Varia

William Dwyer wrote:

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, my good Catholic buddy, are you listening? No, I'm sure he isn't; GWL is almost certainly gone for good.

Think again! Bwahahahahahahahahaha!

That guy was a master of the evasive maneuver -- slippery as an eel on ice. In his parting post, he said that he believed in God, because most people in the world did, and because his parents told him it was true -- a comment which surprised me just a little, given his other more academic arguments, like those from Aquinas and Aristotle. But I suppose that if everything else fails, there's nothing like a good argument from authority. But . . . his PARENTS?? If his parents told him that was a Santa Claus, would he believe them??

Please note that what I actually said in my parting post was the following:

"I know that Santa is a mythical being according to the testimony of my parents and others. I also see no compelling reason to believe such a person as Santa exists. However, in the case of God, not only do I have the testimony of persons I trust and the majority of the globe, I also have independently compelling reasons to believe that He exists."

N.b. the last clause of the last sentence: independently compelling reasons. The independently compelling reasons which I refer to are philosophical arguments which I understand to be persuasive. In other words, my belief in God isn’t based solely on arguments from authority.

Ted Keer wrote:

Spinoza's idea of God is impersonal - defined as natura naturans - "nature naturing." This conception of God is pretty much harmless, and is the best one can really coherently posit with a God "outside" of time.

Spinoza’s conception of God is harmless because it’s entirely gratuitous: it says nothing of God which it can’t simply say of Nature.

The real problem with God in this sense is the assumption of the primacy of consciousness.

For reasons I will explain later, this is not a problem.

People will happily accept the idea of a mind existing without a cause, but they have a hard time accepting existence without a mind to create it.

This is because it makes sense to posit an eternal, necessarily existing Mind behind the universe.

In light of recent cosmological discoveries which provide considerable evidence in support of the conclusion that the universe began to exist, it does not make sense to think of the universe as uncaused. This explains why people have a hard time accepting the existence of the universe as a brute fact.

William wrote:

In our recent debate, Leibniz argued that it's possible for nothing to have existed; therefore, there had to be an explanation for existence, which is God.

That wasn’t my argument. I argued that because the universe is contingent—i.e., because the universe is unable to explain its own existence—there must be a Necessary Being whose existence does not require any further explanation.

I countered that it is not possible for nothing to have existed, because possibility and impossibility apply only to what already exists.

In that case, we ought to believe that the existence of unicorns is impossible. But that can’t be right, for the concept of a unicorn doesn’t contain a contradiction.

The possible depends on the actual; therefore, existence could not not have existed.

Epistemically speaking, the possible depends on the actual, for it is from the actual that we determine what is possible. But metaphysically speaking, the possible is independent of the actual. If something is actual, a fortiori it is possible. But if something is possible, it doesn't follow that it is actual, or that it has any significant conceptual connection with the actual.

The question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is invalid, to begin with, because explanations presuppose an already existing universe and can only be formulated in terms of what exists.

Imagine that an asteroid the size of Texas strikes tomorrow, wiping out all life on earth. In the aftermath, there would still be an astronomical explanation for why the asteroid struck earth, even though nobody would be around to ask for or provide such an explanation.

Similarly, even if the universe never existed, there would still be an explanation for why it never existed, even though no intelligent beings would be around to ask for such an explanation.

Not surprisingly, our pseudonymous Leibniz ("Dubya" for short) held the same view of possibility as the German philosopher himself, while nevertheless claiming that God exists outside of time and space as a necessary being from which all "contingent" forms of being -- i.e., material existents -- emanate.

I wouldn't want to say that material existents emanate from God; that idea has been condemned by the Church as heresy. However, I would want to say that God, being a Necessary Being, is the source of all contingent beings.

In claiming that God is a necessary being, Dubya was therefore implying that God could not not have existed.

Right.

He was assigning to God the same status that Objectivists assign to existence itself.

Why should objectivists assign necessary existence to everything that exists? Such an assignment destroys the very concept of possibility.

One then has to ask how God differs from existence, from the basic stuff of the universe? Well, of course, the answer is that God is a pure spirit or consciousness, whereas the basic stuff of existence is matter -- the primary constituents from which everything else is made.

Well, not quite. God is immaterial. But so are angels, and so is the human intellect, or soul.

So why couldn't a pure spirit exist as a necessary being that created the material constituents of the universe? I like Richard Dawkins answer, [sic] which is that since consciousness or spirit evolved from non-sentient organisms, it depends on a process of material evolution. Matter created consciousness; consciousness did not create matter.

And I, like any other right-thinking philosopher, would say that such an answer is nonsense. Even if matter did create consciousness (I believe we have good reason to believe it didn’t), it doesn’t follow that all forms of consciousness are dependent on matter. It just follows that consciousness-as-it-is-possessed-by-human-beings is dependent on matter.

Moreover, as Rand points out, consciousness presupposes an external world; if nothing existed prior to consciousness, there could be no consciousness, because there would have been nothing to be conscious of. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms; before it could identify itself as consciousness, it would have to be conscious of something (other than itself).

Now Dubya is found of replying that a consciousness could be conscious of its own content (which is how he describes God) without being conscious of anything else. But the content had to come from observing something outside itself. We are able to introspect only because we have extrospected -- only because we have perceived a reality external to ourselves from which we obtain the material of introspection.

Again, because our ideas are not innate, but are rather acquired through sense experience, we can only introspect after we have extrospected. (As St. Thomas Aquinas says, “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu,”—“Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses.”)

However, we have no reason to believe that all possible conscious beings would have to formulate their ideas from sense experience, since the ideas of some conscious beings might be innate.

Moreover, a consciousness must have a material means of cognition -- a brain and physical sense organs -- without which it couldn't perceive reality or process sensory information. Consciousness is always conscious in a particular form. A pure, disembodied consciousness, would have no material form of awareness and could not therefore be conscious.

Again, why should human consciousness be the only possible form of consciousness? If a purely intellectual being, such as an angel, were conscious, it wouldn’t need a material form of awareness.

So, the primary existent(s) could not have been a disembodied consciousness; it had to be the material constituents out of which consciousness eventually evolved. The primary or necessary being is therefore material existence, not God.

Because of the reasons I’ve given, this conclusion doesn't follow.

[...] a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms; before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something.

I see why this is the case for human beings, but I don’t see why it applies to all possible forms of consciousness.

Jordan wrote:

You can reject the "first cause" argument either by challenging the "first" or by challenging the "cause." With regard to the "first": You could opt for infinite regress.

Yes, you could opt for infinite regress: a finite interval with a line beginning from one end and approaching the other end as a limit.

William wrote:

Yes, insofar as Christianity believes in free will, there is a contradiction. If God knows everything that's going to happen, then whatever we do "had" to happen, in which case, there's no free will.

Not if God is atemporal. As Aquinas says:

“God has had an infallible knowledge of all contingent events from eternity, and yet they cease not to be contingent. For contingency is not inconsistent with certain and assured knowledge except so far as the contingent event lies in the future, not as it is present. While the event is in the future, it may not be; and thus the view of him who reckons that it still be may be mistaken: but once it is present, for that time it cannot but be. Any view therefore formed upon a contingent event inasmuch as it is present may be a certitude. But the intuition of the divine mind rests from eternity upon each and every [one] of the events that happen in the course of time, viewing each as a thing present. There is nothing therefore to hinder God from having from eternity an infallible knowledge of contingent events.”

On the other hand, if there's free will, then God cannot know what choices people are going to make, in which case, he's not omniscient.

Free will and omniscience are not mutually exclusive, as I have just demonstrated.

There's also a contradiction between omniscience and omnipotence. If God knows the future, then he can't change it, in which case, he's not omnipotent. If he can change it, then he doesn't know what's going to happen, in which case, he's not omniscient.

God can change the future in the sense that it is within God’s power to change the future. But he won’t change the future, because he wills the future, and his will is perfect and eternal. There is no contradiction.

These contradictions are not resolved by claiming that God exists outside of time and space, whatever that's supposed to mean.

But of course one of these alleged contradictions can be resolved by claiming that God exists outside time and space, because one of them in fact has been resolved by using such an expedient.

It makes sense to say that the universe exists outside of time and space, because time and space are relational concepts that apply to events and entities within the universe, not to the universe as a whole, but God is not all there is (assuming that he exists); he is part of the universe, in which case, it would make no sense to say that he exists outside of time and space.

God, if he exists, is not “part” of the universe. He is a Necessary Being; the universe is contingent. He is the Creator; the universe is the created.

***

I intend to comment on some other posts as soon as I have more time.

-Leibniz

Post 1

Sunday, December 16, 2007 - 10:43am

Leibniz,

It's been so long since we discussed these issues, I've lost track of the context. I don't remember in which thread and post I made these comments, and would like to review the discussion before replying to you.

If you've been absent from a debate for a very long time, as you have, and wish to resume it by starting a new thread, don't you think you should cite the previous thread and post for reference?

- Bill

Post 2

Sunday, December 16, 2007 - 11:33am

William wrote:

It's been so long since we discussed these issues, I've lost track of the context. I don't remember in which thread and post I made these comments, and would like to review the discussion before replying to you.

If you've been absent from a debate for a very long time, as you have, and wish to resume it by starting a new thread, don't you think you should cite the previous thread and post for reference?

Yes, I think I should; therefore, I will.

The quotes are taken from four posts. I've listed the posts below in the order in which they are referenced in my post:

#23, Does a life force or 'soul' exist?, on the Objectivism Q&A board

#3, The best way to refute the 'God exists outside of time' argument ?, on the Objectivism Q&A board.

#5; same thread and board.

#9; same thread and board.

-Leibniz

P.S. I would have made my comments on the above threads, but since I am a "Dissenter," I am only able to post on the 'Dissent' board.

(Edited by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on 12/16, 11:40am)

Post 3

Monday, December 17, 2007 - 12:03am

In Post #23 of the thread "Does a life force or soul exist?" in the "Objectivism Q&A" forum, I wrote of Leibniz, "That guy was a master of the evasive maneuver -- slippery as an eel on ice. In his parting post, he said that he believed in God, because most people in the world did, and because his parents told him it was true -- a comment which surprised me just a little, given his other more academic arguments, like those from Aquinas and Aristotle. But I suppose that if everything else fails, there's nothing like a good argument from authority. But . . . his PARENTS?? If his parents told him that was a Santa Claus, would he believe them??" He replied,

Please note that what I actually said in my parting post was the following:

"I know that Santa is a mythical being according to the testimony of my parents and others. I also see no compelling reason to believe such a person as Santa exists. However, in the case of God, not only do I have the testimony of persons I trust and the majority of the globe, I also have independently compelling reasons to believe that He exists."

N.b. the last clause of the last sentence: independently compelling reasons. The independently compelling reasons which I refer to are philosophical arguments which I understand to be persuasive. In other words, my belief in God isn’t based solely on arguments from authority.

Only partly on arguments from authority then. If you have independently compelling reasons, why elicit the testimony of others as a justification for your beliefs, unless you think that such "testimony" carries weight. But why would it, since other people have no more access to philosophical truth than you do. What the majority is expressing is not testimony, since testimony implies access to direct evidence. And they have no more access to direct evidence of God's existence than you do. Hence, their so-called "testimony" is not testimony at all, but simply an expression of their belief.

As for your independently compelling reasons, they're entirely specious, since you have yet to meet the burden of proof.

I wrote: "In our recent debate, Leibniz argued that it's possible for nothing to have existed; therefore, there had to be an explanation for existence, which is God."

That wasn’t my argument. I argued that because the universe is contingent—i.e., because the universe is unable to explain its own existence—there must be a Necessary Being whose existence does not require any further explanation.

The universe doesn't require an explanation. The universe, which is the sum total of that which exists, is itself a necessary being, not a contingent one -- unless, by "the universe" you simply mean the universe in its present state, but in that case, the cause of the universe in its present state is the universe in its previous state, and the cause of the universe in its previous state is the state of the universe before that, and so on. The universe -- existence -- in some form always existed. There is no reason to posit a God to explain it; it requires no explanation.

I wrote that "it is not possible for nothing to have existed, because possibility and impossibility apply only to what already exists".

In that case, we ought to believe that the existence of unicorns is impossible. But that can’t be right, for the concept of a unicorn doesn’t contain a contradiction.

No, you're missing the point. The point I was making is that possibility depends on what existing entities are capable of doing. I don't know if a unicorn is possible or not. It may be, but if it is, then it is possible only because the evolutionary conditions are capable of producing one.

I wrote, "The possible depends on the actual; therefore, existence could not not have existed."

Epistemically speaking, the possible depends on the actual, for it is from the actual that we determine what is possible. But metaphysically speaking, the possible is independent of the actual. If something is actual, a fortiori it is possible. But if something is possible, it doesn't follow that it is actual, or that it has any significant conceptual connection with the actual.

I agree that if something is possible, it doesn't follow that it is actual; but I don't agree that it needn't have any significant conceptual connection with the actual. If it's possible for me to run a mile in six minutes, then I must actually have the physical conditioning to do it. If I don't, then it's not possible for me to run it in that amount of time. And I can tell you right now that since I don't have the physical conditioning for it, I can't run a mile in six minutes -- although there was a time when I could.

I wrote, "The question, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' is invalid, to begin with, because explanations presuppose an already existing universe and can only be formulated in terms of what exists.

Imagine that an asteroid the size of Texas strikes tomorrow, wiping out all life on earth. In the aftermath, there would still be an astronomical explanation for why the asteroid struck earth, even though nobody would be around to ask for or provide such an explanation.

Okay, in terms of what already exists or already existed. The point was, that an explanation of why there is something rather than nothing would require the existence of something to explain it, which is the very thing one is attempting to explain.

Similarly, even if the universe never existed, there would still be an explanation for why it never existed, even though no intelligent beings would be around to ask for such an explanation.

No. That is the very point I'm contesting. If the universe never existed, then nothing could have existed to explain its never having existed.

I wrote, "Not surprisingly, our pseudonymous Leibniz ('Dubya' for short) held the same view of possibility as the German philosopher himself, while nevertheless claiming that God exists outside of time and space as a necessary being from which all "contingent" forms of being -- i.e., material existents -- emanate."

I wouldn't want to say that material existents emanate from God; that idea has been condemned by the Church as heresy.
Really!
However, I would want to say that God, being a Necessary Being, is the source of all contingent beings.

Yes, you would!

I wrote, "In claiming that God is a necessary being, Dubya was therefore implying that God could not not have existed."

Right.

"He was assigning to God the same status that Objectivists assign to existence itself."

Why should objectivists assign necessary existence to everything that exists? Such an assignment destroys the very concept of possibility.

Not to everything that exists; to existence as such. In other words, the fundamental constituents of the universe or of existence could not not have existed. (By the way, I noticed that you spelled "Objectivist" with a small "o." The correct spelling is with a capital "O," since the term refers to Ayn Rand's philosophy, not to the generic form of objectivism.

I wrote, "One then has to ask how God differs from existence, from the basic stuff of the universe? Well, of course, the answer is that God is a pure spirit or consciousness, whereas the basic stuff of existence is matter -- the primary constituents from which everything else is made."

Well, not quite. God is immaterial. But so are angels, and so is the human intellect, or soul.

The human intellect or soul is as much physical as it is mental. It does not and cannot exist independently of the body, whereas God and his angels are depicted as pure disembodied spirits.

I continued, "So why couldn't a pure spirit exist as a necessary being that created the material constituents of the universe? I like Richard Dawkins answer, [sic] which is that since consciousness or spirit evolved from non-sentient organisms, it depends on a process of material evolution. Matter created consciousness; consciousness did not create matter."

And I, like any other right-thinking philosopher, would say that such an answer is nonsense. Even if matter did create consciousness (I believe we have good reason to believe it didn’t), it doesn’t follow that all forms of consciousness are dependent on matter. It just follows that consciousness-as-it-is-possessed-by-human-beings is dependent on matter. Not true. Matter created consciousness in all its forms, animal as well as human. There is no immaterial consciousness, nor can there be.

I wrote, "Moreover, as Rand points out, consciousness presupposes an external world; if nothing existed prior to consciousness, there could be no consciousness, because there would have been nothing to be conscious of. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms; before it could identify itself as consciousness, it would have to be conscious of something (other than itself).

Now Dubya is found of replying that a consciousness could be conscious of its own content (which is how he describes God) without being conscious of anything else. But the content had to come from observing something outside itself. We are able to introspect only because we have extrospected -- only because we have perceived a reality external to ourselves from which we obtain the material of introspection."

Again, because our ideas are not innate, but are rather acquired through sense experience, we can only introspect after we have extrospected. (As St. Thomas Aquinas says, “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu,”—“Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses.”)

So, you've changed your mind! Weren't you saying just a few months ago that certain ideas were innate? Glad to see you've come around.

However, we have no reason to believe that all possible conscious beings would have to formulate their ideas from sense experience, since the ideas of some conscious beings might be innate.

How? -- unless you are talking about a clone, but the clone would ultimately have to be cloned from a person who acquired his ideas from initially observing the external world.

I wrote, "Moreover, a consciousness must have a material means of cognition -- a brain and physical sense organs -- without which it couldn't perceive reality or process sensory information. Consciousness is always conscious in a particular form. A pure, disembodied consciousness, would have no material form of awareness and could not therefore be conscious."

Again, why should human consciousness be the only possible form of consciousness? If a purely intellectual being, such as an angel, were conscious, it wouldn’t need a material form of awareness.

Because, as I said, "a pure disembodied consciousness would have no material form of awareness and could not therefore be conscious." A consciousness must perceive reality in a particular form -- visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc. -- which is determined by its sensory apparatus. A consciousness with no physical means of perception would have no form of perception -- no way to perceive reality -- in which case, it could not be conscious of the external world.

I continued, "So, the primary existent(s) could not have been a disembodied consciousness; it had to be the material constituents out of which consciousness eventually evolved. The primary or necessary being is therefore material existence, not God. [...] a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms; before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something.

I see why this is the case for human beings, but I don’t see why it applies to all possible forms of consciousness.

It seems to me obvious why it applies to all forms of consciousness; it applies to consciousness as such.

I wrote, "insofar as Christianity believes in free will, there is a contradiction. If God knows everything that's going to happen, then whatever we do "had" to happen, in which case, there's no free will."

Not if God is atemporal. As Aquinas says:
“God has had an infallible knowledge of all contingent events from eternity, and yet they cease not to be contingent. For contingency is not inconsistent with certain and assured knowledge except so far as the contingent event lies in the future, not as it is present. While the event is in the future, it may not be; and thus the view of him who reckons that it still be may be mistaken: but once it is present, for that time it cannot but be. Any view therefore formed upon a contingent event inasmuch as it is present may be a certitude. But the intuition of the divine mind rests from eternity upon each and every [one] of the events that happen in the course of time, viewing each as a thing present. There is nothing therefore to hinder God from having from eternity an infallible knowledge of contingent events.”

Oh, come on! You can't circumvent this contradiction by declaring arbitrarily that God isn't seeing the future -- that he's merely observing events that to his eyes have already happened. Before I make a choice, I haven't already made the choice, and if I haven't already made the choice, then if God "knows" what choice I'm going to make, it's not possible for me to choose otherwise; I must choose what he knows I'm going to choose, in which case, I don't have free will.

I continued, "On the other hand, if there's free will, then God cannot know what choices people are going to make, in which case, he's not omniscient."

Free will and omniscience are not mutually exclusive, as I have just demonstrated.

You've demonstrated no such thing!

I wrote, "There's also a contradiction between omniscience and omnipotence. If God knows the future, then he can't change it, in which case, he's not omnipotent. If he can change it, then he doesn't know what's going to happen, in which case, he's not omniscient."

God can change the future in the sense that it is within God’s power to change the future. But he won’t change the future, because he wills the future, and his will is perfect and eternal. There is no contradiction.

I don't think you're seeing the argument. If God knows the future, then he can't change it, because if he could, then the future wouldn't be as he sees it, in which case, he wouldn't be omniscient. There is indeed a contradiction.

I wrote, "These contradictions are not resolved by claiming that God exists outside of time and space, whatever that's supposed to mean."

But of course one of these alleged contradictions can be resolved by claiming that God exists outside time and space, because one of them in fact has been resolved by using such an expedient.

Not resolved. The correct term is "rationalized."

I wrote, "It makes sense to say that the universe exists outside of time and space, because time and space are relational concepts that apply to events and entities within the universe, not to the universe as a whole, but God is not all there is (assuming that he exists); he is part of the universe, in which case, it would make no sense to say that he exists outside of time and space."

God, if he exists, is not “part” of the universe. He is a Necessary Being; the universe is contingent. He is the Creator; the universe is the created.

The term "universal" refers to all. Therefore, the "universe" of existents quite properly refers to all existents. If God exists, then he is part of universe, because he is part of everything that exists. But of course, he doesn't exist.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 12/17, 10:58am)

Post 4

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 2:01pm

How can something immaterial exist at all? Only thing I can think of close but not yet known is "space" itself:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_space_and_time

GWL is also mentioned here

Post 5

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 2:45pm

Space is not immaterial - energy is merely unconcentrated matter, and no matter how 'thin' the energy in space is, it exist, as an integral aspect of existence [because, within the universe, it is always dynamic, never static]....

Post 6

Wednesday, December 19, 2007 - 6:16am

I didn't think so, so my question remains - how does one postulate something immaterial when no such thing exists?

Post 7

Wednesday, December 19, 2007 - 3:08pm

Kurt,

Are you attempting to champion crude materialism?

Ed

Post 8

Wednesday, December 19, 2007 - 7:17pm

When I say "crude" materialism, I mean "reductive" materialism (e.g. Marxist-style materialism). Here's a diagram showing that an ontology of reductive materialism inevitably leads to an epistemology of solipsism ...

From:
http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/Appendix1.htm

Ed

Post 9

Friday, December 21, 2007 - 6:09am

Hardly - just trying to see what the definition of "immaterial" is. Are you championing deism? Is the postulation of an immaterial being reasonable then?

Post 10

Friday, December 21, 2007 - 9:22am

Kurt,

(1) immaterial
not composed of matter <it is only possible to study immaterial forces like gravity by observing their effects on the physical world>

Adapted from:
m-w.com

(2) I'm not explicitly championing Deism, but I am sympathetic to Spinozian pantheism. Integrate (3) below in order to understand my standpoint on this ... er ... matter.

;-)

(3) Everything immaterial, such as gravity or consciousness -- is derived from, or originates in, the physical world.

Ed

Post 11

Tuesday, January 15, 2008 - 8:19pm

William wrote:

In Post #23 of the thread "Does a life force or soul exist?" in the "Objectivism Q&A" forum, I wrote of Leibniz, "That guy was a master of the evasive maneuver -- slippery as an eel on ice. In his parting post, he said that he believed in God, because most people in the world did, and because his parents told him it was true -- a comment which surprised me just a little, given his other more academic arguments, like those from Aquinas and Aristotle. But I suppose that if everything else fails, there's nothing like a good argument from authority. But . . . his PARENTS?? If his parents told him that was a Santa Claus, would he believe them??" He replied,
Please note that what I actually said in my parting post was the following:

"I know that Santa is a mythical being according to the testimony of my parents and others. I also see no compelling reason to believe such a person as Santa exists. However, in the case of God, not only do I have the testimony of persons I trust and the majority of the globe, I also have independently compelling reasons to believe that He exists."

N.b. the last clause of the last sentence: independently compelling reasons. The independently compelling reasons which I refer to are philosophical arguments which I understand to be persuasive. In other words, my belief in God isn’t based solely on arguments from authority.
Only partly on arguments from authority then. If you have independently compelling reasons, why elicit the testimony of others as a justification for your beliefs, unless you think that such "testimony" carries weight. But why would it, since other people have no more access to philosophical truth than you do. What the majority is expressing is not testimony, since testimony implies access to direct evidence. And they have no more access to direct evidence of God's existence than you do. Hence, their so-called "testimony" is not testimony at all, but simply an expression of their belief.

As for your independently compelling reasons, they're entirely specious, since you have yet to meet the burden of proof.

You are right; I was wrong to give such a significant place to popular testimony in attempting to present a justification for my beliefs.

However, I must disagree with the idea that the pervasive, transcultural belief in God does not constitute "testimony." Of course it qualifies as testimony: because most of the persons who claim to believe in God also claim to have had religious experiences in which they felt the presence of God.

Therefore, unless we have reason to believe that the religious experiences of the world's majority are wholly illusory, or that those who profess having such experiences are engaged in a vast enterprise of deception, then we have reason to accept their testimony of having experienced God's presence as evidence of the presence of God.

Let me use a similar case as an example. Imagine a man born with a particular brain defect: he lacks the C-fibers responsible for creating the sensation of pain. Although unable to experience pain himself, such a man knows from the testimony of other human beings that pain is real.

Now please note that this man has no "direct evidence" for believing that there is such a sensation as pain, because he has not experienced pain himself. Nevertheless, the testimony of others constitutes a justification for his belief in the reality of pain. Therefore, for testimony to justify belief it need not imply access to direct evidence.

I wrote:
"[B]ecause the universe is contingent—i.e., because the universe is unable to explain its own existence—there must be a Necessary Being whose existence does not require any further explanation."

William replied:

The universe doesn't require an explanation. The universe, which is the sum total of that which exists, is itself a necessary being, not a contingent one -- unless, by "the universe" you simply mean the universe in its present state, but in that case, the cause of the universe in its present state is the universe in its previous state, and the cause of the universe in its previous state is the state of the universe before that, and so on. The universe -- existence -- in some form always existed. There is no reason to posit a God to explain it; it requires no explanation.

First, the universe isn't a "thing." It's a collection of things: quarks, leptons, stars, galaxies, fish, elephants, chimpanzees, etc.

Second, each of the many things which compose the universe is contingent, i.e., there is nothing contained in the concept of any which necessitates that it exist. Therefore, there is a possible world in which none of these things exists.

Now, because there is a possible world in which none of these things exists, and because the universe is a certain collection of these things, it follows that the existence of our universe is not necessary.

But if the universe does not necessarily exist, then we are permitted to ask why it exists. And the only satisfactory answer to why the universe exists is that there exists some Greatest Possible Being, who exists necessarily, and who brings everything else in the universe into existence.

It matters not whether this Greatest Possible Being is definitionally included in the term "universe" or not. If we define universe as "everything that exists," as you do, then such a Being is indeed part of the universe.

But even if we use this definition of universe, a satisfactory answer to the question 'Why does the universe--why does this particular collection of things--exist?' can only be provided by positing the existence of a necessary Being among the seemingly infinite observable contingent beings.

Therefore, there exists a Necessary Being.

William wrote:

[P]ossibility depends on what existing entities are capable of doing. I don't know if a unicorn is possible or not. It may be, but if it is, then it is possible only because the evolutionary conditions are capable of producing one.

Why must the existence of unicorns only be possible insofar as the "evolutionary conditions are capable of producing one." Isn't it perfectly possible that in some far-away part of the universe there exists an eternal race of unicorn-producing alien scientists?

I wrote:
"Epistemically speaking, the possible depends on the actual, for it is from the actual that we determine what is possible. But metaphysically speaking, the possible is independent of the actual. If something is actual, a fortiori it is possible. But if something is possible, it doesn't follow that it is actual, or that it has any significant conceptual connection with the actual."

William replied:

I agree that if something is possible, it doesn't follow that it is actual; but I don't agree that it needn't have any significant conceptual connection with the actual. If it's possible for me to run a mile in six minutes, then I must actually have the physical conditioning to do it. If I don't, then it's not possible for me to run it in that amount of time. And I can tell you right now that since I don't have the physical conditioning for it, I can't run a mile in six minutes -- although there was a time when I could.

I concede that for a thing to be possible it must have some conceptual connection with the actual. My point was only that for a thing to be possible it needn't have a significant conceptual connection with the actual.

William wrote:

The question, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' is invalid, to begin with, because explanations presuppose an already existing universe and can only be formulated in terms of what exists.

I replied:

"Imagine that an asteroid the size of Texas strikes tomorrow, wiping out all life on earth. In the aftermath, there would still be an astronomical explanation for why the asteroid struck earth, even though nobody would be around to ask for or provide such an explanation."

William then responded:

Okay, in terms of what already exists or already existed. The point was, that an explanation of why there is something rather than nothing would require the existence of something to explain it, which is the very thing one is attempting to explain.

You're missing the point. I'm not asking, 'Why is there nothing rather than something?"

I wrote:

"[E]ven if the universe never existed, there would still be an explanation for why it never existed, even though no intelligent beings would be around to ask for such an explanation."

William replied:

No. That is the very point I'm contesting. If the universe never existed, then nothing could have existed to explain its never having existed.

If the universe never existed, its non-existence would not require an explanation, for the simple reason that there would be nothing to explain. The case is different for an actually existing universe. Because it exists, and does not (on your view) seem to include a Necessary Being, its existence requires explanation. There is something there, viz. the universe, therefore, there has to be a reason for its being there if its existence is not necessary.

I wrote:
"I wouldn't want to say that material existents emanate from God; that idea has been condemned by the Church as heresy."

William replied:

Really!

Yep. From the First Vatican Council (Canons: On God the Creator of All Things):

If anyone says that finite things, both corporal and spiritual, or at any rate, spiritual, emanated from the divine substance; or that the divine essence, by the manifestation and evolution of itself becomes all things or, finally, that God is a universal or indefinite being which by self determination establishes the totality of things distinct in genera, species and individuals: let him be anathema.

Also, from the Catechism of the Catholic Church (S. 296):

We believe that God needs no pre-existent thing or any help in order to create, nor is creation any sort of necessary emanation from the divine substance. God creates freely "out of nothing."

I asked:

"Why should objectivists assign necessary existence to everything that exists? Such an assignment destroys the very concept of possibility."

William replied:

Not to everything that exists; to existence as such. In other words, the fundamental constituents of the universe or of existence could not not have existed.

Could the laws of the universe have been different? If you say, 'No,' it follows that everything that exists is necessary. But you have to say 'No.'

The human intellect or soul is as much physical as it is mental.

I disagree. The human intellect is immaterial.

William wrote:

It does not and cannot exist independently of the body, whereas God and his angels are depicted as pure disembodied spirits.

I agree that it cannot exist independently of the body by its own power. However, God can sustain it in existence independently of the body. (This is the position of St. Thomas Aquinas.)

I wrote:

"Even if matter did create consciousness (I believe we have good reason to believe it didn’t), it doesn’t follow that all forms of consciousness are dependent on matter. It just follows that consciousness-as-it-is-possessed-by-human-beings is dependent on matter."

Not true. Matter created consciousness in all its forms, animal as well as human. There is no immaterial consciousness, nor can there be.

Neither statement has been justified.

I wrote:

"[B]ecause our ideas are not innate, but are rather acquired through sense experience, we can only introspect after we have extrospected. (As St. Thomas Aquinas says, “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu,”—“Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in the senses.”)"

So, you've changed your mind! Weren't you saying just a few months ago that certain ideas were innate? Glad to see you've come around.

Yes, I decided to change my mind after reading St. Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's De Anima and the book Intellect: Mind over Matter, by Mortimer Adler.

I wrote:

"[W]e have no reason to believe that all possible conscious beings would have to formulate their ideas from sense experience, since the ideas of some conscious beings might be innate."

William replied:

How? -- unless you are talking about a clone, but the clone would ultimately have to be cloned from a person who acquired his ideas from initially observing the external world.

What do you mean how? Such beings have innate ideas because it belongs to their nature to have them.

I wrote:

"Again, why should human consciousness be the only possible form of consciousness? If a purely intellectual being, such as an angel, were conscious, it wouldn’t need a material form of awareness."

Because, as I said, "a pure disembodied consciousness would have no material form of awareness and could not therefore be conscious." A consciousness must perceive reality in a particular form -- visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc. -- which is determined by its sensory apparatus. A consciousness with no physical means of perception would have no form of perception -- no way to perceive reality -- in which case, it could not be conscious of the external world.

Certainly, all of the conscious beings we know of--i.e. various kinds of animal--must perceive reality in a particular form which is determined by their sensory apparatus. But why must conscious immaterial beings perceive reality in a particular sensory form?

You're trying to argue from an actual truth (All conscious beings we've encountered must perceive reality in a particular form) to a necessity truth (All possible conscious beings must perceive reality in a particular form). That is mistake of logic.

I wrote:
"I see why this is the case for human beings, but I don’t see why it applies to all possible forms of consciousness."

William replied:

It seems to me obvious why it applies to all forms of consciousness; it applies to consciousness as such.

It doesn't seem obvious to me. You've presented no reason why consciousness dependent on a physical support structure represents "consciousness as such."

Aquinas wrote:

“God has had an infallible knowledge of all contingent events from eternity, and yet they cease not to be contingent. For contingency is not inconsistent with certain and assured knowledge except so far as the contingent event lies in the future, not as it is present. While the event is in the future, it may not be; and thus the view of him who reckons that it still be may be mistaken: but once it is present, for that time it cannot but be. Any view therefore formed upon a contingent event inasmuch as it is present may be a certitude. But the intuition of the divine mind rests from eternity upon each and every [one] of the events that happen in the course of time, viewing each as a thing present. There is nothing therefore to hinder God from having from eternity an infallible knowledge of contingent events.”

Oh, come on! You can't circumvent this contradiction by declaring arbitrarily that God isn't seeing the future -- that he's merely observing events that to his eyes have already happened. Before I make a choice, I haven't already made the choice, and if I haven't already made the choice, then if God "knows" what choice I'm going to make, it's not possible for me to choose otherwise; I must choose what he knows I'm going to choose, in which case, I don't have free will.

But God doesn't know the choice you're going to make. He knows the choice you make. The distinction is important. As Aquinas explains:

" When it is said, 'God knows, or knew, this coming event,' an intervening medium is supposed between the divine knowledge and the thing known, to wit, the time to which the utterance points, in respect to which that which is said to be known by God is in the future. But really it is not in the future in respect of the divine knowledge, which existing in the instant of eternity is present to all things. In respect of such knowledge, if we set aside the time of speaking, it is impossible to say that so-and-so is known as non-existent; and the question never arises as to whether the thing possibly may never occur. As thus known, it should be said to be seen by God as already present in its existence. Under this aspect, the question of the possibility of the thing never coming to be can no longer be raised: what already is, in respect of that present instant cannot but be. The fallacy then arises from this, that the time at which we speak, when we say 'God knows,' co-exists with eternity; or again the last time that is marked when we say 'God knew'; and thus a relation of time, past or present, to future is attributed to eternity, which attribution does not hold; and thus we have fallacia accidentis."

I wrote:

"Free will and omniscience are not mutually exclusive, as I have just demonstrated."

You've demonstrated no such thing!

True, but Aquinas has.

I wrote:

"God can change the future in the sense that it is within God’s power to change the future. But he won’t change the future, because he wills the future, and his will is perfect and eternal. There is no contradiction."

I don't think you're seeing the argument. If God knows the future, then he can't change it, because if he could, then the future wouldn't be as he sees it, in which case, he wouldn't be omniscient. There is indeed a contradiction.

I'm seeing the argument perfectly: If God knows the future, then he can't change it. But that doesn't entail a contradiction between omniscience and omnipotence; it only shows that God can't do what is logically impossible. For, if God were to change the future, this would pit God's will to actualize the future with his will to not actualize the future, which is a contradiction. God cannot simultaneously will two mutually exclusive things. No (orthodox) Catholic ever said He could.

As Aquinas says in the Summa Theologiae (p. I, q. 25, a. 4):
"[T]here does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power."

The term "universal" refers to all. Therefore, the "universe" of existents quite properly refers to all existents. If God exists, then he is part of universe, because he is part of everything that exists.

Fine. If you want to define "universe" as everything that exists, then God is indeed part of the universe.

Post 12

Tuesday, January 15, 2008 - 9:26pm

Leibniz says:

Fine. If you want to define "universe" as everything that exists, then God is indeed part of the universe.

To which I reply:

You are invoking the existence of something for which there is little or no empirical evidence. Every theological explanation of events in the sensible (physical world) can be explained in a natural fashion without invoking God.

If believing that GodDidIt (say that fast and often and you will sound like frog) makes your day better, then by all means believe it, but do not insist that what you believe is a fact.

Bob Kolker

Post 13

Wednesday, January 16, 2008 - 6:06pm

Leibniz wrote: “God can change the future [1] in the sense that it is within God’s power to change the future. But he won’t change the future [2], because he wills the future, and his will is perfect and eternal. There is no contradiction.”

“…God can't [3] do what is logically impossible. For, if God were to change the future, this would pit God's will to actualize the future with his will to not actualize the future, which is a contradiction. God cannot simultaneously will two mutually exclusive things. No (orthodox) Catholic ever said He could. [4]”

1) God can change the future.
2) God won’t change the future, that would be logically impossible, a contradiction.
3) God can’t change the future.
4) No Catholic ever said God could change the future.
Goto [1]

(Edited by Jon Letendre on 1/16, 6:09pm)

Post 14

Thursday, January 17, 2008 - 7:21pm

I wrote:

"If you want to define "universe" as everything that exists, then God is indeed part of the universe."

Mr. Robert J. Kolker responded:

You are invoking the existence of something for which there is little or no empirical evidence.

You have sources of empirical evidence in what cosmologists call the 'fine-tuning' of the universe as well as the religious experiences of the majority of human beings. At any rate, what sort of evidence would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of an essentially invisible Being such as God?

Every theological explanation of events in the sensible (physical world) can be explained in a natural fashion without invoking God.

What sort of natural explanation is there for the Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ?

If believing that GodDidIt (say that fast and often and you will sound like frog) makes your day better, then by all means believe it, but do not insist that what you believe is a fact.

I do not believe that God did, does, or will do anything in the natural world which can be explained adequately without invoking God, and which I have sufficient reason to ascribe to a cause other than God.

John Letendre wrote:

Leibniz wrote: “God can change the future [1] in the sense that it is within God’s power to change the future. But he won’t change the future [2], because he wills the future, and his will is perfect and eternal. There is no contradiction.”

“…God can't [3] do what is logically impossible. For, if God were to change the future, this would pit God's will to actualize the future with his will to not actualize the future, which is a contradiction. God cannot simultaneously will two mutually exclusive things. No (orthodox) Catholic ever said He could. [4]”

1) God can change the future.
2) God won’t change the future, that would be logically impossible, a contradiction.
3) God can’t change the future.
4) No Catholic ever said God could change the future.
Goto [1]

The argument is flawed because you neglected to notice the way in which I qualified the first sentence: "God can change the future in the sense that it is within God's power to change the future."

What this sentence means is that, referring only to the power of God, as abstracted from his perfect wisdom and will, God is able to change the future.

However, if we consider God as a being of not only power, but also perfect wisdom and goodness, it becomes apparent that he is unable to change the future. For God's perfect wisdom and goodness determine his eternal will to fix upon a single plan for creation, such that, if God were able to change the future, it would follow that God would be able to alter his eternal will, which is impossible.

Post 15

Thursday, January 17, 2008 - 9:11pm

Omnipotence takes a bit of a shave, doesn’t it? No shame, that’s for sure. I mean, omnipotence is taking one for the team in order to avoid a major contradiction. The gesture has to have an impact on omniscience and omnibenevolence.

What comes around goes around. Down the road omnibenevolence will seek a pass for a tsunami that kills thousands and omnipotence will be there making things happen.

Post 16

Saturday, January 19, 2008 - 9:08am

Omnipotence takes a bit of a shave, doesn’t it? No shame, that’s for sure. I mean, omnipotence is taking one for the team in order to avoid a major contradiction. The gesture has to have an impact on omniscience and omnibenevolence.

Well, since we're talking about God, we have to take his whole Being into consideration, not just one of his divine attributes, such as omnipotence.

What comes around goes around. Down the road omnibenevolence will seek a pass for a tsunami that kills thousands and omnipotence will be there making things happen.

God's goodness and wisdom "judged it better to bring good out of evil than to allow nothing evil to exist" (St. Augustine; Enchiridion xxvii), so that although God's power is capable of preventing all evil, His wisdom and goodness deem it better to permit evil for the sake of the good.

Post 17

Monday, January 21, 2008 - 5:09pm

Leibniz wrote,

I was wrong to give such a significant place to popular testimony in attempting to present a justification for my beliefs.

However, I must disagree with the idea that the pervasive, transcultural belief in God does not constitute "testimony." Of course it qualifies as testimony: because most of the persons who claim to believe in God also claim to have had religious experiences in which they felt the presence of God.

I'm not sure it's even true that most of those who believe in God claim to have had religious experiences in which they felt the presence of God. In any case, you've provided no evidence to support that assertion. But even if it were true, a religious experience is not the perception of an existent in the external world, which is normally what we consider to be "testimony" for the existence of a person, place or thing; it's simply an emotional experience accompanied by a belief that the experience emanates from a being in whom they already believe. Their belief in God does not result from their religious experience; judging their experience as "religious" results from their belief in God.

Let me use a similar case as an example. Imagine a man born with a particular brain defect: he lacks the C-fibers responsible for creating the sensation of pain. Although unable to experience pain himself, such a man knows from the testimony of other human beings that pain is real.

Now please note that this man has no "direct evidence" for believing that there is such a sensation as pain, because he has not experienced pain himself. Nevertheless, the testimony of others constitutes a justification for his belief in the reality of pain. Therefore, for testimony to justify belief it need not imply access to direct evidence.

Your analogy works only if you define religious "experience" as a feeling in the same way that you define pain as a feeling, in which case, the term "God" would refer simply to a feeling, not to a pure spirit who created the universe. Besides, as I've already pointed out, a pure spirit is a contradiction in terms, because a spirit or consciousness requires a body; it requires sense organs to perceive the external world and a brain to store and process sensory information. So, in any case, it is logically impossible for someone's "religious experience" to count as evidence for the existence of God, because God himself is logically impossible.

Leibniz wrote: "[B]ecause the universe is contingent—i.e., because the universe is unable to explain its own existence—there must be a Necessary Being whose existence does not require any further explanation."

I replied: "The universe doesn't require an explanation. The universe, which is the sum total of that which exists, is itself a necessary being, not a contingent one -- unless, by "the universe" you simply mean the universe in its present state, but in that case, the cause of the universe in its present state is the universe in its previous state, and the cause of the universe in its previous state is the state of the universe before that, and so on. The universe -- existence -- in some form always existed. There is no reason to posit a God to explain it; it requires no explanation." Leibniz replied,

First, the universe isn't a "thing." It's a collection of things: quarks, leptons, stars, galaxies, fish, elephants, chimpanzees, etc.

Second, each of the many things which compose the universe is contingent, i.e., there is nothing contained in the concept of any which necessitates that it exist. Therefore, there is a possible world in which none of these things exists.

Not true. It is logically impossible for everything in the universe to be contingent, in the sense of being dependent on something else, because there is nothing else for it to be dependent on. The fundamental constituents of the universe from which everything else is composed are independent, irreducible primaries.

I wrote, "[P]ossibility depends on what existing entities are capable of doing. I don't know if a unicorn is possible or not. It may be, but if it is, then it is possible only because the evolutionary conditions are capable of producing one."

Why must the existence of unicorns only be possible insofar as the "evolutionary conditions are capable of producing one." Isn't it perfectly possible that in some far-away part of the universe there exists an eternal race of unicorn-producing alien scientists?

Of course! I was assuming that by "unicorn" you meant a naturally occurring animal.

Leibniz wrote: "Epistemically speaking, the possible depends on the actual, for it is from the actual that we determine what is possible. But metaphysically speaking, the possible is independent of the actual. If something is actual, a fortiori it is possible. But if something is possible, it doesn't follow that it is actual, or that it has any significant conceptual connection with the actual."

I replied: "I agree that if something is possible, it doesn't follow that it is actual; but I don't agree that it needn't have any significant conceptual connection with the actual. If it's possible for me to run a mile in six minutes, then I must actually have the physical conditioning to do it. If I don't, then it's not possible for me to run it in that amount of time. And I can tell you right now that since I don't have the physical conditioning for it, I can't run a mile in six minutes -- although there was a time when I could."

I concede that for a thing to be possible it must have some conceptual connection with the actual. My point was only that for a thing to be possible it needn't have a significant conceptual connection with the actual.

And my point was that what is possible depends on the actual; it depends on the nature of the acting entities. It is not possible for a man to outrun a cheetah, oil to quench a fire or bowling balls to float on water, etc.

I wrote: "The question, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' is invalid, to begin with, because explanations presuppose an already existing universe and can only be formulated in terms of what exists."

Leibniz replied: "Imagine that an asteroid the size of Texas strikes tomorrow, wiping out all life on earth. In the aftermath, there would still be an astronomical explanation for why the asteroid struck earth, even though nobody would be around to ask for or provide such an explanation."

I replied, "Okay, in terms of what already exists or already existed. The point was, that an explanation of why there is something rather than nothing would require the existence of something to explain it, which is the very thing one is attempting to explain."

You're missing the point. I'm not asking, 'Why is there nothing rather than something?"

Yes, you're asking why is there something rather than nothing, and I'm saying that that question makes no sense, because the only possible answer to it presupposes the very thing one is attempting to explain.

Leibniz wrote: "[E]ven if the universe never existed, there would still be an explanation for why it never existed, even though no intelligent beings would be around to ask for such an explanation."

I replied: "No. That is the very point I'm contesting. If the universe never existed, then nothing could have existed to explain its never having existed."

If the universe never existed, its non-existence would not require an explanation, for the simple reason that there would be nothing to explain.

Earlier you said that "even if the universe never existed, there would still be an explanation for why it never existed." Now you're saying that its non-existence would NOT require an explanation, since there would be nothing to explain. So which is it?

The case is different for an actually existing universe. Because it exists, and does not (on your view) seem to include a Necessary Being, its existence requires explanation. There is something there, viz. the universe, therefore, there has to be a reason for its being there if its existence is not necessary.

Where did I say that the universe doesn't include necessary (i.e., independent) existents? I said just the opposite -- that the fundamental constituents of the universe are necessary in the sense of not being dependent on anything else. The universe does NOT require an explanation in terms of something outside itself, because the universe is all that exists.

Leibniz asked, "Why should objectivists assign necessary existence to everything that exists? Such an assignment destroys the very concept of possibility."

I replied: Not to everything that exists; to existence as such. In other words, the fundamental constituents of the universe or of existence could not not have existed."

Could the laws of the universe have been different? If you say, 'No,' it follows that everything that exists is necessary. But you have to say 'No.'

Right; the laws of the universe could not have been otherwise, because what is possible to an entity depends on its nature. So the laws of the universe are "necessary" in that sense of the term; that is to say, they could not have been otherwise, given the nature of existence. In responding to your previous statement, I took you to mean "necessary" in the sense that the opposite is unimaginable or inconceivable. There is a sense in which I can imagine myself running a mile in 4 minutes, even though given the nature of my physical talents and conditioning, it's impossible for me to do so. But I cannot even imagine everything's being contingent in the sense of depending on something else, because there is nothing else on which it could depend.

Does assigning necessary existence to everything destroy the concept of possibility? No, because possibility in the sense that you evidently mean it, is contrasted to certainty rather than to necessity. It is an epistemological not a metaphysical concept. For example, I can say that when I flip a coin, it is "possible" that it will land either heads or tails, but how it will actually land is necessitated by the various forces acting on the coin. The coin "must" land a certain way. We say it is "possible" that it will land either heads or tails, simply because we don't know how it will actually land.

(To be continued . . .)

Post 18

Tuesday, January 22, 2008 - 8:11am

This is a continuation of Post 17, in which I reply to Leibniz' Post 11.

I wrote, "The human intellect or soul is as much physical as it is mental." He replied,

I disagree. The human intellect is immaterial.

I'm not denying the existence of a consciousness or soul. The point I was making is that it is an aspect of the physical body, not something that exists independently of it. The intellect or soul requires a physical body in order to exist and function.

I wrote: "It [the intellect] does not and cannot exist independently of the body, whereas God and his angels are depicted as pure disembodied spirits."

I agree that it cannot exist independently of the body by its own power. However, God can sustain it in existence independently of the body. (This is the position of St. Thomas Aquinas.)

This is an arbitrary assertion that cannot in logic be defended. The concept of a pure spirit is impossible in theory; it is literally inconceivable, because to conceive of a consciousness, one must conceive of it as having a particular form of awareness (such as sight, hearing, etc.) which is a function of its sensory organs and the kind of brain it possesses. A consciousness with no sensory organs and no brain would have no form of awareness and could not, therefore, exist.

Leibniz wrote: "Even if matter did create consciousness (I believe we have good reason to believe it didn’t), it doesn’t follow that all forms of consciousness are dependent on matter. It just follows that consciousness-as-it-is-possessed-by-human-beings is dependent on matter."

I replied, "Not true. Matter created consciousness in all its forms, animal as well as human. There is no immaterial consciousness, nor can there be."

Neither statement has been justified.

That matter created consciousness is justified by the evolutionary evidence. Higher forms of life arose from lower forms. That there can be no immaterial consciousness is justified by the fact that a consciousness requires a material body in order to exist. (See above.)

Leibniz wrote: "[W]e have no reason to believe that all possible conscious beings would have to formulate their ideas from sense experience, since the ideas of some conscious beings might be innate."

I replied: "How? -- unless you are talking about a clone, but the clone would ultimately have to be cloned from a person who acquired his ideas from initially observing the external world."

What do you mean how? Such beings have innate ideas because it belongs to their nature to have them.

The reason I asked "how" is that an idea, as we understand it, is a mental integration of information acquired in a particular sensory form. All of our ideas exist in the form of sensory qualities unique to our means of perception. Why would a conscious being have innate ideas in sensory form that were not acquired by sensory means? And if they were not acquired by observing the external world, then how would such a consciousness know whether its ideas were true or false? The notion of "innate ideas" doesn't fit with our understanding of the function of consciousness, which is to facilitate the survival of the organism that possesses it.

Leibniz wrote: "Again, why should human consciousness be the only possible form of consciousness? If a purely intellectual being, such as an angel, were conscious, it wouldn’t need a material form of awareness."

I replied, "Because, as I said, 'a pure disembodied consciousness would have no material form of awareness and could not therefore be conscious.' A consciousness must perceive reality in a particular form -- visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc. -- which is determined by its sensory apparatus. A consciousness with no physical means of perception would have no form of perception -- no way to perceive reality -- in which case, it could not be conscious of the external world."

Certainly, all of the conscious beings we know of--i.e. various kinds of animal--must perceive reality in a particular form which is determined by their sensory apparatus. But why must conscious immaterial beings perceive reality in a particular sensory form?

You're trying to argue from an actual truth (All conscious beings we've encountered must perceive reality in a particular form) to a necessity truth (All possible conscious beings must perceive reality in a particular form). That is mistake of logic.

I'm not simply saying that all conscious beings we've encountered must perceive reality in a particular form. I'm saying that entailed in the very idea of consciousness is that it requires a particular form of awareness. If I were to say that all animals are living organisms, would you accuse me of an error in logic, on the grounds that I'm trying to argue from an actual truth to a necessity truth -- from the fact that all animals we've encountered are living organisms to the conclusion that all possible animals are living organisms? If you would, then you'd be wrong, because entailed in the very concept of an animal is that it's a living organism. Similarly, entailed in the very concept of consciousness is that it perceives reality in a particular form, because to perceive reality in no particular form is not to perceive it.

Leibniz wrote: "I see why this is the case for human beings, but I don’t see why it applies to all possible forms of consciousness."

I replied: "It seems to me obvious why it applies to all forms of consciousness; it applies to consciousness as such."

It doesn't seem obvious to me. You've presented no reason why consciousness dependent on a physical support structure represents "consciousness as such."

See above.

Leibniz quoted Aquinas:

“God has had an infallible knowledge of all contingent events from eternity, and yet they cease not to be contingent. For contingency is not inconsistent with certain and assured knowledge except so far as the contingent event lies in the future, not as it is present. While the event is in the future, it may not be; and thus the view of him who reckons that it still be may be mistaken: but once it is present, for that time it cannot but be. Any view therefore formed upon a contingent event inasmuch as it is present may be a certitude. But the intuition of the divine mind rests from eternity upon each and every [one] of the events that happen in the course of time, viewing each as a thing present. There is nothing therefore to hinder God from having from eternity an infallible knowledge of contingent events.”

I replied, "Oh, come on! You can't circumvent this contradiction by declaring arbitrarily that God isn't seeing the future -- that he's merely observing events that to his eyes have already happened. Before I make a choice, I haven't already made the choice, and if I haven't already made the choice, then if God "knows" what choice I'm going to make, it's not possible for me to choose otherwise; I must choose what he knows I'm going to choose, in which case, I don't have free will."

But God doesn't know the choice you're going to make. He knows the choice you make. The distinction is important. As Aquinas explains:

"When it is said, 'God knows, or knew, this coming event,' an intervening medium is supposed between the divine knowledge and the thing known, to wit, the time to which the utterance points, in respect to which that which is said to be known by God is in the future. But really it is not in the future in respect of the divine knowledge, which existing in the instant of eternity is present to all things. In respect of such knowledge, if we set aside the time of speaking, it is impossible to say that so-and-so is known as non-existent; and the question never arises as to whether the thing possibly may never occur. As thus known, it should be said to be seen by God as already present in its existence. Under this aspect, the question of the possibility of the thing never coming to be can no longer be raised: what already is, in respect of that present instant cannot but be. The fallacy then arises from this, that the time at which we speak, when we say 'God knows,' co-exists with eternity; or again the last time that is marked when we say 'God knew'; and thus a relation of time, past or present, to future is attributed to eternity, which attribution does not hold; and thus we have fallacia accidentis."

So, according to Aquinas, what's going to happen has already happened. In other words, when it comes to God, all things are possible including contradictions. I've got news for you and Aquinas: The future is NOT the present.

Leibniz wrote: "Free will and omniscience are not mutually exclusive, as I have just demonstrated." I replied, "You've demonstrated no such thing!"

True, but Aquinas has.

Aquinas has not demonstrated it; he's simply rationalized it by equating the future with the present.

Leibniz wrote: "God can change the future in the sense that it is within God’s power to change the future. But he won’t change the future, because he wills the future, and his will is perfect and eternal. There is no contradiction."

I replied, "I don't think you're seeing the argument. If God knows the future, then he can't change it, because if he could, then the future wouldn't be as he sees it, in which case, he wouldn't be omniscient. There is indeed a contradiction."

I'm seeing the argument perfectly: If God knows the future, then he can't change it. But that doesn't entail a contradiction between omniscience and omnipotence; it only shows that God can't do what is logically impossible. For, if God were to change the future, this would pit God's will to actualize the future with his will to not actualize the future, which is a contradiction. God cannot simultaneously will two mutually exclusive things. No (orthodox) Catholic ever said He could.

Well, either God can change the future or he can't. You say that he can change the future in the sense that it's within his power to change the future. Then you say that he can't change the future, because that would be a contradiction, in which case, it's NOT within his power to change the future. You can't have it both ways -- as Jon Letendre has already pointed out. You answer him as follows:

[Y]ou neglected to notice the way in which I qualified the first sentence: "God can change the future in the sense that it is within God's power to change the future."

Excuse me, but you've just said that it's NOT within his power to change the future, because he's willed the future. You try to get around this by stating:

What this sentence means is that, referring only to the power of God, as abstracted from his perfect wisdom and will, God is able to change the future.

But you can't abstract God's power from his wisdom and will, which (as you've pointed out) qualify and delimit it under pain of self-contradiction. I think what you want to say is that God cannot change the future, but that that doesn't mean that he is not omnipotent, because omnipotence does not include the power to override the law of contradiction and to do what is logically impossible.

If you want to construe omnipotence in this manner, fine, but I would say that in that case, omnipotence doesn't permit God to perform miracles either, because a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature and therefore of the law of identity. What a thing can do depends on what it is, and since, according to your theology, God has created everything in existence, he cannot cause it to act contrary to its nature without violating the law of identity. For example, God cannot enable me to run a mile in four minutes, because that would contradict the limits of my natural ability, i.e., my identity as a sedentary non-athlete. In fact, God cannot do anything that is inconsistent with an entity's natural abilities without violating the law of identity.

So if, as you say, God's omnipotence cannot override the laws of identify and contradiction, then that "omnipotence" turns out to be of a highly limited sort that is incapable of performing miracles and other actions normally attributed to God. God's power is thus limited by the very existence that he has supposedly created.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 1/22, 8:15am)

Post 19

Thursday, January 24, 2008 - 9:23am