Success in a vacuum

You have no idea what an individualist is —  but that is understandable if one has been indoctrinated into believing that one has no value and is helpless outside of a group.

You and your ilk are bound and determined that we will pay to be nurtured, no matter how destructive it is to us, as individuals, and to "society."
 
Your biggest weakness is that you don't understand that your position is one of aggression.

So, you would never say that you "owed" somebody in any sense of the term unless you were in legal contractual privity with them?

Well, in answering this question, do you agree that there are some debts that cannot be repaid materially? For example, don't we owe our parents in a relatively transcendental sense, not just for the tangible material they provided for our physical survival, but for the love, support, etc. that helped shape who we are?

In accepting the basic necessities of food, clothing, etc., from his parents, the child does not incur an obligation to repay that support at some future date. The support is his by right. If, years later, when he is an adult, his parents encounter financial difficulty, it is not his duty to help them regardless of the cost to himself. There can be no unchosen obligations of this kind. If, however, they had treated him at all well and if he has maintained cordial relations with them, he properly would wish to help them to the extent that he reasonably and non-self-sacrificially can do so.

"By virtue of their unique biological relationship, parents and child are normally predisposed to feel benevolence toward each other. Parents expect to feel love for their creation. A child wishes to feel love for his protectors. But this biological tie must never be "traded on" -- that is, used as a moral blank check, as a substitute for personal value. Parents cannot demand love as a duty -- "because we're your parents." A child cannot demand absolution of any irrationality -- "because I'm your child." Emotions are not causeless. Love, respect, admiration have to be earned. (Nathaniel Branden, "What are the respective obligations of parents to children, and children to parents?," The Objectivist Newsletter, December 1962)

You quoted the following statement of mine:

At the very least, what Ford owes society is a recognition that society has played a crucial role in his success—how, or if, this "debt" translates into a material payment, as I asserted above it does, is another matter altogether. But, if it does not, the argument is not moot, because if objectivists nevertheless accept the premise that Ford owes society in just a moral, rather than a material, sense—something I know they won’t—it would weaken the moral basis for their absolutist free market fervor. After all, objectivists are not hedonists, right? They believe in morality, but just disagree with others about what morality means.

You then wrote,

You seem to think that the justification for Ford's right to keep what he earned is the idea that his achievement occurred ONLY as a result of his individual effort, which is false. That's not the justification; the justification is that he earned it, which means he produced something of value that people chose to buy.

This paragraph is tautological. "He earned" and "he produced": your use of these phrases is just another way of minimizing or negating society's alleged role in Ford's "production," even though the existence and nature of that role is what we're arguing about in the first place.

Indeed, to commit you to your "justification," would you agree that if society then plays a role in Ford's production, it follows that society should share in the profits?

Gratitude, yes, so long as by "gratitude" we don't mean submissive fawning at the wonder that is society pater, but rather the recognition of the causal relationship between society's constructs and Ford's ability to "earn" what he had.

Some have tried to sarcastically reduce "gratitude" down to a "pat on the back." But if debt has a moral prong to it—that is, not only represented by digits on a ledger, but by personal commitments implicating the integrity of the debtor—then it follows that the moral basis for absolutist free-market thinking is weakened, because that thinking erroneously overlooks the role of society in individual gain.

I refer you to the last paragraph in your previous post. I also refer you to my response, in which I noted your own arbitrariness without scolding.

You assume that by "false dichotomy" I mean solely the choice between society's power being limited or unlimited—an assumption that is somewhat understandable. However, Rand's "answers" go farther than just providing the options of "limited" versus "unlimited." They go on to define what those terms mean, and the definitions themselves make the choice a false one, because one can believe in collectivism without believing that individual freedom must always yield to the wishes of society. In other words, I don't have to accept your/Rand's definition of collectivism.

No. I mean those individuals and the society they represent.

Even if we are going to use the more legal definition of the term "agency," a principal may be bound by the actions of her agent even if her agent's acts are inconsistent with her wishes. You set your agent straight or fire them, and attempt damage control, not claim you never had an agent in the first place.

But this isn't about you. It's about society.

And I'm not part of society?

If a majority of society agreed that the laws are made by them, even if you don't—that is, if they recognize the agency relationship—would you then agree that society created those laws, even if you did not?

After all, I essentially agreed a while back to delineate society from our individual producer for theoretical purposes.

More importantly, I wonder what Ford believed? The Ford Foundation?! A pretty socially-conscious organization if you ask me.

Sam, maybe you should cool the jets a bit. You give yourself way too much credit for understanding who I am or why I'm here. You refer to my "ilk," that I'm "indoctrinated," or that I have an "agenda." You seem far too inclined to reducing the people around you down to caricatures, like Rand does via the ridiculously two-dimensional characters in Atlas.

So you probably think I'm short, fat, lazy, with degenerate facial features, and dark hair and eyes, right?

There is, of course, another sense in which I have certain non-contractual moral obligations, such as the obligation not to violate the rights of others, if I expect my own rights to recognized and respected. But that "obligation" is simply one of consistency; I must treat others as I would have others treat me.

This is an immensely concessionary statement, although you perhaps don't realize it.

First, you admit that you are "obliged to"—that is, you owe—others based on an obligation not arising out of a contractual agreement.

Second, if you expect others to feel this same “moral obligation’—which you must given your expectation of reciprocity—then you admit that equal obligations between individuals don’t “cancel out” as you suggested later in your post. Rather, the obligations must still be “satisfied.”

Third, if you feel you must "pay" this debt—i.e., you must adapt your behavior to the respective "obligation"—"if [you] expect [your] own rights to [be] recognized and respected," then you necessarily concede that you can't rely on police power to ensure the protection of your interests. Rather, you rely on the fact that others will feel morally bound to the principle of reciprocity as you do. This is a "social contract." I know you'll try to run from that boogie-man phrase, but that's what it is.

Further, the practical benefits the moral obligation you describe yields cannot arise without the existence of a critical number of individuals who feel equally bound. This ensures stability—the stability you and I need to enjoy what we have and to focus on things other than basic physical survival, such as spending way too much time arguing on message boards.

Why do others share this same moral obligation? We know it's not entirely because of direct state coercion, as you necessarily admit, and as I wholeheartedly agree. You might, then, try to backpedal from your description of this obligation as a "moral" one by emphasizing the “rational self interests” individuals have in the "bargain": we "trade" respect for our own selfish reasons.

But what if I have no interests to protect? What if my existence is miserable because I lack physical necessities such as adequate heat and food? Will my "investment" in the deal be high? It will not. What do I have to lose? Poor uneducated people commit violent crimes more often than the affluent and educated. My diminishing investment makes me more likely to "breach" our bargain by not respecting your rights, a lack of respect the criminal justice system cannot prevent if presented on a massive scale. It follows that something other than the threat of force is needed in order to maintain a “social system” where individuals respect each others’ rights.

What is needed is to instill in people internal mechanisms like the "moral obligation" to which you admit you're bound. To instill in them the belief that they are parties to the social contract. How is this done? Well, good parents for one, but are they common? Not common enough. Education does this (with a debatable amount of efficacy). But does government have to educate? As an empirical matter, to say that instilling such values in individuals can realistically be achieved through purely private means is naive. Invariably people won’t be able to afford it. Society keeps enough (although not all) people from resorting to less desirable instinctual conduct.

Owe someone "in a relatively transcendental sense"? Could you be a little clearer on what you mean?

 I don't know how I can be clearer. I mean the moral obligation like the one you described above. Another form is gratitude—I specifically agreed in the previous post that gratitude was an example.

You said,

Let me be generous and assume that what you were trying to say is that "society" is all the individual members of a community including its government officials? If that's your definition, then it makes your theory of social obligation circular, as well. "Everyone owes "society" would then simply mean that "everyone owes everyone else. If I owe you what you owe me, then our debts are self-cancelling.

 But as you’ve unknowingly demonstrated, this “self-canceling” is a fallacy. You owe me your respect for my rights, and I owe you the same. This cannot be meaningful if we agree it’s merely a wash, forget about it, and go back to assuming no obligation.

You’re milking the “circular” thing a bit much. I meant to type the “individuals” they represent. Moreover, my definition of “society” is not “shifting.” You forget that the times in which I’ve invoked the concept of “society” are very context specific. Then you turn around and try to say that the narrow manner in which I use the term in a given context represents what I believe is the full and exclusive scope of the term. For example, . . .

Before, you said that by "society" you simply [i.e., only] meant the government.

I never said that. 

I say: “But this isn't about you. It's about society.”

 

You say: “And I'm not part of society?”

 You deduce that what I’m saying is that since you are not the whole of society, then you are not a part of society. This is silly.

Society = the government and those it represents.

(Edited by Edward Cantu on 6/06, 6:43pm)

(Edited by Edward Cantu on 6/06, 6:46pm)

This is an immensely concessionary statement, although you perhaps don't realize it.

First, you admit that you are "obliged to"—that is, you owe—others based on an obligation not arising out of a contractual agreement.

Second, if you expect others to feel this same “moral obligation’—which you must given your expectation of reciprocity—then you admit that equal obligations between individuals don’t “cancel out” as you suggested later in your post. Rather, the obligations must still be “satisfied.”

Third, if you feel you must "pay" this debt—i.e., you must adapt your behavior to the respective "obligation"—"if [you] expect [your] own rights to [be] recognized and respected" . . .

One's obligation to respect the rights of others is not an obligation to pay a debt, unless the debt arises from a contractual agreement involving an exchange of values. My obligation to abstain from mugging you, for example, is not an obligation to pay a debt.

. . . then you necessarily concede that you can't rely on police power to ensure the protection of your interests.

Oh, I readily concede that. If most of us didn't choose to respect the rights of others, there wouldn't be enough police to handle the ensuing crime, which is why individual morality is so important. Moreover, without private morality, what guarantee would we have that the police themselves will respect our rights?

Rather, you rely on the fact that others will feel morally bound to the principle of reciprocity as you do. This is a "social contract." I know you'll try to run from that boogie-man phrase, but that's what it is.