The Fallacy of "the Naturalistic Fallacy"

William Dwyer said:

Consider, for example, the following propositions: "I ought not to smoke, if I want to avoid cancer and heart disease."

"I ought to look for a job, if I want to make money."

"People ought to respect each other's rights, if they want to live in a free and peaceful society."

These are adequate statements of fact, but the usual form of a moral judgement is "I ought to look for a job" period. In a truncated statement like that, you have no way to ground the "ought" to any "is".

And what Joel said about "Murder is bad".

Post 21

Wednesday, April 5, 2006 - 4:48pm

"To say that one ought to do something just because one ought to do it makes no sense. "

Which leaves you in the position of a moral nihilist. Not that that position is unheard of, but it's not very Objectivist.

The problem with denying any validity to "You ought to X." is that your morality will eventually work its way back to that.

For Objectivist morality, its "You ought to behave rationally". To which the thug replies "Why?"

Post 22

Wednesday, April 5, 2006 - 5:12pm

Quick take: Is. Ought. Each of these words represents one half of the same equation. Part of being human is learning to survive; adaptation is how we evolve. One adaptive need is social order. This order requires rules and principles for peaceful coexistence. Thus, it is only natural that we naturally and autonomously create our own moral standards as a way of meeting an adaptive need, which enables us to survive. "Ought" evinces a better "is" and, in turn, "is" evinces how "ought" ought to be. "Ought" and "is" are one and the same.

Got it? So, the problem isn't that you can't get an "ought" from an "is." It's that you can't an "ought" from another "ought." Saying that someone ought not to do something because someone else said he or she ought not to do it, is absurd. It answers nothing, helps no one. This is another way of saying the exact same thing Bill said in the second to last paragraph of his first post.

UK

Post 23

Wednesday, April 5, 2006 - 8:21pm

In Post 20, Craig Ewert wrote

William Dwyer said:
Consider, for example, the following propositions: "I ought not to smoke, if I want to avoid cancer and heart disease."

"I ought to look for a job, if I want to make money."

"People ought to respect each other's rights, if they want to live in a free and peaceful society."
These are adequate statements of fact, but the usual form of a moral judgement is "I ought to look for a job" period. In a truncated statement like that, you have no way to ground the "ought" to any "is".

Craig, you are buying into the very Kantian view of morality that Rand fought so hard to disabuse us of. Look, the concept of "ought" doesn't mean anything if divorced from an antecedent end or goal. A categorical imperative is a floating abstraction. It cannot be grounded in concrete reality. You have to start with an actual value before you can talk about what you "ought" to do. "Ought to do for the sake of what value?" is always the relevant question, and if you cannot answer it - if your reply is "ought to period," then you're endorsing a floating abstraction.

I wrote, "To say that one ought to do something just because one ought to do it makes no sense." In Post 21, Craig replied,

Which leaves you in the position of a moral nihilist. Not that that position is unheard of, but it's not very Objectivist.

No, it's not moral nihilism at all, and it is very Objectivist. Read Rand's essay "Causality versus Duty" to see why.

The problem with denying any validity to "You ought to X." is that your morality will eventually work its way back to that.

For Objectivist morality, it's "You ought to behave rationally". To which the thug replies "Why?"

And he deserves an answer (assuming that he's asking a sincere question and not being perverse). The answer is: because it will enable him to better achieve his (ultimate) values. As Rand puts it,

Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must . . . if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive. You must work, if you want to eat. You must think, if you want to work. You must look at reality, if you want to think - if you want to know what to do - if you want to know what goals to choose - if you want to know how to achieve them." ("Causality versus Duty," Philosophy: Who Needs It (pp. 118, 119)

Post 24

Wednesday, April 5, 2006 - 9:43pm

Oddly, most folks tend to follow a Randian form in their moral structure with regard to moral statements rather than Kantian form. Most folks don't consider a moral statement to be in the form of an obligation to an immaterial thing, but rather an obligation to one's own wish to survive.

I ought not murder because X[you can give many many good reasons why not to...].

I ought not steal because X.

Both statements here reflect on one form.

I ought not X because Y. The ought refers to an 'is' in a sorta future-tense, and the because gives a reason to that future-tense of the moral statement. Ought to ought doesn't work because Ought and Is both are about tenses, prior is present and the latter is future.

Or atleast, that's how I consider it...

-- Bridget

Post 25

Thursday, April 6, 2006 - 4:02am

UberKuh said:

"[...] it is only natural that we naturally and autonomously create our own moral standards as a way of meeting an adaptive need, which enables us to survive."

To recall here that all beasts have the "adaptive" need to survive, too. And to remark that moral humans value liberty more than survival.

Let's put a simple example. In the cases where "ought" is used in moral terms,

"Having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place."

this "ought" is independent from "is",

"Having lunch is $5.00 at my aunt's place."

This "is" describes a bare fact. Now, a short description of the naturalistic fallacy:

"The argument tries to draw a conclusion about how things ought to be based solely on information about how things are in fact.")

In my example is easy to see that you cannot deduce the "ought" from the "is."

(Edited by Joel Catal� on 4/06, 4:41am)

Post 26

Thursday, April 6, 2006 - 9:17am

How about this?

I have $5
I am hungry - it is a fact I need food in order to live
I OUGHT to go to my Aunt, because she will give me food for my $5

Post 27

Thursday, April 6, 2006 - 9:50am

Kurt, what you added --and your second sentence includes a value judgement(!)-- is not deduced from the "is." That's the fallacy's point. Please check it out...

(Edited by Joel Catal� on 4/06, 9:54am)

Post 28

Thursday, April 6, 2006 - 11:58am

Bill, I don't personally subscribe to Kantian ethics, but I claim, contrary to Bridget, that most people do at the bottom of their chains of moral reasoning.

The problem of the thug is: most moral reasoning presumes to tell you what your ultimate goal "ought" to be, as well as how to achieve it.

You quote Rand:
Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must . . . if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive. You must work, if you want to eat. You must think, if you want to work. You must look at reality, if you want to think - if you want to know what to do - if you want to know what goals to choose - if you want to know how to achieve them."

The problem is, none of those 'musts' is a moral claim; they are all just claims about reality.

Consider Kurt's Syllogism:
I have $5
I am hungry - it is a fact I need food in order to live
I OUGHT to go to my Aunt, because she will give me food for my $5

Despite the word "ought"; there is nothing moral about this reasoning.

That's why I'm suggesting your position is morally nihilistic; you are saying that there are no "oughts", just "is's". At least, that's how I'm reading what you write.

Post 29

Thursday, April 6, 2006 - 1:03pm

When the term need, rather than the more common (in some minds, synonomous, unfortunately) term want is seen to be relevent to 'ought', then any probs re the latter's connections to other 'oughts', and even to 'is' become trivial.

Of course, the tricky part is identifying, and distinguishing, needs from wants, and, what the needs are for.

LLAP
J:D

Post 30

Thursday, April 6, 2006 - 1:49pm

I was (quickly) trying to fit something into what Joel said, however, that does not mean other "oughts" cannot exist that are less amoral, nor does it mean that eating is a "value" relative to surviving - it is a fact, though I did not digress to prove that from the ground up, I think it something that everyone can agree is a fact, that animals need food in order to live.

Post 31

Thursday, April 6, 2006 - 11:25pm

Joel wrote,

Let's put a simple example. In the cases where "ought" is used in moral terms,

"Having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place."

What does this statement mean in concrete terms? That your aunt ought to charge diners $5.00 for lunch? If so, why should she? Does it mean that diners ought to offer her $5.00 for lunch? If so, why should they? Unless you can reduce your statement to one that has a clear meaning in concrete reality, the statement is a floating abstraction.

This "ought" is independent from "is",

"Having lunch is $5.00 at my aunt's place."

This "is" describes a bare fact.

It is true that from the statement "having lunch is $5.00 at my aunt's place," you can't conclude that "having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place" (whatever this latter statement is supposed to mean), but that doesn't imply that an 'ought' statement isn't reducible to an 'is' statement. To say that if you want to survive, you ought to engage in life-sustaining action simply means that engaging in life-sustaining action is the only way to achieve what you value, namely, your own survival. It is in this sense that 'ought' statements are reducible to 'is' statements.

Now, a short description of the naturalistic fallacy:

"The argument tries to draw a conclusion about how things ought to be based solely on information about how things are in fact.")

Saying how "things ought to be" makes no sense, if taken literally. "Ought" statements prescribe what choices one ought to make, not how "things" ought to "be." Things don't make choices, nor is "being" is an action which is chosen by a moral agent.

- Bill

Post 32

Thursday, April 6, 2006 - 11:46pm

Craig wrote,

Bill, I don't personally subscribe to Kantian ethics, but I claim, contrary to Bridget, that most people do at the bottom of their chains of moral reasoning.
Which is why their view of morality is mistaken.
The problem of the thug is: most moral reasoning presumes to tell you what your ultimate goal "ought" to be, as well as how to achieve it.

If that's true, then "most moral reasoning" doesn't make any sense. What could it possibly mean to say that one's ultimate goal 'ought' to be X. 'ought to' for the sake of what end or goal??

You quote Rand:
Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must . . . if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive. You must work, if you want to eat. You must think, if you want to work. You must look at reality, if you want to think - if you want to know what to do - if you want to know what goals to choose - if you want to know how to achieve them."
The problem is, none of those 'musts' is a moral claim; they are all just claims about reality.

Yes, they are moral claims (as well as claims about reality). You are still laboring under a Kantian misconception - that morality involves categorical imperatives, when in fact, morality is simply a means to an end.

Consider Kurt's Syllogism:
I have $5
I am hungry - it is a fact I need food in order to live
I OUGHT to go to my Aunt, because she will give me food for my $5

Despite the word "ought"; there is nothing moral about this reasoning.

That's why I'm suggesting your position is morally nihilistic; you are saying that there are no "oughts", just "is's". At least, that's how I'm reading what you write.

What do you mean, I'm saying that there are no "oughts"?! I've said all along that there are oughts and that they refer simply to a means of achieving your values. If I ask someone, how do I improve my health, he might say something like, "If you want to improve your health, then you 'ought' to eat a balanced diet and get more exercise." Why is this idea so difficult to understand?? I'm simply baffled at the inability of people to see this very simple point. The difficulty has to be that those who don't get it have been very successfully indoctrinated by Kantian propaganda. Galt help us; It's worse than I thought! :-/

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 4/06, 11:49pm)

Post 33

Friday, April 7, 2006 - 9:29am

Kurt said:

"nor does it mean that eating is a "value" relative to surviving - it is a fact, though I did not digress to prove that from the ground up, I think it something that everyone can agree is a fact, that animals need food in order to live."

True. Animals need food in order to survive. Nothing moral in the bare fact of survival.

Consequently, we (apparently) agree that facts are amoral, and then we (logically must) agree that the Naturalistic Fallacy is not a fallacy, but the correct definition of an error.

(Edited by Joel Catal� on 4/07, 9:30am)

Post 34

Friday, April 7, 2006 - 9:37am

William wrote:

Joel wrote,
Let's put a simple example. In the cases where "ought" is used in moral terms,

"Having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place."
What does this statement mean in concrete terms?

i rewrite it: "My moral position is that having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place." And reasons are irrelevant to the point that this is a moral statement.

Unless you can reduce your statement to one that has a clear meaning in concrete reality, the statement is a floating abstraction.

I hope I did it successfully.

This "ought" is independent from "is",

"Having lunch is $5.00 at my aunt's place."

This "is" describes a bare fact.

It is true that from the statement "having lunch is $5.00 at my aunt's place," you can't conclude that "having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place" (whatever this latter statement is supposed to mean), but that doesn't imply that an 'ought' statement isn't reducible to an 'is' statement.

I am talking about these statements. It is enough to demonstrate that the 'Naturalistic Fallacy' is not wrongly conceived, but authentic.

I hope it can be understood.

Have a nice weekend.

Joel Catal�

(Edited by Joel Catal� on 4/07, 12:05pm)

Post 35

Friday, April 7, 2006 - 3:48pm

Joel wrote,

Let's put a simple example. In the cases where "ought" is used in moral terms,

"Having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place."
"What does this statement mean in concrete terms?"
I rewrite it: "My moral position is that having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place." And reasons are irrelevant to the point that this is a moral statement.
Unless you can reduce your statement to one that has a clear meaning in concrete reality, the statement is a floating abstraction.
I hope I did it successfully.

Unfortunately, you did not, because you recast your statement in the passive voice. "Having lunch" is the subject of the sentence, but having lunch is not a moral agent. Further, moral statements prescribe actions, but "to be" is not an action; it is a condition. A proper rewrite would have specified a moral agent as the subject of the sentence and prescribed a choice of action. Viz., "My aunt ought to charge $5.00 for lunch." Or: "Each diner ought to offer my aunt $5.00 for lunch." This is not just a grammatical nicety; it is requirement of clarity, precision and meaning.

I wrote, "It is true that from the statement "having lunch is $5.00 at my aunt's place," you can't conclude that "having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place" (whatever this latter statement is supposed to mean), but that doesn't imply that an 'ought' statement isn't reducible to an 'is' statement." Joel replied,

I am talking about these statements. It is enough to demonstrate that the 'Naturalistic Fallacy' is not wrongly conceived, but authentic.

If that's all the naturalistic fallacy is supposed to mean, then it doesn't support Hume's contention that you can't get an 'ought' from an 'is,' because the statement, "Taking care of my health is a means to my goal of living well" is equivalent to the statement, "Since my goal is to live well, I ought to take care of my health." The first is an "is" statement with no prescriptive content; the second is an "ought" statement with prescriptive content. Yet they mean the same thing, the second simply taking a prescriptive form. So contrary to Hume, you can get an "ought" from an "is." Of course, both statements are ultimately descriptive; the second is simply a descriptive statement that is simultaneously prescriptive. Every prescriptive statement is descriptive, but not every descriptive statement is prescriptive. In other words, a prescriptive statement is a kind of descriptive statement. All meaningful statements are thus descriptive, because they purport to say something about reality and are therefore either true or false.

- Bill

Post 36

Friday, April 7, 2006 - 5:33pm

Joel, your example doesn't involve moral reasoning. The speaker of that sentence isn't taking a moral position. The word "ought" in that sentence doesn't refer to moral prescription, but to probabilistic guesswork. You might as well say, "I expect my aunt..." You ought to know better!

Post 37

Saturday, April 8, 2006 - 8:16am

UK wrote:

"Joel, your example doesn't involve moral reasoning. The speaker of that sentence isn't taking a moral position."

You may see that in my last post I rewrote the sentence in a more explicit manner:

'My moral position is that having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place.'

It *is* a moral statement.

"The word "ought" in that sentence doesn't refer to moral prescription, but to probabilistic guesswork."

The "ought" word is not a requirement to make a moral statement, and for the Naturalistic Fallacy to be correct.

(Edited by Joel Catal�
on 4/08, 8:18am)

Post 38

Saturday, April 8, 2006 - 8:26am

I rewrote the sentence containing "ought" in the following manner: 'My moral position is that having lunch ought to be $5.00 at my aunt's place.'

And added that (providing moral) reasons is irrelevant to the point that this is a moral statement. I say it is, and that's enough.

And William Dwyer said:

"Unless you can reduce your statement to one that has a clear meaning in concrete reality, the statement is a floating abstraction."

The only relevant point: my statement is a moral statement: the relevant point is that I *can* imagine an explicit moral reason an apply it to the quote. That's why the Naturalistic fallacy is correctly defined.
(Edited by Joel Catal�
on 4/08, 8:27am)

Post 39

Sunday, April 9, 2006 - 4:59pm