A Universal Mistake

A Universal Mistake

One of the most important of Ayn Rand's contributions to the field of epistemology is contained in the seventh chapter of her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology entitled, "The Cognitive Role of Concepts."

In it she explains how the world we are conscious of is comprised of an infinite complexity of existents, events, and relationships and why it is not possible for us to comprehend this complexity simply by perceiving it. To understand it, we must "break it up," into manageable pieces we can identify and understand. This, Ayn Rand explains, is the role of concepts.

"The essence ... of man's incomparable cognitive power is the ability to reduce a vast amount of information to a minimal number of units—which is the task performed by his conceptual faculty." ["The Cognitive Role of Concepts," Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology," Page 63.]

The principle clearly explicated is this: the development of knowledge is essentially a process of simplification.

The Simplification of Philosophy

If there is any hope philosophy is going to be successful answering the most difficult questions, it must do so in terms of concepts that are simple, clear, and exact. With notable exceptions, the history of philosophy is the record of a relentless effort to make its concepts as complex, obscure, and incomprehensible as possible. The exceptions are the high points in the history of philosophy from which the most significant advances can all be traced.

One example of those high points is Occam's Razor, which, as Bertrand Russell observed, "swept away mountains of metaphysical lumber." Other high points of clarity and simplicity include Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, and most recently Ayn Rand.

Despite the efforts of these and other great minds dotting the landscape of philosophy's history, the field continues to labor under a load of unnecessary complexity. It is the purpose of this article, the previous one on Perception, and additional planned articles in this series, to address these points of unnecessary complexity and confusion which continue to infect the field of philosophy, and to correct them.

Superfluous Concepts

One of the most damaging concepts to ever infect philosophy is the concept of universals. Originated by Plato in his "forms," and "improved" by Aristotle as "universals," the idea has existed in some manner in every philosophy since.

It might be interesting to trace the destructive effects of this concept throughout history to observe how it has corrupted every area of philosophical enquiry, but that is not my purpose. My purpose is to eliminate the concept from philosophy completely; because it is not a concept at all. It is a pseudo-concept, impossible of meaning, which even corrupts valid concepts when mixed with them.

What are universals? That is an excellent question and there are many answers to it and they are all different. There has never been a general agreement on what universals actually are; nevertheless, every philosopher has been sure there are such things and all have felt obliged to discuss and explain them. Even Ayn Rand felt obliged to solve, "the problem of universals," which she equated with, "concepts," calling it, "philosophy's central issue." [Foreword, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Page 1.]

Where Did Universals Come From?

There are two different though related questions of philosophy the concept of universals attempts to answer. The first has to do with the meaning of certain words. For example, we have general concepts, like "circle", "man," and "book," but to what, exactly, do we refer by those words? We know what a circle, a man, or a book is when we see one, but when we say, "that is a circle," "that is a book," or, "that is a man," what exactly are we saying?

I think it is safe to say what we and all men have always supposed we are saying is, "that is one of those things with the qualities of a circle," or "that has the qualities of a book," or "that has the qualities of a human being," which leads directly to the second question. What are the qualities of a circle, or the qualities of a book, or the qualities of a man? And what exactly are qualities, anyway?

There are lots of circles, but almost no two are exactly alike. How can they all be circles if they are all different? How can there be "qualities of a circle," if they all have different qualities? The problem is even greater for books and men, because circles only differ in size, but the differences in books and men are practically infinite. How can they all be books, with the qualities of books, or men, with the qualities of men, if they are all different and all have different qualities?

Universals and Essence

The problem gets worse. Before we even begin to think about the answer to the first two questions, another philosophical concept pops up. That is the concept of essence.

It is easy to imagine that all circles, despite their differences, have some quality which is common to them all. We can see it. Though they are all different (in size), the common quality is what makes them all look like circles. The ancient philosophers called that common quality which made circles circles, whatever other attributes they might have, their essential quality or essence.

Essence was thought to be what makes a thing what it is, and it was assumed everything has an essence; "circleness" is the essence of circles, "bookness" is the essence of books, and "manness" is the essence of man. As we mentioned, we can more-or-less see what "circleness" might be, but what in the world would "bookness" or "manness" be?

Philosophical Sleight of Hand

Plato was the first to attempt to provide an answer to the question of what the essence of a thing, which makes it what it is rather than something else, actually is. It was obvious to the early philosophers there is something about human beings that makes them men, and not books or rhinoceroses, no matter how different they are, and there is something about books that makes them books, and not men or pickles, no matter how different they are.

Plato's "solution," was to simply to give the notion, "that which makes a thing what it is," a name. The name he chose is forms. Just giving a concept a name does not exactly answer the question of what these "forms" are, or explain how they "work". Plato might have succeeded with the trick if he had left it at that, but felt constrained to explain what forms were. Plato's explanation of forms, however, as things which existed independently, and ideally, somewhere, that when infused or impressed on existents cause them to be what they are is very confused, and obviously wrong. Aristotle saw through it right away.

Aristotle's improvement was to rid the notion of essence of its mystical independent "real" existence. According Aristotle, essences exist only as attributes of existents; but they are actual attributes and they are universals, which is where we began. By universals aristotle only means, the essence of any kind of existent is present in all existents of that kind, and it is the presence of that essence that makes the existents the kind of existents they are.

Two Solutions, Two Kinds of Qualities

Aristotle's "solution" does not really answer the question of what essence is, but it does answer the two original questions about universals. The second question was, how can two things with different qualities be the same kind of thing? Aristotle's answer to that question is there are two different kinds of qualities: essences and accidentals. Essence is that quality or property a thing has that makes it what it is; a thing must have its essence (or essential qualities) to be that thing, and having that essence, it cannot be anything else. All other qualities are accidentals, and for any existent, accidental qualities are any qualities it might have but which it does not necessarily have.

The answer to the first question of universals which was what do we mean by words like "circle", "man," and "book," follows directly. Aristotle's answer is we mean by, "circle," anything with the essential quality, "circleness," no matter what other " accidental" qualities it has, and by, "man," we mean anything with the essential quality, "manness," no matter what other " accidental" qualities they have, and by, "book," we mean anything with the essential quality, "bookness," no matter what other "accidental" qualities they have.

What is left unanswered by Aristotle is exactly what the essential qualities of, "circle," "man," and, "book," are. It is only asserted that they are universals.

Everything is a Universal

But what exactly does it mean to say something is a universal? It means that, whatever it is, it can be a quality or attribute of more than one thing. Of course this must be true if there is to be more than one of any kind of thing. Unless there is only one circle, "circleness" must be a quality of more than one thing, and unless there is only one man or only one book, manness and bookness must be qualities of more than one thing too.

This is where the concept of universals becomes very confused. It seems like it is the answer to the question, "what is essence?" but if all it means is it can be a quality or attribute of more than one thing, it means all qualities are universals, for the very same reason essences or essential qualities are universals. Unless there is only one "red" or only one "round" or only one "new" thing, "red," "round," and "new" must be qualities of more than one thing, and therefore universals.

Answers to Nothing

If universals are nothing more than qualities (any attribute, characteristic, or property), then what does the concept explain and what purpose does the concept serve?

It does not, in fact, answer any questions. It does not explain what we mean by words like circle, book, or man. Aristotle, at least provided the answer in abstract. Circle means anything with the essential quality, circle, and book means anything with the essential quality book, and man means anything with the essential quality man.

So What Is Essence?

Aristotle observed there are two kinds of qualities, essential qualities and accidentals. Though Aristotle wrongly identified what essential qualities are, his answer at least explained how things with different qualities can be existents of the same kind. What makes them existents of the same kind is they all have the same essential qualities, while their accidental qualities can be and usually are different.

Interestingly enough this solves another question as well, which is how a single thing can be the same thing over time if its qualities change. The answer is, the essential qualities do not change, only the accidental qualities change. A man starts as a baby, becomes a child and then an adult, the whole time, his knowledge is increasing; he then grows old, and may loose both physical and mental attributes in the process. Yet, the whole time it is the same "man," because the essential quality, "manness" remains the same the entire time, while all the other "accidental" qualities are changing.

Essence, for actual existents, is never a single quality, however, but a combination of all the characteristics and attributes necessary for an existent to be that existent. This is why I do not choose to use the term essence, but rather, the expression, "essential qualities," or, even better, necessary qualities.

At this point I must make two important notes to avoid confusion.

NOTE 1: Essential qualities, ontologically are different from essential qualities in the context of a definition. Ontologically, a thing is whatever all its qualities are, and as a member of a class or category, it is all the qualities necessary to that class; that is, all the qualities a thing must have to be one of the things belonging to that class. The necessary qualities also exclude any qualities with which the existent would be something else. The necessary qualities are, "all of these and only these," even if all of these are not entirely or perfectly known, and even if they are not known at all.
For purposes of a definition it is not necessary (and would be mistake) to enumerate all the necessary qualities. It is not necessary for a definition to name any of an existents actual qualities. It is only necessary for a definition to isolate the existents subsumed by the concept, which in some cases is accomplished by naming a quality or some qualities that within the scope of present knowledge, identify the things the concept subsumes, but meaning those existents with all of their qualities.

NOTE 2: The, term "accidental," for those qualities that are possible to an existent, but not necessary to it is unfortunate. I prefer the term possible for two reasons: 1. they are possible to any member of a class of existents, but for any particular existent, all the qualities of that existent are necessary, not, "accidental," and, 2. since not just any other qualities other than the necessary qualities can be true of an existent, the other qualities an existent may have, must be possible to that kind of existent. It is an existent's necessary qualities that determine what other kinds of qualities are possible to existents of that kind.

What's Wrong With Universals

If the fact a quality or attribute that can be true of more than one thing is all that is meant by a universal, there is nothing inherently wrong with that idea, but it is unnecessary. It is at least a violation of Occam's razor. Universals add nothing to our understanding of anything and can only add confusion to what is already perfectly well understood. But the concept of universals not only adds an unnecessary level of complexity to already difficult concepts, it blurs distinctions that are useful and important.

Disparate Concepts

One of the most damaging aspects of the pseudo-concept, universals, is that it conflates totally unrelated concepts, making them referents of a concept for which there is no purpose whatsoever.

A banana is a banana because it has the necessary qualities of "banananess," and a cow is a cow because she has the necessary qualities of "cowness." Everything has its necessary qualities, humans, mountains, dogs, and books, the necessary qualities of which we call humanness, mountainness, dogness, and bookness. All these necessary qualities of are called universals.

But other qualities, like redness, sharpness, heaviness, and wetness are also universals. Even abstract qualities, like oldness, importantness, goodness, and fiveness are universals.

Subsumed by the concept universals, therefore are all these: banana, cow, human dog, book, mountain, red, sharp, heavy, wet, old, important, good, and five. If it were not for the concept universals, we would never know these were in some sense, all the same kind of thing. Anyone can see, just by looking what all these have in common, NOTHING! It is a huge confusion.

There is another confusion. Since universals include all qualities (characteristics, attributes, and properties), both necessary (essential) and possible (accidental) qualities are included as universals. What is the point of a concept that confuses this most important distinction between two categories of qualities.

The only possible commonality between the things called universals is that they can be predicated of something. Well, we already have the perfectly good term, "predicates," which has none of the nonsensical implications of the pseudo-concept "universals." If that is all that is meant by "universals," it is simply superfluous.

Making Something of Nothing
or
In More Than One Place at the Same Time

No matter how clearly it is demonstrated there is no rational basis for the concept universals, the advocates of this mistaken notion persist. There are two questions always presented as necessitating the concept of universals, "how can the same thing be in more than one thing?" and, "how can it be in more than one thing at the same time?" Even if these were legitimate questions, which they are not, how the concept of universals would answer them is not explained, but, we are assured it is necessary because otherwise the questions pose some great mystery.

The always unstated (and denied if pressed) implication of these questions is qualities are something which are actually in things. I suspect these questions are really a confusion of language and could be corrected simply by pointing out qualities are not "in" things, they are "of" things. A thing's attributes are not the result of anything added to, impressed on, or infused into it, a thing's attributes are what that thing is or does.

Not Things and Not Abstractions

Qualities are not things and they are not abstractions. (There are abstract qualities, however.) Suppose we have a bunch of tin sheets, all perfectly flat. Someone comes along and, with a hammer, pounds dimples into several of the sheets. Looking at the sheets of tin we immediately notice there is something different about some of the sheets. The quality that makes those sheets different is "dimples." We may call that quality "dimpled." Obviously "dimpled" is not something added to the sheets. Its not a "something" that in any sense is in them, because nothing as been added to them at all. The dimples are an aspect or attribute of the dimpled tin sheets. But "dimpled" is also not "abstract." Dimples are real features or characteristics of some of our tin sheets.

The mistaken notion that qualities are "in" things, once it has gripped someone, seems very hard to shake. One other way this "great mystery" is sometimes expressed is, "how can there be multiple instances of the same thing in different places at the same time? How can redness, for example, be present in more than one thing like an apple, a traffic light, and an LED all at the same time?

There is nothing that can be present in multiple instances, at least not at the same time. Of course I can be present at the barbers in the morning and at the supper table in the evening, but that is not what is meant here. The idea is that there is actually "something" which is present in different things, even at the same time. If that were not what is meant, there would be no mystery?

Consider jumping beans. One of the attributes of jumping beans is that they jump. Jumping is an attribute of jumping beans. It would be absurd to say that "jumping" is in more than one jumping bean at the same time. What is in more than one jumping bean is a worm that makes them jump. It is a different worm in every jumping bean. It is the same kind of worm, however, that is in each jumping bean, but each worm is a distinct existent.

All attributes are "in" things in the same way as jumping bean worms. Just is it may be said loosely, it is the same worm in all jumping beans, but means the "same kind of worm," when we say, it is the same color (or shape or any other attribute) in things, it would be more accurate to say, it is the same kind of color, such as red, that is "in" all red things, but each instance of red is unique to that the piece of red paper.

The Physics of Qualities

While there is no general agreement about what universals are, exactly, they usually include all possible qualities and attributes. In most discussions, however, the examples given are usually attributes of physical existents. For example, roundness would be a universal because it is an attribute of apples, oranges, and other round things. But non-physical attribute are also considered universals. For example difficultness is a universal because it is an attribute of some mathematical problems, computer programs, and other difficult things. Roundness pertains to physical existents, difficulty pertains to some kinds of problems relative to achieving some objective; these are concepts, not physical existents.

For the moment, I only want to consider those concepts called universals that pertain to physical existents. By demonstrating their true nature, it becomes obvious they are not anything of which it can be said, "they are in more than one thing."

Ultimately, all physical properties can be reduced to the behavior of entities. We know this is true, for example, of the quality red. Red is not a something that is in red things, it is something red things do. What they do is cause (by reflecting it, transmitting it, or producing it) light within a specific range of wave lengths or frequencies to eminate from them. An object may be red because its surface only reflects red light or it is illuminated only by red light for it to reflect. A traffic light is red because the lens only transmits red light. An LED is red because it produces red light. Redness is not something in red things, redness is how we perceive what red things do.

This is how all the attributes of physical things can be understood. Since someone is bound to ask, I will explain this in terms of an attribute that does not seem like something an entity does, the attribute of roundness. How is roundness something a round thing does? There are two answers to this question. The first is somewhat general. Any shape is an attribute of things that maintain a shape. (A shape might be a transitional state for some things, however.) To be round it must behave in a way that allows it to be round, for example a marble, a drop of water (under the right conditions) and a smoke rings are all round. The roundness in each case is the result of the behavior of the entity, however nebulous (or smokey). It is fairly easy to see how the roundness of a smoke ring, or a drop of water falling is simply an attribute of what it does, but what about the marble. It doesn't do anything to be round, does it?

This is where the physics comes in. I do not believe philosophical problems can be solved by appeals to science, but since I do not regard universals as a legitimate philosophical concept (or any other kind of legitimate concept), an exception may be safely made in this case.

Physics tells us there is nothing static in the physical universe. Even those things that seem most solid and, "still," just beneath the surface of what we can see, they are a seething caldron of ceaseless atomic and subatomic activity, and all those attributes of solidity and "stillness" are the manifestation of that activity at the physical perceivable level. We cannot see all that activity, but in even the most solid of entities, we can feel it, in the form of heat.

A marble is round and remains round because that is the manifestation of all the behavior of the molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic particles of which it is comprised. If all the molecules suddenly bent in one direction, or all the atoms suddenly shifted to one side, or most of the subatomic particles suddenly left, the marble would, at least, have a different shape, and would probably cease to exist.

The Phoenix of Philosophy

For physical existents, those attributes and characteristics said to be "the same quality in more than one thing," are actually only actions, and the actual case is, the common attributes and characteristics are only the same actions by those existents that exhibit those qualities. This fact alone should dispense with the false notion of universals once and for all; but, there are still those abstract qualities for things which are not physical, like effectiveness (of a processes or program, for example) or beauty (of a work of art or a woman, for example). Obviously these kinds of universals are not "actions." But, it is equally obvious they are not characteristics that are in anything. In fact, neither is in the object predicated by them at all, because they are both, "evaluations," the first in relation to some objective, the second in relation to someone's values, and no matter how objectively analyzed, the object of the evaluations remains the same however it is evaluated.

The concept, "universals," is a useless and confusing concept first

interjected into the body of philosophical thought by the mystic Plato. It is a synthetic concept like the phoenix or unicorn, completely devoid of objective meaning. The concept of universals must be relegated to the trash heap of junk concepts along with phlogiston, animal magnetism, and ectoplasm.

—Reginald Firehammer (7/06/04)

Post 1

Tuesday, July 6, 2004 - 12:19pm

Mr. Firehammer,

If universals were what you claim them to be, i.e. "the same quality in more than one thing," I would have accepted your thesis as valid. However, even your own essay points out that this is not necessarily so. You mentioned Aristotle's definition as being "the essence of any kind of existent [that] is present in all existents of that kind." So the concept of universals does not refer to just any quality (like redness, roundness, etc.), but only to essential qualities in the context of the objects of which these qualities are essential. So, for example, roundness can be a universal quality w.r.t. circles, but not w.r.t. building blocks, though one could conceivably create a round building block. "Building-blockness" consists of other qualities that are essential to building blocks, while roundness is only a possible quality. Roundness is not a universal where building blocks are the subjects of one's evaluations.

The terms "essential" and "universal" are very close and, in my estimation, interchangeable in most instances. For example, one can say: "The qualities necessary to Object A are essential qualities, which are universals for every Object A." The term "universal" is merely a slightly different perspective on a quality's manifestation by all objects of a given category, while the term "essential" notes the quality's manifestation by any object of said category. The proximity here is evident; the difference is just a matter of focus.

I find myself in agreement with just about everything else in this treatise.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 2

Tuesday, July 6, 2004 - 12:50pm

Mr. Stolyarov,

I'm afraid I may not have been clear enough since you say, "If universals were what you claim them to be, i.e. "the same quality in more than one thing," I would have accepted your thesis as valid."

I reject both the concept universals and essence as superfluous; although, if we must have one of them, I think essence at least can be given a legitimate meaning, just as you described.

My description of "universals" is not mine, but the one that is commonly accepted. I agree the concept might be, "cleaned up," but do not see any point in doing so.

Both (essence and universals) are loaded with philosophical "lumber" of both mystic and skeptic background. That is why I use only the terms necessary qualities, (which is what you refer to as essence/universal, I think) and possible qualities, and simply throw out the rest.

I'm sure we are not very far apart in our understanding of these issues, however; because we have already discussed some of these things.

Thanks again.

Regi

(Edited by Reginald Firehammer on 7/06, 12:51pm)

Post 3

Wednesday, July 7, 2004 - 7:14pm

Hi, Regi.

I understand your argument against universals. I also understand your argument against essence. Instead you argue that "essence" is better understood in terms of the necessary and possible qualities of an entity. OK, but doesn't that take "essence" out of the metaphysical realm? Isn't a necessary quality dependent upon what is of interest to me in a group of entities?

For example: A group consists of a man, a baby, and a kitten. If what interests me in that group is development, then the necessary quality of the baby and the kitten is "infantness" and "adultness" for the man. The manness of the man and the baby and the catness of the kitten are only a possible qualities. If the necessary and possible qualities are contingent upon the context in which a group of entities are considered, how would this be different from Ed's intentional conceptualism?

Regards,
Bill

Post 4

Wednesday, July 7, 2004 - 8:34pm

Bill,

I am preparing a longer response to you very interesting question.

For the time being let me say, concepts identify "kinds of things," not "groups."

A concept is "open-ended," and means, "all the the things of this kind, past, present, and future."

Since there is no such thing as a man-baby-kitten, there is no need for such a concept. A man, a baby, and a kitten are all separate concepts, which certainly may be identified as members of a group which is another concept, and their characteristics, such as "infantness" and "adultness" analyzed, which are even more concepts.

The one thing Ayn Rand emphasized, but not enough, is that a concept does only one thing, identify. A concept is not knowledge about what is identified. The concept "baby" only identifies what a baby is (by means of those qualities necessary to those existents called babies), it does not imply any knowledge about babies beyond that identification.

Regi

Post 5

Thursday, July 8, 2004 - 5:33am

Hi, Regi.

>>Since there is no such thing as a man-baby-kitten, there is no need for such a concept.<<

Yes. Metaphysically, every thing is what it is. Every thing has a unique set of qualities which make it identifiable -- i.e., distinguishable from every other thing. So how do we put those qualities to use when we want to group things together instead? I think I have a glimmer of where you are going when you refer to kinds of things as opposed to groups of things. This will give me something to chew while I am away the next few days.

I look forward to your further response to this.

Regards,
Bill

Post 6

Thursday, July 8, 2004 - 9:06am

Mr. Firehammer,

Thank you for your response.

Now I understand more clearly the purpose of your endeavor; because the concepts of "universals," "essences," and "accidentals" have acquired so much cultural baggage, not all of it rational, you would like similar concepts to be represented by different words that can be defined wtihout being confused with the perversions of universals that Plato and the mystics had undertaken.

My concern about this is that it might throw the baby out with the bathwater, so to speak. In a language, it is often useful to have an entire array of synonyms, standing for just about the same concepts, only with different shades of meaning or perspectives. For example, egoism, individualism, and selfishness all mean essentially the same thing, but egoism approaches the notion from the perspective of man's mind (the mind is seen as the principal entity defining the individual), selfishness approaches the concept's implication that a man must act for his own benefit, while individualism implies that any individual can follow this filosofy and benefit himself. So, by a use of all three terms, we can already say that Objectivist ethics embraces the centrality of man's mind/ego, encourages an individual to act for himself, and encourages each individual to do so.

Similarly, essence, universality, and necessity have complementary meanings, though they, properly defined, will address just about the same conceptual fenomenon. Thus, I do think that the cultural baggage ought to be trimmed from those concepts without necessarily discarding them. You have done part of that work by identifying false or overly expansive definitions of universals or essence, but I still consider the concepts worthy of keeping.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 7

Thursday, July 8, 2004 - 11:15am

Regi, in your effort to stake out territory for yourself you seem to be ignoring what I pointed out in another thread: that AR only used essence and universals as identifiers or preliminary labels for the problems she was addressing, and then avoided them thereafter. Once one has grasped her theory, the two terms naturally fall by the wayside--or if they don't, it is easier to avoid falling into error because of them. So Objectivists would find your observations beside the point (they might have some use among non-Objectivists however--I'm not sure).

Much of what you say is part of, or corollary to, AR's theory. To the extent that you are original I think you are wrong! When I have time I will continue the conversation I started with my "Socratic question" in another thread.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 7/08, 11:19am)

Post 8

Friday, July 9, 2004 - 6:33am

Bill,

Since you seem to have realized the answer to your own question, I am not going to provide my long answer.

I think I have a glimmer of where you are going when you refer to kinds of things as opposed to groups of things.

That is more than a glimmer. Since this is obvious to you, I am not certain exactly what your question is. I think the problem is possibly a confusion between the metaphysical and epistemological.

The subject was universals, particularly those universals called essences, that which makes an existent what it is, metaphysically, not epistemologically. I do not prefer the term essence, but so long as it is understood to mean "that which is distinctive about existents which makes them the same kind of existents," it is acceptable; but ultimately that essence must mean, whatever qualities are necessary for those kinds of things to be the kind they are.

Epistemologically we may group things in any way we please, though practically there must be some logical reason for the grouping. Totally arbitrary groupings would be irrational (though possible). In your case, the group was just what was at hand. We can group things which all have some relationship to something else (the members of the third-grade class, the citizens of Ohio, or like your example, all the living things in the parlor) or that perform the same thing (football players, time-pieces), or that share some quality (all red-round things).

The difference is what the concept is about. If it is about thing's metaphysical natures, those "groups" are always open-ended concepts the include (mean) anything with that nature (of that kind), that is, with all the necessary qualities of those kinds of existents. Those existents have that nature and are that kind whether anyone is aware of the existents or understands their nature or not.

If the concept is about things grouped according to some relationship or specific action or recognized characteristic, those groupings are epistemological. They require knowledge before they can be made. What is known may or may not be about some metaphysical qualities (ultimately all characteristics must be), but the groupings could not be made without knowledge and are not determined by the metaphysical nature of the units subsumed by those concepts. Some of these concepts may be open-ended (all red-round things) but usually are not (members of the third-grade class).

Both kinds of concepts, epistemologically, have necessary and possible qualities. To distinguish between the two types of concepts I will call those that identify things in terms of their metaphysical nature metaphysical, and those which identify things in terms of relationships, specific actions or characteristic, epistemological. Now here is a curious thing, the necessary qualities for metaphysical concepts must be discovered, and we can be mistaken about them, but the necessary qualities for epistemological concepts are chosen and we can never be mistaken about them. This does not mean we cannot form bad epistemological concepts, only that we cannot be wrong about what they mean (what the units are) because we "pick" them.

What determines whether or not our epistemological concepts are good ones or not, is ultimately our metaphysical concepts. If we are wrong about the nature of actual existents, all our other (epistemological) concepts, which are really abstractions and integrations from metaphysical concepts, will be wrong.

(Ayn Rand does identify concepts in this way. The closest she came to this identification is in her chapter, Abstraction from Abstractions, in Introduction to Obejectivist Epistemology, which together with, "The Cognitive Role of Concepts," are her best writing, in my estimation, on epistemology. And, by the way, the question you raised is extremely important. Some philosophers have addressed little else than this question, and have mostly gotten it wrong. Most Objectivists do not even know such questions exist. This is my short answer. You may thank, whomever or whatever you thank, I spared you my long answer.)

Regi

Post 9

Friday, July 9, 2004 - 7:04am

Mr. Stolyarov,

You have done part of that work by identifying false or overly expansive definitions of universals or essence, but I still consider the concepts worthy of keeping.

Of course we cannot avoid using the words universals and essence if we are going to communicate with those who do use them (mostly incorrectly). I used them throughout my article because there was no other way to address them. But if we are going to use them, it will always be necessary to make our own meaning explicit, because they are going to be generally misunderstood with the "classical" meaning.

In my own writing, I prefer to avoid the necessity to explaining what I mean by these words, especially since I can express my meaning without them.

As always, you are a very careful observer and provide valuable comments. Thank you!

Regi

Post 10

Friday, July 9, 2004 - 7:12am

Rodney,

I appreciate the comments, especially since you are so busy.

Regi, in your effort to stake out territory for yourself you seem to be ignoring what I pointed out in another thread: that AR only used essence and universals as identifiers or preliminary labels for the problems she was addressing, and then avoided them thereafter.

I did not forget. I think I even alluded to that, but the fact is, you and I are about the only one's who know it; else why are so many Objectivist, even on SOLO spending time trying to explain what universals are. But my article is not addressed only to Objectivists, and outside of Objectivism, universals and essence are completely misunderstood and strongly promoted.

Much of what you say is part of, or corollary to, AR's theory. To the extent that you are original I think you are wrong!

That could certainly be. It would be very helpful and greatly appreciated if you could point out, explicitly, where you think I am wrong. If I'm wrong, I want know about it now, before I make any more mistakes based on my errors.

Thanks again!

Regi

Post 11

Friday, July 9, 2004 - 5:25pm

Hi, Regi.

>>Since this is obvious to you, I am not certain exactly what your question is.<<

That's because my question changed once I began thinking about what you wrote and what I posted in response. It might have been helpful if I mentioned that. ;)

>>Now here is a curious thing, the necessary qualities for metaphysical concepts must be discovered, and we can be mistaken about them, but the necessary qualities for epistemological concepts are chosen and we can never be mistaken about them. This does not mean we cannot form bad epistemological concepts, only that we cannot be wrong about what they mean (what the units are) because we "pick" them.<<

This is very close to what I concluded after having given the matter some serious thought for the first time. Here is what I am still stumbling over. An entity possesses of set of qualities which identifies it. All entities are unique, thus every quality of an entity is metaphysically necessary to it. Now we can choose to associate various entities, and that epistemic association will determine which qualities are necessary to each entity to belong to that association and which are merely possible. Because possible qualities arise only in the context of such an association of entities, possible qualities are strictly epistemological.

This is why, for example, you and I can disagree about the definition of a human being while be in full agreement as to what the qualities are of a human zygote, embryo, fetus, infant, child, adolescent, and adult. We agree on what the qualities of these are, but we disagree as to what is necessary and what is merely possible in the context of the epistemological association called "human being". I agree logic and commonsense will best determine what epistemological associations we use, but I don't see how such associations can be determined metaphysically.

I hope I have expressed myself clearly. The subject is new to me, and I appreciate the time you have taken to consider my questions.

Regards,
Bill

(Edited by Citizen Rat on 7/09, 5:27pm)

Post 12

Friday, July 9, 2004 - 6:51pm

Bill, you are a pretty sharp customer. You will be atheistic yet.

Hopefully I can put my own disagreement in terms that will cause Regi (gasp!) to change his mind.

Post 13

Friday, July 9, 2004 - 9:21pm

One thing that rubbed me raw in OPAR was Leonard Peikoff's assertion on page 17:

"Many commentators on Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle claim that, because we cannot at the same time specify fully the position and momentum of subatomic particles, their action is not entirely predictable, and that the law of causality therefore breaks down. This is a non sequitur, a switch from epistemology to metaphysics, or from knowledge to reality. Even if it were true that owing to a lack of information we could never exactly predict a subatomic event -- and this is highly debatable -- it would not show that in reality, the event was causeless."

Um, Dr. Peikoff, when you say that "we could never exactly predict a subatomic event owing to a lack of information", that shows that you just don't understand quantum mechanics, and are presuming that the rules are the same on that tiny level as they are on the real world.

They're not. That's the whole point, and you have yet to understand it.

You're essentially saying that you can't predict things on that level because you just don't yet understand the governing formula for their behavior. That's the implicit thinking here, and it's false. You may never understand the governing formula(s) for their behavior! To assume that you will, after looking at the evidence, is to some degree, arrogance.

Based on empirical evidence gathered so far, on the quantum scale, things are a mixture of totally certain and completely random: they are tendencies. In fact, they "exist" in what you could accurately call "tendency space", where they tend to exist in certain areas at certain times, presently only properly dictated by mathematical rules of random wave-shaped distribution.

At some point, it may happen that an "algorithm" or "formula" for this "apparent" randomness might be discovered. But then again, there's no reason to violate Ockham's Razor to do so. Perhaps, just perhaps, there really is true randomness on this level, and that that is the creative nature of the universe: mostly continuous, occasionally eccentric.

You have to adapt your logic to reality, no matter how little you like it. Failure to do so usually results in nature opening up a whole damn can 'a' Whup-Ass on you.

(Edited by Orion Reasoner on 7/09, 9:25pm)

Post 14

Saturday, July 10, 2004 - 12:09am

Orion, Bill;

Orion, to come to Peikoff's defense here (gasp), he does use a qualifier to leave the door open for inescapable non-omniscience (caps added for clarity):

"This is a non sequitur, a switch from epistemology to metaphysics, or from knowledge to reality. Even IF it were true that owing to a lack of information WE COULD NEVER exactly PREDICT a subatomic event -- and this is highly debatable -- IT WOULD NOT SHOW that in reality, THE EVENT WAS CAUSELESS."

Bill, I have another thought-experiment for you (perhaps you'll view it as "hitting below the intellect" but I just couldn't hold my tongue):

I introduce you to 2 human-looking "men." After meeting them, you comment to me on how they had both seemed to be real "stand-up guys" - and that you would like to get their phone numbers from me so that you could call them over for Monday Night Football. At this point, I say that I have a confession regarding each of these guys:

I say: "Man 1 has an artificial heart" - to which you say: "That's okay, he's still a human, and besides, he's a real stand-up guy - I'd like to hang out with him"

Then I say: "While Man 2 does have human-like tissues for 90% of his body, he has an artificial mind - he's a cyborg-robot programmed to give human-like responses to most of the ordinary cues"

Bill, doesn't the having (or not having) of a functional central nervous system determine "human-hood" (at least in the negative sense here)?

I understand that you may either attack the analogy or answer the question, but keep in mind that one does not necessarily preclude the other (you may do both).

Ed

Post 15

Saturday, July 10, 2004 - 12:34am

Even so, I just find much of Peikoff's writing to be not to my taste... He's developed the typical kind of academic language that is designed to confuse and thereby intimidate and alienate others from... I picture the visual metaphor of a hippopotamus trapped in molasses.

It doesn't have to be this way; I'm sure he could make his point much more clearly, if he were so inclined.

(Edited by Orion Reasoner on 7/10, 12:35am)

Post 16

Saturday, July 10, 2004 - 5:06am

Hi Bill,

Your understanding is better than most Objectivists, but you have made one mistake, I think.

All entities are unique, thus every quality of an entity is metaphysically necessary to it. Now we can choose to associate various entities, and that epistemic association will determine which qualities are necessary to each entity to belong to that association and which are merely possible. Because possible qualities arise only in the context of such an association of entities, possible qualities are strictly epistemological.

When identifying things as metaphysically the same kind of things, we cannot arbitrarily choose to associate things. Remember, metaphysical natures are discovered, not chosen. Things which are the same kind of things are so because they have the same necessary qualities. All cats are cats because whatever qualities are necessary for a cat to be a cat are true of all existents which are cats. That is a metaphysical fact, not the result of some arbitrary association we make.

There are two kinds of possible qualities. Those qualities which are possible to individual entities over time and those qualities an existent may have but does not necessarily have as an existent of a particular kind. What qualities are possible to an existent are determined by the nature of the existent, that is, it necessary qualities.

The necessary qualities that make a cat a cat determine what kind of qualities are possible to a cat. A cat (any cat) may have a tail, or not have a tail, but will be a cat if it has the necessary qualities of a cat, with or without a tail. A particular cat may have a tail when it is born, but might loose it at some point in its life. It is still the same cat with or without the tail as long it as has the necessary qualities of that cat, whatever those might be. A cat cannot have horns and be a cat. A cat must have a liver to be a cat. Both these are necessary qualities (required attributes) of any (and all) cat(s).

When you say, "Because possible qualities arise only in the context of such an association of entities, possible qualities are strictly epistemological," it sounds like you are attributing the possibility of qualities to epistemology, not metaphysics. It also sounds like you think we can associate things "willy-nilly" so to speak. We can, actually do that, which accounts for a great deal of nonsense, but we cannot do so if we are to have knowledge. What we "associate" must be based on the metaphysical nature of things. The associations (the hierarchy of existents into classes of existents) is metaphysical, the hierarchy of our knowledge is valid to the extent it conforms to that hierarchy of reality, which already is and we only discover.

Regi

Post 17

Saturday, July 10, 2004 - 7:01am

Rodney,

Hopefully I can put my own disagreement in terms that will cause Regi (gasp!) to change his mind.

Promises, promises!

I would gladly and eagerly change my mind about anything I am mistaken about. I do not believe it is possible that I have made no mistakes at all in all of my thinking and therefore welcome the opportunity to have my mistakes pointed out to me. I know you think the same way. So did Ayn Rand.

Regi

Post 18

Sunday, July 11, 2004 - 7:29pm

Greetings, Regi, Rodney, & Ed.

Regi: I agree that the association of entities needs to "make sense". I agree that the basis for association is metaphysical -- i.e., the perception of the same qualities in different entities. It would seem to me that the reason why I identify a kitten as a cat first and an infant second is metaphysical, but I don't readily see how. Understanding the epistemology of association seems straightforward, and yes, it can lead to a lot of nonsense because it's arbitrary. I'm going to have to chew on this more, Regi, before I have more to say (or more likely, ask ;).

Rodney: Thanks for the compliment, although I must tell you that taking philosophy seriously (starting with Objectivism) has led me away from non-theistic thinking to a return to my Catholic roots. So, the odds might be long on your intuition bearing out. ;)

Ed: A human being is not merely human tissue. A human being is an organism; it has a life, so it exists through time as well as space. It begins life as a human being, and the replacement of its components with mechanical devices does not change its identification as a human being. A machine that animates human tissue, such as your cyborg with the artificial mind, is not a human being. It was created as a machine and has no life, which -- to use a Firehammerian term -- is a "necessary quality" to a human being.

Regards,
Bill

Post 19

Sunday, July 11, 2004 - 8:25pm