Phil Donahue' 2 Interviews of Rand

Robert,

I suggest proceeding on to your other examples of Rand's immorality, then.

The Rand book that contains the statement you object to -- ITOE -- provides ample "means." She believed her theory was inconsistent with Russell's approach. You may think she got Russell wrong, but that's hardly the same thing. I thus remain completely unconvinced that Rand was trying to do anything but make a point. She was not trying to"intimidate'" anyone. She provided a real argument, whether you agree with it or not.

Glenn,

Perfect or not, Rand never did anything so immoral as what either of the Brandens did to her. This is morally obvious.

Post 61

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 8:48am

James,
I'm not comparing Rand's morality with the Brandens'. I've just been trying to understand the Objectivist concept of moral perfection.
You said to Brant in the Daily Linz 3 thread:
A moral failure isn't necessarily the end of the road. One can recover.
How does one recover? By an act of contrition? "Say three hail Dagny's and make a contribution to ARI."
Seriously, let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that Rand did have a moral lapse (failure to apply one of the Objectivist virtues) at time T. Does this mean that at a later time T', if she realized the error, identified the cause, and resolved to not let it happen again, that she would return to a state of moral perfection? (I'm not suggesting that this is the mechanism, but I think you get the picture.)
Thanks,
Glenn

Post 62

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 9:02am

One can amend one's ways, come fully clean to any victims, make full and complete restitution (in many cases), rededicate oneself to not doing the same again. Under these circumstances one has corrected the previous error, but one has not made it go away. In that context, perfection is lost. Of course. But she could have done otherwise and avoided this imperfection.

Post 63

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 10:38am

James,
One more question and I'll drop this "line of questioning". (BTW, I appreciate your taking my questions seriously.)
According to your understanding of the Objectivist concept of moral perfection, if someone states that a person is morally perfect, then the former person is implying that the latter person has never done anything for which restitution or amending his ways would be necessary?
Thanks,
Glenn

Post 64

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 10:54am

Yes, but must also be a moral breach. Even non-moral errors must be accounted for and corrected once discovered. Or else what was an innocent error will become a moral breach. Also, one does not need to wait for omniscience. One can make a contextual assessment (when is the assessment ever a-contextual?) based on the evidence one has.

Post 65

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 10:55am

To strive for moral perfection, as opposed, say, to doing the right thing, is simply insanity writ large. One constantly puts oneself on trial and enslaves oneself to the notion of am I still perfect or is anyone noticing I'm not? We end up with self-delusionment if not hypocrisy and putting our self-esteem in the hands of significant others, including the clerk in the grocery store.

--Brant

Post 66

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 3:04pm

Oh, but Brant,

�to do the right thing� and �not fuck anyone over� is all it takes now to achieve �absolute moral perfection,� all of which is �easy.� Did you miss a meeting?

Jon

Post 67

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 3:28pm

That wasn�t quite right. You *can* do the wrong thing (and, I presume, even fuck someone over,) but then you have to correct it, and then you are absolutely morally perfect again. How many times this is allowed is unclear.

Post 68

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 3:31pm

Jon:
>That wasn�t quite right. You *can* do the wrong thing (and, I presume, even fuck someone over,) but then you have to correct it, and then you are absolutely morally perfect again. How many times this is allowed is unclear.

It's not unclear, it's...contextual!

- Daniel

Post 69

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 3:45pm

James,

In response to your #60:

The Rand book that contains the statement you object to -- ITOE -- provides ample "means." She believed her theory was inconsistent with Russell's approach.

OK. As it happens, I really do believe that Bickhard, Campbell, and Christopher's knowing-level theory of the development of the self, goals, and values (as expounded in several articles in academic publications) is inconsistent with Rand's conception of moral perfection (as expounded in the "unbreached rationality" passage of Galt's speech, in her treatment of pride in "The Objectivist Ethics," and throughout her descriptions of Howard Roark, Dagny Taggart, and John Galt's emotional reactions to adverse outcomes in their lives).

Unless you already have a pretty good understanding of Bickhard et al.'s theory, and of Rand's ethics, you aren't likely to find my previous statement persuasive. You may still need convincing that the theories are inconsistent with each other! Even if you are able to recognize the inconsistency, more will be needed before anyone has any business expecting you to prefer Bickhard et al. to Rand. Especially if I tell you lots about Bickhard et al., but not a whole lot about Rand.

My stating that Theory A is incompatible with Theory B is merely one of the opening moves in an argument. Once persuaded that there is an inconsistency between the theories, you may need further reasons to care about it--for why should anyone take Theory A all that seriously? Merely pointing to the inconsistency is hardly enough to persuade anyone not already convinced that Theory A is true to reject Theory B. For that matter, even those well versed in Theory A might like to know what Theory B is about, before they decide to reject it.

Now suppose that I express my judgment a whole lot more tersely than I have already done. Plus I throw in a motivational lagniappe. I merely declare, "Look what Rand was able to perpetrate, because most people 'kinda know' what moral perfection means."

And that's where I stop.

No further analysis of the position I believe to be true; no further analysis of Rand's position, no effort to connect the dots. There are just two things I'm not being stingy with: aspersions on Rand--and on any reader who might be inclined to agree with her, or even to ask what precisely the disagreement is about.

Do you think my one-sentence special is a real argument? That it's not fallacious? Do you think it qualifies as responsible discourse in this context?

You may think she got Russell wrong, but that's hardly the same thing.

In point of fact, I'm opposed to several key ideas of Russell's that Rand was apparently also opposed to. Among them is the one that her enigmatic passage on pp. 50-51 of ITOE seems to be about. I do think, however, that she got his motivations wrong--and I really wonder what grounds she could have had, unless it was assuming that any smart person who accepts a bad idea must be doing it on purpose.

The question remains, what did he do or say that she found objectionable (something to do with number... but what exactly)? And how can you tell from reading what she said about Russell in ITOE? Or in any other essay published while she was alive?

You still haven't explained what she was objecting to, out of Russell's rather voluminous corpus. Am I correct in concluding that you don't actually know? There's nothing dreadful about not knowing. But if you don't know, wouldn't it have been a whole better if Rand had taken a few sentences to explain it to you?

I thus remain completely unconvinced that Rand was trying to do anything but make a point. She was not trying to "intimidate'" anyone. She provided a real argument, whether you agree with it or not.

I hope we can agree that there are good and bad ways--indeed, clean and dirty ways--to make a point. The professor who waves Spiffkin's purported refutation around--not to encourage the student to read it and respond to it, but to make the student feel guilty for not knowing it already and to scare him or her off Aristotle--is trying to make a point.

A statement of disagreement that goes heavily on allegations about the moral character of an opponent and lightly on substance of the disagreement makes a point, too. But it is not a "real argument." If intended as an argument, it's fallacious. And Rand herself identified the precise kind of fallacy.

When someone reads that passage in ITOE, what is he or she likely to assimilate?

Someone who knows some of Russell's work and is inclined to think favorably of it will come away from the book convinced that Rand is probably pretending to know more about Russell than she does--and definitely prefers to play dirty where Russell is concerned.

Meanwhile, is the reader who agrees with Rand on other points in the book going to run out and start reading Russell to find out just what Rand is complaining about? (He or she will have lots of fun hunting, since she provides no citation and scarcely any content.) After all, Rand has said that Bertie Russell was a pretty awful thinker, indeed a dishonest one. Would a good, clear-thinking person stand up for such a disreputable character? Even put much effort into finding out what he had to say?

Rand knew very well what was wrong with the argument from intimidation, and was highly indignant at any attempt to use it against her ideas, or those of thinkers she agreed with.

Unless arguments from intimidation are bad only when used against Rand's ideas, she was violating her own stated standards.

And if she ever made amends for so doing, they aren't in the public record.

Robert Campbell

(Edited by Robert Campbell
on 10/06, 3:47pm)

(Edited by Robert Campbell
on 10/06, 3:49pm)

Post 70

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 3:48pm

(I am not talking about Branden, just the nonsense of absolute moral perfection.)

�That�s just the first one; he made it right, he�s still perfect.

OK, now that was wrong. Nothing like the first one, though, and he�s made it right, so he is still absolutely morally perfect.

Oh, now a third breach, but look at him making up for it, that�s devotion. He�s absolutely perfect.�

At some point, presumably, he becomes less than morally perfect. The part I laugh at is the perfect�perfect�perfect�fucking scoundrel.

Jon

Post 71

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 4:22pm

James:
>(Rand) provided a real argument, whether you agree with it or not.

Robert:
>You still haven't explained what she was objecting to, out of Russell's rather voluminous corpus. Am I correct in concluding that you don't actually know? There's nothing dreadful about not knowing.

No, absolutely not. But it's interesting to get an idea of what, for James, qualifies as a 'real argument'.

- Daniel

Post 72

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 6:20pm

Robert,

I will agree that it is difficult to assign motives to the thinkers behind them. But I do not think that it is an "Argument from Intimidation" every time someone assigns motives. It depends. Whether or not one agrees with the conclusion, arriving at such a conclusion from a complex theory is a whole lot different than a snide remark or two in the course of a lecture, or other forms of pure hit-and-run bullying.

Thus, I only meant to say that Rand's assault on Russell in that passage was of a somewhat different character, however you read Russell. When attached to a whole theory of concepts, the example must really have been meant to illuminate. Rand obviously failed to do so in your case. Whether she got Russell right or wrong, Rand is indicating that her theory of concepts answered Russell here. That would be a "whole argument," even if you think a bad one. An Argument from Intimidation is the substitution of a sneer for an argument, not what an author believes is the application of the theory she has just articulated to her reading of Russell there.

Do you see the difference?

Brant,

I don't get the dichotomy you propose.

Daniel,

It's interesting to see how Rand's argument's are sometimes missed.

Post 73

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 7:32pm

James,

In my humble opinion, Rand's remark about Russell is the precise equivalent of a snide remark in the midst of a lecture. I don't see what else it could be, but a sneer in place of an argument. The fact that Rand could have produced a genuine argument on this subject (yes, I'm sure she could have) does not excuse it. A writer with tremendous command of her craft, a finely honed sense of what is a valid argument and what is a non-argument or a fallacy, and a keen sensitivity toward the dirty tactics that had been used against her own ideas, apparently decided to sneer instead of making her case. (And it's not the only time she did that.)

What makes Rand's purported argument against Russell different from my "one-sentence special" directed against her?

You say that her slam at Russell fails to illuminate in my case. You've yet to say whether it illuminates in your case... If it's just a slam, it won't illuminate in anyone's case.

Robert Campbell

(Edited by Robert Campbell
on 10/07, 11:28am)

Post 74

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 8:42pm

J. Valliant:

Whether she got Russell right or wrong, Rand is indicating that her theory of concepts answered Russell here. That would be a "whole argument," even if you think a bad one. An Argument from Intimidation is the substitution of a sneer for an argument, not what an author believes is the application of the theory she has just articulated to her reading of Russell there.

Immediately before she made the remark about Russell, her topic was the dividing line between ostensive definitions and verbal definitions. Yet her remark was not about his position on that - if he even had one - at all.

I agree with Robert C. It illuminated nothing about such dividing line in my case, and I doubt anyone else's. It was simply a gratuitous slam.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 10/07, 4:55am)

Post 75

Friday, January 27, 2006 - 1:08am

     Somewhere within a yr ago, my 13-yr old g-son Joey and I got into a discussion that somehow led into (what I consider a 'bromide' he got from school) his asserting "Well, no one's perfect." My mental eyebrow went up, and, we got into a...discussion. --- (An aside: to his intellectual degree, he can give as much as he can take; as I said once before, he never left 'the little lawyer stage'...indeed, since as of late watching so many re-runs of Law and Order [pick your variation], he now wants to be a 'prosecutor'. I guess 'cause he feels he's good at arguing. Wonder how that happened?)

     Anyhoo, I pointed out that that depends on what the user-of-the-word 'perfect' actually means (if, they're actually clear on THAT) by it. Some people mean perfect as being beyond reaching. We agreed that that's what he meant. However, I pointed out, a school test where he gets 100% has to be considered perfect (barring 'bonus'-point questions), no? Given that, then any meanings some people have of 'beyond reaching' for the word perfect are really nonsense (not useful/real-oriented) meanings. In short, some things ARE perfect...depending on the criteria (rules) one goes by for evaluating (or, comparing/measuring). Sometimes the rules are nonsense (like, a 'rule' of how to draw a square circle: the set is self-contradictory...following some automatically means breaking others: a nonsense criteria.)

     Then I pointed out that, earlier in the same month, he had said that one of his teachers had argued the worth of "Never settle for less than what is best," when I had, at that time, commented on something as being "Good Enough (for govt. work)." He didn't pick up on my parenthetical, but saw my 1st two words as contrary to what he accepted from his teacher. This (earlier discussion) got me thinking about Good Enough and Perfect.

     I came to see that there's no difference, whether one's talking about building a birdhouse, making a painting, or dealing with a relationship-conflict...whatever the puzzle/problem in human life, if the 'solution' is good enough, then it's perfect...for the goal/purpose intended. ("Unintended Consequences" re other goals that should be/have-been considered, we didn't get into.)

     I spelled this out to him, but, back to the thread's...puzzle:

     The 'Platonic' idea of perfect seems to imply something like the impossible dream, the unreachable goal, etc (and I really liked the musical Man of La Mancha) where no matter how close you measure/compare A to B, there'll always be some trivial difference that makes a non-exactness (ergo, lack of perfectness) theoretically expectable as necessarily acceptable. --- Now, I'm not one for General Semantics (or 'Semiotics'), but, I do go by Alfred Korzybski's dictum that "A difference which makes no difference...is no difference." To put it another way, to para-context Rand, "Perfect? By what standard?"

     Whether one's talking about a perfect cue-ball, a perfect ship, a perfect human, a perfect morality, or a perfect matching of A to B (actions to an 'ideal' morality, per this thread) methinks that all the aforegoing posted arguments have lost sight of a certain fact: if, and when, once one reaches 'perfection' (given sensible, rational, definitional-criteria, and in whatever subject), this does not imply, especially in territory where things CAN 'change', that even if reached, one cannot have the perfect thing become imperfect ! (Like, a 'bad' change can happen.) That such was never perfect to begin with is a nonsense idea of using the term Perfect. --- As Bruce Wayne's father rhetorically asked the boy Bruce in Batman Begins, "Why does one fall down?" His answer to Bruce: "So you can pick yourself up."

    The attempt to improve one's situation, however one got there, is what 'moral perfection' is all about. A former prostitute or prof-assassin CAN be(come) one who has 'unbreached rationality'. Unfortunately, too many think 'unbreached' has to do with one's PAST...rather than one's PRESENT...orientation.

LLAP
J:D

P.S: I think this is one my most Perfect posts ! I won't even add an 'edit!' (I proof read the sucker enough times !!!)

PPS: Dammit; had to edit; ok: it wasn't Perfect :(

(Edited by John Dailey on 1/27, 1:31am)

Post 76

Saturday, January 28, 2006 - 12:08am

John, if I am to take you completely and sincerely, then the very concept of perfection would be contextual.

And that might be true (or rather, is NOT demonstrably false) ...

Ed

Post 77

Saturday, January 28, 2006 - 3:24am

Ed:
That is exactly my point, re any use of the term to be meaningful. No context=No meaning.
(Finally, someone understands me !)

LLAP
J:D

Post 78

Saturday, January 28, 2006 - 11:07am

John,

==============
Finally, someone understands me !
==============

John, don't get your hopes up too high -- I work very hard to understand others (and I find this task uncommon in most others).

Ed
[superhero alter-ego: The Understander]

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 1/28, 11:07am)

Post 79

Sunday, January 29, 2006 - 10:31pm