| | Ed wrote, This is, in a sense, true. Everything has it's origin in the material world (ie. no matter = no anything). However, in another sense (that sense held by Binswanger), Rand's Objectivism can be seen as a non-Cartesian Dualism.
Whaddaya' think o' that? Not according to Peikoff. He writes: A philosophy [i.e., Objectivism] that rejects the monism of idealism or materialism does not thereby become "dualist." This term is associated with a Platonic or Cartesian metaphysics; it suggest the belief in two realities, in the mind-body opposition, and in the soul's independence of the body -- all of which Ayn Rand denies.
None of the standard terms applies to the Objectivist metaphysics. All the conventional positions are fundamentally flawed, and the ideal term -- "existentialism" -- has been preempted (by a school that advocates Das Nichts, i.e., nonexistence). In this situation, a new term is required, one which at least has the virtue of not calling up irrelevant associations.
The best name for the Objectivist position is "Objectivism." (OPAR, 35-36)
If I understand Peikoff correctly, he is saying that if Existentialism had not preempted the term, then "existentialism" (not "monism" or "dualism") would best denote the Objectivist metaphysics. In other words, Objectivism upholds a view of reality in which there is one substance -- existence -- which takes various forms like mind and matter or the mental and the physical.
According to Rand, matter is understood in contradistinction to mind -- the material or physical in contradistinction to the mental. See her discussion in ITOE, pp. 245-251. So, according to her, it would be incorrect to say that everything is material, since the proposition, "Existence exists" is not synonymous with the proposition, "The material world exists."
Nevertheless, there is no such thing as an immaterial spirit -- one that exists independently of matter -- unless you believe in ghosts. Consciousness requires a physical form and means of awareness. It requires a brain, central nervous system and physical sense organs. Without such a material basis, there could be no consciousness or spirit.
But the question remains: If, according to Rand, existence can be divided into the mental and the physical, then couldn't the Objectivist metaphysics be described as a "dualist" (if that term had not been corrupted by Plato and Descartes)? Although it's true that reality can be divided into the mental and the physical, it can also be divided into the animate and inanimate or the rational and non-rational, etc. There is no reason to consider mind and matter to be any more fundamental metaphysically than these other divisions, nor therefore to focus on it in contradistinction to some other equally legitimate form of dualism. I think it's best to abandon the term "dualism" as a description of the Objectivist metaphysics, as it is simply too misleading and nonspecific to be of any real value.
- Bill
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