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Sunday, September 5, 2010 - 3:16pmSanction this postReply
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I read McCaskey's Amazon review of Harriman's book but I am not enough of a history buff to evaluate his claims. In any case, if well-educated people sympathetic to Objectivism see holes in Harriman's arguments, that does not bode well for the book. (I am reading it right now and enjoying it, though.) I think Peikoff possibly had another one of his emotional hijackings when writing that letter.

I am beginning to think any training program in Objectivism needs to include a course on how to handle criticism with courage and grace!

Thanks for sharing this, Robert.

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Monday, September 6, 2010 - 6:11amSanction this postReply
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This is interesting.  McCaskey got his PhD in History from Stanford in 2006.  His dissertation was on the subject of the history of induction.  I read his review of Harriman's book on Amazon.com and found it to be critical of Harriman's historical interpretations, but not of the fundamental objectivist ideas of induction and concepts. 

I've read Harriman's book several times and found it to be well worth reading.  I don't think that his interpretations of the historical developments in science are that different from mainstream history of physics.  It depends on which historians you read.

Thanks,
Glenn


Post 2

Monday, September 6, 2010 - 7:45amSanction this postReply
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I read it too, Luke.

In my view, Newton could have been imperfect and incomplete in his thinking, but still have enough grain of truth for later thinkers to refine his thoughts to the point where Harriman's theory -- a theory which I, myself, independently arrived at (1) -- still fits facts.

Ed

(1) "Phil Valid Induct Infer"
Available:  http://rebirthofreason.com/Articles/Thompson/The_Philosophic_Validation_of_Inductive_Inference.shtml

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 9/06, 7:52am)


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Post 3

Monday, September 6, 2010 - 7:46amSanction this postReply
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I am beginning to think any training program in Objectivism needs to include a course on how to handle criticism with courage and grace!

Good observation.

I am beginning to think that the academic well has been tainted in a deep and severely damaging way.

It has created armies of thin-skinned, child-like warriors, inspiring mankind to turn mostly away.

As if by design...

regards,
Fred


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Post 4

Tuesday, September 7, 2010 - 7:58amSanction this postReply
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I had a look at John McCaskey's page http://www.johnmccaskey.com/. It includes some articles/presentations on induction.
.ppsx files are created using PowerPoint 2007. I was able to open a .ppsx file with PowerPoint 2002 by downloading and installing the Microsoft Office Compatibility Pack. Instructions for doing so are here: http://www.tenthofmarch.com/2007/10/26/how-to-open-ppsx-file-in-powerpoint-2003/


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Tuesday, September 7, 2010 - 2:05pmSanction this postReply
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Thanks, Merlin,

I'm looking forward to going through some of those papers and presentations. So far, I like the guy and find what he's written to be solid and he's got a very readable style.

Post 6

Wednesday, September 8, 2010 - 3:58pmSanction this postReply
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I ordered Harriman's book and it should be here by Friday.

In the interest of a dynamic, rivalrous scramble toward truth**, I look forward to a possible 'debate-off' between the proponents of Harriman's ideas (I'll likely be in this camp) vs. the proponents of McCaskey's criticisms of Harriman's ideas.

Ed

**Controversy is usually a good thing.

Post 7

Thursday, September 9, 2010 - 8:34pmSanction this postReply
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I got my book!

For starters, I don't get McCaskey's criticism yet (I'm on p 35). Peikoff said that McCaskey "denounced" Harriman's book. I'm of the understanding that McCaskey's biggest problem was with the history of science, as told by Harriman. Yet Harriman, himself -- on p. 2! -- makes explicit this kind of a realistic and mature insight:
The balancing act that I have tried to achieve--moving back and forth between the science and the philosophy, covering the former in sufficient depth while keeping the focus on the latter--was a challenging job, and Dr. Peikioff has been a very generous editor and teacher. Of course, any errors in the science and its history are entirely my responsibility.
Now, I'm not one for making biting comments or for overstating things for the purpose of getting reactions from others, but I do have to say that careful thought on this subject has led me to the preliminary conclusion that:

1) Harriman is cool
and
2) McCaskey is quite possibly the devil incarnate (or a reasonable facsimile)

Ed

:-)


Post 8

Thursday, September 9, 2010 - 9:20pmSanction this postReply
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I haven't taken any position on McCaskey's criticisms, or on Peikoff's reactions, or on Harriman's coolness, but here is what McCaskey wrote for his personal info on his home page:

"Got BSEE, MSEE, and MBA (all in 5 years!) at Case Western Reserve University. One patent. Moved to Boston to work for a computer company. Fell in love with a woman who said “I’m moving back to California. You coming with me or not?” Joined a Silicon Valley start-up founded by John Hennessey, now Stanford’s president. Married the woman. In ’97 got MLA from Stanford. Founded a software company with Steve Blank and two other guys. Did well. Several software patents. IPO in ’99. Moved to London. Returned. Got PhD in history of science from Stanford in ’06. Visited twice at Pitt. Now research, write, and teach part-time in Stanford’s History and Philosophy of Science and Technology Program and Ethics in Society Program. Live in Saratoga, CA (part-time in Manhattan). Still in love with the same woman.
-----------

That's pretty cool!
-----------

Here is an excerpt from the abstract for one of McCaskey's papers, "Whence the Uniformity Principle":
The idea of induction, or epagoge, goes back to Aristotle—who said he got it from Socrates. Aristotle said it is a progression from particulars to a universal. But there is an ambiguity here. Did Aristotle mean progression from observation of particular things to cognition of a universal concept (as Posterior Analytics B 19, other passages, and the Socratic reference indicate) or as a progression from particular statements to a universal statement (as Prior Analytics B 23 seems to say)? Is induction fundamentally an aspect of concept-formation or fundamentally a kind of propositional inference? The first was assumed through nearly all of antiquity. But the Neoplatonic commentators introduced the second and and bequeathed the idea to both Latin and Arabic medieval traditions.

------------

Here is another abstract excerpt. “Whately’s Revolution: Attempts to Render Induction as a Syllogism”:
"What was arguably the most momentous development in the modern history of induction was announced in a footnote. In his 1826 Elements of Logic, Richard Whately said that an induction is an inference “employing a syllogism in Barbara with the major Premiss suppressed.” A footnote added, “Not the minor, as Aldrich represents it.” But it was not just Henry Aldrich, author of a popular textbook of the time, who thought an induction could be cast as a syllogism with the minor premise suppressed. The view had been canonical since late antiquity. Whately’s assertion was not a technical correction to an oversight, nor was the disagreement a Scholastic quibble. Whately was turning the very conception of induction upside down, and the implications were huge. Adoption of Whately’s view brought the uniformity principle into discussions of induction, gave John Stuart Mill the foundation for his whole inductive system, and made it possible for us to say that David Hume, though he did not use the term, was really discussing induction. Whately’s proposal for how to render an induction as a syllogism engendered a revolution in the very concept of induction and set the framework by which we understand induction today. This paper will describe the conception of induction Whately inherited, explain his alternate proposal, document its remarkably fast and unchallenged adoption, and show the pervasive implications."


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Post 9

Friday, September 10, 2010 - 5:13amSanction this postReply
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Ed,
Here's a quote from McCaskey on the page linked to at the beginning of this thread:
The historical accounts as presented are often inaccurate, and more accurate accounts would be difficult to reconcile with the philosophical point the author is claiming to make.

I think he is saying that Harriman has misinterpreted the history of science in order to support his arguments that the great scientists of the past used Harriman's (and Peikoff's) method of induction; and that if he got the history right, it wouldn't support the Objectivist view of how induction works.  I still maintain that there isn't consensus on the interpretation of this area of the history of science and that you can find authors who would agree with Harriman (just look at his references!).  But, I await any discussion that argues for the contrary.
Thanks,
Glenn
(Edited for spelling.)
(Edited by Glenn Fletcher on 9/10, 9:14am)


Post 10

Friday, September 10, 2010 - 8:00amSanction this postReply
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I had to use Google to learn more about syllogism in Barbara, a term new to me.

Given the history of Objectivism, one could have all sorts of fun with that phrase!

Glenn Fletcher wrote:

I think he is saying that Harriman has misinterpreted the history of science in order to support his arguments that the great scientists of the past used Harriman's (and Peikoff's) method of induction; and that if he got the history right, it wouldn't support the Objectivist view of how induction works.

Even if the great scientists used a more convoluted or roundabout way of making their discoveries, would it be fair to say that Harriman's approach represents an "idealized" or "distilled" approach that would empower future thinkers to avoid such wrong turns?

(Edited by Luke Setzer on 9/10, 9:41am)


Post 11

Sunday, September 12, 2010 - 12:30pmSanction this postReply
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Glenn,

I would really like to know McCaskey's specific criticisms (and how he proposes they would apply to "Objectivist induction"). Do you (or anyone) have enough specifics wherein it would be possible to formulate a syllogism based on McCaskey's reasoning -- in order to evaluate his thinking for truthfulness of premises and validity of logic inference?

Ed


Post 12

Sunday, September 12, 2010 - 12:45pmSanction this postReply
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I'm not done reading it, yet, but I'm going to make a "leap" (of faith or logic):

Page 79 is the key page in the book.

On page 79, Harriman outlines how it is that Galileo missed the mark and failed to legitimately (read: validly, perfectly) perform inductive generalization. By examining the best case which was still illegitimate (invalid, imperfect), one can see what it would take to move it into full legitimacy with reference to inductive generalizations. 

It is a method of understanding error because of its difference from truth (especially when that difference is small). On page 79 you will find that:

1) Galileo claimed that circular pendulums were isochronal for all amplitudes -- but he did so without the concepts of "infinitesimal" and "limit"

2) Galileo extended his analysis of frictionless motion to rolling balls -- but he did so without the dynamical and mathematical concepts necessary to grasp the effects of (ball) rotation

3) Galileo assumed his law of constant vertical acceleration applied even at large distances from the Earth's surface -- but he did so without the concept of "gravity"

In these 3 cases, getting the right concepts would fix things -- i.e., allow for valid inductive generalizations. Harriman goes on about how future scientists -- working with valid concepts -- eliminated Galileo's errors.

Ed


Post 13

Sunday, September 12, 2010 - 7:03pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,
All I have to go on is the Amazon.com review of Harriman's book that McCaskey wrote. And it's not very long.
Thanks,
Glenn

Post 14

Wednesday, September 15, 2010 - 6:07pmSanction this postReply
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Thanks, Glenn.

I'll review the review and a syllogism (reflecting a distillation of the "McCaskey argument") will be forthcoming ...

Ed


Post 15

Saturday, September 18, 2010 - 11:45amSanction this postReply
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Here's the first attempt at distillation of McCaskey's first criticism of Harriman.

Here's Harriman (p 43-44):

Galileo demonstrated the answer with his characteristic flair. He climbed to the top of the famous Leaning Tower and, from a height of more than fifty meters, dropped two lead balls that differed greatly in size and weight. The students and professors assembled below saw both objects hit the ground at very nearly the same time. . . .

Galileo then asked the next logical question: Does the rate of fall depend upon the material of the body? He repeated the experiment using one ball of lead and another made of oak. Again, when dropped simultaneously from a great height, they both hit the ground at very nearly the same time. Thus Galileo arrived at a very broad generalization: All free bodies, regardless of differences in weight and material, fall to Earth at the same rate. ...

... it seems too easy. It appears as though Galileo arrived at this fundamental truth . . . merely by doing a few experiments that any child could perform. ...

First, notice that the objects he dropped were not selected randomly. If Galileo had thrown a bale of hay and a straw hat ... these objects are made of similar material and have greatly different weights, just like the two lead balls he actually used. Or ... Imagine that he attempted to drop the lead and oak balls through water instead of air ... Again, the result would not have led to any important discovery. ...

He wanted to minimize the effects of friction. ... he thought deeply about air resistance and other forms of friction, and he carefully distinguished the cases in which friction plays a minor role from the many cases in which it plays an essential role.




Harriman makes a claim above that Galileo, in order to control for it, deliberately minimized air resistance or friction (by using similarly shaped objects instead of differently shaped ones, and by using a thin medium of air instead of a thick medium of water). He was aware of, and tried to minimize, friction. That is the claim that Harriman makes above (that friction will change results, and that the best experiment to uncover a law of motion is one wherein friction's effects are most accounted for via minimization).

Here's McCaskey's response:
But in the Discorsi Galileo presents the difference between dropping balls through air and dropping them through water as the very heart of his discovery. (Day One, 8:110-116). He begins by recounting a report of the tower experiment but does not consider it sufficient to establish the law. He instead explains that we must consider air as a medium and compare what happens in other mediums, such as water and mercury. He notes that heavier things (ones heavy enough not to float) do land at different times and the difference is bigger the higher the resistance of the medium. In water the difference is higher than in air; in mercury, the difference even higher. Galileo extrapolates and concludes that in a medium that offered no resistance, there would be no difference in speed of fall and all objects would hit at the same time. Galileo claimed that comparing the dropping of objects in air, in water, and in mercury is exactly what justifies his discovery, contra Harriman's claim.
And now, here is McCaskey's criticism in syllogistic form:
Harriman claimed that Galileo wasn't aware of, or at least wasn't terribly concerned with, the effects of friction/resistance.
However, Galileo claimed that dropping objects in different mediums really does matter regarding the results you find (because of the effects of friction/resistance).
________________________________________________________________________

Therefore, Harriman's claim (that Galileo didn't integrate friction into his observations), is false.




Well, the above syllogism is unsound because premise # 1 is false -- and straightforwardly so. Unless someone else can chime in here, I will go ahead and start keeping score:

Harriman: 1
McCaskey: 0

Ed

more to come ...

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 9/18, 11:03pm)


Post 16

Saturday, September 18, 2010 - 2:12pmSanction this postReply
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Here's the first attempt at distillation of McCaskey's second main criticism of Harriman.

Here's Harriman (p 78-79):
[Jean] Buridan was correct in thinking that something about a freely moving body remains the same in the absence of frictional forces, and dissipates as a result of such forces. However, because he thought that a force is necessary to cause motion, he misidentified the nature of the conserved property [e.g., the nature of conservation of momentum; i.e., the concept of inertia]. He proposed an intrinsic attribute of the body that supplies the internal force propelling it and he called that attribute "impetus." Since there is no such attribute, all generalizations referring to it are false. Yet physicists found that the facts regarding motion could not be integrated without some such idea, and therefore "impetus" eventually had to be reformed and replaced rather than simply rejected outright. After Galileo identified and eliminated the underlying false premise, it was Newton who finally grasped the concept of "momentum" that had been out of Buridan's reach.
Harriman makes a claim above that Newton, in order to arrive at his laws of inertia [i.e., laws incorporating momentum (mass x velocity), and its default, or "natural", conservation (inertia)], had to first identify the nature of the conservation of momentum (the "conserved property" quoted above). As momentum is a product of mass and velocity, it is an identification of the nature of the conservation of the product (mass x velocity) which goes beyond, for instance, Buridan's understanding of the matter. In Buridan's understanding, the 'mass-velocity product' (the momentum) was thought to be conserved by a continuing internal force (the "impetus") propelling an object already in motion -- with no explanation of why the force remains the same or of why/how it can affect other objects, such as billiard balls do.

With Newton's newer, better understanding -- that objects have stable mass (conservation of matter) and that it is a property of mass to resist changes in the velocity (and to cause changes in other objects, such as billiard balls) -- a green light occured allowing Newton to formulate laws of inertia (laws simultaneously incorporating mass, veloctity, acceleration, and external forces). That is Harriman's claim above, that Buridan was stuck because he didn't have the concept "mass" -- which means he couldn't conceptualize momentum properly, or its conservation (inertia). Newton needed to understand "mass" (better than did Buridan) in order to formulate his laws of inertia. That is the claim.

Here's McCaskey:
At first, Newton accepted the concept of impetus and rejected the concept of inertia advanced by Descartes and others. Newton's first derivation of the v-squared-over-r law presumed impetus. Newton soon, however, changed his mind and adopted Descartes' proposal. But then just as quickly he swung back again. He remained committed to impetus for the next twenty years. When he then began work on what would become the Principia, he struggled to reconcile the two concepts, recognizing that each (the way then conceived) had problems. He finally settled on a hybrid, what he called the force of inertia. This force was, for him, one kind of force, another being impressed force. The force of inertia was what keeps a moving body moving and a resting body resting. The concept was a not a rejection of impetus but a combination of impetus with resistance.

But, after Newton died, the utter strangeness of this force of inertia became increasingly apparent. It was that by which a moving body kept moving, but a body not moving had the same amount of this force as it had when it was moving. It took a few generations, but eventually Newton's concept of the "force of inertia," this strange combination of impetus and resistance, got replaced by the modern concept of inertia. Though it was not such in Newton's mechanics, the modern concept is a fundamental one in what we now call Newtonian mechanics. Newton scholars have generally concluded that the replacement of the concept of impetus by the modern concept of inertia was not an event that made Newtonian mechanics possible. Instead, the replacement was a slow process whose completion marked the end, not the beginning, of the formation of Newtonian mechanics.


And now, here is McCaskey's criticism, distilled down into 2 syllogisms:
 Harriman claims that Newton needed a superior understanding of momentum (mass x velocity) in order to discover/formulate his laws.
Momentum is "mass x velocity", and Buridan understood "velocity" (leaving "mass" misunderstood).
______________________________________________________

Therefore, Harriman claims that Newton needed a superior concept of "mass" than Buridan (in order to discover/formulate his laws).





Harriman claims that Newton needed a superior concept of "mass" than Buridan (in order to discover/formulate his laws).
But Newton believed in Buridan's original concept of an "internally-propelling" impetus (which dissipates as a result of frictional forces).
__________________________________________________________

Therefore, Newton -- when formulating his laws (which make use of a refined concept of "mass") -- didn't have a superior understanding of "mass" than did Buridan



The trouble with the syllogism above is that the conclusion is self-refuting. How can you incorporate a refined concept of "mass" while being totally unaware of the refinement -- intelligent use of something being the most immediate proof that you understand it? The error in McCaskey's distilled thought stems from premise # 2, which is taken to be proof that Newton didn't understand "mass" better than Buridan. It is plain fact that Newton understood "mass" better than Buridan. Newton's laws are the proof of that. The whole argument is a non-sequitor.

Harriman: 2
McCaskey: 0

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 9/18, 2:19pm)


Post 17

Sunday, September 19, 2010 - 6:17amSanction this postReply
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Ed, I don't agree with your syllogism in post 15. You first premise is incorrect and doesn't recognize what McCaskey said after the part you quoted:

Moreover, the air resistance Galileo speaks of is not the same as friction (though Harriman treats it that way). Instead, at least in this point of Galileo's argument, Galilean resistance is Archimedean buoyancy.
I don't agree with your syllogisms in post 16 either. As I see it, McCaskey's main point is that Harriman's narrative about Newton is too simple. McCaskey's narrative has Newton grappling with the concept of inertia, including Descartes' concept of inertia; Harriman's does not. His narrative includes "impressed force"; Harriman's does not. It seems to me that "a body not moving had the same amount of this force as it had when it was moving" in McCaskey's narrative is about the distinction between inertia and acceleration (although McCaskey doesn't use the latter word). Harriman's account does not mention "impressed force." On the other hand, Harriman's account on page 78 includes the distinction between "natural" and "violent" motion. McCaskey's does not, although the quantitative difference between them may be "impressed force" or "acceleration."

So I don't agree with your scoring either.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 9/19, 6:18am)


Post 18

Sunday, September 19, 2010 - 12:35pmSanction this postReply
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Merlin,

Can you offer better syllogisms? At this point, here is what I glean from your post:

Even though Harriman really did write about how Galileo understood resistance enough to formulate a useful experiment and preliminary conclusion ...

Because Harriman didn't include all nonessential details to this argument ...
_____________________________

Harriman still got something "wrong" -- and, therefore, it's not a big deal that McCaskey's main point (about Harriman supposedly glossing over Galileo's integration of 'resistance') is totally false.
... and ...

Harriman's narrative is too simple.
It doesn't go on and on about the back-and-forth that Galileo went through in his writings. Impetus first, then inertia, then back to impetus for 20 years.
_____________________________________________

Therefore, because Harriman's account isn't as detailed as a text devoted solely to the historical study of Newton -- even if the differences don't, actually, matter (because of not being essential to the argument) -- then Harriman is "wrong."
This distinction-without-important-difference point is even made by McCaskey, himself, when he admits that "Newton scholars have generally concluded that the replacement of the concept of impetus by the modern concept of inertia was not an event that made Newtonian mechanics possible. Instead, the replacement was a slow process whose completion marked the end, not the beginning, of the formation of Newtonian mechanics."

Another way to say this is that Newton's concepts were fine enough to formulate his laws. According to Newton scholars, a modern concept of inertia was not needed to get Netwon's enterprise up and running, so that quibbling about how he felt about inertial is a Red Herring non-sequitor.

Ed


Post 19

Monday, September 20, 2010 - 7:31amSanction this postReply
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Ed,
In the first criticism of Harriman by McCaskey that you discuss, I think that McCaskey misunderstood Harriman's argument.  Harriman was not saying that Galileo wasn't aware of friction.  He was saying that in the particular part of Galileo's investigation, where he wanted to show that similar size objects of different materials (and therefore different weights) had the same acceleration due to gravity, if Galileo had dropped them in water instead of air, he wouldn't have got the desired result.  But, Galileo was aware of friction (both fluid resistance and buoyancy), and he knew he had to drop them in a less dense fluid: air.

The second criticism of Harriman that you mention is more legitimate.  A major point of Harriman's book (due to Peikoff, originally) is that a valid concept is a "green light for induction".  That means that an invalid concept is a red light.  McCaskey is claiming that even though Newton used the concept of impetus (an invalid concept), he was able to create his mechanics.  So, I think he's saying that this is a counter-example to the idea that you must use valid concepts to make advances in physics.

Thanks,
Glenn


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