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Post 0

Monday, January 11, 2010 - 5:59pmSanction this postReply
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I have decided to take some advice and move to the dissent forum.

From ITOE2 pages 237-38:

Prof. A [Binswanger]: So in the argument against the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, when you say that newly discovered characteristics are included in the concept's meaning, you mean they belong to the same units.

AR: Yes. But it doesn't change the concept.


I can see where Younkins may have been confused - Binswanger implied that Rand and not Peikoff made the arguments in that essay.

Does Binswanger's slip mean that Peikoff wasn't the true author? Or does it mean that it was a secret collaboration effort where Rand allowed Peikoff to take all the credit for it?

Furthermore, I have to ask: why does Rand answer by saying that newly discovered characteristics don't change the concept? They change the concept's meaning, but not the concept itself?

Post 1

Monday, January 11, 2010 - 6:18pmSanction this postReply
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Robert,

I have no idea what you are talking about with Binswanger, Rand, and Peikoff.

Regarding a concept ...

why does Rand answer by saying that newly discovered characteristics don't change the concept? They change the concept's meaning, but not the concept itself?
Because a concept's "essence" is epistemological, rather than metaphysical. Ideally (and I mean super-ideally, with omniscience as a factor), a concept's essence would be metaphysical, too. But man doesn't learn "all-or-none" like that.

Since "essence" is epistemological, it grows with man's growing body of knowledge. That's how newly discovered characteristics don't necessarily change the concept -- i.e., it still refers to the same units. If all swans were once thought to be white, and then a black one shows up, they're still all swans.

Ed


Post 2

Monday, January 11, 2010 - 7:16pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

When Prof. A (Binswanger) in the Q&A appendix to the second edition of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology says "So in the argument against the analytic-synthetic dichotomy...", what precisely was he referring to?

Since "essence" is epistemological, it grows with man's growing body of knowledge. That's how newly discovered characteristics don't necessarily change the concept -- i.e., it still refers to the same units. If all swans were once thought to be white, and then a black one shows up, they're still all swans.


The concept "swan" remains the same, there is no need to create a new concept to cover the case of black swans.

Ok.

Post 3

Monday, January 11, 2010 - 8:35pmSanction this postReply
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Robert,

what precisely was he referring to?

I think he was referring to how the 'dichotomists' err in talking about concepts and concept-formation. Dichotomists would say that concepts are analytical and internally-consistent -- under the rubric of a coherency theory of truth or knowledge. They would say that concepts -- while referring back to themselves -- don't tell you about reality. It's an inescapable nominalism, when you think about it. It's as if analytic-synthetic dichotomists are from outer space or something (they're so far out there).

Basically, on the planet Dichotoma, concepts only refer to rough resemblances of external reality. They do not tell you anything about your sensory impressions, but are just a heuristic way for you to keep track and to keep yourself at least half-sane while being bombarded with sensory input in a blurring, buzzing confusion. In other words, concepts are there to make us feel good, but they aren't helpful in understanding "things-in-themselves" (external reality).

A dichotomist would point to every advance in knowledge as a mistake, making all previous concepts (related to the new thing learned) invalid. A dichotomist -- accepting the analytic-synthetic dichotomy -- would look at a concept as something which refers only to itself. The linchpin holding this thinking error in place is to equate a concept with its definition. However, definitions change along with changes (advances) in knowledge -- so the dichotomist would throw out the old heuristic (the "old" concept) in place of a new one.

On Dichotoma (far, far out there), it's okay to throw out old concepts (definitions) because concepts were only ever thought to be rough approximations anyway. On the planet Aynrandia (or Earth, for that matter), however, concepts refer to actual things. It's the actual things. It's the referents. If the referents don't change -- and referents don't change because of the Law of Identity -- then the concept doesn't ever change, either.

Whew! That was hard to think about! Let me know if it helps ...

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 1/11, 8:36pm)


Post 4

Monday, January 11, 2010 - 9:02pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

A concept is not exactly equal to its definition. But also -

Concepts stand for specific kinds of existents, including all the characteristics of these existents, observed and not-yet-observed, known and unknown.
ITOE2 65.


How is it that the concept of an entity stands for everything about that entity known and as yet unknown? Why doesn't it stand for only that which is known?

Post 5

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 4:22amSanction this postReply
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Robert,

How is it that the concept of an entity stands for everything about that entity known and as yet unknown? Why doesn't it stand for only that which is known?
Because of the Primacy of Existence. Because something's nature does not depend on our level of knowledge about it. We form concepts for the purpose of categorically differentiating existents. With respect to awareness, there are 3 possibilities:

1) react to the world without consciousness (as plants do)
2) react to the world with only a) instincts, b) sense perception, and c) memory of particulars (as animals do)
3) divide the world up so that it is understandable

Take apples and oranges. They're different. They're 2 things. Not only that, but they're different -- they're 2 different things -- regardless of our level of knowledge about them. Eventually we learn things about the referents of these 2 concepts (e.g., apples have malic acid which helps fibromyalgia syndrome; oranges have citrus bioflavanoids which help leg edema and varicose veins, etc). The 2 concepts, however, had always referred to the same 2 things. The concepts always will.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 1/12, 4:24am)


Post 6

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 7:43amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

You wrote: Because of the Primacy of Existence. Because something's nature does not depend on our level of knowledge about it

Is this nature metaphysical or epistemological?





Post 7

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 8:22amSanction this postReply
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Robert,

The answer to your puzzlement over Binswanger’s remark in Post 0 is this: The reference is indeed to Peikoff’s essay on the analytic-synthetic distinction. Rand published that essay in her journal The Objectivist immediately after the last installment of her “Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology” in that journal. There was nothing, and I mean nothing, in that journal that was not ratified by Rand. Efron’s essay on biology and consciousness, Branden’s essays on self-esteem and the visibility principle, everything in the journal, had Rand’s seal of approval and was to be taken as having her approval simply by having appeared in that journal. The journal was her outlet for answering questions about her philosophy and for presenting what new was consistent, by her own lights, with her philosophy. When an author was known to disagree with Rand’s view in areas of philosophy he was not writing on for her, she added a circumscribing editorial notice to let readers know the limited zone of co-incidence.

Rand’s journal The Objectivist, as well as its predecessor and its successor, were the platform for written manifestos of what was her philosophy (and what not). Peikoff’s essay was a declaration of what Rand had ratified as correct in every way in her own view, and to be taken as the position of Objectivism on that issue. It is reasonable to suppose that she had some sense of what was crucially part of her philosophy and what was not (e.g. enjoyment of stamp collecting or ballroom dancing). But Peikoff’s treatment of the analytic-synthetic distinction in this essay was clearly a crucial part of her Objectivist epistemology. It was perfectly sensible for Harry to take for granted that Peikoff’s published positions in his essay were precisely Rand’s positions too.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I wanted to let you know that I continue to work on the response to your #44 and #47 in the original thread. I think you will find it a worthwhile closer look. I’ll bring that part of the thread over here to the dissent sector. It is good to get your various issues divided for staying on the different topics and creating a more coherent discussion of each.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Concerning #4 above, Rand acknowledges that conceptual change can happen and happen in correct ways. One cannot know, I say, at a given stage of one’s knowledge, which among one’s concepts plausibly susceptible to reformation in the future will indeed need change and what the change will be. Whatever the changes in the specifics of one’s classifications, in the specifics of one’s identifications of items and their contrast classes, it sure seems there is continuity, even if not complete constancy, of referents across conceptual reformations. This subject is best illuminated, I think, by historical studies of conceptual advances in the history of science. One recent work in this vein is Representing Electrons by Theodore Arabatzis (Chicago 2006).

My own writings on the Analytic-Synthetic distinction so far are these:
Formal or Existential
Concerning Quine
Mathematical or Physical


(Edited by Stephen Boydstun on 1/12, 8:32am)


Post 8

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 10:49amSanction this postReply
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Stephen,

That was longish reply, and not at all wasted on me even though I possess all copies of the The Objectivist Newletter, The Objectivist and The Ayn Rand Letter in book format. I also own the much abbreviated versions on the Objectivist Research Cd-Rom.

Searching the Research Cd indicates that Rand did mention an analytic-synthetic dichotomy on page 77. This pagination refers to the second edition of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, so obviously it was considered part of her epistemology.

It is therefore only natural for me to ask which author Binswanger was really referring to as having said "that newly discovered characteristics are included in the concept's meaning," because while Rand mentioned the dichotomy she had said nothing like this. All she actually wrote on the subject was: The cognitive function of concepts was undercut by a series of grotesque devices—such, for instance, as the "analytic-synthetic" dichotomy which, by a route of tortuous circumlocutions and equivocations, leads to the dogma that a "necessarily" true proposition cannot be factual, and a factual proposition cannot be "necessarily" true.









Post 9

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 11:11amSanction this postReply
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Steve,

You wrote: Concerning #4 above, Rand acknowledges that conceptual change can happen and happen in correct ways. One cannot know, I say, at a given stage of one’s knowledge, which among one’s concepts plausibly susceptible to reformation in the future will indeed need change and what the change will be.

Then why isn't it possible simply to hold that a concept stands for everything known about an entity, yet also hold that the facts subsumed by the concept can change with the arrival of new knowledge?



Post 10

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 11:36amSanction this postReply
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Hi Robert,
Is this nature metaphysical or epistemological?
If I were Ed (talk about violating the Law Of Identity), I'd say metaphysical. If it helps, I'd say that under Objectivism, concepts are open-ended categories, created to account for all referrents (with their varying characteristics) subsumed thereunder. It's generally epistemically economic to keep concepts open-ended. If concepts were closed, we'd have to create new concepts with every new referrent as well as perhaps with every time an old referrent were to add to or substract from itself a characteristic.

Jordan


Post 11

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 12:35pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

At post 2 I wrote: The concept "swan" remains the same, there is no need to create a new concept to cover the case of black swans.

By the same token, there is no need to "create" a new species to cover the case of black swans. Or to put it differently, the black swan is not, in reality out there, a new species of avian life. A species is not something man creates using rules of concept-formation. A species is not a concept but a group of actual existents categorized by an intellect according to rules of taxonomy.

Ed wrote: something's nature does not depend on our level of knowledge about it.

A swan is not a concept, nor is its essence a concept. They like to say around these parts that a concept's "essence" never changes, however, it seems that there is no practical distinction being made here between concept and essence, or in the swan example, mental concept and real species.



Post 12

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 12:38pmSanction this postReply
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[deleted]

(Edited by Jordan on 1/12, 12:51pm)


Post 13

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 1:18pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Robert,
They like to say around these parts that a concept's "essence" never changes, however, it seems that there is no practical distinction being made here between concept and essence, or in the swan example, mental concept and real species.
I think Objectivism says (and didn't Ed already say?) that essences can change, that the rules for filing this or that referrent under this or that mental category can grow as we experience new things.  (Disclaimer: I disagree with some of how Objectivism views of concepts.)

Jordan


Post 14

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 1:29pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

You wrote: I don't have Peikoff's essay in front of me. It's been awhile since I read it. The example you gave suggests to me that Peikoff (and Rand) confused the analytic / synthetic distinction with the a priori / a posteriori distinction. Under Kant's theory, 2+2=4 is a priori true. And 2qts. H20 + 2qts. CH3CH2OH = 3.86 qts. at 15.56°C is a posteriori true. I think Kant would say both of these propositions are synthetic since neither subject "2+2" nor subject "H20 + 2qts. CH3CH2OH" somehow "contains" its predicate.

I don't think Peikoff's confusion is fatal to his argument. I'm not sure, but I think his underlying claim is that a subject always "contains" any predicate that is true. So he would reject the analytic / synthetic distinction as incorrectly limiting what a subject can and does "contain." I think his argument has problems, and I think the analytic / synthetic distinction does, too, but for reasons other than those Peikoff offers.

And separately, I would guess that Peikoff (and Rand) reject the idea of a priori truths, instead claiming that all truths are a posteriori, i.e., derived from the senses, hence experience.


I don't see Peikoff as being confused, he was dealing with someone's version of a dichotomy only it was not Kant's idea. Kant, he wrote, gave it its "present name," not much else. So if you want to know whose version of it Peikoff was dealing with, I would look to A. J. Ayer in his 1952 work Language, Truth and Logic.

If Peikoff was using Ayer as an excuse to castigate Kant as some kind of demonic force, it is a weak excuse based on a simplistic view of history ("Kant led to Hegel," etc.)

I think you summed up Peikoff's argument correctly. And it's likely he would consider nothing to be a priori, only a posteriori, and the latter only in the sense that it is "a priori," i.e., a universal and necessary truth standing outside and independent of any human ability to represent and conceive.

So in his view being an "a posteriori" truth says nothing about the actual existents being considered, what they are is true no matter what we think about them. The "dichotomy" has conflated metaphysics with epistemology, the mind - a source of apriori truths - becomes independent of reality, from which it concludes that man's mind is impotent to deal with reality which is the source of a posteriori, contingent truths.

I wouldn't know why you consider Peikoff's argument to be defective. But it seems obvious to me that any true statement of fact contains both a priori and a posteriori elements. It only requires an intellectual effort to separate the two, but merely making the effort doesn't imply that any dichotomies exist.






Post 15

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 1:37pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

You wrote: I think Objectivism says (and didn't Ed already say?) that essences can change, that the rules for filing this or that referrent under this or that mental category can grow as we experience new things. (Disclaimer: I disagree with some of how Objectivism views of concepts.)

Ed referred to that term using scare-quotes, viz., "essence."

This tells me that he was referring, not to metaphysical essences, but to essential characteristics subsumed by a concept. These are characteristics essential to forming the concept, nothing else.

However, in the Q&A appendix on page 231, Rand stated: Epistemologically, the process of determining a defining characteristic will proceed by means of the question: which characteristic explains the others? Metaphysically, this means: which characteristic makes the others possible? Which is the cause?

So again I ask: Is there really any practical distinction being made between a metaphysical "essence" and a concept's "essential characteristics"?


Post 16

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 5:48pmSanction this postReply
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Robert,

Is there really any practical distinction being made between a metaphysical "essence" and a concept's "essential characteristics"?
Essential characteristics are fully known or know-able via the robust application of logic to experience. Metaphysical "essences" aren't. According to Aristotle -- who postulated them -- they are sort of "intuited." This makes them -- when spoken of by someone thinking that they are (somehow) aware of metaphysical essences -- somewhat, if not entirely, mystical notions.

Ed


Post 17

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 8:34pmSanction this postReply
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Robert,

I only now looked at the stretch of conversation on pages 237–38 to which you referred in #0. Very often in that stretch, the pronoun you is merely the usage in which one could as well use the pronoun one.

Rand speaks that way chronically. So, for example, on page 236 where she says “but your understanding of the meaning of a concept and your knowledge about the referent . . . .” she could just as well say “but one’s understanding of the meaning of a concept and one’s knowledge about the referent . . . .”

Similarly, on page 238, from Binswanger “you don’t know about these referents . . . which is all that concerns you in regard to concept-formation” and, from Gotthelf, “you do know fully now what you mean.”

One might take Binswanger’s statement spanning 237-38 to be the same sort of talk. Binswanger saying “So in the argument against the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, when you say that newly discovered characteristics are included in the concept’s meaning, you mean they belong to the same units” could be understood to be saying only “So in the argument against the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, when one says that the newly discovered characteristics are included in the concept’s meaning, one means they belong to the same units.”

I would say that that much is being said in the statement, but there is more. “The argument” does not refer to Quine’s argument against the distinction. Nor the argument of Morton White. It refers to “the” Objectivist argument. There could be more to that argument, which may have been discussed at this seminar or in other verbal discussion, but anyway the Objectivist argument would include at least all the argument published in Peikoff’s essay. There is another reason, however, to think that Binswanger was not here using the pronoun you indifferently to one.

He does not refer to the synthetic-analytic essay, but to the synthetic-analytic argument. And as you noted, when he speaks of “newly discovered characteristics” being “included in the concept’s meaning,” he is referring back to rather dubious remarks of Rand earlier in the conversation (pp. 236–37). He is right, I think, to be wary of Rand’s slippage here away from the idea that a concept is only its units (as substitution elements), which are fixed by a definite class of particulars (the referents) organized with units (as measures) along dimensions such that in the context of one’s present knowledge the concept will be productive working with one’s other concepts. Rand gets into saying on page 237 that as one learns more about the referents of one’s concept, one knows more about the particulars that are those referents and more about the units that figure into one’s concept, yet: an alteration in one’s knowledge of the units has not altered one’s concept.(!) But I digress into some of the substantive issues (in which you have also indicated some interest). Anyway, Rand is here in oral discussion, which has loose ends and ambiguities and which Rand did not know would ever appear as published material.

Returning to your question on “the [Objectivist] argument against the analytic-synthetic dichotomy,” I conclude after this further look only what I had concluded in the previous post: there is no intimation here that Rand was the author of Peikoff’s essay, only that it was a paper with which, as published, she concurred in every way. Peikoff has spoken of giving Rand manuscripts on her philosophy that she would mark up, and they would discuss the shaky points or expressions, and the ones squarely wrong, and so forth. As the editor of Objectivity, I almost always had discussed with the authors, in great detail, the manuscripts that eventually made it to acceptance for publication (about one-fifth of those submitted were eventually accepted). In my case, I was not bringing them around to my own considered view of an issue, but talking about expression, about arguments counter theirs that they might want to address, about further research or analyses of others bearing on their topic, and so forth. (Our communication in those years was entirely by written letters, surface mail, except for some authors in Chicago, where oral discussion of the paper and my letters was feasible.) Essays in Objectivity not authored by me were seldom something I thought true in every way. Not so for Rand in the journals she edited.

You might like to ask Peikoff (not about that minute statement of Harry’s, but) what was the way Peikoff worked with Rand as editor on his paper. What was his professional learning that he brought to her learning on this topic? How did the idea of having such a paper get going, and how did it develop?


Post 18

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 9:16pmSanction this postReply
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Concerning #9, Robert, I’m not so sure now that Rand would have been comfortable with using my expressions conceptual change and conceptual reformation in a representation of her thought about concepts. Conceptual change is the phrase in contemporary developmental psychology and in contemporary philosophy.

Your proposal—friendly, I gather, on behalf of Rand—I think dubious. Rand thought of concepts as implicitly containing the propositions in which the concepts could be used to state facts. Supposing any problems in that idea were cleared up, it still seems to me internally discordant to then say that those implicit propositions could change, yet the concept not change. Rand explained, at least informally, in her seminar, that her sense of the implicit in contexts such as this includes only implicit knowledge nearby, not implicit knowledge distant. Supposing concepts contain implicit propositions in that way, if you greatly increase knowledge, greatly increase the table of implicit true propositions in which a concept can be used, then that concept has got to have changed. Or so it seems to me.


Post 19

Tuesday, January 12, 2010 - 9:39pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

I did not quote anything from Aristotle, I quoted Rand stating: Metaphysically, this means: which characteristic makes the others possible? Which is the cause?

But since you know some Aristotle, I want to know what Rand meant by the word "cause" in this metaphysical context. And how fundamental characteristics can "cause" other characteristics if this is not some reference to essence, particularly, to Aristotelian formal causality.

Is Rand claiming knowledge of essences in that quote? She knows that some characteristics exist that are the most fundamental ones making the rest possible. If she knows this much, then she knows what those essences are. And she knows them in the Aristotelian sense although lacking Aristotle's dynamic process-orientation approach to metaphysics.

For example, take the definition of "man" as "rational animal." She knows this not only as the definition of a concept, that which defines some essential characteristics epistemically. She also knows that these are REAL characteristics that make the rest of man's characteristics metaphysically possible. I.e., rationality and animality are causally responsible for all the rest in a very real albeit metaphysically formal sense.
(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/12, 9:40pm)


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