order. It is simply poorer people stealing in order to acquire more wealth. In my opinion, these same people would steal in other ways if they were wealthier and thought they could get away with it -- by embezzling from their company, defrauding their customers and investors, reneging on their agreements, etc.

I wrote, “You say, ‘including values,’ but how does one control for values, since action is itself a reflection of values?! The only way you could know that their values are the same is if their action is the same.”

No. Desperate people sacrifice values to satisfy less abstract obligations—like the obligation to feed their children.
All right, but then stealing in order to feed their children is a value to them under those circumstances. A “value,” as I was using it, is whatever one acts to gain or keep; a value is an object of an action.
If circumstances don't force one person to sacrifice their values, yet do so force another, this does not mean they have different values. Rather, disparate pressures can trigger disparate behavior among those with common values.

I wouldn’t say that they “sacrificed” their values; I would say that under those circumstances, they no longer valued a respect for people’s rights. In any case, if I understand you correctly, you’re saying that if wealthier people with the same values were in these same dire circumstances, they would take the same predatory actions. The only reason they don’t is that they are better off and are able to survive without violating people’s rights. I'll agree with you, but I think that the need to resort to robbery in order to survive is extremely rare in modern day America, and where it does occur, it's almost always the result of prior negligence on the part of the thief, who wouldn't be in that position if he had taken responsibility for his life.

I wrote, “Furthermore, even if we assume the same values, it doesn’t follow that the poor are more likely to violate the rights of the privileged, if the privileged have the power, and can more easily get away with violating the rights of the poor. Throughout history . . . . By far, the biggest exploiters and worst violators of rights in history have been the people in power, i.e., governments . . . Any crimes committed by indigent people seeking to acquire the necessities of life pale by comparison to these democidal figures."

I don't understand what the point of all of this is.

First, you conflate wealth and political power.
Of course, wealth and power are not the same, but those with political power undoubtedly had more wealth than their exploited subjects, if only because they could tax and expropriate the latter's property.
A vast majority of the perpetrators you list above committed their crimes by abusing their political power.
A vast majority? No, all of the perpetrators I listed above committed their crimes by abusing their political power.
Sure, wealth often leads to power, but so what? What matters is not how many crimes several powerful people committed, but rather how many powerful individuals committed crimes—do you see the key distinction?
Yes, but many, rather than simply a few, powerful individuals committed these crimes. Whole armies perpetrated the atrocities I cited, because they were powerful enough to pull it off. You argue that poorer people are more inclined to commit crimes than are wealthier people with the same values. But a poorer person with the same values would be less inclined to commit these crimes, if only because he doesn’t have the resources to get away with it.
You've approached this backwards. You focus on the effects of a few to prove your point. You're arguing that "a huge amount of oppressive crime has been committed by powerful people," when what you should be arguing is that a "wealthy individual is just as likely to commit violent crime as a poor individual."

Given the same values, a wealthy person is not as likely as a poor person to break the law in the commission of a violent crime – e.g., by robbing a bank or convenience store, or mugging someone on the street. But he is more likely to violate rights through the coercive, predatory actions of government, because he has the legal power to get away with it. For example, in the "Kelo vs. City of New London" decision, Justice Souter's vote authorized city governments to take land from one private owner and give it to another if the government can be expected to collect more tax revenue when the land is developed by the new owner. Justice Souter and his accomplices didn't have to worry about being arrested for grand larceny, because it was authorized by the government.

I wrote, "And even if, in some altered universe, [robbing people in order to show them that robbery is wrong] did work, I still wouldn't support it, because the end does not justify the means."

If it could not be achieved through purely private means, you would rather live in an environment where individuals don't have the values you think are crucial for us to enjoy our rights because "the ends don't justify the means," correct?

No, I wouldn't rather live in such an environment, but your question implies that I could avoid it through public education, which is a non sequitur. The values that I think are crucial for us to enjoy our rights prohibit taking people's money by force, which is exactly how public education is financed. It is financed by forcing unwilling taxpayers to subsidize it. How could I live in an environment in which individual rights are valued and respected when the government hypocritically and systematically violates these rights in the very process of claiming to uphold them? The end -- a recognition and respect for people's rights -- does not justify the means -- a violation of their rights. I pointed out this very contradiction in the omitted portion of the passage you're addressing.

Secondly, education can always be achieved through purely private means, because under a system in which their rights are respected, individuals are always free to start schools, educate their children and subsidize the education voluntarily. What they are not free to do is rob other people in order to subsidize it. Under a system of individual rights, neither is the government.

To be continued . . .

- Bill

Post 77

Wednesday, June 13, 2007 - 9:39pm

I wrote, “There are plenty of goods and services that are privately produced that are available to virtually everyone, because the price is low enough for them to afford it. Food is one; television sets are another, automobiles are another.”

I don't know why you assume true "privatization" has produced these results. Policy makers have generally understood that capitalism, like democracy, caves in on itself if taken to its extreme—none other than Adam Smith recognized this back before capitalism degenerated from a utilitarian paradigm to a religion.

So the right to freedom of action, of which laissez-faire capitalism is the politico-economic expression, is a religion that should be jettisoned as having no practical or utilitarian value, whereas the right of government to dictate people's choices and actions is a perfectly reasonable and much preferred alternative. Got it!

As for the reference to Adam Smith, you're evidently referring to the famous quote of his so often cited by critics of capitalism: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” (The Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter 10)

I think we can cut Smith a little slack here, since in most other respects, he was an ardent and eloquent defender of capitalism. Cartels are inherently unstable, as the history of OPEC makes clear. After Carter began a phased decontrol of oil prices in 1979, culminating in Ronald Reagan’s final phase-out in 1981, the subsequent rise in prices lured non-OPEC oil producers into the market, cutting into OPEC’s market share and increasing supplies, which subsequently brought down prices, causing the cartel to collapse. In a market free of government price controls, a cartel like OPEC would not have lasted as long as it did.

So your argument just re-begs the question: to what extent have government programs helped to ensure that most of the poor do have access to, for example, food and the lesser luxuries?

The question that must be asked here is, why do the poor need food stamps, to begin with? It’s because the government’s anti-poverty and welfare programs have removed any incentive for them to acquire the skills to become self-supporting. Government assistance has kept them poor and has increased their dependency and sense of entitlement.

Contrary to your assumption that, for example, the television industry is "privatized," virtually nothing in America is truly privatized. Anti-trust laws, for example, help ensure the competition that is needed to keep prices down so some poor can afford televisions.

On the contrary, antitrust laws have often been used by rival firms to limit competition from more successful producers with better products and lower prices. This was evident in the antitrust case against Microsoft in which Sun Microsystems and Netscape called for heightened scrutiny of the software giant by the DOJ.

As Alan Greenspan notes, “The necessary precondition of a coercive monopoly is closed entry – the barring of all competing producers from a given field. This can be accomplished only by an act of government intervention, in the form of special regulations, subsidies, or franchises. Without government assistance, it is impossible for a would-be monopolist to set and maintain his prices and production policies independent of the rest of the economy. For if he attempted to set his prices and production at a level that would yield profits to new entrants significantly above those available in other fields, competitors would be sure to invade his industry.”

But couldn’t a monopolist force competitors out of business by undercutting prices and selling at a loss, after which it would be free to charge high prices? If it tried this strategy, it would invite competition from rival firms who would be free to enter the market and cash in on the high profitability without any losses to recoup. The ensuing competition would reduce prices, and the monopolist would be forced to match the lower prices or risk going out of business.

Government programs like welfare subsidies help the poor buy food; Sixteen million Americans use food stamps (whether they deserve them is another matter altogether)

Far from helping the poor, government subsidies destroy the incentive to develop productive skills and move up the economic ladder, a fact that is now recognized by what were formerly the staunchest supporters of welfare benefits, the liberal democrats.

"overproduction" of staple crops is encouraged by government subsidies in effect since the New Deal. You might counter that the subsidies are your money, which is stolen from you to pay Paul. But that's irrelevant for present purposes. You may also argue that such subsidies are not needed because the taxpayer would save money from not having to pay the subsidies and therefore could spend more on food produced by a purely privatized agricultural industry. But the poor pay little to no taxes anyway, so a lack of subsidies would not yield them such a savings.

Right, but in a free market without public welfare or subsidies, the poor would still be better off than they are now, because economic productivity would be so much greater. Taxing producers to subsidize non-producers discourages production by both the producers and the non-producers. It discourages production by the producers to a certain extent, because they are not allowed to keep what they earn, and it discourages production by the non-producers, because they have little, if any, incentive to become self-supporting.

I wrote, “And most people believe in God; that doesn't mean that one exists. Here you're committing a common logical fallacy called "appeal to majority"

You misapply the argumentum ad populum concept, Mr. Dwyer.
I didn’t accuse you of argumentum ad populum; I accused you of appeal to majority, and no, they’re not the same. Argumentum ad populum is appeal to emotion, not appeal to majority. These are separate and distinct fallacies. “Ad populum” refers to "the mob," and gets its name from the rabble-rousing language used by demagogues.
If I were to say, "most people think that the sky is black, and therefore it is black," your point would be well taken. But you yourself argue agency must be voluntary. If most people accept the republican premise—that is, that the government is their agent—then, by definition, such agency is voluntary as to those individuals.

Okay, but I didn’t understand that that’s what you were saying. I thought you were saying that the government is the agent of every member of society, on the grounds that most people believe it is. You did say, and I quote, "Most people accept the premise of a republican form of government that the government is the agent of the people, even if they don’t support all of the government’s policies." "Of the people" would seem to imply everyone.

I so wish I had the time to respond to the remainder of your post, as I have plenty left to write.

I feel your pain. :-/

- Bill

Post 78

Thursday, June 14, 2007 - 6:58pm