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Post 40

Saturday, January 30, 2010 - 2:46pmSanction this postReply
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The "Happy Parasite" Ann: The story reads as a tribute to the "Animal Husbandry" skills of Philosopher Kings. Ann is grateful for her "Work" performed as defined and ordered by her superiors. No thinking, no changes necessary. Afraid of thinking, afraid of change, Ann is happy. No doubt people who don't want her services enrage her and she is "grateful" for the power of government to force recalcitrant people to accept her service. I don't see Ann's "happiness" as much different than the happiness of a cow grazing behind a fence on a sunny day. I guess your point is Ann is not virtuous but she is "happy". Well, if you want to call that "happiness". What word do you reserve for the feelings of those who strive mightily and achieve great things?

Post 41

Saturday, January 30, 2010 - 4:19pmSanction this postReply
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Not familiar with the distinction, or unable to address the difference between pleasure and joy in that framework, or both?


Taking a stab with the best I understand the Objectivist description, sensations cause percepts, percepts cause concepts, and concepts can lead to one or another emotion being felt. As best as I can tell, using that system, pleasure is a sensation, while both 'happiness' as described by Ed and 'joy' as I'm trying to describe it are positive emotions caused by concepts. The difference between the latter two seems to be Ed's suggestion that happiness can only be felt by people following Objectivist principles, while I'm trying to argue that such an emotion can be felt by anyone, whatever philosophy they follow.

So while, if my stab is right, the distinction you want me to make according to that framework /can/ be made, it doesn't seem to do anything to further the discussion, and so I'm pretty certain that I got something wrong with my stab.

Post 42

Saturday, January 30, 2010 - 4:44pmSanction this postReply
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Ed speaks for Ed. I think he suffers from rationalist tendencies, and he thinks I am a probable hedonist, or has, at least, accused me of that in the past. I think his assertion that only humans can be happy is as helpful as saying that only humans can be healthy. But even I don't think he would insist that only Objectivists can be happy. It would be somewhat odd to claim that no one who died before 1943 ever lived a happy life. Not even the Catholic church claims that there is no salvation outside the Church, only that there is salvation within.

Do you know what Rand's definition of happiness is? Do you think it is a formally valid definition? If you think that pleasure is a sensation, while joy is conceptual, how would you reword Rand's definition of happiness?


Post 43

Saturday, January 30, 2010 - 9:51pmSanction this postReply
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Ted,

If you just want to pick a fight, why not create a Ted versus Ed thread and go play with yourself there?
Actually, I was thinking of creating a thread called Ed and Ted's Excellent Adventure.

:-)

More seriously now, I have to admit, I am learning from, and enjoying, your Socratic questioning of Daniel. Asking him to address the difference between joy and pleasure inside the epistemological framework of sensations, percepts, and concepts was insightful if not ingenius. I hadn't thought of that, but you did. And I appreciate that.

Ed


Post 44

Saturday, January 30, 2010 - 10:02pmSanction this postReply
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Daniel,

I think we're referring to two different things - I didn't mean Rationalism as a particular philosophy, just, well, being rational, using one's mind rationally.
Well, if you start with the right information set, and you apply rationality consisently, you end up with Objectivism. Now, you can argue that Objectivism is a subset of rationalism (as in of "rationality"), that it's just one possible off-shoot among many, but that's all you can do -- argue, rather than conclude.

However, in 10 years, I have not witnessed someone win that argument (that Objectivism is just one of many, equally-valid, peculiar creations you can get from starting with rationality).

Ed



Post 45

Saturday, January 30, 2010 - 11:38pmSanction this postReply
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Is Objectivism the method or all the results some proponent of Objectivism identifies with the application of that method? There are very few people who think Rand didn't make some mistakes of fact and of theory. Anarchists (even tho they are wrong) obviously think this to be true, as do most homosexual Objectivists. How many people think Rand's theory of femininity is correct, and how many people think her opposition to a female president is valid. Are those views Objectivism, or not? If not, then what does one call a better, corrected Philosophy? Do you call it Truth?

Objectivism is, I suspect, within the event horizon of reason. Strange things, like Hawking radiation, happen at event horizons. Some objects, like Satanism and Neo-Tech, approach the reason event horizon, but are flung off in the other direction at high speed. But Objectivism is not the singularity. Existence is.

Post 46

Sunday, January 31, 2010 - 7:22amSanction this postReply
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Ted,

*****************
... and how many people think her opposition to a female president is valid[?] Are those views Objectivism, or not? If not, then what does one call a better, corrected Philosophy? Do you call it Truth?
*****************

Those views aren't essential to Objectivism (if you don't think much farther than the "on one foot" outline she gave), so this question of yours doesn't need to ever come up. Only if you are a "rationalist" would you take every stance Rand ever took as sacred and holy and an inescapable part of Objectivism (i.e., as a floating abstraction).

Aristotle was about 80-85% correct, and Rand about 95-100%. Other philosophers are lucky to score in the 50's. Rand saw this fact -- that Aristotle was light-years ahead of all other philosophers and therefore that he really deserved the name "The Philosopher." Wrong as he was, she saw this.

Now, with her going even farther than Aristotle -- and in light of the courtesy she extended to him -- it is that much more of an egregious error for you to criticize her work for missing even a tangential mark. Just as Aristotle's errors didn't detract from his discovered truths, so with Rand.

Ed

Post 47

Sunday, January 31, 2010 - 8:57amSanction this postReply
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Those views may not be essential to Objectivism, but a thing is not is not its essence. And properly, essences belong to concepts, not proper nouns. Is Objectivism a class, or an individual?

Post 48

Sunday, January 31, 2010 - 10:19amSanction this postReply
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Ted,

I agree that a thing isn't it's essence. However, I'm still not sure I get what you mean with the distinction between class and individual. Can you re-state the question another way in order for me to triangulate what it is that you do mean? That said, here is a premature answer, anyway:

Objectivism is a proper noun and, therefore, (in at least one sense) an "individual." However, like an individual city, state, or country it not only has many parts -- but can be looked at in many different ways. It is a proper noun which happens to stand for a class of things. Your question reminds me of the Two Tables problem (is a table a flat surface with supports; or a bunch of whirling electrons).

Getting to know in which sense you ask the question is as important as knowing the raw facts of the matter. Take China. There are several correct ways to answer the question:

What is the quickest way to get to China?

Here are some correct, but mutually-exclusive answers:

1) travel west (though China is in the far east)
2) by lear jet (if "quickest" means shortest time)
3) by digging (if "quickest" means shortest distance)
4) burn Chinese flags (if "get to" means to "get a rise out of the people in" China)
5) by re-electing BH Obama (if we're trying to "get to" the communism characteristic of China)
6) by ICBM (if "getting to them" is in a war sense)

If you don't know in what sense the question was asked, you won't know which answer is correct. If you do know in what sense the question was asked, you will know which answer is correct. It's that way with Objectivism, too. If you are clear enough with your question, then an answer is possible. Please elaborate in order to make your question more clear to me.

Ed

Post 49

Sunday, January 31, 2010 - 11:00amSanction this postReply
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The obvious answer is that Objectivism now has two senses: 1) The philosophy (i.e., the personal philosophical positions) of Ayn Rand. 2) A philosophical system based upon the central principles of Ayn Rand's philosophy, the primacy of existence and the hierarchy of concepts, and (presumably) embracing the positions of objecitive realism, the supremacy of reason, egoism, [romanticism,] and laissez faire capitalism. You simply have to make sure you do not equivocate between these two senses.

As an aside, Epicureanism, Stoicism and Spinoza's philosophies rank much closer to (and in some areas better than) Aristotle's philosophy than your "50% or below" schools.

Post 50

Sunday, January 31, 2010 - 11:52amSanction this postReply
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There's a de facto third sense, which can be quite problematic, but which nevertheless is often adopted by the media: Objectivism is whatever people who call themselves Objectivists say it is.

Jordan

Post 51

Sunday, January 31, 2010 - 3:45pmSanction this postReply
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All recent points conceded.

Ed

Post 52

Monday, February 1, 2010 - 8:30pmSanction this postReply
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On objective value:

Suppose a kid in a museum sees a Ming vase with a stylized fawn, worth thousands of dollars, and thinks, "what a great slingshot target!"

So, is his evaluation correct or incorrect? 

Both, taken out of context.  Certainly, ignoring the replacement value/cost, the vase would make a great target.  Put in the context of the range of other potential values as well as the relative actual cost, compared to other likely targets, the vase makes a terrible target, no matter how much the kid loves shooting his slingshot.  Note that the kid, if he is old enough to use a slingshot, is undoubtably old enough to grasp the rudiments of comparative value, and understand that for the price of the vase, he could buy a virtual universe of targets. 

Suppose the same kid is scrounging the local dump, looking for things to use for target practice for his beloved slingshot.  He stumbles across the same or an identical Ming vase that a local Alzheimers victim has mistakenly thrown out with the trash, along with assorting pretty Azizona Tea bottles worth only the recycling fee.  Knowing nothing about the comparative value, he chooses the vase as his first target, losing potentially thousands of dollars, had he but known.

It's interesting how much trouble people have in grasping that value could have any objective component, when such examples abound. 


Post 53

Sunday, February 7, 2010 - 12:24amSanction this postReply
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Phil,

Are you familiar with Rand's take on "market value" vs. "objective value?" It's available here:

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/market_value.html

It's where the "immediate" market value (the snapshot sum of all individuals' market choices) does not necessarily reflect the objective value of a product, but asymptotically approaches it -- as the market (eventually) teaches all of the focused individuals about how to objectively improve their own lives (by "valuing" in a way that is objectively "better" than they used to value before).

Ed

Post 54

Thursday, March 29, 2012 - 3:59pmSanction this postReply
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Mr Thompson,

I enjoyed reading Objectivist views on objective value versus market value, a very old subject discussed by Aristotle (value-in-use versus value in exchange, see Politics), St. Thomas Aquinas (notion of "just price", see Summa Theologica), Adam Smith (see Wealth of Nations), Karl Marx, and many others.

I would like to better understand the "objectiveness" of philosophically objective value. The link you posted says the following:

"By “philosophically objective,” I mean a value estimated from the standpoint of the best possible to man, i.e., by the criterion of the most rational mind possessing the greatest knowledge, in a given category, in a given period, and in a defined context (nothing can be estimated in an undefined context)."

This seems to give dictatorial power for determining value to a single being. There are a few things that I would like clarified: what if two beings are equally rational and knowledgeable (I have assumed away all issues about how one goes about demonstrating "most rational" and "greatest knowledge)? Would they necessarily estimate the same value?

Also, is an estimate "objectively true"? It may be objectively true that it is an estimate, but what is its relation to reality (citing Rand's views on the relation of concepts to reality will not due, I am specifically interested in "estimates")?

Also, what sort of things would this mind consider when determining value? Are these things objective? How are we to know what they are if they, as the quote suggests, require rationality and knowledge?

And how would one go about verifying any of these things, from a mind being the most rationality and knowledge to them applying the objectively correct criteria for determining wealth?

What role do personal preferences play (related to "equal minds" disagreeing)? Perhaps one can say that a minds' personal preferences are objectively what they are (I'd need to be convinced, but let's assume), but what does this have to do with the object being valued (i.e. an intrinsic property of the object)?

This whole thing seems very confusing. Many very intelligent people have struggled with this issue, and I do not see it solved here. The common view amongst economists these days seems to be that either there is no "philosophical value", or its a meaningless or useless thing to discuss. Personally, I need to be convinced that any object has an "intrinsic value", even if we fix time and context. It seems to me that the only "objective" thing would be that a mind has an estimate of value...it is objectively true that a value is determined by a mind. This sounds an awful lot like value being subjective...

Also, the problem of determining the most rational and knowledgeable mind seems to push us into a territory that Rand despises: there's an objective reality, but it is inaccessible to us.

I am eager for a response and look forward to learning and discussing.

MT Stern

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Post 55

Thursday, March 29, 2012 - 6:28pmSanction this postReply
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Mr., Mrs., or Ms. Stern,
"By “philosophically objective,” I mean a value estimated from the standpoint of the best possible to man, i.e., by the criterion of the most rational mind possessing the greatest knowledge, in a given category, in a given period, and in a defined context (nothing can be estimated in an undefined context)."

This seems to give dictatorial power for determining value to a single being.


If you look at it in the hyper-literal sense -- where one, and only one, man gets to estimate something -- then it appears like the best guy gets to call all the shots. But it's actually just a normative statement. If you look at normative language and thought, you will find examples of certain kinds of things are given -- and those examples are typically the very best individuals of those kinds of things. Take birds.

If you are attempting to outline or provide an example of a certain bird, let's say a spine-tailed swift for example, then you would avoid referring to mutant birds born with only one wing. The reason that -- when outlining or providing such examples -- you don't talk at all about such anomalies is because it would not help you in understanding what the bird is or what it does. The spine-tailed swift is the fastest-flying bird and can fly at 100-mph. Let's try another example: knives.

If you were trying to characterize what a Ginsu knife was, you wouldn't include botched knives that came off of the assembly line without a handle (or with an imperfect handle). You wouldn't include deformed knives, or even dull ones. Instead, you would only include the very best and most sharp knife -- in your characterization of what all of these knives are, or what they do. Or you could try explaining a circle. In doing so, you would show or talk about only the most perfect circle possible. You would not include discussion of imperfect circles when trying to get someone to understand what a circle is.

So, it is just a method utilized during normative discussions, to always and only include the very best or brightest -- temporarily putting aside the fact that there may be some things of a certain kind which are not perfect. So, when Rand said that philosophically objective value would be what is estimated by the best man in the best situation, she was merely speaking "normatively." All natural law philosophers do this: Aristotle, Aquinas, Jacques Maritain, etc.

what if two beings are equally rational and knowledgeable ... Would they necessarily estimate the same value?
No, and your question seems misguided -- as if you are still in the same train of thought as in the first quote above. If so, then my answer above should be sufficient to answer this question, too (because it applies in the same way to the subject matter). An absurd example (reductio ad absurdum) would be: What if 2 spine-tailed swift birds had the same genetic impediments? Would they necessarily fly at the same speed?


Also, is an estimate "objectively true"?
Yes, you just have to "show your work." What you do is start out by saying: "Under these assumptions, the value of X is properly estimated to be between Y and Z." If you take a stick that is 18" long, and you use a reproducible method of estimating that it is between 1-foot and 2-feet, then your estimate is objectively true. An example might be that you have a 12-inch ruler laying around. To be more precise (if the context called for that) you could put the stick up to the ruler and see that the stick is longer (by about half). You could make a notch on the stick that is exactly 12-inches down the stick and then you could measure from the notch to the end of the stick (another 6 inches). No matter the precision required by any specific context in question, you can always get to an estimate that is objectively true.


Also, what sort of things would this mind consider when determining value? Are these things objective? How are we to know what they are if they, as the quote suggests, require rationality and knowledge?
It's simple, we would use our rationality and knowledge. Under Rand's philosophy, man (in general) is a creature with rationality and he is a creature that gains knowledge (and even passes knowledge on to others). So there isn't this one, very special and unique human being who has in his possession the rationality and the knowledge -- leaving the rest of us like hungry baby birds waiting to be fed whatever it is that he regurgitates. Because humans have a common nature, it will be possible to find out what kinds of things lead to an objectively-fulfilling life for folks -- and what kinds of things detract from human fulfillment.

At the margins, there will always be some idiosyncratic differences, but this doesn't prevent us from arriving at some broad truths. For instance, the existence of psychotic people -- people who value murdering others, for example -- does not take away from a normative conclusion about murder and mankind. These kinds of exceptions actually work to prove the rule. Also, you could ask if faith and force is good for mankind, and if reason and freedom is better for mankind. And then you could get to an objectively correct answer to that question. 


And how would one go about verifying any of these things ...?
In the example I gave above (faith & force vs. reason & freedom), you may start with reference to first principles about mankind. For instance, man survives via the use of his mind and faith and force subvert the use of the mind. It follows that for humans faith and force will, in general, result in what scientists call "a failure to thrive" when compared to the opposite ideas: reason and freedom.


What role do personal preferences play (related to "equal minds" disagreeing)?
I'll have to answer when I have more time. Welcome to RoR.


Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/29, 10:34pm)


Post 56

Thursday, March 29, 2012 - 7:44pmSanction this postReply
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Mr Thompson,

I am very pleased that you have responded. I will carefully read your comments, and likely respond.

Best Regards,
Mr. Matthew Stern

Post 57

Thursday, March 29, 2012 - 9:39pmSanction this postReply
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Addendum:
Also, what sort of things would this mind consider when determining value? Are these things objective? How are we to know what they are ... ?
One of the things to consider for this purpose is the set of natural needs for humans, things we humans require because of our identity as a specific entity. One natural need is our need for oxygen. If your morality does not include oxygen, then it is not an objective morality for mankind. The reason that it is not an objective morality for mankind, is because oxygen is an objective value for mankind, and an objective morality will have to include the pursuit of objective values. To broaden the scope way beyond oxygen, here is a short list of things which humans might be proven to objectively require in order to live well -- they might be proven necessary, even if not proven to be sufficient:

1) knowledge
2) peace
3) liberty
4) justice
5) pleasure
6) basic physical health
7) mental health
8) art
9) friendship
10) purpose
11) autonomy
12) a sense of self-efficacy
13) self-esteem
14) beauty (the experience of)

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/29, 10:37pm)


Post 58

Thursday, March 29, 2012 - 10:13pmSanction this postReply
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Ed:

You continue to impress me with your skill in explaining abstract ideas with concrete examples.

Sam


Post 59

Thursday, March 29, 2012 - 10:16pmSanction this postReply
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Mr. Stern,
What role do personal preferences play (related to "equal minds" disagreeing)?
It depends on the context. Let's say that the context involves leisure time. You are searching for a way to spend your time, but the time itself is already categorized as being leisure time. In this purposely-confined context, we can give a straight answer to your question. Personal preferences would properly be the primary arbiter of value in this context. You may prefer to read a book, or call a friend, or take a nap, etc. Now let's broaden the context to a point where personal preferences get knocked off of the throne of being the arbiter of value. Let's say that you've got this guy and he's got criminal intentions -- his preference is to rape his date. Now, his "date" is a gal who happens to have as one of her personal preferences: Going throughout the whole day without getting raped.

Okay, so we've got a conflict of interests. On the surface, it might appear that there is no such thing as objective morality. When we take a gal (we could probably substitute nearly every gal on the planet to the same effect) and we look at her personal preference with regard to a particular event or outcome, and when we take this one mentally-twisted fellow -- it appears that not all humans want the same things to occur. It appears that there cannot be values that are objectively good for us all in virtue of our being human beings. But, alas, we can ask if doing what the twisted guy wants to do is a "viable" value or not (1). Because humans aren't omniscient, it is possible for us to want things that aren't, actually, good for us. We can make moral mistakes. Keeping in mind that the victim's life has already been tragically affected, let's travel through the looking glass into this twisted man's future ...

1) He rapes the gal.
2) She tells the police.
3) The police arrest him.
4) He goes to jail.
5) He experiences immense pain and suffering.
6) He experiences remorse.

That's it (the "r" word)! That is the proof that there is an objective (rather than purely subjective) morality. When you experience remorse, it is because you made a mistake -- you made a choice which had a net-negative effect on the probability of you attaining a whole life, well lived. Now, did the guy really need to go through all of this trouble? No. Is rape something that tends to be a good thing for humans, and this guy was only an exception to that rule? No. Instead of raping the gal, he could have worked to discover the kinds of things that folks need in order to live well. If he had known about those things, he might have avoided the decade in jail followed by the painful death (by "shanking") from the girl's ex-boyfriend, who was also in prison and heard about the rape.

:-)

Caveat:
There is a possibility that even armed with the correct moral knowledge, that this man might have went ahead and raped the gal anyway. That would be called weakness-of-the-will or simply: poor character development. M. Scott Peck ("The Road Less Traveled") once said that a strong will is the second most important thing to have. He never said what was the (first) most important thing to have. He left that out as an exercise for the reader.

Anyway, now we've got this all-around negative result -- one immediate victim, and ongoing pain for the predator -- and we've chalked it up as being the result of poor character development. Now we can take just one more step back and determine the cause of the poor character development. If the man was a jungle boy -- just came out of the jungle and the girl thought he was cute -- then we can say that the cause of his bad character is misfortune (not experiencing civilization). However, the much more likely cause of his bad character -- the aspect that would allow him to do the wrong thing, even when armed with the right knowledge -- is his own moral failing as a human being.

Ed

Reference
Viable Values. (2000). Tara Smith. Rowman & Littlefield.

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/30, 5:43am)


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