Regarding Objectivist Ethics

After starting my last thread, I think I figured out the issue that is at the bottom of it. I think I'm just trying to figure out if Ethics should deal with evaluating ALL actions (mental and physical) in terms of right and wrong, or just those actions which take place after the choice to live. Objectivism seems to say that choices can only be evaluated as they bear on the choice to live, but I think that man in general needs a guide of right and wrong that applies whether he wants to live or not. Aren't "right" and "wrong" , in the broadest sense, concepts which apply to ones actions whether one wants to live or not? I think so. However, even if we did end up creating an ethics which told us in the broadest possible sense what right and wrong were, we might have the problem that the principles that one choose from that ethics would depend on what one's fundamental end was: life or death.

Post 1

Sunday, July 6, 2008 - 5:10pm

Christopher,

I think I'm just trying to figure out if Ethics should deal with evaluating ALL actions (mental and physical) in terms of right and wrong, or just those actions which take place after the choice to live.

Ethics should deal with just those actions which take place after everyone makes the universal, unanimous choice to live (the choice that everyone, everywhere makes every time).

Objectivism seems to say that choices can only be evaluated as they bear on the choice to live, but I think that man in general needs a guide of right and wrong that applies whether he wants to live or not.

Choices can only be evaluated as they bear on life; life "creates" value.

Aren't "right" and "wrong" , in the broadest sense, concepts which apply to ones actions whether one wants to live or not? I think so.

This is kind of a trick question (whether you meant it to be, or not). If, for example, no one wanted to live -- no one, anywhere -- then "right" and "wrong" wouldn't even be concepts (they'd have nothing in reality to refer to).

However, even if we did end up creating an ethics which told us in the broadest possible sense what right and wrong were, we might have the problem that the principles that one choose from that ethics would depend on what one's fundamental end was: life or death.

I'm not supposed to answer (because I've already undercut the line of reasoning that would lead to this kind of hypothetical speculation in the first place) but I think what you are saying is that even if your end was death, then you would still need to know about the means to the proper end -- which is life -- so that you would be in the position to thwart it.

The medical professionals, for instance, know so much about how to keep someone alive that they are in the best position to take lives (knowing what life itself needs). You're saying that, instrumentally, even if you are a death-monger -- you need to study life-based ethics (to get better at death-dealing).

Is that right?

Ed

Post 2

Sunday, July 6, 2008 - 5:20pm

If a person does not have a goal, then all actions and events are indifferent to them, nothing improves or reduces their goal attainment.

For example, lets say I have no goals, and someone asks if I'd like to be punched in the face, and I answer "I don't care." And then the person decides to punch me in the face so hard that my nose is broken. How does this influence my goals? It doesn't, because I have none. I can't evaluate how it impacts my goals, there is nothing to evaluate, because I do not have a goal.

Other people can evaluate how my broken nose impacts their goals. I could evaluate how my broken nose impacts their goals.

Post 3

Sunday, July 6, 2008 - 9:22pm

Hi Parker,

Objectivism evaluates all actions by using life as the yardstick. It doesn't matter whether people choose or want life in order for Objectivism to evaluate the morality of people's actions.

But under Objectivism, ethics won't matter to people unless and until they first choose to live. That is, there might objectively be right and wrong actions in people's lives, but that'd be irrelevant to them, and ethics would be an irrelevant subject to them, at least until they choose to live.

As an analogy, the principle of geometry hold irrespective of whether we know them. But they won't matter until we need to figure out how to, say, bisect a triangle or take the circumference of a circle.

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 7/06, 9:24pm)

Post 4

Monday, July 7, 2008 - 12:04pm

Christopher,

It might help to argue in the most transparent way possible -- the syllogism. If I were to attempt to put your latest line of reasoning into a syllogism, it might look like this:

People choosing to die can "safely" disregard life-based ethics, but might ought to still regard an ethic not based on life.

Right and wrong don't require life -- but instead are intrinsic values in their own right, ones that ought to be important to everyone everywhere.
=======
Therefore, even people choosing to die ought to work in order to do right and not wrong (even if it doesn't help living beings).

Is that an accurate representation of your view?

Ed

Post 5

Monday, July 7, 2008 - 12:28pm

First of all, thanks to all of you for trying to help me out on this one.
Second of all (this part is to Ed Thompson): What I was trying to say was that, given that it is sometimes appropriate to want to end life for some individuals, it must also be approriate (in the sense of being "right" or "proper") for a person to take specific actions which advance that purpose. I've been reading Tara Smith's Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics lately, however, and that at least seems to give me an idea of what Ayn Rand may have thought of this issue. If I understand what she says in that book correctly, concepts such as "appropriate", "inappropriate", "proper", "improper", "right", and "wrong" etc... ammount to "stolen concepts" if used apart from the concept and value of life. I don't really understand what Ayn Rand meant by "stolen concepts" yet, but I intend to look that up. Tara and Ayn may have been right, but I don't feel certain yet.

Post 6

Monday, July 7, 2008 - 12:31pm

Jordan,
First of all, thanks for your post. ;)
I wonder though, how could we say that it is wrong for a person to end his life who does not want to live. (I'm not saying that it is right, I'm simply doubting whether we could validly say that it is wrong.) I mean, wouldn't it only be wrong if the person wanted to live?

Post 7

Monday, July 7, 2008 - 4:30pm

Not all life is a success - this applies to ALL living organisms, as per the bell curve - and it, by the same token, applies to humans... whether liked or not...

Post 8

Monday, July 7, 2008 - 4:40pm

Hi Christopher,

how could we say that it is wrong for a person to end his life who does not want to live. (I'm not saying that it is right, I'm simply doubting whether we could validly say that it is wrong.) I mean, wouldn't it only be wrong if the person wanted to live?

Under Objectivism, what is right or wrong is not determined merely by what someone wants or doesn't want to do. Merely wanting to lie, cheat, steal, or kill oneself, does not justify taking such action. The Objectivist's ethical justification for an action is sounds in preserving and furthering one's life, not merely in wanting to do this or that.

So to answer your question, it is wrong for people to kill themselves if such action does not preserve or further their life. Some Objectivists will then conclude that it is never okay to kill oneself for death never furthers life. Others will accept killing onself if one's "life" (which can include fulfillment, flourishing, joy) is no longer reasonably attainable. I believe the latter is the better view.

[EDIT. It might help to rephrase the above this way: Under Objectivism, what someone is motivated to do is not necessarily what one is ethically justified in doing.]

Howzat?

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 7/07, 4:46pm)

Post 9

Monday, July 7, 2008 - 8:44pm

Dean: You cared enough to reply to the question. You cared enough to breathe or you wouldn't have done that much. You cared enough, I'm guessing, not to simply fall over catatonic, which is really the ultimate in lack of values, simply shutting down - but even then, most catatonics still continue to breathe.

Post 10

Tuesday, July 8, 2008 - 8:30am

Thanks for your response, Jordan:)
I don't understand though how life could be impossible for someone who is contemplating ; doesn't one have to first be alive in order to go through with that act? Or is this where understanding what Ayn Rand meant by "man's life" as the standard of morality comes in? I have read what Tara Smith thinks Rand meant by this standard, but do not understand her argument. She seems to be saying that "flourishing" should be the end of value, but that brings to my mind several questions. First of all, if one's reasoning for accepting a given standard of value is that it best enables one to live, then why not just choose LIFE as your standard. Elevating that standard to "flourishing" or anything else would mean that, under certain circumstances, one would have to choose instead because one's life would not meet the elevated status of the new standard. Doesn't this defeat that whole purpose? Also, how can you demonstrate if a person who is ill in certain respects but healthy in others is flourishing or not. (Smith suggests that the answer to this one is that the individual is flourishing if he is living well in those areas of his life which are "most signifigant"), but how do you determine exactly which areas fit under the umbrella of "most signifigant"?... Do I stop after I've considered the first 5 areas that are top priorities, for example, or should I include the sixth as well? ;) Also, according to what criterion do I divide a persons life into the categories that will be rated in signifigance?... Do I divide the persons life into 9 areas, according to a certain criterion, for example, or do I instead divide the persons life into 5 areas according to a different criterion? I just don't understand "flourishing" as a standard, in other words.
I'm sorry to barrage you with questions, but all of these things are interconnected for me. I don't know how to ask you some of these things without asking you all of them.
Anyway, even if you don't continue to try and help me, I deeply appreciate what you've done already. These questions matter a lot to me, and I honestly don't feel that--at this part of my life, at least--I can answer them on my own... Thanks again.
--Chris

Post 11

Tuesday, July 8, 2008 - 3:38pm

Hi Christopher,

Thank you for the kind words.

I don't understand though how life could be impossible for someone who is contemplating [suicide]; doesn't one have to first be alive in order to go through with that act?

Under Objectivism, life and death are incompatible goals. One cannot pursue the two simultaneously. Of course, one must be alive to pursue either goal. But people will destroy (kill) themselves to the extent that their chosen goal is death. I'm not sure I answered your question.

First of all, if one's reasoning for accepting a given standard of value is that it best enables one to live, then why not just choose LIFE as your standard.

You lost me here. Objectivism does choose life as the standard of value. Generally, Objectivists take "life" here to mean not just survival (i.e., quantity of life) but also fulfillment (i.e., quality of life), and I've often see the integration of survival and fulfillment referred to as "flourishing" although I cannot attest as to whether Tara Smith agrees with this treatment of the term.

Also, how can you demonstrate if a person who is ill in certain respects but healthy in others is flourishing or not. (Smith suggests that the answer to this one is that the individual is flourishing if he is living well in those areas of his life which are "most signifigant"), but how do you determine exactly which areas fit under the umbrella of "most signifigant"?... Do I stop after I've considered the first 5 areas that are top priorities, for example, or should I include the sixth as well? ;)

First, I think most Objectivists treat the determination of whether one is flourishing as a personal determination. As Rand put it, "[T]he purpose of living a life proper to a rational being . . . belongs to every individual man, and the life has to live is his own." That is, while the standard of life is the same for everybody, its application differs per person.

Second, that said, I think one could interpret Objectivism here by appeal to Rand's discussion of values and virtues. I would suggest that Rand's three primary values of Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem comprise the Objectivist's proper life of a human that she identifies as our ethical standard. Rationality, Productiveness, and Pride the virtues -- the means -- that she identifies as that which we need to have in order to achieve those life-comprising values. Thus, under Objectivism, to the extent people behave rationally, productively, and pridefully (which are arguably fairly observable qualities) is the extent to which those people achieve reason, purpose, and self-esteem, which is the same extent to which they achieve life, and in turn, happiness.

Third, and to sum up a bit -- on the one hand, Objectivism might view the "most significant" areas of concern for flourishing as being the three big aforementioned values of reason, purpose, and self-esteem. But on the other hand, Objectivism might reject prioritizing categories because their priority might differ depending on the specific individual's situation.

There is much discussion in Objectivist circles on these topics. I would recommend Ari Armstrong's article called The (Five) Objectivist Ethics for a taste of the viewpoints. http://www.freecolorado.com/ari/iphil/5oethics.html . I suspect you've already read Ayn Rands The Objectivist Ethics, but it wouldn't hurt to read it again. Finally, the best exhaustive treatise of Rand's ethics that I have read is Chris Sciabarra's Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical. Just skip to the ethics portion for insight into this particular topic.

I'm happy to keep up this discussion if you're finding it helpful.

Jordan

Post 12

Tuesday, July 8, 2008 - 11:31pm

Christopher,

According to Objectivism, suicide is proper, but only if life has lost all value, such as when one is dying of a painful and incurable disease. In that case, to commit suicide is not to gain or keep a value, but to negate a disvalue. To commit suicide when one has something to live for -- i.e., when happiness is possible -- is to negate that which is valuable.

As to the stolen concept, that which is valuable (i.e., happiness) is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of of "life," because happiness arises only within the context of life and is the product of a successful state of life. To speak of "happiness" as apart from life is worse than a contradiction in terms. It is only the concept of "life" that makes the concept of "happiness" possible.

- Bill

Post 13

Wednesday, July 9, 2008 - 3:43pm

Thanks again, Jordan:)
I have done a lot of thinking about the issue of "flourishing" lately. While I think that it would be determinable for certain people whether or not they were flourishing, I cannot understand how one can tell if someone is flourishing "overall" in cases in which they are doing well in certain respects and not in others. (I mean "doing well" here objectively, in terms of promoting ones life.) I especially have a hard time thinking about how you could determine whether a person was flourising in general who is doing well in certain respects and actually decaying in other areas. For an example, if I have a heart condition which I know is for sure minimizing how long I will be able to survive, but I have a good job (relative to my interests and capacites), and am otherwise altogether healthy, how can I say that I am flourising in general? In short, how does one objectively determine how a person is faring in general who is flourishing in certain respects but is not (or is decaying) in others. This reminds me of the debates of whether there can be a "G Factor" or "general intelligence" of a person, although I'm not sure if the difficulties involved in this case are the same. Anyway, I feel sure that if there is a way to determine--with reference to some general objective principle-- who is flourising and who is not, then one has a definite case for why can be ok in some cases.
I am afraid of this idea that it is just some very "personal" kind of decision, however, if by that one is implying that it is at all a matter of subjective determination whether one is flourishing or not. I also quiver at the idea that we can tell if we are flourishing or not simply by reference to whether we are happy or not. This later may be true, but doens't being happy sometimes involve knowing your objective situation and finding it worthwhile? If one does not know what his general status is like, then he may not be happy even if he is otherwise flourishing.

Post 14

Thursday, July 10, 2008 - 4:49pm

Hi Christopher,

I don't think Objectivism explicitly offers a method for determining when someone is flourishing overall.

But I don't think Objectivists would advocate using personal *choice* or even *happiness* as the overall flourishing test: (1) Not choice because people don't just decide whether they are flourishing. Flourishing is a general characteristic, like being sick or hungry or tall or fast -- not the type of thing subject to personal decision. (2) Not happiness, at least not in the traditional sense -- i.e., some emotional state -- because people can keep happy in destructive environments or when engaging in destructive behaviors, and they can be unhappy when making rather life-affirming decisions.

Despite rejecting decision and happiness as definitive overall flourishing criteria, I think Objectivists still consign the question of overall flourishing to a personal level, probably because all the disparate facets of an individual's life, especially when blended together, are best known to that individual.

I'd say an Objectivist's third party assessment, at best, is an approximation by reference to the relationship between the individual and those values and virtues I mentioned in prior posts.

Totally Aside, I think your text is for some reason omitting the term "suicide" or maybe the term "death".

Jordan

Post 15

Saturday, July 12, 2008 - 12:08am

Christopher wrote,

[I]f I have a heart condition which I know is for sure minimizing how long I will be able to survive, but I have a good job (relative to my interests and capacites), and am otherwise altogether healthy, how can I say that I am flourising in general?

As I understand the term "flourishing," it refers to those actions which optimize one's health and wellbeing, given the available alternatives. Obviously, if one has a heart condition, one does the best one can under the circumstances. One takes one's medicine, watches one's diet and engages in proper exercise. In following these guidelines, which are designed to give one the best chance at survival, one is adhering to a standard of flourishing. What's not to understand?

- Bill

Post 16

Saturday, July 12, 2008 - 10:56am

Dwyer,

I thought Parker was having trouble dealing with *overall* flourishing -- like is the guy who has terminal cancer but a great job flourishing *overall*?

Jordan

Post 17

Saturday, July 12, 2008 - 11:48am

Jordan,
You are absoluetely right... It is the issue of overall flourishing which confuses me (in cases where, in certain aspects of one's life one is NOT flourishing). I think that it can get really complicated in certain instances to tell whether there is any overall flourishing in a persons life or not. I think that Rand's overall idea (in my own words here) that life is what is signifigant, not death, is right on target though; it's just a matter for me of deciding how to determine whether one is flourishing in difficult cases perhaps. Thanks again for everything. I've obsessed about this for so long now that I'll probably take a break from reading this thread for awhile though. lol Oh and you were right: I did accidentally leave the word "suicide" out by of my last post. I was trying to edit it to where it would read correctly, but the computer I was working on wouldn't let me edit my post. Very perceptive of you.

Post 18

Wednesday, July 16, 2008 - 12:15am

I still don't understand the problem. The goal is to gain as much happiness as possible. given the available options. That's it. If one achieves a less than optimal state of happiness, that doesn't mean that one is less than optimally moral, so long as one does the best one can in a fallible world. Nothing more is required.

- Bill

Post 19

Wednesday, July 16, 2008 - 2:00am