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Friday, September 8, 2006 - 4:32pmSanction this postReply
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Ayn Rand admitted her lack of knowledge in biology and withheld her judgment on Darwinism due to her ignorance of the necessary technical knowledge. This was entirely appropriate, and reflects well upon her. Yet Objectivism sees the centrality of an understanding of life in its ethics. And the mind, a biological phenomenon, is the subject matter of epistemology. Rand rejects a priori cosmological speculation as one of the central faults of classical and much of modern philosophy. Philosophy puts no pre-conditions on the facts of science. Yet one cannot avoid certain scientific or, as I would express it, cosmological questions, given their fundamentality to our conception of man and the world we live in.

This is not a rejection of Rand's claim that philosophy must be available to all competent adults at all levels of knowledge, a claim which is of no controversy so far as fundamental premises, methods, and axioms are concerned. Rather, it is a recognition that issues within the scope of philosophy, such as the nature of mind, and the nature of life, and more narrow questions such as the substrate of the will do raise questions that require the attention of specialists. We can take the freedom of the will as axiomatic, but its explication is not a burden to be left at the feet of the layman.

Existence is one. The sciences cohere.
There are no contradictions outside our own misconceptions.

Technical questions within Objectivism such as jurisprudence, statecraft, and logic are not to closed to investigation but are open for business.

Let us use the tools that Rand and the minds that nature have given us.

Ted Keer September 8, 2006, NYC

(Edited by Ted Keer
on 9/08, 10:10pm)

(Edited by Ted Keer
on 9/08, 10:27pm)


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Post 1

Friday, September 8, 2006 - 4:46pmSanction this postReply
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BIRD BRAINS

Both the birds and the mammals have their origins in the Jurassic period, over 145 million years ago. The extant groups were all established by the end of the Cretaceous, before 65 MYA. The divergence between the opossum and the chimp, so far as intelligence concerned, is quite large. The diversity between the birds so far as life-styles is extremely large. Although we think of the birds as all being rather similar, this is because the necessitudes of flight in non-flightless species constrain their body forms. Yet we see the penguin, the ostrich, the condor (extinct forms with 24ft wingspans) the sparrow, the peacock, the owl, the crow & the pigeon.

More significantly, social frugivorous and carnivorous birds exhibit what appears to be quite intelligent behaviour:

The Harris's hawk "is a medium-sized, tropical or semitropical hawk, widely distributed from the US-Mexico border south to Chile and Argentina. It is one of the most remarkable birds of prey, because it has a unique behaviour pattern. These birds hunt in family groups, in much the same way as wolves hunt in packs. Each group consists of a pair, with a dominant female, and several helpers. When they sight their prey from the air, they land on the ground and take turns to scare the prey animal until it darts out from its hiding place and is captured by another member of the hunting pack. "

(Quoted from >http://helios.bto.ed.ac.uk/bto/desbiome/harris.htm<)

As I have commented before, the most intelligent animals are largely "pack animals" like the dolphin, the wolf, the chimp, and the crow. Crows show ingenuity such as misdirection and as flexible tool use, acquired through observation of others or by trial and error. Parrots, which can live more than a century, can not only mimic many calls, they have great memories, remembering from year-to-year what single tree, miles away in the rain-forest, will ripen, returning to it at the proper time, without visiting it at all in between. This is like the behaviour of elephants who will travel a hundred miles across barren terrain to reach a watering hole they have not visited for a decade, or who will make heroic attempts to rescue their young.) I will assert here that corvids and parrots are no less intelligent than wolves and elephants.

As to brain morphology, the wrinkling of the cerebral cortex in humans is held to be an indirect sign of our intelligence, in that it is wrinkled in order to fit within a skull that is constrained in its possible size by mechanical limits. The ponderous whales and elephants which do not suffer this same constraint do not have wrinkled cortices. Other primates and carnivores that are not so intelligent but are fleet and agile do show wrinkling. And wrinkling in itself has no neurological significance. The anatomy of the cortex is no different so far as has been discovered. Wrinkling is a developmental response to fit more cortex without necessitating other disadvantageous anatomical changes. In any case, all the intelligent birds are non-flightless species. Thus they must make due with a limit on the mass of their body mass. Whether other organic changes that we do not understand lead to intelligence along another path cannot be simply discounted. Also, the neuroanatomical description of birds is undergoing a revolution, until a recent conference which redescribed the bird brain from scratch many structures which had been arbitrarily named with the same terminology used in mammals. This has been shown to be invalid and a great hamper in bird zoology. After all, the last common ancestor of the bird and mammal lineage was in the early Carboniferous period over 250 MYA. Drawing anatomical analogies between groups separated by hundreds of millions of years, when we are far from understanding the nature of that physiology in Humans is unjustified.

As for using the term "crude association" I find that also to have unacceptable connotations. Crude means raw, as in undercooked.

KREU@- "raw flesh" (1) RAW from Old English hreaw...(2)KREW@-S CREATINE Greek kreas "flesh" (3) suffixed *kru-do-...Latin crudus "bloody, raw"
['@' indicates 'scwhwa']
-Watkins, Calvert Amer. Her. Dic. Indo-E. Roots


Ted Keer, 8 Sep, 2006 NYC

(This post is in response to Ed's on the Generally Annoyed thread. It has aslo been edited for format and in response to Ed's questions.)

(Edited by Ted Keer
on 9/08, 5:14pm)

(Edited by Ted Keer
on 9/08, 11:48pm)


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Post 2

Friday, September 8, 2006 - 9:00pmSanction this postReply
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Ted,


And the mind, a biological phenomenon ...
I find this proposition controversial, I understand that the brain is a biological organ (this is beyond questioning) -- I just don't understand that the mind is too, necessarily (biology being one of the physical science, and the mind not being a physical existent).


Philosophy puts no pre-conditions on science.
More precisely, philosophy puts pre-conditions on the appropriate epistemological methods of science, and on some of the appropriate subject matter (eg. science ought to only be concerned with things that can be known, for example, not things that are impossible to know). Ted, you said it better elsewhere, philosophy need make no cosmologic conjecture regarding the ultimate ontological substance -- ie. the very fabric of reality.


Rather, it is a recognition that issues within the scope of philosophy, such as the nature of mind, and the nature of life, and more narrow questions such as the substrate of the will do raise questions that require the attention of specialists. We can take the freedom of the will as axiomatic, but its explication is not a burden to be left at the feet of the layman.
Good points. As the questions become more precise, the level of expertise required -- in order to speak competently at a given and higher level of precision -- rises.



Crows show ingenuity such as tool use and misdirection.
Ted, I take issue with the inference you seem to draw here (ie. that tool use is a sufficient sign of "ingenuity"). For instance, there is a spider (the "trap-door" spider) that weaves a trap-door and gets into a hole in the ground and covers the hole with the trap-door -- only to barge out to capture an unsuspecting victim. This trap-door is a tool. Indeed, it is even "made" (read: crafted) by the organism wielding it. But spider brains are not very developed, evolutionarily-speaking. It would be quite a stretch to say that spiders exhibit ingenuity.

Spiders, by the way, weave perfect webs (which differ according to the species) -- on their very first try. And for the rest of their lives, they weave the same, exact, perfect web. Now, it could be said that the spiders are exhibiting an unprecedented memory (of "how" to weave a web well) -- but that wouldn't account for the perfect first try. No, the only thing that explains this phenomenon -- is instinct. Spiders "have it in them" to weave well -- from the get-go. Can we exclude this same, parsimonious explanation for the behavior of the crow?



I will assert here that corvids and parrots are no less intelligent than wolves and elephants.
I take issue with this assertion -- on biological grounds. For instance, the wolf brain is more encephalized (due to relative gain in cerebral cortex -- the most advanced structure of brains, overall) than is the parrot brain. To make this assertion in the face of the physiological, though admittedly indirect, evidence of brain difference seems to me to be epistemologically brazen.


Drawing anatomical analogies between groups separated by hundreds of millions of years, when we are far from understanding the nature of that physiology in Humans is unjustified.
Good point. But though anatomical analogies are possibly frought with unexpectancies, the contradictory alternative (ie. to pay no attention to anatomy) is, at the very least, equally absurd. In short, appeals to anatomical difference -- in the absence of more fruitful evidence -- is quite a logical method, at least as a starting point.



As for using the term "crude association" I find that also to have unacceptable connotations. Crude means raw, as in undercooked.
Perhaps you'd feel better about it integrating the relevant geneological "cooking time" here (millions of years)?

;-)

Please elaborate on an example connotation that you find unacceptable, Ted. Culinary appeal isn't forwarding my understanding of your disagreement with the term: crude association. To be clear, I'm talking about the kind of meaningless association of Pavlov's dogs (ie. classical conditioning).

Ed



 
 
 


Post 3

Sunday, September 10, 2006 - 3:30pmSanction this postReply
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Eros Emergent

The Mind as a Biological Phenomenon

Ed, to answer one of the questions you raised above:

All biological phenomena are chemical, and thus physical phenomena. I describe the mind as a biological phenomenon to stress that in order to get beyond those facts available to us by introspection or axiomatic analysis, it will be the task of those trained in the relevant biology (and hence the other more reductive sciences) and psychology, ethology, epistemology, etc., to research further.

Two important and complimentary concepts are necessary: supervenience, and emergence. Supervenience is the notion that certain levels of causation may rest upon lower levels of description without being able to be reduced merely to the lower level of description. An example would be the claim that biological facts supervene upon chemical facts. This claim is the equivalent of saying that if there is no chemical difference, there is no biological difference, all other things being equal. I am referring here to the comprehensive description of a concrete circumstance. This concept allows us to address emergent phenomena such as volition. One can hold that, ceteris paribus, if there is no difference in the physical description of two physical states, than there can be no difference in the psychological description of two states. This does not, however, mean that the psychological description can then be collapsed to the physical description. Think, for example, of the property of roundness, which we can stipulate to be defined as the ability to roll downhill. Roundness is a mechanical property of bodies which depends on their form. Both a bowling ball and a snowball can roll downhill. But roundness is not a property of snowflakes per se, or a property of plastic molecules. Roundness is a mechanical property that emerges from the arrangement, in a certain form, of those substances which have the proper potentialities, such as solidity and cohesion. If the snowball melts, it will no longer roll, so the chemical state of solidity is necessary for an arrangement of water particles to have that property. But the property of solidity itself need not imply or give rise to roundness, as bricklayers are aware. The emergent property necessitates the given state of affairs upon which it supervenes. Solidity is necessary, but not sufficient for roundness. One cannot reduce the emergent property to the lower description upon which it supervenes. The particles making up the snowball do not have the property of roundness in themselves, in the way that the weight of the snowball is reducible to the combined weight of the snowflakes which comprise it.

The concept of emergence is necessary when dealing with properties that arise when material of a certain potential is arranged in a form that brings about higher properties not found in the substrate per se. Consciousness is an emergent property of certain organisms whose organs, tissue and cells are arranged in a certain form. The cells themselves are not, however, conscious as individual cells. Volition, consciousness, health, beauty, justice, and other such states emerge when the lower level states upon which they supervene are properly arranged. When this necessary arrangement is lacking, the entities involved regress by default to a lower level of description. If truth and reciprocity disappear from the affairs of men, justice reverts to the "state of nature," anarchy or war. If symmetry or purposeful unity are removed from a work of art, beauty reverts to mere appearence, if not ugliness. If the proper relationship between body tissues is not maintained, an organism first loses its animate properties, then its vegetative properties, and eventually, through death, reverts to its mere physical properties. Certain organs may work properly in an unhealthy man, the tissues of his vascular system may temporarily remain intact even if his blood flow becomes erratic due to arrhythmia. His heart may retain its functionality even if temporarily stopped. Eventually his heart muscle will die from lack of oxygen and fuel and its cells will lose their integrity, reverting to mere decaying conglomerations of chemicals. When the emergent state loses form it reverts to the level of organization upon which it supervenes.

Hence I refer to consciousness as a biological phenomenon for two reasons. First, only biological entities exhibit or profit from having consciousness. Second, conscious states supervene upon biological states, which then supervene on chemical, and then quantum mechanical states. Consciousness is not a non-physical phenomenon, but its description can be no more reduced to a description of sub-atomic particles than can roundness be reduced to a chemical description.

The proof of this? Tell me the mass in grams of your love for Erica, or describe to us the emotional rush of her whispering in your ear using chemical formulae.

Ted Keer Sep. 10, 2006, NYC

P.S. I have not addressed here whether it might be possible to design a mechanical contrivance from which consciousness could emerge. Given that the body is a machine, I see no reason to believe that a sufficiently complex inorganic device might not come to be conscious. Yet, should that happen, it seems likely that it would do so in a form analogous to that of biological beings. The premises of many in the AI field are so confused and faulty that I don't expect this to be achieved any time soon. Many AI theorists see consciousness as something that can be programmed as floating abstractions, not grown from sense-perception and experience. Not all AI theorists are so deluded, I would recommend On Intelligence by Jeff Hawkins, inventor of the PalmPilot, and Computer Power and Human Reason by Joseph Weizenbaum, the inventor of SLIP and ELIZA.

Post 4

Wednesday, September 13, 2006 - 8:28pmSanction this postReply
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The Birds and the Bees

Spiders and other arthropods such as honeybees exhibit complex purposeful behaviors such as web building, trap-door ambush and the use of sticky bolas – wads of silk thrown on a line as a missile to entrap and drag back prey in the same way a chameleon uses its tongue to catch bugs. Crows and other corvids such a mynah-birds exhibit complex behaviors such as mimicking human speech, using twigs to pry food from otherwise inaccessible crannies, deceiving other birds by acting as if food can be found where there is none only to consume the actual and hidden food unmolested and at leisure while their dupes are distracted, and dropping hard-shelled food items from a height to crack the otherwise impervious shell. Is there any difference between the behaviors of the birds and the bugs?

Arthropod behavior is highly stereotyped. Studies have shown that complex arthropod behaviors such as web weaving and the lardering of a wasp’s nest with grubs and caterpillars or the dances of bees are inborn, hardwired, inflexible and un-innovative. Arthropods do not nurture and teach their young and the young do not stay around their mothers in order to learn the behaviors they use as adults. Many arthropods do take great care in protecting or feeding their young until a certain level of maturity. But this behavior is not acquired or taught. Pregnant queen bees do not sit around observing their mother and watching her lay eggs before setting off to start their own hives. Rather, upon hatching and at some point mating, the princesses either assume control of the hive directly if the elder queen is dead, fly off with some portion of the hive to begin another if the population and resources of the hive suffice, or stay and kill their mother or sisters if the resources are limited and such fertile competitors are present. These activities, while varying in detail between different hive species, are determined in each case by external sensory stimuli such as pheromones and temperature, and by internal factors such as the quality of food they were fed as larvae. There is no observation, no learning, no strategizing, just stereotyped behaviors determined by genetics and environment.

The stereotyped nature of arthropod behaviors has been demonstrated by ingenious experiments which isolate the behavioral steps that they follow. Entomologists interrupt predators in a certain stage of their activities, such as removing a paralyzed prey from the nest, and placing it outside where the mother wasp would first place the prey before entombing it with a fertilized egg. If the already paralyzed animal is removed to a sufficient distance by the experimenter, the wasp will dutifully sting it again with a paralyzing sting, although this has already been done, and the expenditure of toxin is of a finite but real cost to the adult. This can be repeated indefinitely until the experimenter is exhausted. The insect will never vary its actions. Unmoving prey within a certain perimeter will be dragged into the larder without stinging. Prey removed repeatedly outside that perimeter will by re-stung indefinitely. Neither is this behavior learned. The entire capture, paralysis, burial, egg deposition routine has been broken down into a series of such separate determinate steps. When the larval wasps metamorphose and emerge as adults, their mothers are long gone, and almost invariably dead. The young insect never “knows” its parent, or even another of its kind except perhaps to breed.

More advanced vertebrates , especially carnivores and frugivores that live in packs (fruit and meat being concentrated but spotty resources, as opposed to the low-grade but ubiquitous and docile vegetation that herbivores unmindfully masticate) exhibit learned, flexible, and novel behaviors. And not only are these behaviors purposeful in the strictly practical sense. Many such behaviors are engaged in for reasons that can seem almost cultural and psychological, if not recreational. Certain raptorial birds will grasp each others talons while in flight and twirl through the air in an avian ballet. Elephants, which habitually place there trunks in each others mouths upon greeting, where the exquisitely muscled and enervated nerves of their trunks provide them with a detailed knowledge of each others smells and the shapes of their teeth. Because older elephants often die at territorial watering holes where they loiter as they slowly succumb to the ravages of age, their bones remain where the animals fall, in what men call “elephant graveyards.” They say that elephants never forget, and although anecdotal, the claim seems based in fact. The elephants fondle the teeth and bones of their dead, rubbing the bones under their footpads, caressing them gently, without breaking them as they do great trees and small shrubs without compunction. They rub there trunks on the molars of their dead, undoubtedly recognizing their feel, and who cannot believe, imaging their lost kin.

When an elephant or a crow is faced with an unusual situation, it may behave in startlingly original ways. The devotion of elephant mothers who stay with their sick or stranded young and the reactions of their herds which do not move on like witless wildebeest herds but gather around the mother and child pair, fending off lions and helping dig the young from muddy pits by collapsing the banks of the waterhole , at a distance from the calf, and coaxing it with their bellows or pulling with their trunks as necessary to rescue it.

As with the elephants, which pass on their knowledge of watering holes used only once a decade in cyclical droughts or distant resources for times of famine, crows and chimps pass along learned behaviors such as dropping shellfish from heights or using rocks to smash nuts. These behaviors are neither instinctual or universal. Only animals which have observed others in such purposeful behaviors learn to imitate them, although one must infer the original discovery of the behavior, whether fortuitous or intuited. “Cultures” evolve and are passed on, other troops or packs not showing the behaviors or showing other trick such as crushing nuts with logs rather than stones. These behaviors are acquired through mimicry. But they are not stereotyped, they are learned by observation and practice. They do not appear spontaneously and full-blown without tutelage, nor are they repeated mindlessly as a response to stimulus without respect to their contexts.

Animal behavior varies over a spectrum varying from the tropisms of protests to the mournfulness of mammals. Humans, happen to be animals. Our close relatives are extinct, we are an aggressively competitive species. If the spectrum of links between ourselves and the apes were present, we might better understand the emergence of our unique capabilities. Self conscious thought and the recursive ability to use words to discuss and understand the fact that we use words to discuss and understand is, quite literally, miraculous. It is a matter at which to wonder. But wondrous matters have their origins in nature, however obscure. Aristotle, perhaps the greatest mind whose influence we are privileged to inherit, saw nature as a continuum from the physical (not the material – physical substances are a unity of matter and form separable by abstraction, not reductionism) to the vegetal - the self sustaining, to the animate – the self moving, to the rational – the self aware. The radical separation of man from the animals is a relic not of classical thought, but of Judeo-Christian creationism. To ignore biology, to ignore evolution, and to reduce man’s nature to reason alone is rationalist unreason. We cannot ignore the facts of biology and our animal nature as irrelevant to rational egoism. To vacate the field is to surrender to those who would deny our natural origins.





Post 5

Thursday, September 14, 2006 - 10:28amSanction this postReply
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Ted,

Consciousness is not a non-physical phenomenon, but its description can be no more reduced to a description of sub-atomic particles than can roundness be reduced to a chemical description.
Ted, I enjoyed your reasoned description of supervenience and emergence. My favorite example, due to its simplicity, is the chemical combination of hydrogen and oxygen to create water -- something with "new" properties that each constituent lacked. But I'm still having trouble with calling consciousness a physical phenomenon (as you do here, if only by default). We both agree that reductive materialism is bunk, as regards to explaining consciousness. You, here, clearly adopt a non-reductive materialism -- but I still take issue with it.

Can't it be noncontradictory to say that, while rooted in a certain combination of elements in the material world -- that consciousness, itself, is immaterial?

Ed


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Post 6

Thursday, September 14, 2006 - 10:42amSanction this postReply
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Ted,

Given that the body is a machine, I see no reason to believe that a sufficiently complex inorganic device might not come to be conscious.
This reasoning gets a foothold in one's mind via appeal to the 'proof of a negative' (it, apparently, can not be disproven in advance that machines won't be able to think). Again, I'm having "trouble." It appears to me to be premature to even make this kind of conjecture. It's like describing what God wants -- without first having an adequate understanding of the kind of thing that God is. If we do not currently have a sufficient understanding of the very fabric of consciousness, then how can we make any conjecture at all -- about re-creating its instantiation, in inorganic material?

Consciousness has always and only been a power wielded by organic beings and, in my mind, AI theorists are dropping that context. It's like saying that you will be building a pond on the planet Mercury -- where it's too hot for water to exist in its liquid form. Now, perhaps I could be persuaded to take a more moderate view, but currently, that is my stance on AI.

Ed


Post 7

Thursday, September 14, 2006 - 11:02amSanction this postReply
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Ted,

Aristotle, perhaps the greatest mind whose influence we are privileged to inherit, saw nature as a continuum from the physical (not the material – physical substances are a unity of matter and form separable by abstraction, not reductionism) to the vegetal - the self sustaining, to the animate – the self moving, to the rational – the self aware. The radical separation of man from the animals is a relic not of classical thought, but of Judeo-Christian creationism.
I'm not sure that Aristotle himself didn't radically separate man from beast (I will research this).



To ignore biology, to ignore evolution, and to reduce man’s nature to reason alone is rationalist unreason. We cannot ignore the facts of biology and our animal nature as irrelevant to rational egoism. To vacate the field is to surrender to those who would deny our natural origins.
I don't quite follow. Reason is the essential characteristic that differentiates man from beast (just as animation is the essential characteristics that differentiates beast from vegetation). If reality were different, this might not be so -- because essential characteristics are epistemological things (they're what we use in order to differentiate among the entities we conceptualize).

Ed 



Post 8

Thursday, September 14, 2006 - 10:55pmSanction this postReply
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A reflection on shadows,

Ed, answering your question in post (5) at length would be in conflict with this sites stated policy of claiming the right to reprint any submitted material and my intention to publish an objectivist cosmology. I will answer you with an enigmatic question. Is a shadow immaterial, in the sense in which you use immaterial?

Likewise, I cannot explain at detail in public why I am most definitely and adamantly not a materialist, in the way that term is commonly understood. Reagarding the possibility of machines becoming conscious, I agree with the implications of the common thought experiment - if one could design a chip (or other contrivance) that behaved in every way identical to a neuron, with the same inputs, outputs, and inner functionality governing these external relations, and one then slowly replaced each of a man's neurons with "chips" until his entire nervous system was replaced by analog components, would the man not become a conscious machine. This assumes, of course, that such chips might be buit, and that one can replace neurons with chips in a way that does not disrupt his mind to the point of disintegration. And I do not assert that this is now or will ever necessarily be possible. But given my understanding of cell physiology, that cells' emergent properties have a chemo-physical basis in the nature of their lipid membranes, surface receptors, and internal metabolism just as chips' emergent properties arise from their natures as miniature boards of transistors, capacitors, and conductors (please correct me any experts here, I am very ignorant so far as electronics) there seems to be no a prior reason to deny this possibility. Indeed, would one deny that deaf people with functioning cochlear implants hear? I will leave (7) to you, but (8) is making the mikstake of confusing the epistemological nature of essence for metaphysical import. The essential characteristic of an entity (or, more properly) the concept of an entity, is that characteristic which best explains the unique identity of the type being conceptualized. Rationality is the essential attribute of man because that attribute explains langauge and technology. This is covered quite clearly by Rand in ITOE.

I apologize for my reticence in explaining all my ontological arguments here. But I believe that the Objectivist world would be better served by a book that addresses these issue, and writing that book is my most important intellectual goal, one which I cannot sabotage by publishing it piecemeal for free.

I will be travelling for the next 72 hours, this post is unedited and I will only be able to respond intermittently

Ted Keer, Sep 15, 2006, NYC



Post 9

Friday, September 15, 2006 - 7:05amSanction this postReply
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Ted,

Is a shadow immaterial, in the sense in which you use immaterial?
Yes. A shadow is nothing other than a relative absence of photons and -- being a void -- is immaterial (by definition).

Ed


Post 10

Thursday, September 21, 2006 - 7:20pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

Sorry for the delay,

You said:

"Can't it be noncontradictory to say that, while rooted in a certain combination of elements in the material world -- that consciousness, itself, is immaterial?"

I asked in response, and you answered:
"Is a shadow immaterial, in the sense in which you use immaterial?" -TED
"Yes. A shadow is nothing other than a relative absence of photons and -- being a void -- is immaterial (by definition)." -ED
I would then ask you, if a shadow is not "material,"
then what is it? That, is, [for example] is it "spiritual?" What would we be willing to use to positively ascribe to it?

A few more questions:
Is a shadow real? Does it have a location and a duration? Where is it? Does it have causes and effects?
and:
What is fatherhood? Love? The color magenta? and are these real, And where are they? And do they have causes and effects? And if they are not material, then what are they?

I know this may be a bit socratic and frustrating, but I think that you answering my questions before I give my answers will be more helpful.

Ted

P.S. Robert, the question is asked in the full context of the string & my previous discussion with Ed. I am a monist, but not a materialist, and most definitely not a spiritualist, idealist, or supernaturalist.
(Edited by Ted Keer
on 9/21, 8:42pm)


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Post 11

Thursday, September 21, 2006 - 8:03pmSanction this postReply
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The material is what is - the spiritual is what gives meaning to what is - and the supernatural is what is not......

Post 12

Thursday, September 21, 2006 - 9:25pmSanction this postReply
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Ted, better late, than never (and please forgive the full answer -- I know how you'd rather deal with each piece separately) ...

====================
if a shadow is not "material,"
then what is it?
====================

It is the perceived contrast of a lack (of photons) against a richness (of photons -- reflected off of material things). It takes the existence of a richness -- to even be able to recognize a lack. This is akin to the truism that, without good, there would be no evil.



====================
That, is, [for example] is it "spiritual?"
====================

No. Like the Rev' said, what is spiritual -- is what is meaningful. Materiality, itself, has no meaning in-and-of-itself -- but human existence makes meaning possible; because we're part-spiritual beings, along with being material beings (we're beings with meaning).


====================
What would we be willing to use to positively ascribe to it?
====================

As I alluded above, nothing could be positively ascribed to a void of photons (ie. a shadow) -- if no contrast of a richness of photons existed (it is the noted difference, that makes shadows perceivable in the first place). Another way to say this is that it is only because there are shadowless sections in our ambient optic array -- that shadows can have any meaning at all to us.



===================
Is a shadow real?
===================

It's a real contrast (to the shadowless sections in our ambient optic array). Rand spoke of the zero. The nothing. It is senseless to speak of the ontological 'being' of nothingness; without the needed contrast to actual existence. When nothing's in your pocket, then nothing positive can be said about what's in your pocket, EXCEPT TO TALK ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF ANY SOMETHING in there.



===================
Does it have a location and a duration?
===================

Only because of the provided contrast (to non-shadowed things). In a sense then, shadows RELY on non-shadowed things -- to have any kind of existence at all. Shadows are not things that are ontologically primary -- they are merely contingent contrasts (to the lighted things).



===================
Does it have causes and effects?
===================

The contrast provided by shadows has causes and effects (on our ambient optic array). Shadows are caused by the physical obstruction of photons -- and shadows reduce the visibility of shadow-contained objects.


===================
What is fatherhood?
===================

It's a 'right relation' between a male and his offspring. The 'rightness' can be viewed in the context of the kind of creature that the male is. Some male animals naturally pay no attention to their offspring (which are raised solely by the mother). This, however, is not true of human fatherhood -- wherein the male plays a role in the upbringing of the child. This is because of the kind of creatures humans are.



===================
Love?
===================

Love is tricky. There are at least 2 main kinds of love:

1) Romantic love (which is always sexual in nature)
2) Excellence admiration/propagation (which is always growth-oriented)

In #1, the motivation is lust and desire.

In #2, the motivation is to create something wonderful. It's to take the "what is possible?" -- and to actually make it so. In this respect then, to 'make' love -- is to actually 'make' something new and perceivable. In this 2nd sense of love, somebody always grows. In this 2nd sense of love, the more you love someone -- the less they need you (love is inherently strengthening, rather than co-dependence fostering).

In this 2nd sense of love, love is always an action (it's something you 'do' -- not 'feel'). One necessary ingredient -- in this 2nd sense of love -- is active listening. You cannot love another -- in the 2nd sense -- without truly listening to them.

Now, be sure, you can have strong feelings for folks (without listening to them) -- but this isn't love (in the 2nd sense of the term). Instead, when you have strong feelings for someone (though you don't thoroughly listen to them), then it can be said that you cathect them.



===================
The color magenta?
===================

The color magenta gets its ontology (ie. its very 'being') from the contrast from the other colors in the world. It is a special experience among general experiences -- the general experiences (of various colors) being the necessary preconditions for any epistemological 'notice' of magenta.

Another way to say this is that, if everything were magenta, then magenta wouldn't exist as a recognizable contrast with anything (ie. anything non-magenta). It is the color spectrum itself -- which give magenta any meaning whatsoever.

Ted, does that adequately answer your questions?

Ed


Post 13

Thursday, September 21, 2006 - 10:51pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

Thanks, & I expected the candystriping, given the nature of my questions. You have used two words that I would emphasize much more than you did in your response to me, rely and physical. This is a matter of my formulation, not of your not answering my questions.

But let me ask this, do shadows or magenta or fatherhood really exist in the way a lump of metal exists? (And by fatherhood and love I meant ontologically, not morally.) In the extent to which a spider is the father of eggs which hatch long after their mother has eaten him and died herself, where is his fatherhood? If something is in no place, does it exist? If a void doesn't exist, then can a shadow or a color or fatherhood exist unless these things are atoms with mass and location?

These are really trick questions, so answer as you will, for now.

Ted





Post 14

Friday, September 22, 2006 - 4:29amSanction this postReply
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Regarding the 'fatherhood', one must distinguish between the progenitor and the concept of being a father....

Post 15

Friday, September 22, 2006 - 8:11pmSanction this postReply
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Ted,

====================
do shadows or magenta or fatherhood really exist in the way a lump of metal exists?
====================

No, as I alluded to above. There are different ways to exist (different 'senses' of the term 'exist'. Here is Aristotle (METAPHYSICS, 1077b) on one of the different ways to exist (caps for italics) ...

====================
... the objects of mathematics are not substances in a higher sense than bodies are, and that they are not prior to sensibles in being, but only in formula, and that they cannot in any way exist separately. But since they could exist IN sensibles either, it is plain that they either do not exist at all or exist in a special way and therefore do not exist without qualification. For 'exist' has many senses.
====================

Recap:
There's more than one way to exist (ie. numbers don't exist in the same WAY that metal does). Allow me to take account of all of existence (by quoting myself) ...

====================
The units of the concept "existence" are every entity, attribute, action, event, or phenomenon that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist. These "units" can be indicated ostensibly. Existence includes the subjective contents of the human mind, as well as the intentional objects of human thought that exist for 2 or more minds (which allow us to both be talking about one and the same thing).
====================

Recap:
Here's a comprehensive list of what it is that can possibly exist within reality ...

1) entities (that which has spatio-temporal continuity)

2) attributes (that which can be said of entities)

3) action (the potential behavior of entities)

4) event or phenomenon (those things which, though entity-originated, appear as a conglomerate -- such as a thunderstorm)

5) subjective, psychological experience (that which has temporal continuity -- and that which one particular person, and no other persons -- can experience; such as a toothache)

6) intentional, conceptual experience (that which any person -- indeed, all competent persons -- can experience; such as the concepts of 'love' or 'fairness' or 'justice' or 'fatherhood')

There it is. No less than 6 ways to exist within reality (though ways #5 and #6 can be conceptually collapsed into ways 3 and 4 -- leaving only 4 ways to exist within reality; and even way #4 can be collapsed into way #3; leaving only 3 ways to exist within reality).



======================
In the extent to which a spider is the father of eggs which hatch long after their mother has eaten him and died herself, where is his fatherhood?
======================

In the case of the Black Widow spider (where the expecting mother immediately eats the father), the fatherhood is within the insemination (for THAT species). For humans however, 'fatherhood' means more than insemination. This is because of the kind of creatures we are.



======================
If something is in no place, does it exist?
======================

Not everything need be SPATIO-temporal -- in order to exist. A toothache, for instance, exists without taking up any space.



======================
... can a shadow or a color or fatherhood exist unless these things are atoms with mass and location?
======================

See above.

Ted, I really appreciated these questions. I am really enjoying this conversation. Thank you for asking for my thoughts on this fundamental matter.

Feel welcome to do that, anytime.

Ed

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Post 16

Friday, September 22, 2006 - 9:57pmSanction this postReply
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Consciousness is a Dance

Consciousness (awareness in the broadest sense, not necessarily conceptual and self-aware consciousness) is a biological phenomenon (and hence, by supervenience, physical) that allows a conscious entity to stand in a potential or actual relationship to its environment, a relationship of formal harmony mediated by the senses and governing the animate activity of that living entity.

Consciousness is a relationship (in truth, a very complex set of hierarchical relationships) that exists between an animate being and its environment. The environment also includes the animate entity itself.

Consciousness is a harmony, a temporal relationship of correspondence in form, between an animate being whose central nervous system (CNS) comes to map in spatial and temporal ways not only the present stimulus, but also remembered experience and imagined goals. These maps are spatial in their instantiation in the brain and temporal in that they evolve through time. Most importantly, the neurons of the CNS of an aware animal are firing in temporal harmonies with each other in ways that imply that attentive awareness is not so much found in a location but arranged to a beat.

Consciousness, like a very complex play of shadow and light arranged in repetitive but evolving temporal and spatial patterns, exhibiting both regularity and novelty, both stasis and feedback, is a dance.

Consciousness is a dance.

23 September 2006, Manhattan
© Theodore Keer, 2006, all rights reserved


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Post 17

Saturday, September 23, 2006 - 8:29amSanction this postReply
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Ted,

That sounds reasonable.

Ed
[and well written, too]


Post 18

Saturday, September 23, 2006 - 4:44pmSanction this postReply
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Materialism as Derived, Not Given

The scholastics describe consciousness (externally, not experientially) as the capacity of an animate being to grasp the form of an object without absorbing its material. When we eat a cake, we consume its material, and convert that material to our form. When we observe a cake (at least not by tasting it!) we absorb a portion of the form of the cake without materially altering it.

Consciousness is thus a relational existent, not an entity in the same way that bodies are entities. Rand speaks of concepts as being mental entities. This is correct in the way that we might describe a symphony as an entity, it has a complex unified form and can be spoken of as agent in the same way that an idea or a political convention can. Neither an idea, nor a symphony nor a political convention can be spoken of or understood as a merely physical body. (Although the U.N. might be described in the same terms as a garbage dump prowled by scavengers and vermin.) Describing any of them as mental, musical or political in merely physical terms misses the point, although each does supervene on the physical.

Reductionism works in finding how the higher levels of description of reality can be shown to supervene on the lower levels. The order existing at one level can be separated into the material of a lower level, but without the form arranging the lower level material into an emergent structure, the mere material does not suffice to explain the higher level order. We cannot reduce the rolling of a ball to the glass or plastic particles constituting the ball. We cannot reduce health to a molecular formula. We cannot reduce man's mind to mere sensation. Materialism tries to substitute a derived and learned theory of physical nature, the idea developed over centuries that physical bodies can be broken into microscopic particles, as an ontological primary, and a philosophical given. Once he has reduced existence to material devoid of emergent form, (which is a very advanced scientific theory, not a perceptual given) the materialist expects us to then explain higher levels of order, levels of order whose nature is given and intuitive to the layman, as if these higher levels of order must be proven.

Although Marxist ideology still hangs on in the political and humanities departments of academia, Marxism's ally in the hard sciences - reductive materialism, and its offspring Behaviorism in psychology have long been abandoned. The researchers and theorists of Cognitive Science in biology and psychology and the new (and still faddish) un-formalized field of Complexity Theory have seen the forest for the trees, and are moving us toward an acceptance that order remains to be discovered at many descriptive levels in the physical world. The physical is not merely the material. This is an insight consistent with the monism of Rand's Objectivism, and one that should bode well for an integration of Randian philosophy with modern science which Rand largely ignored.

23 September 2006, Manhattan
© Theodore Keer, 2006, all rights reserved

Post 19

Saturday, September 23, 2006 - 8:02pmSanction this postReply
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Ted, excellent rejoinder. However, in it, you said ...

===================
... the monism of Rand's Objectivism ...
===================

This is, in a sense, true. Everything has it's origin in the material world (ie. no matter = no anything). However, in another sense (that sense held by Binswanger), Rand's Objectivism can be seen as a non-Cartesian Dualism.

Whaddaya' think o' that?

Ed

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