| | Bill, Jordan,
I just went back to Jordan's post that I have not answered yet and read through to this last (#29) by Bill. It was very entertaining (and you have managed to cover most of epistemology, ontology, non-rational consciousness (e.g. recognition as precognitive) and science (the infinite regress of constituents).
I wish I could get Chris Sciabarra over here to see this. It's a perfect example of what's wrong with "dialectics."
Let me see if I can shed some light on those parts of your conversions for which I particularly contributed to the confusion.
First the unanswered question:
Your view that all ontological properties are actions (or manifestations of actions?) is an interesting one. I'll have to chew on that a bit more. I've gotten myself good and confused on the subject. Here's why: A property is an action, which is of an entity. But an entity is all of its properties, which are all actions. So an action is of something that is all actions, which seems to suggests that an action is of actions. Where did I botch this?
You didn't. My original point is that no physical existent can be static. Physics recognizes this, obviously, but philosophers frequently forget it. Existence is dynamic, always everywhere; since existence is only "all the existents," existents are always dynamic, as well, both in their relationships to other existents, and in their own nature.
Now the confusion is this, I think. When I say, an entity is all of its attributes or qualities, and all the qualities of an entity can be attributed to its behavior, those qualities are only how that behavior is manifested or we perceive it. The entity is a dynamic acting thing, its qualities (how it is observed to act, how it relates to other entities, how it is perceived) are that behavior or the result of it. For example, suppose I have a nugget of radium. In the dark it will be light green. That light green is a quality of the radium. The light green is not an action. The emission of light in that wave length by radium is an action. In fact, the emission of light is also a property of radium, but not a perceivable one; it is one discovered scientifically. It is the same action that both attributes, the perceived green color and the scientifically discovered emission of light, are manifestations of.
I am going to try one other thing. So long as we say, "a thing is all its qualities, we don't have a problem. We don't say since a quality is only a quality of a thing, and a thing is all its qualities, a quality must be a quality of qualities. It is only when we point out those qualities are not static things, but dynamic, we become confused, but it is really the same thing.
Remembering that real things are not static "lumps" but dynamic, "events with continuity," all of their qualities are only whatever actions are those existents.
Jordan, you were willing to skip the following but I want to mention the answer because it is very simple:
I'm still not sure how to distinguish ontic from epistemic concepts The distinction is only a matter of convenience, there is not essential difference in the nature of the concepts. The immediate referents of ontic concepts are entities (ontological existents); the immediate referents of epistemic concepts are other concepts (epistemological existents).
You said this to Bill, Jordan:
My own view is that qualities and entities are both ontologically basic. Only entities exist physically; qualities are attribute of entities, events are the action of entities, and relationships (which make up the bulk of qualities and events) are only between entities. Qualities, events, and relationships are ontological, but only aspects of existents. So qualities and entities are not ontological in the same sense.
OK, Bill, you are now on the hook:
So I understand that other entities like me -- i.e., other people -- must also be singularities, even though I identify them by the qualities of theirs I perceive: One's a redhead, another's fat, and the guy over there is old. I know that the old fella is not a union of 80 years of age, gray hair, brown eyes, 5'8" stature, dark complexion, etc. I cannot gather up these qualities and reproduce him. He is who he is, a singular human being and not union of the qualities of a particular human being. I am only going to note that all of your examples are particulars, and therefore, all the qualities you mentioned are necessary qualities of the individuals they are qualities of (because if they had different qualities they would not be who they are). I say this to demonstrate it is not the qualities that "make" them who they are, but who they are (with the qualities they actually have) that is the reason for the qualities and why they are necessary.
Yet, the distinction plainly exists, and I know it. It is a metaphysical distinction that allows me to separate canine entities from feline ones. That's why I believe an entity is not a sum of its qualities, but what is it I perceive that allows me to understand this? Is it an overall quality of canine-ness and feline-ness? If so, why is that not reducible to measurement like other qualities (and so programmable into my computer)? Is that which is not measurable, yet perceived, the foundation for the metaphysical (or perhaps ontic) association of entities as opposed to an epistemic one?
Have you ever seen the Porphyrian Tree?
It is from classical logic and actually pertains to definition, rather than ontology, but the purpose of definition is, after all, to isolate existents in terms of their difference from all other existents by means of the concepts they define.
Original Porphyrian Tree | Genus | Generic Difference | Contrary | | | Substance | Material [Body] | Non-material [Spirit] | | | Body | Living [Organism] | Non-living [Mineral] | | | Organism | Sentient (Animal) | Non-sentient [Plant] | | | Animal | Rational [Man] | Non-rational [Brute]
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Ayn Rand never mentioned the Porphyrain Tree, but she must have been aware of it because many of her statements make direct reference to the concept it portrays. Now, here is an interesting thing to think about. Man is the only known existent which can be precisely defined in this way.
At each level, the class of existents is distinguished from all other existents by means of that attribute that is unique to that class of existents, e.g. the unique characteristic of organisms, that separates them from all others, between plants and animals, is sentience.
The reason man is the only kind of existent that can be defined this way is because he is the only member of the class of existents that is rational.
For all other things (e.g. animals - called "brutes" in the tree) there is no single differentia (or difference). To identify other animals, some combinations of qualities must always be used as the differentia.
That in fact, is exactly how we know the difference between a cat and a dog. The cat has some qualities the dog does not, and vice versa. I'll let you mull that.
In the meantime, the way I can tell the difference between a cat and a dog is this. If I send them both out to play, when the cat comes in she smells heavenly, but when the dog comes in, she stinks.
OK, back to Jordan:
Now, would you say that a thing is a sum (or integration) of its parts? Example: The red rubber ball's parts are the rubber and the red paint; the ball wouldn't exist without these. If so, this brings up another prob: if every thing is made out of its constituent parts, and if in turn these constituent parts are themselves made out of constituents parts, then don't we suffer an infinite regress in reducing things into their constituent parts? This is a popular problem in philosophy, but perhaps it's more a question for science than philosophy At the perceptual level, except for substances (copper, water, iodine) existents are a "configuration" of parts. From the perceptual level, "down," everything is the sum of its parts, because only substances are treated by the sciences from there down.
But you are right, the question is a scientific one from that point on. However, there is a philosophical element to the question, which philosophy has not addressed, and must. I will give you a hint to what I am certain is the answer--the real is the world we directly perceive and all the "constituents" which the sciences describe or not real in the same way rocks, trees, dogs and planets are real. Every real existent is unique. No two real existents are identical in every way. Atoms of the same element are all identical. (Something to think about.)
Finally, Bill,
The electro-magnetic radiation we perceive as red and violet is metaphysical. However, red and violet are associations, respectively, of the qualities red-ness and violet-ness of different entities. The association of these qualities independent of their propagating entities is an epistemic exercise. Therefore, red and violet are epistemological concepts.
Sounds nice. What does it mean?
(Bill is right, this is a lot more fun than Grand Abuse.)
I have no idea if I've answered any questions, but I am always willing to try. I sometimes have trouble understanding what other people's difficulties are. I have been answering these questions for myself for so long, I have forgotten some of the things that originally troubled me. I can remember events, people and places back to the age of three, (according to the testimony of others, I do not remember myself how old I was), so am a bit troubled by these things I cannot remember. (I need another Wild Turkey.)
Regi
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