| | Here is the executive summary of Freedomhouse.org's 2007 report on Georgia:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since Georgia’s independence, the country’s hybrid system has caused
widespread internal instability. For most of this period, the opposition and
independent media have enjoyed a high level of independence, but there
has been a lack of fair competition for political power, causing unconstitutional
changes of power in 1992 and 2003. ThewarsforsecessioninAbkhaziaandSouth
Ossetia from 1991 to 1993 brought some 15 percent of Georgia’s territory under
the control of unrecognized governments. These unresolvedconflicts as well as
tense relations with Russia, the major protector of secessionist regimes in these
areas, continue to challenge the stability of the country.
TheNovember2003eventsknownasthe“RoseRevolution,”whenPresident
Eduard Shevardnadze resigned following mass protests over rigged parliamentary
elections, brought to power a group of pro-Western reformers led by the charismatic
president Mikheil Saakashvili. Subsequent years were marked by success in rooting
out mass corruption, strengthening public institutions, and promoting robust
economic growth. As the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe remarked in September 2007, “In a remarkably short time,
Georgia has made stunning progress in carrying out substantial economic, judicial,
and state reforms. It has laid the foundations that should allow Georgia to become
a prosperous liberal market economy and a fully fledgeddemocracygovernedby
human rights and the rule of law.”1
However, the crisis at the end of 2007 signifiedanimportantsetbackforGeorgia’s
democratic development. On September 27, the arrest on corruption charges of
Irakli Okruashvili, a former minister of defense turned opposition politician, led to
a series of protest rallies that reached a climax on November 2, when an estimated
50,000–75,000 people called for early parliamentary elections and amendments
to election legislation. As the rallies continued, the demands radicalized into calls
for the immediate resignation of the president. On November 7, the government
dispersed the rallies, closed down two major opposition-oriented TV stations, and
introduced a state of emergency that lasted nine days. Theseactionswerejustified
by the imminent danger of a coup. On November 8, the president unveiled his
plan to resign, with a call for snap presidential elections on January 5, 2008, as
well as a plebiscite on the date of the parliamentary elections. Imedi TV, the main
opposition channel, was accused of conspiring to overthrow the government, and
its broadcasting was temporarily suspended.
National Democratic Governance. Georgia’s mixed political system protects
major civil and political rights and provides for political pluralism and meaningful
expression of the public will. However, the unbalanced character of the system,
where the executive branch dominates other state agencies, combined with a
weak opposition prevent Georgia from becoming a consolidated democracy. The
effectivenessofthegovernmenthasincreasedconsiderablysincetheRoseRevolution,
especially in attracting public revenue and providing public goods. However, the
fact that opposition protests led to a political crisis ending in a nine-day state of
emergency exposed the vulnerability of Georgia’s democratic institutions. The
government’s lack of full territorial control also constitutes a continuing source
of instability. Reflecting the political crisis causedby mass rallies andthe resulting
setback to Georgia’s unbalanced system of governance, the rating for national democratic
governance is downgraded from 5.50 to 5.75.
Electoral Process.
Elections since the Rose Revolution have been generally free
and fair, overcoming widespread fraud hitherto endemic to the system. The2006
legislation on public financing for political parties and free TV airtime for electoral
campaigning has created a more even playing field for the government and opposition
parties. The dramatic events inNovember 2007showedthat the oppositionis
gaining strength, which led to demands for extra-constitutional changes of power
as well as disturbing occurrences of violence against opposition figures, thoughthe
crisis was resolved by calling for early elections. Although the crisis was returned to
the electoral track, owing to occurrences of violent and unconstitutional means in the
political competition the rating for electoral process worsened from 4.50 to 4.75.
Civil Society. The legislation regulating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is
quite liberal, and there are no impediments to their activities. Nonprofitorganizations
are easy to register, and the registration process was made even simpler in 2007. A
majority of the public appreciate the role of civil society in advancing democracy.
However, after the Rose Revolution, the sector’s visibility has diminished. NGO
cooperation with the government is productive in some areas, but there is no
stable mechanism for interaction between the government and civil society. There
are organizations with illiberal, extreme-right agendas, but government has been
successful in curbing their activities so the groups are free to express their opinions
but violence has largely stopped and their influenceis marginal. Thesocial base
for NGOs is rather narrow, and organizations in most regions outside the capital
are less developed. They are dependent primarily on foreign funding. Tradeunions
exist but have little influence.The rating for civil society remains unchanged at 3.50.
Independent Media. Georgia’s Constitution and legislation ensure a liberal
environment for the development of independent media. The 2004 Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression took libel off the criminal code and relieved
journalists of legal responsibility for revealing state secrets. However, Georgian
media demonstrate weak editorial independence and low professional standards and
are often used to promote the political interests of their owners. Still, pluralism of
voices is guaranteed by the diversity of media ownership. Temporary suspension of
Imedi, the major opposition-oriented TV and radio, questioned the government’s
Nations in Transit 2008234
commitment to media freedom and exposed the fragility of media pluralism.
Owing to the setback in media freedoms caused by the nine-day state of emergency
and temporary closing of Imedi TV and radio, the rating for independent media is
downgraded from 4.00 to 4.25.
Local Democratic Governance. The Constitution does not define Georgia’s
territorial arrangement or the competences of subnational institutions of state
power. In December 2005, the Parliament adopted legislation that lays the
groundwork to create new local government institutions. In 2007, following the
October 2006 local elections, a new system of municipal government was instituted
with the potential to create meaningful and effectivemunicipal bodies. However,
it has not yet demonstrated the necessary level of competence and independence.
Owing to insufficientdatatoevaluatetheperformanceof thenewsystemof municipal
government, the rating for local democratic governance remains unchanged at 5.50.
Judicial Framework and Independence. Georgia’s Constitution provides
important safeguards for the protection of human rights and the independence
of the judiciary. However, since the Rose Revolution, the judiciary still finds it
difficult to withstand political pressure. There has been a decrease in abuse by law
enforcement officers, but the problem is still acute in some parts of the country. In
2007, there was an alarming trend of tampering with the property rights of citizens
and businesses. A set of reforms carried out in 2006–2007 will help strengthen
the independence of the judiciary. Positive reforms in the judiciary and penitentiary
system and reductions in police abuse were offset byproblems inthe areaof property
rights and excessive force used to disperse political demonstration; thus, the rating for
judicial framework and independence remains unchanged at 4.75.
Corruption. Although corruption remains an important concern, resolute
measures by the government started to bear fruit, as reflectedinconsiderably
lower perceptions of corruption among experts and the general public. While in
the aftermath of the Rose Revolution anticorruption efforts consistedof strong
but somewhat erratic punitive measures with insufficient respect fordueprocess,
later anticorruption policies have become more comprehensive and orderly. Lack of
transparency in a number of public institutions contributes to continuing concerns
about corruption. Georgia’s corruption rating remains at 5.00.
Outlook for 2008. Thequalityof snappresidential andregular parliamentary
elections in 2008 will be an important test for measuring the development,
direction, and effectiveness of Georgia’s democratic institutions. Inadditionto
gauging Georgia’s electoral procedures, the polls will test the maturity of opposition
parties, as well as the genuine freedom of the media and their ability to facilitate
meaningful policy dialogue. The expected recognition of Kosovo’s independence
may directly affect Russia’s attitude toward the self-proclaimed entities of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, thus increasing tensions between Russia and Georgia and
destabilizing the zones of conflict.
Note the section on press freedom. There is no LEGAL impediment to speech. Revdealing state secrets is not a crime. The problem lies in the fact that media may be partisan based on ownership, and that there are low journalistic strandards! Is this a matter of state censorship? By Objectivist standards, rather than leftist standards, this is a totally free media.
Given the facts presented - the arrest of ONE politician on corruption charges, and a nine day (i.e, temporary) "period of emergency" in a country having recently undergone two revolutions in two decades, I would consider this a highly free country. I hope these facts have some import on those who have until now portrayed Georgia as somehow not up to par with the West.
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