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Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 7:29amSanction this postReply
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This interesting TIME article compares the thought-processes of dogs, wolves, chimps, and humans.

The following paragraphs from the article,
(summarizing how humans created dogs out of wolves, then discussing how human babies, dogs, and wolves approach a particular cognitive task)
may particularly interest those who think about psycho-epistemology and the origins of social metaphysics:

"As humans became better at hunting, they left scraps around their gathering spots. When they departed, the ancestors of dogs could move in. At first, when humans and wolves came into contact, many of the animals ran away. Others lashed out and were killed. Only the affable animals had the temperament to become camp followers, and their new supply of food let them produce affable puppies. "They selected themselves," says [cognitive scientist Alexandra] Horowitz.
"Once dogs became comfortable in our company, humans began to speed up dogs' social evolution. They may have started by giving extra food to helpful dogs--ones that barked to warn of danger, say. Dogs that paid close attention to humans got more rewards and eventually became partners with humans, helping with hunts or herding other animals. Along the way, the dogs' social intelligence became eerily like ours, and not just in their ability to follow a pointed finger. Indeed, they even started to make very human mistakes.
"A team led by cognitive scientist Josef Topál of the Research Institute for Psychology in Hungary recently ran an experiment to study how 10-month-old babies pay attention to people. The scientists put a toy under one of two cups and then let the children choose which cup to pick up. The children, of course, picked the right cup--no surprise since they saw the toy being hidden. Topál and his colleagues repeated the trial several times, always hiding the toy under the same cup, until finally they hid it under the other one. Despite the evidence of their eyes, the kids picked the original cup--the one that had hidden the toy before but did not now.
"To investigate why the kids made this counterintuitive mistake, the scientists rigged the cups to wires and then lowered them over the toy. Without the distraction of a human being, the babies were far more likely to pick the right cup. Small children, it seems, are hardwired to pay such close attention to people that they disregard their other observations. Topál and his colleagues ran the same experiment on dogs--and the results were the same. When they administered the test to wolves, however, the animals did not make the mistake the babies and dogs did. They relied on their own observations rather than focusing on a human."

/1/
If "small children ... are hardwired" for social metaphysics, what implications does this have for Objectivism?

/2/
If -- as this experiment suggests -- one psychological (or psycho-epistemological) difference between a dog and a wolf is the presence or absence of some form of social metaphysics
(the wolves "relied on their own observations" -- the dogs and the babies didn't, when they had a human to follow instead),
does this mean that a wolf is in some sense a "first-hander" while a dog is a "second-hander" because humans have bred the dog into that state?

/3/
If humans have managed (over generations) to change an entire species (dogs) from first-handers into second-handers
(by accidentally -- then intentionally --
creating conditions which encouraged the second-handers, but not the first-handers, to flourish and to reproduce their kind),
could it have happened (over generations) that humans have changed *each* other* from first-handers into second-handers (as with dogs: by accidentally and/or intentionally creating social conditions which made it easy for a second-hander to prosper, but hard for a first-hander to do so?)

Post 1

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 2:10pmSanction this postReply
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Great questions, Kate:

/1/
If "small children ... are hardwired" for social metaphysics, what implications does this have for Objectivism?
A rival hypothesis is that, on top of social metaphysics, rote learning happened (in both infant and dog). This would confound one's ability to draw conclusions from the data. The social metaphysics part is that the children and the dogs "guessed" that the toy would be under the cup that had always been "chosen" or been "intended" by the experimenter.

Guessing the experimenter's intentions (rather than trusting their eyes), might have been rote learned -- rather than "in-born" or "hard-wired.".


/2/
If -- as this experiment suggests -- one psychological (or psycho-epistemological) difference between a dog and a wolf is the presence or absence of some form of social metaphysics
(the wolves "relied on their own observations" -- the dogs and the babies didn't, when they had a human to follow instead),
does this mean that a wolf is in some sense a "first-hander" while a dog is a "second-hander" because humans have bred the dog into that state?
Being more responsible for his own personal survival -- I think a wolf is, in some sense, more of a first-hander.


/3/
If humans have managed (over generations) to change an entire species (dogs) from first-handers into second-handers
(by accidentally -- then intentionally --
creating conditions which encouraged the second-handers, but not the first-handers, to flourish and to reproduce their kind),
could it have happened (over generations) that humans have changed *each* other* from first-handers into second-handers (as with dogs: by accidentally and/or intentionally creating social conditions which made it easy for a second-hander to prosper, but hard for a first-hander to do so?)
Yes. One possibility regarding human second-handers and social metaphysics is that it's natural; the other possibility is that it was created by the wrong philosophies of man (e.g. Kant, Marx, Dewey, Skinner, Rawls, Gladwell, Obama, etc.).

The answer to the riddle is that social metaphysics isn't natural -- but that it was created by man.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 9/16, 2:14pm)


Post 2

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 3:13pmSanction this postReply
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And if it wasn't natural - why was it created?

Post 3

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 3:24pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

You could also go overboard in the other direction by saying that the wolf is a 'taker' whereas the dog has evolved into a 'trader' - offering services in fair exchange for support.

The answer to the riddle is that social metaphysics doesn't apply to animals that don't have the capacity to reason. It isn't about 'natural' or 'unnatural' - disease is natural as well as health.

I don't think that Kate's inclusion of social metaphysics is warranted for dogs, wolves or babies. Babies are learning how to learn. They are taking cues from others, but it is for the purpose of independent acquisition of skills. They must mature these cognitive skills before they are capable of choosing between social metaphysics and intellectual individualism.

Social metaphysics requires a context that both human and a certain level of cognitive maturity not available to a baby.

Post 4

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 4:15pmSanction this postReply
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The experiment does not tell us about whether a subject is prone to social metaphysics, i.e., to substituting others' consciousnesses for reality. Rather, it shows how some subjects prioritize information when solving problems.



Jordan

Post 5

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 4:37pmSanction this postReply
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Re:

A rival hypothesis is that, on top of social metaphysics, rote learning happened (in both infant and dog). This would confound one's ability to draw conclusions from the data. The social metaphysics part is that the children and the dogs "guessed" that the toy would be under the cup that had always been "chosen" or been "intended" by the experimenter.

That hypothesis wouldn't explain why the "rote learning" (in babies and dogs) occurred only when the movement of the cups depended on visible humans rather than on visible wires (manipulated by unseen humans).
Ed -- and any other defenders of Ed's hypothesis -- please explain why the rote learning didn't happen around wires: why didn't the kids and the dogs (in the experiment with wires) similarly guess (wrongly) or learn by rote (wrongly) that the toy would inhabit the cup that had always moved on previous uses of the wires?

Post 6

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 4:56pmSanction this postReply
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Not my field, but it seems like you guys are going overboard on this. The issue at hand seems to be one of concept formation.

Hypothesis: Babies and dogs have a concept of adult humans that includes giving them priority in learning and mimicry. Their immature concept for "other person" includes "Thing that I should pay attention to." The wires fall under the category of "Thing that I'm not attached to". The child's concept of them includes irrelevance, so they make the correct judgement. Their concept of "adult" includes such a high estimation of relevance that they can be "tricked". This seems like an obvious survival adaptation to me. One that we have naturally and have bred into dogs.

Secondary Hypothesis: The baby or dog isn't developed enough to recognize that one toy is at stake. They don't see the zero sum nature of the experiment. There's been a toy under one cup the entire time and they can't evaluate that there won't be repeatedly.

I wouldn't call dogs "second handers". Most dogs are capable at some level of survival without people. The difference is we've bred that expanded concept into them. Wolves see us as rivals, prey, or irrelevant. Dogs see us as potentially all of the above AND peers with a strong inclination toward "peer".


Post 7

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 5:11pmSanction this postReply
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Re:

social metaphysics isn't natural -- ... it was created by man.

... making it as much a part of nature as anything else created by man.

(Or isn't man a part of nature, since there is nothing outside of nature -- a/k/a the universe -- for man to be a part of?
As I enjoy pointing out to eco-freaks who equate "natural" with "good": If a beaver's dam is "natural, ergo good" because nature a/k/a the universe includes beavers and their dams, then Hoover Dam is equally "natural, ergo good" given that nature a/k/a the universe likewise includes us humans and our dams.)

If man (or some men and women) created social metaphysics at some time in the history of our species (instead of some or all of us having it unfortunately "hard-wired" as the cup-and-toy experiment suggests), there must have been a First Social Metaphysician.
He (or she) would, by definition, have been raised in a society without social metaphysics and social metaphysicians. So ...
How would such a person have come to invent social metaphysics?
(I'm not saying that he or she couldn't have invented it; I'm merely wondering precisely what would lead someone who'd grown up without social metaphysics to invent the idea.)
Further: once the First Social Metaphysician arose among our distant ancestors, how on Earth did he or she manage to sell that notion to other people (who weren't social metaphysicians already)?

With regard to the other possibility (that social metaphysics is hard-wired in us, perhaps as an animal inheritance, but that full rationality demands learning to override it), I wonder what folks here think of the hypothesis presented here (you'll unfortunately have to scroll down past quite a bit of blank space to read the meat of the document)

Post 8

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 5:20pmSanction this postReply
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Robert,
And if it wasn't natural - why was it created?
Good question.


Steve,
You could also go overboard in the other direction by saying that the wolf is a 'taker' whereas the dog has evolved into a 'trader' - offering services in fair exchange for support.
Yes. And, like you go on to say (below), this discussion of infants and dogs is already overboard.

The answer to the riddle is that social metaphysics doesn't apply to animals that don't have the capacity to reason. It isn't about 'natural' or 'unnatural' - disease is natural as well as health.
I should have been more clear. When I said natural, I meant metaphysical -- as in a distinction between the metaphysical and the man-made. It is natural for man to create money, for instance -- but money isn't a metaphysical thing.

I don't think that Kate's inclusion of social metaphysics is warranted for dogs, wolves or babies.
I agree. In a way, the discussion starts off "overboard." It is remniscient of the rampant anthropomorphization that animal cognition researchers use. If a bird recognizes pictures with humans in them -- vs. pictures without humans -- then researchers say that the bird, little evolved beyond a dinosaur, formed a concept. Here is how their thinking errs ...

They say to themselves: "Well, if I (a human) were to be able to make the distinction between pictures with humans from pictures without -- then that would be because I had first formed a concept of human (in order to distinguish). ... Sooooo .... if an animal does close to the same thing (gets it right 80% of the time), then ... then ...

the animal (because it is animate like humans are) made a concept, too."

This reasoning line is guilty of the Bad Analogy -- because birds have memories so profound that they can remember thousands of particulars (think of being able to remember thousands of the names of people in an audience; or thousands of the digits of "pi", etc). And memories are perceptual powers of awareness, not conceptual ones. The only reason, then, that humans have got to develop a concept of human in order to get the pictures right, experiment after experiment -- is because human subjects are unable to memorize the thousands of pictures that the experimenters might place in front of them.

To bring it back to what were talking about then, the wrong-headed experimenter would say to himself:

"Well, if I (an adult human) were to go ahead and choose based on the experimenters intentions (rather than trusting my eyes), then I (as an adult human) would be using social metaphysics.

Therefore, babies (because they are humans like adults are) do, too.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 9/16, 6:36pm)


Post 9

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 5:24pmSanction this postReply
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Kate,

That hypothesis wouldn't explain why the "rote learning" (in babies and dogs) occurred only when the movement of the cups depended on visible humans rather than on visible wires (manipulated by unseen humans).
Ed -- and any other defenders of Ed's hypothesis -- please explain why the rote learning didn't happen around wires ...
Unfortunately your link doesn't work so I am unable to comment further. One thing I need to know -- in order to answer -- is if babies were always first exposed to experiments with humans instead of with wires (even the babies eventually tested with wires).

Ed


Post 10

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 5:28pmSanction this postReply
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Ryan,

Good points about the preferential attention of infants (and how that is a confounder). However, you said:

I wouldn't call dogs "second handers". Most dogs are capable at some level of survival without people. The difference is we've bred that expanded concept into them.
Perhaps you didn't mean it literally, but I wouldn't agree that we bred anything resembling a bonafide concept into dogs.

Ed


Post 11

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 5:31pmSanction this postReply
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What was bred was 'servility' , the essence of domestication, the same [with regards to humans] as slavery, an old practice from before recorded history, from the north cavemen on down..[those who existed by the 'taking' syndrome]

Post 12

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 5:48pmSanction this postReply
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Although I'm not particularly equipped to delve deeply into the subject. I would say that some level of conceptualization does go on among animals. My understanding of the subject is that abstraction is the next level of cognition that seperates us, not conception. This is not to say that they conceptualize things in the same way we do, but it seems obvious that some sort of "proto-conceptualizing" goes on beyond just sensory perception. Dogs differentiate (roughly) some things from food. They can learn that some behaviors are ill-advised. The rooting of our mind in biological structures seems to imply that there is a possibility of instinctive basic conceptualization. A lot of people here are proabably a lot more qualified to elaborate, but it seems clear that the animal mind isn't just a sensory device.

I don't agree that we've bred servility into dogs, although that doesn't really change what I've said. If we bred them to be servile, they would have to have some understanding of what to be servile to. That sounds like a concept. Dogs are naturally servile within a certain pack dynamic, what we've done is bred the capacity to include us in the pack. A dog will run right over you and dominate the relationship if you let it. You have to assert your dominance so that it can fit you into the hierarchy it instinctively knows.


Post 13

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 5:57pmSanction this postReply
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I'll guess that after watching the toy being hidden in the same cup over and over again, they got tired of the game, and began paying attention to other things. And then they didn't really care to think for a moment about which cup to pick up because they were thinking about more important things or relaxing... its so much more efficient to just mindlessly automatically pick the same cup as its been then to watch and determine which cup every time.

Now maybe if they punished picking the wrong cup by a brutal beating, or starved the subject then put food instead of a toy... then maybe the experimental subjects would be more careful to pick the correct cup.

Post 14

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 6:44pmSanction this postReply
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Ryan,

In case you are interested in further and evidence-based debate, I have disagreed with what it is that you are saying here. My argument really started to get off of the ground -- or get trail-blazing traction -- in post 102.

Ed


Post 15

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 7:34pmSanction this postReply
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Rand's brief overview of epistemology was really more prescriptive than descriptive.

I find it useful to compare the mind to the internet, a vast chaos of largely unrelated pieces of data, most of which we don't have the time or inclination to focus on. It is having a purpose driving us that enables us to think of our minds as organized, just as with the web. A particular focus reveals implicit order, like typing in keywords in Google.

I think of Rand's epistemology as a picture of a kind of an idealized mental process. Most people do not systematically analyze a word's conceptual content to determine if the proper aspects have been isolated to precisely reflect an optimal choice of superset and subset categories. Rather, they mentally connect the word to that chaotic universe with a bunch of links to references in that chaos, like a flat database that is organized on the fly by each user via their choices.

Most of the time people probably do get a reasonable approximation of a rigorous philosophical analysis via this non-method, which is closer to the "small world" theory (which explains the 'six degrees of separation' thing), and most of the time that's all they need. There are over a million words in the English language. A child no doubt uses a variety of epistemological shortcuts, based, once again, on an implicit decision theory. Some things you can shluff off as a quick approximation, because you only have so much time and processing bandwidth, and reality is real-time.

Other things, such as precise definitions in the fields of mathematics, sciences, and philosophy, require very precise and justifiable definition - if you are going to be working in that field.

As in the field of justice, I see a lot of wheel-spinning by objectivists giving in to their native inclination to rationalism - trying to determine which punishment is required by justice, when justice has nothing to do with punishment to begin with - or trying to determine the conceptual state of an infant as though there is one single path that all infants will or should take.

I'm not saying that the discussion so far in this thread hasn't been useful and cogent, just that there may be this unfortunate tendency to treat consciousness as some kind of Platonic ideal, when an evolutionary model, driven by values and strategies related to our biological nature, rather than some kind of "perfect competition" model, may be more productive.
(Edited by Phil Osborn on 9/16, 8:04pm)


Post 16

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 - 9:37pmSanction this postReply
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Phil,

I disagree with almost everything you said in post 15. I know that that, according to you, makes me a "rationalist" -- which reminds me of the current debate tactics being used on the political Left: "If you disagree with Obama, you're a racist -- because Obama is black and that makes whatever you have to say automatically associated with racism (his blackness is proof-positive of your racism).

Nice way to stifle a debate, Phil. But I'm not buying it.

Firstly, in order for Rand to get into a position to prescribe epistemology well, she'd have to be able to describe it well (and she did). Secondly, this idea of the "reasonable approximation" replacing "true concepts" is bogus and dealt with in ITOE. Thirdly, it's true that there is the constant pressure of reality and time forcing us to focus on various parts in various time-limited contexts but, again, this misses the point of philosophy -- which is, itself, timeless.

To say otherwise is Hegelian.

Fourthly, justice occurs when folks get what they deserve: reward or punishment. Aristotle said it's when you treat likes alike, or equals equally; and unequals unequally. That means some people get treated differently (read: better or worse) because the opposite of treating everyone the same, regardless, is complete and total injustice. When you treat folks good, that's reward. When you don't, or when you treat them bad, that's punishment.

And fifthly, when Rand said that you're born tabula rasa, she meant in content, not method. Humans have the same method of building up a "mind": reason. It's objective. Objective means it's not particular to the individual, or to the times, or to the place, etc. It's what allows for humans to live among one another in a complex society. Besides Rand's work, Alasdair MacIntyre dealt with this issue in: Who's Justice? Which Rationality?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 9/16, 9:39pm)


Post 17

Thursday, September 17, 2009 - 8:27amSanction this postReply
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I don't know why the TIME link didn't work for Ed (it works from my computer), but Ed or anyone can find the article by Googling (within quotation marks) any 10 - 20 consecutive words of the part I quoted.

Post 18

Thursday, September 17, 2009 - 3:09pmSanction this postReply
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Found it:

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1921614-1,00.html

I'll read it and comment soon ...

Ed


Post 19

Thursday, September 17, 2009 - 8:15pmSanction this postReply
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I didn't read Rand - AS - until 1960 at age twelve. By that point, I had already read several hundred mostly sf novels. I recall that I really had to stretch my brain at age 7 to handle my first juvie sf. However, apart from a few key concepts, such as Newton's laws of motion, there was very little required in terms of formally defining terms. Instead, I would take a new term in the context of the action of the story, assign it a few constraints, making assumptions about what the story required it to mean, and then move on. Very rarely did I consult a dictionary or other reference.

I'm sure that I got things wrong occasionally, but more often in pronunciation than in meaning.

As I said, this is how most people learn, I'm sure, as they generally have to be taught the methods of formal logic and the various kinds of fallacies much later in life. Assuming that they could in fact generally employ any sort of rigorous epistemology, without first knowing something about that field and the validation of itself to begin with is really a leap of faith. I do feel a bit sorry for all the people who opted out of higher math, including such marvels as the limit theorems, but even plane geometry and its sets of proofs, simply because someone who has not gone through such an experience simply doesn't have a real concept of rigor in thought.

I do recall how wonderfully refreshing and exciting it was, however, to run slam into the amazing feats of logic throughout AS. For years afterwards, I would find myself lying awake at night or taking a shower while thinking through the arguments from Galt's speech. And, I had the great good fortune to have a teacher give me a copy of "Fallacy, the Counterfeit of Argument."

The difference between a smart person who gets at least as far as introductory Euclidian geometry and has a grasp of the nature of proof and logic, and someone who is exposed to Rand, however, I think is profound in most cases. People simply do not realize that it is possible to apply such rigor to areas such as politics or ethics - and they don't.

And that is the point that I was making, despite Ed's jumping the gun on me. Rand, I'm sure, would agree that most people survive epistemologically by approximations and fuzzy logic. However, that kind of thought won't get you to the moon, and the failure of the intellectual community to realize that a similar rigor is required in the soft sciences is as limiting as if we had to use fuzzy approximations - pre-Newton physics to design our machines.

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