| | Ayn Rand defines value as 'that which one acts to gain or keep', and this makes sense to me. How can we have a value which the valuer does not want? So if a value is something of benefit to someone, and not necessarily something that the valuer desires, then I think we have a contradiction. It also seems to me that if we define value as something of benefit to someone, then the door opens to utilitarianism, majority rule, and public bans on smoking, etc., since someone has to define the benefit, and if we separate this person from the valuer himself, then it goes to someone else like a dictator, a majority, etc. So values must be subjective.
And this leads to a leap in logic. I can see that the human animal has a nature; that free-will is a strong component of that nature; that the ability to think is his primary tool of survival; and I can conclude logically from these observations that humans have Natural Rights dervied from their nature -- and that for the human animal to live like a human animal, his rights must be respected. But outside of my own egoistic nature, I don't care about your rights. It's because I DO want to live in a world where everyone is happy, and people are free, and the world makes sense, without contradiction, that I then personally value the rights of everyone. I see it as a social contract: because everyone else respects my rights, and life is good, I am more than happy to respect everyone else's rights.
But where's the objectivity? Is it objective because we can observe man's nature and see his need for individual rights? If so, then this doesn't really have anything to do with value. It's simply an observation. People must still, subjectively, value the rights of others. There is still, and always will be, an IF in value because people have to choose their values.
But really, there are two questions here in ethics: "How should I treat myself?" and "How should I treat my neighbor?" and they have different roots. "How should I treat myself?" can be answered when I establish my own life as my highest value, and derive my moral code accordingly. "How should I treat my neighbor?" can be answered when I establish an observation of 'human nature' as the primary value from which to derive a moral code. There are two premises here for two different questions, and BOTH are incorporated into the Objectivist framework, it seems.
Isn't it this standard for value which pins down Objectivist ethics, both personally and communally? In both cases it's a variant of human Life which is the standard for value.
Back again to moral relativism. Even if moral relativism is culturally based, without a standard for value, such as human nature as the Objectivists base it, then "anything goes" as long as some culture has a tradition for it. Without a standard for value, there can be no limits for such a moral code.
SnowDog
(Edited by SnowDog on 12/03, 2:19pm)
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