Moral Relativism

Craig,

Are you seriously saying that something that an individual does not desire, and does not want, could be of value to him if it benefits him? If so, then how do you know it's of benefit to him? Where do you get this knowledge? Who decides?

The colonoscopy example that Ethan mentioned earlier sufficies. Or consider giving a shot to a kid. The kid doesn't desire or want it, but it's good for him. No one decides that the shot is good for the kid. It's good for the kid because of the kids nature. We simply recognize this benefit.

As for Rand's definition, so are you saying that if you want lice, then they're of benefit to you? Here you haven't acted to gain or keep the lice; you've just expressed a desire for it, so it doesn't meet Rand's defintion, and it doesn't make sense to me. OR: are you saying that if you intentionally obtain lice (regardless of whether you want them), then they are of benefit to you? That doesn't make sense to me either. Also, I still want you to address my other criticism of Rand's definition -- that her view doesn't allow that objects that the agent does not act to gain or keep can still be of benefit or desire to the agent. Example: The shot is still of benefit to the kid, even if it's not administered to him.

Jordan

Post 21

Saturday, December 4, 2004 - 10:54am

This discussion seems to be involving a lot of incorrect substitution of terms. Under Ayn Rand's definitions which are being discussed here, �value� is not the same as �benefit.� An individual can value things that are not of benefit to him; likewise, there can be things that benefit an individual that he does not value. They are not equivalent concepts.

Value is �that which one acts to gain or keep.� People act to gain or keep many things, not all of which are of benefit to them. So it is correct to say that if a person deliberately works to gain or keep lice, then they are a value to him�but not a benefit to him. What benefits an individual is that which advances or preserves his life or happiness, on the basis of his identity as a man and an individual�and, depending on the rationality of his value hierarchy, may not actually be values to him.

Now, the goal of a rational ethics is to teach an individual to value that which is of benefit to him.

Though, this is an interesting point:

Here you haven't acted to gain or keep the lice; you've just expressed a desire for it, so it doesn't meet Rand's defintion, and it doesn't make sense to me.

More realistically, there are people who desire money, but do not act to gain or keep it. This may mean that there is a further distinction necessary—between “desire” and “value”—or it may mean that the definition is flawed and should encompass desire as well as action. Personally, I'm inclined towards the former.

Post 22

Saturday, December 4, 2004 - 1:04pm

The colonoscopy example that Ethan mentioned earlier sufficies. Or consider giving a shot to a kid. The kid doesn't desire or want it, but it's good for him. No one decides that the shot is good for the kid. It's good for the kid because of the kids nature. We simply recognize this benefit.

Jordon, I don't think the colonoscopy example helps you. Here you have a medical procedure that you're claiming will benefit the agent. But the agent 1) has no emotional desire fore the procedure; 2) has no rational desire for the procedure; 3) does not believe it benefits him. Therefore how do you know it's a benefit to him?

OR are you saying that the agent believes HIMSELF that a colonoscopy would BENEFIT him, but he has no intention of going through with the procedure because of some irrational fear? We need to clarify the conditions for this example. If you are saying that the agent believes this procedure to be a benefit, but decides not to take any action toward acquiring this procedure, THEN are you saying that this procedure is still a value to him? It seems to me that this procedure still cannot be called a value. Maybe it's a potential value, but with no intent to act to acquire it, then where does it fit into his life? It doesn't. If he were to win one in a radio contest, he wouldn't take it. If someone were to pay him $1 not to go take the procedure, he'd take the dollar. So how can it be called a value? Real values have a price: "I love her so much that I wouldn't take all the money in the world for her." People will trade their time and/or money for real values. Here we don't have this.

Likewise with the kid who doesn't want the shot. Here we have a medical procedure which the kid does not understand and does not want because he knows it hurts him. His mother, on the other hand does value the procedure, takes time away from work to pick the child up from school and take him to the doctor, and then spends money purchasing the shot because she believes it to be good for the child's long-term health. It's clearly of value to the mother that the child get his shot, but it's of no value to the child. He doesn't desire it, want it, or understand the benefit. Why do you want to make it a value to the child?

How can making this medical shot be a value to the child, be of use to our definition of value? How can making the colonoscopy be a value to the agent, be of use to our definition of value? Why do we need to incorporate these examples into our definition of value?

Post 23

Saturday, December 4, 2004 - 5:54pm

Rowlands:
We respect rights because we want the benefits of society
I would say this isn't primary. If we can reap the benefits of society w/o respecting others' rights, then should we? This is the prudent predator problem. And if a person clearly offers us no benefit, then may we ignore or disrespect his rights? This I would call the useless-and-harmless agent problem.

Jordan, I think it is primary, although I don't think it's the only reason. But just imagine if society were a cost instead of a benefit. Would you still respect rights if by doing it you hurt yourself?

The prudent predator nonsense is really more of a question of whether consistency, independence, etc. But it presupposes a rights-respecting society. You're not talking about not-respecting rights at all...you're talking about secretly trying to get away with petty crimes.

If it's a question of what reason is primary, you have to look at what values are being gained by that reason. I think it's clear that the benefits of society are so huge and important, it easily explains the primary motivation for respecting rights. Of course, if you think there's some reason that's more fundamental, speak up.

Post 24

Saturday, December 4, 2004 - 8:49pm

Snowdog,

But the agent 1) has no emotional desire fore the procedure; 2) has no rational desire for the procedure; 3) does not believe it benefits him. Therefore how do you know it's a benefit to him?

An agent's desires do not determine what is of benefit to an agent. It's the agent's life as whatever kind of creature it is that determines what is of benefit to it. The kid benefits from the shot because his risk of disease is reduced. And generally, diseases are not of benefit to any animal, let alone a rational animal.

Rand views life as an ultimate value because all other values are predicated upon it and not primarily because she desires life above all other things. Life is the benefit. The benefit for life might influence the desire or pursuit for it (perhaps sort of like what Leseul was saying when he wrote, "the goal of a rational ethics is to teach an individual to value that which is of benefit to him"), but the benefit of life doesn't precipitate from the desiring of it.

Rowlands,

Would you still respect rights if by doing it you hurt yourself?

This begs the question of whether disrespecting rights more greatly harms me than would living in a society that hurts more than helps me.

So here's what I think is O'ism's most tenable view of the primary for respecting others' rights. I have trouble laying it out though. Here's the short version: The heroic life sacrifices neither self to others, nor others to self, even when others themselves don't reciprocate or display such heroism. That is, just because people are raping and pillaging doesn't mean it's okay for me to. The heroic is just that much more difficult to obtain.

Here's the longer version. Humans play by the same principles of success and failure. No one is exempt. If I deny the application of a principle to one human, then I've denied it to all humans, including myself. So if I acknowledge the efficacy of a principle in myself, then I am obligated to acknowledge the efficacy of this principle in all others. This goes back to Aristotle's basic rule of justice: treat similar cases similarly. I acknowledge the efficacy of the principle that I ought to be an end in myself (we can, if you like, discuss why I think this principle is effacious, but let's not in this thread). Thus, I am obligated to acknowledge that others are ends in themselves. Summing up: The primary purpose to respect others' rights is because I acknowledge my own rights. The principle that allows for and protects my rights, is the principle that allows for and protects the rights for each and all.

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 12/05, 2:22pm)

Post 25

Saturday, December 4, 2004 - 10:38pm

Jordon, I don't think we're communicating...

An agent's desires do not determine what is of benefit to an agent.

Neither you nor I are suggesting that an agent's desires determine that which is of benefit to him. And I haven't tried to draw a relationship between the two concepts.

The kid benefits from the shot because his risk of disease is reduced.

But who decides that the shot is a benefit? Obviously in this example, it's the mother, but go back to the colonoscopy example? Who decides if it's a benefit? The agent doesn't want the colonoscopy, so how do we know it's of benefit to him? It sounds as if you're saying that there are unrealized benefits lying out in the world. No doubt that there are. But an unrealized benefit has nothing to do with value. There are probably lots of things in my life that would benefit my life that go unrealized, but they don't sit in my value tree.

Do you believe that the terms 'value' and 'benefit' are interchangeable? If so, then we should be able to get rid of the word 'value' altogether. But values are requirements for life because living things (let's assume volitional living things for simplicity), have to make choices to continue living. These choices are determined by their values which they must seek-out from the world around them -- rationally from those things which would benefit their lives. But if the choice to pursue something beneficial to an agent is not made, then the value does not exist; it does not sit in the agent's value hierarchy; and doesn't offer anything of value to the agent -- until it's chosen. The value is the chosen. The benefit may exist with or without the agent's knowledge. Notice, though that a benefit does not exist completely independent of the agent's values. If someone wants to go to New York City, then a free airline ticket could be considered beneficial to the agent. But if the agent does not want the ticket, (for whatever reason), then it's of no value to him. Maybe he doesn't know that the ticket is available to him. In such a case, the ticket exists as an unrealized benefit, and nothing of value.

But what do we lose if 'value' and 'benefit' are interchangeable? Then do we say that living things have to pursue those things beneficial to them? This sounds OK. But without the concept 'value', we lose scope. How do we decide between two things which may both seem beneficial to us? We have to place more value on one benefit over the other, and when we do that, we reintroduce the concept 'value' as that which is chosen. So the colonoscopy procedure, beneficial as it may be to the agent's health, is of no value to him until he chooses it.

But there's one other thing to consider as well: There's no such thing as an obvious benefit. Everything carries risk. The airplane ticket carries the possibility of a fiery death. The flu shot carries the risk of delivering the flu, itself, to a very small percentage of its recipients.Even food sometimes carries deadly bacteria. So the benefit has to be evaluated by the agent, himself. As we consider humans to be rational, volitional, creatures, each responsible for their own lives, then each individual must be the final arbiter between that which is beneficial to his life and that which isn't, and he must be the final arbiter between those things he values, and those things he does not.

Craig (Houston)

(Edited by SnowDog on 12/04, 10:42pm)

Post 26

Saturday, December 4, 2004 - 11:08pm

The heroic life sacrifices neither self to others, nor others to self, even when others themselves don't reciprocate or display such heroism. That is, just because people are raping and pillaging doesn't mean it's okay for me to. The heroic is just that much more difficult to obtain.

Nathaniel Branden says something similar in "The Virtue of Selfishness". "... since the only rational base of individualism as an ethical principle is the requirements of man's survival qua man, one man cannot claim the moral right to violate the rights of another. If he denies inviolate rights to other men, he cannot claim such rights for himself; he has rejected the base of rights. No one can claim the moral right to a contradiction."

To me this sounds like deontology. I can find a lot of reasons why someone shouldn't violate the rights of another, but it seems kind of weak to say "don't do it -- just because ..."

Craig (Houston)

Post 27

Saturday, December 4, 2004 - 11:11pm

Jordan, while I can appreciate the argument you make, I still think it's not primary. We don't treat animals as ends in themselves, and we don't see anything "heroic" about people who try to recognize the rights of the animals. Why are humans different? This view of other humans as deserving of rights has to be based on the understanding that there is no fundamental conflict between them. If there were, it wouldn't be heroic, it would be insane. Certainly when your own life is the standard, you wouldn't praise the sacrifice of it for some feeling that you're good for treating them as equals. That's why we don't treat criminals that way...they're lives are fundamentally at odds with our own lives. We throw them in jail, banish them, or kill them.

In other words, treating other people as ends in themselves only makes sense when there is no conflict of interest between them. If the values society has to offer didn't exist, and instead it was a zero sum world where we fought for scraps, then respecting the rights of others would be anything but heroic.

I think you're making an argument for consistency, which is fine. There is a value there. But that's certainly not the biggest reason. The value gained there is insignificant compared to the value society has to offer. I can't see that as the primary motivation since the value gained is so small in comparison.

It's only because we recognize a fundamental harmony of interests that treating others as equals makes any sense. And without it, the argument for heroic consistency would be an inversion of morality. It's the harmony of interests that comes first.

Post 28

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 7:52am

Hi Craig,

People don't decide what is of benefit to them. Benefits are objective. In O'ism, a benefit is measured by how well it further's the life of some particular agent. It doesn't matter if benefit is unrealized. The question is: if X obtains Y, would Y benefit X? Of course there's a cost-benefit analysis here. There're risks associated with obtaining any benefit. There's no absolute certainty of success.

So the benefit has to be evaluated by the agent, himself. As we consider humans to be rational, volitional, creatures, each responsible for their own lives, then each individual must be the final arbiter between that which is beneficial to his life and that which isn't, and he must be the final arbiter between those things he values, and those things he does not.

It's one thing to say that agents should be free to decide upon and pursue their own ends (something I agree with). It's quite another to say that whatever the agent pursues is necessarily of benefit to him (something I disagree with).

Do you believe that the terms 'value' and 'benefit' are interchangeable?

Not necessarily. I think 'value' is a mess of a word. Some people use it to mean benefit; others to mean desire; others to mean object of an agent's intentional actions. I'd rather dispense with the term for the sake of clarity.

But if the choice to pursue something beneficial to an agent is not made, then the value does not exist; it does not sit in the agent's value hierarchy

Eh? Agent's have to choose which objects to pursue. They have to weigh which pursuits are more and less worthwhile. The objects of an agent's choices will be weighted and stacked into a hierarchies, with or without the term 'value.' Seems like now you want 'value' to mean 'choices.' As Tom Robbins would say, value is a sponge word. we keep wringing new meanings out of it.

Oh, and Nathaniel Branden captured what I was trying to say pretty well. Thanks for reminding me of that. I'll have to get to Mr Rowland's comments later.

Jordan

Post 29

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 8:55am

Rowlands,

We don't treat animals as ends in themselves, and we don't see anything "heroic" about people who try to recognize the rights of the animals. Why are humans different?

Well, I disagree with you here, but I don't want to get into it. O'ists think humans are different because only humans have volitional choice. The moral standard that applies to a being of volition choice applies to each and every being with volitional choice. The standard is universal. This needn't be deontic. I would suggest it's far more consequential because the goodness of the action is judge by its ends, by what is kept. More on this in a moment.

In other words, treating other people as ends in themselves only makes sense when there is no conflict of interest between them.

I'm not following you. If someone aggresses upon me, I may defend myself. And so may anyone who is aggressed upon. But it does not follow that I may aggress upon others just because others aggress upon others.

I can't see that as the primary motivation since the value gained is so small in comparison.

The benefit kept is the benefit of living as a creative mind and not a brute, a hero and not a parasite. In aggressing upon others, we would lose what I think is most valuable to us. Our humanity.

Also concerning your position, predicating respect for rights primarily on reciprocity or benefit from others is primarily other-centered. It seems to treat others as means to your own end. Further, the rule crumbles in various situations, like the ones I've already mentioned (like the prudent predator and the useless-and-harmless agent). These are counter examples that demonstrate the limits or unsoundness of the principle. Societal benefit is a fine consequence, not a cause, of recognizing and acting on our humanity.

Jordan

Post 30

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 10:31am

Jordan!

It seems we have a lot to discuss. No hurry. :)

I found this to be an interesting comment in your last post:

"I think 'value' is a mess of a word. Some people use it to mean benefit; others to mean desire; others to mean object of an agent's intentional actions. I'd rather dispense with the term for the sake of clarity."

So you want to design an ethical framework without using the concept of 'value'. I would like to see this. What do you use instead? Choices, and benefits?

"People don't decide what is of benefit to them. Benefits are objective. In O'ism, a benefit is measured by how well it further's the life of some particular agent. It doesn't matter if benefit is unrealized. The question is: if X obtains Y, would Y benefit X? "

The concept of 'benefit', though, requires a choice. Until a choice is made, no benefit can exist. The flu shot is of no benefit to someone who does not choose to live. The airline ticket is of no benefit to someone who does not choose to travel. So what constrains an individual's choices? The way you're using benefit, it sounds as if a benefit can only be something that aids in one's survival.

Craig

Post 31

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 11:27am

Hi Craig,

So you want to design an ethical framework without using the concept of 'value'. I would like to see this. What do you use instead? Choices, and benefits?

Sure. Ethics is all about the choices we ought to make. I'll leave alone for now whether those choices should be predicated on desires, benefits, or a combo of the two.

The concept of 'benefit', though, requires a choice.

I disagree, because we cannot choose what's good and bad for us. The moral quality (i.e., goodness or badness) of the relation between agent and object has nothing to do with the agent's choice. So I disagree with this:

The flu shot is of no benefit to someone who does not choose to live.

The flue shot isn't of benefit to someone who is dead, but so long as he's alive, it would help him, even if he doesn't choose or desire it. I'm not suggesting that we force the shot on him. After all, that might sabotage a greater benefit to him (i.e., his autonomy). O'ists will argue that's it's better he get sick than lose his self-determination.

So what constrains an individual's choices? The way you're using benefit, it sounds as if a benefit can only be something that aids in one's survival.

Only if we're measuring against survival. O'ists measure against the "life of a rational animal." Some O'ists take this measure as whether the object will cause the individual to flourish, while other O'ists take this measure as whether the object will cause the individual to survive, while yet others try to integrate or renegotiate those two metrics. For the purposes of this discussion, we don't need to choose specifically what we're measuring against because a flu shot would normally be beneficial to the individual under any of those metrics.

Jordan

Post 32

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 4:02pm

I disagree, because we cannot choose what's good and bad for us. The moral quality (i.e., goodness or badness) of the relation between agent and object has nothing to do with the agent's choice. So I disagree with this:

So what makes something good or bad? Is it simply to do with an agent's survival? That which is good for an agent's survival is good, otherwise bad? Because you can't separate goodness and badness from choice if you allow an agent is to flourish. To flourish, an agent needs to add choice to his life, and decide what will make his own Life the best it can be. These decisions he makes as to how he is to live his Life and choose his career, for instance, become ethical when he makes the choice. Or are you saying that all actions in addition to those that are necessary for survival fall within an ethical framework derived from the nature of the rational human animal? In other words, are you saying that becoming a doctor, for instance, is Good regardless of whether the agent decides to become a doctor?

Craig

Post 33

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 4:22pm

The benefit kept is the benefit of living as a creative mind and not a brute, a hero and not a parasite. In aggressing upon others, we would lose what I think is most valuable to us. Our humanity.

I brought up the example of animals, which I think is apt, but you seem to dismiss it for no stated reason. You could argue it's our "humanity" not to live off of other animals, and to act heroic treating the wolves and the tigers as equals. You could say it's parasitical to live off of other animals, or of nature itself. You could apply all this to plant life if you wanted as well. The point is that these phrases only make sense in the context of other human beings where there's a harmony of interests. The term parasite, for instance, assumes a context where you can survive without living off of other life forms. It's because people can produce wealth, and to do so doesn't rob other people of their wealth (i.e., there's no conflict of interests) that you can even posit the choice between hero and parasite.

Plus, the statements are meaningless. You're attempting to show the validity of these "values" my calling them moral, instead of showing how they benefit a person. The first thing you have to do is show how they actually benefit a person. Using terms like "heroic" begs the question.

You seem to not get what I'm saying. You think that some kind of respect for your fellow man is good in and of itself, but I'm saying that that respect only makes sense when there is no fundamental conflict of interest. If you had a conflict of interest, say the world was zero sum and to eat others needed to starve, this abstract respect for other people would be suicidal, not heroic. It's the recognition that there is no conflict, and more importantly that there is an actual benefit, that we treat other people in a positive way. It's not because of some weird moral sense that we should treat other life forms as equal to ourselves. This isn't a reason.

I say that the benefits of society are the primary reason for respecting rights. You disagree, but you seem to do so because of derivative problems, like the prudent predator. You want an answer that can be applied to everything, and you think that would make it primary. I disagree. I think the big motivation is living in society, and the benefits gained. Once you're in that situation, where you're trying to live in society, and trying to practice virtues that will help you live, then you have reason for respecting the rights of everyone, and seeing them as ends in themselves. You do that to better integrate your life, to practice the virtue of independence, benevolence, etc. But those don't come first.

And to show this, I've asked what if the harmony of interests went away? What if the only way to gain from another person is to steal from them or kill them like we do with animals. What if you couldn't benefit from them like we do from other people. What if we're all competing for limited resources, that wealth can't be produced, etc? If that were the case, we would treat each other like animals. There would be no "Well, I'll starve rather than make my fellow over there starve...he got to the food first after all". All this talk about creative minds and heroic lives only make sense once you accept the harmony of interests. And it is the value from the harmony of interests that makes these derivative values a benefit.

Post 34

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 5:08pm

Craig,

So what makes something good or bad? Is it simply to do with an agent's survival?

I'm not saying. I'm saying that O'ists measure whether something is good or bad for someone by how much the thing would further or hinder the person. Oists interpret "life" here to mean either survival, flourishing, or a renegotiation/integration of the two. We don't have to choose any one interpretation here because it doesn't make a difference to my argument. All of the interpretations consider physical health as normally furthering life.

To flourish, an agent needs to add choice to his life, and decide what will make his own Life the best it can be.

This is basically what I said in my last post. A person's self-determination (i.e., his ability to make and act on his own decisions) might be a greater benefit (i.e., it might more greatly further his life) than would administering to him a flu shot. Self-determination and physical health are both measured against the same standard -- life (however you interpret it) -- and they are good or bad or better or worse for the individual regardless of whether the individual chooses, desires, or acts to gain/keep them. In other words, if keeping an ability to choose is a benefit to the individual, then it is a benefit regardless of whether the person desires or chooses to keep the ability to choose.

Jordan

Post 35

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 6:14pm

Hiya Joseph,

I dismiss the animals example because addressing it would bring us too far afield. But if you substitute "animal" for "rock," then I can answer easily: rocks and humans are in different categories. And Aristotle's second basic rule of justice is to treat dissimilar cases dissimilarly.

The term parasite, for instance, assumes a context where you can survive without living off of other life forms.

I don't really care whether the term exists, only whether the thing the term is referring to exists. A person who survives primarily by living off of others can exists regardless of whether he's in a world where people can survive without living off of others. I don't care if you call what that is a 'parasite'; it would exist either way. Same with the term 'hero.'

You're attempting to show the validity of these "values" my calling them moral, instead of showing how they benefit a person. The first thing you have to do is show how they actually benefit a person.

Eh? I'm not calling anything 'values'; you are. And for the sake of brevity, I'm making O'ist assumptions that reason and self-esteem are great benefits (certainly some of the stuff the O'ist hero is made of).

You think that some kind of respect for your fellow man is good in and of itself, but I'm saying that that respect only makes sense when there is no fundamental conflict of interest.

I'm not viewing respect as good in and of itself. That would be deontic or "intrinsic," as Rand would say. I'm saying it's good for an individual to respect others because doing so keeps his humanity.

If you had a conflict of interest, say the world was zero sum and to eat others needed to starve, this abstract respect for other people would be suicidal, not heroic.

In my view, O'ism breaks down when faced with the choice of life or autonomy because both qualities are vital to an O'ists ethics. A person loses something vital either way. No sense in respecting rights if we're going to die; no sense in living if it's the life of a brute or parasite. More on this in a moment.

You disagree, but you seem to do so because of derivative problems, like the prudent predator.

I see nothing "derivative" about the prudent predator. It serves as a direct counter-example that falsifies your view. What if you could retain the benefits of society without respecting others' rights? What if you could get away with raping, murdering, and stealing (or would you unreasonably deny this as a possibility)? Why wouldn't you? Your goal of benefiting from society is still met. Seems like the only reason you would respect rights would be because you might otherwise get caught. Oh sure, if everybody raped and murdered, then the benefits from society would be compromised, but such is not the case now. Beside, you seem to reject univeralization, so you shouldn't make this argument anyway. You could argue that we should respect rights for their own sake -- to respect them even if we don't gain from society by doing so -- but that'd be deontic, something neither you nor I will agree with.

And the same goes for the useless-and-harmless agent. If you find someone who won't harm you but won't benefit you either, what's keeping you from harming him? Why bother respecting this guy if he won't meet your goal of reaping benefits from society?

Again, these are counter-examples that falsify the view that respect for rights should be primarily predicated upon the idea that one aims to benefit a lot from society.

And to show this, I've asked what if the harmony of interests went away?

Keep in mind that self-defense is not a disrespect of others rights. In any case but emergency situations (like the choice between life and autonomy), a conflict of interests (as I understand it) arises because someone aggresses or threatens to aggress upon another. (Incidentally, "interests" is similar to "value" in the mess of meanings people have wrung from it, but I think we can leave that be for now.)

What if the only way to gain from another person is to steal from them or kill them like we do with animals.

I'd stop interacting with other people. <shrug>.

Jordan

Post 36

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 6:53pm

Jordan, this is going nowhere because you use phrases like "humanity" without definition or reason for thinking it's important. It sounds like humanity is supposed to mean someone who lives a moral life, but then that's circular. You should act morally because it's moral.

Here's some other disagreements:

I dismiss the animals example because addressing it would bring us too far afield. But if you substitute "animal" for "rock," then I can answer easily: rocks and humans are in different categories. And Aristotle's second basic rule of justice is to treat dissimilar cases dissimilarly.

This doesn't help. The question is not whether you treat animals different from people, but how you should treat either. Why not respect animal rights? Because they'll eat you. Why respect the rights of a human who wants to kill you? You don't...we call them criminals. If, by nature, there was a fundamental conflict of interest between people, you'd treat them all like criminals. Saying that you treat them like human beings who have a fundamental harmony of interests is violating Aristotle's rule you mentioned.

I don't really care whether the term exists, only whether the thing the term is referring to exists.

I didn't say whether the term existed, but whether what it refers to exists in a particular context. If I asked you why you don't respect the rights of animals, you wouldn't say that rights don't exist. You'd say that animals don't have them. Or to be more specific, that rights don't exist in that context.

I'm saying it's good for an individual to respect others because doing so keeps his humanity.

That's the vague term that means everything and nothing. An altruist would argue the same thing for why we should help other people as our life goal.

In my view, O'ism breaks down when faced with the choice of life or autonomy because both qualities are vital to an O'ists ethics.

Life is the standard of Objectivist ethics. Autonomy for the sake of autonomy is meaningless. It's true the independence is a virtue, but only because of its compatibility with life. As I said, we don't try to be independent when it comes to nature, or animals. And even the independence we have with other people is limited. Very few people argue that you should never have friends, trading partners, or whatever. But even with the best interpretation of the phrase, autonomy would only be important to Objectivist ethics to the extent it is compatible with life.

Again, these are counter-examples that falsify the view that respect for rights should be primarily predicated upon the idea that one aims to benefit a lot from society.

And again, I say they don't falsify it at all. The prudent predator has nothing to do with you running around killing, stealing, and raping. It has to do with you pretending to be rights respecting, and then secretly not doing it. The question then is, why pretend in the first place? It assumes that everyone is rights-respecting, and then posits the possibility that you can sneak to avoid it. The problem is derivative, because you start with the conclusion of rights-respecting in general, and then ask about alternatives.

We respect rights so we can live in society, and accrue the benefits of it. We don't form societies so that we can respect rights so we can feel proud of how we're so fair-minded and humane.

Post 37

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 7:29pm

Hi Joseph,

Jordan, this is going nowhere because you use phrases like "humanity" without definition or reason for thinking it's important.

I don't mean anything controversial by "humanity," which is why I don't bother defining it. You're welcome to view the term as meaning -- Life as a creative, non-aggressive volitional, rational animal. Humanity is that which you retain when acting in accordance with whatever it means to be human. It's what underlies and enables many, many other benefits.

This doesn't help. The question is not whether you treat animals different from people, but how you should treat either. Why not respect animal rights? Because they'll eat you.

Are you realled worried about cows, pigs, and chickens eating you? There must be some other reason you disrepsect their rights (if they have rights). Again, I think the traditional O'ist regard for animals and our relationship with them is horribly flawed, which is why I don't want to deal with the animals example here. We don't respect a rocks would-be rights because the principles that it would "live" by are vastly different from my own. It is in a class significantly different from humans.

Why respect the rights of a human who wants to kill you?

But I do. It's when he tries to kill me that I may defend myself, and in my act of self-defense, I am not disrespecting his rights. Upon his aggression against me, he forfeits those rights that I would've otherwise violated had I been the aggressor.

That's the vague term that means everything and nothing. An altruist would argue the same thing for why we should help other people as our life goal.

I don't know why you think it's wrong to be a parasite. How does being a parasite effect one's self-esteem? How does it effect his concept of humankind? How is parasitism consistent with the life of a creative, non-aggressive volitional, rational animal?

autonomy would only be important to Objectivist ethics to the extent it is compatible with life.

No argument here. And under O'ism, it would seem that autonomy is compatible with life until one must choose between the two, as in your emergency case.

Anyway, it makes no sense to me why you've rejected the prudent predator problem (as I've laid it out), and you seem to be dodging the useless-and-harmless agent problem. If you would, please answer the questions I posed that arise from each problem. Otherwise, we might be at impasse.

We respect rights so we can live in society, and accrue the benefits of it. We don't form societies so that we can respect rights so we can feel proud of how we're so fair-minded and humane.

This suggests to me that my position must be unclear to you. I agree that we live in society to accrue the benefits of it. And I agree that we don't form societies in order to respect rights (that's a strawman). We respect rights in order to keep our humanity (as generally defined above). And as a derivative and consequence from keeping our humanity, we are able to form societies. (And as derivative and consequence of forming societies, we accrue those lovely benefits.)

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 12/05, 7:43pm)

Post 38

Sunday, December 5, 2004 - 9:09pm

Jordan, I'm having trouble understanding what you're saying, but I really would like to know how you begin this ethical framework. Are my assumptions 1, 2, and 3 below correct? Are you saying:

1) Morality is not determined by an individual's choices, but by human nature?

2) Likewise Benefit is not determined by an individual's choices, but by human nature?

3) So, because humans are rational beings, that which is good, (and of benefit to an individual), is that which supports the life of a human being, regardless of an individual's choices. Becoming a doctor would be good. Becoming a fisherman would be good. Getting a flu shot would be good. Respecting the Rights of others is good. etc...

If so, then it looks like you've reversed the logic from Objectivism. In Objectivism, you choose your values, with your Life as your highest value. From such a list, you derive your moral code. Here, though, you start with a moral code, determined by observing human nature. This gets you around the need for values, since none are necessary to determine right and wrong. This might work if we're talking about simply survival, since we can look at those things necessary to keep a human being alive, and determine the correct course of action accordingly? However, when trying to do more than simply survive, we are left without a moral code. For instance, those steps necessary to become a doctor, become a-moral, existing outside of morality. Prudence, therefore, becomes a-moral. This also leads to the question of why we need a moral code at all, defined as it is here? Why do we need to be good? Because it enables us to survive? So what?

The decision to live starts the value chain. It starts the entire process. It's the axiom of ethics. I don't think you can circumvent this. It seems to me that you are saying it's Right to live, without explaining why, without the introduction of a value for Life. "Life is Good!" "Why?" "Because..."

Craig

Post 39

Monday, December 6, 2004 - 7:00am