The idea of induction, or epagoge, goes back to Aristotle—who said he got it from Socrates. Aristotle said it is a progression from particulars to a universal. But there is an ambiguity here. Did Aristotle mean progression from observation of particular things to cognition of a universal concept (as Posterior Analytics B 19, other passages, and the Socratic reference indicate) or as a progression from particular statements to a universal statement (as Prior Analytics B 23 seems to say)? Is induction fundamentally an aspect of concept-formation or fundamentally a kind of propositional inference? The first was assumed through nearly all of antiquity. But the Neoplatonic commentators introduced the second and and bequeathed the idea to both Latin and Arabic medieval traditions.

"What was arguably the most momentous development in the modern history of induction was announced in a footnote. In his 1826 Elements of Logic, Richard Whately said that an induction is an inference “employing a syllogism in Barbara with the major Premiss suppressed.” A footnote added, “Not the minor, as Aldrich represents it.” But it was not just Henry Aldrich, author of a popular textbook of the time, who thought an induction could be cast as a syllogism with the minor premise suppressed. The view had been canonical since late antiquity. Whately’s assertion was not a technical correction to an oversight, nor was the disagreement a Scholastic quibble. Whately was turning the very conception of induction upside down, and the implications were huge. Adoption of Whately’s view brought the uniformity principle into discussions of induction, gave John Stuart Mill the foundation for his whole inductive system, and made it possible for us to say that David Hume, though he did not use the term, was really discussing induction. Whately’s proposal for how to render an induction as a syllogism engendered a revolution in the very concept of induction and set the framework by which we understand induction today. This paper will describe the conception of induction Whately inherited, explain his alternate proposal, document its remarkably fast and unchallenged adoption, and show the pervasive implications."

[Jean] Buridan was correct in thinking that something about a freely moving body remains the same in the absence of frictional forces, and dissipates as a result of such forces. However, because he thought that a force is necessary to cause motion, he misidentified the nature of the conserved property [e.g., the nature of conservation of momentum; i.e., the concept of inertia]. He proposed an intrinsic attribute of the body that supplies the internal force propelling it and he called that attribute "impetus." Since there is no such attribute, all generalizations referring to it are false. Yet physicists found that the facts regarding motion could not be integrated without some such idea, and therefore "impetus" eventually had to be reformed and replaced rather than simply rejected outright. After Galileo identified and eliminated the underlying false premise, it was Newton who finally grasped the concept of "momentum" that had been out of Buridan's reach.

At first, Newton accepted the concept of impetus and rejected the concept of inertia advanced by Descartes and others. Newton's first derivation of the v-squared-over-r law presumed impetus. Newton soon, however, changed his mind and adopted Descartes' proposal. But then just as quickly he swung back again. He remained committed to impetus for the next twenty years. When he then began work on what would become the Principia, he struggled to reconcile the two concepts, recognizing that each (the way then conceived) had problems. He finally settled on a hybrid, what he called the force of inertia. This force was, for him, one kind of force, another being impressed force. The force of inertia was what keeps a moving body moving and a resting body resting. The concept was a not a rejection of impetus but a combination of impetus with resistance.

But, after Newton died, the utter strangeness of this force of inertia became increasingly apparent. It was that by which a moving body kept moving, but a body not moving had the same amount of this force as it had when it was moving. It took a few generations, but eventually Newton's concept of the "force of inertia," this strange combination of impetus and resistance, got replaced by the modern concept of inertia. Though it was not such in Newton's mechanics, the modern concept is a fundamental one in what we now call Newtonian mechanics. Newton scholars have generally concluded that the replacement of the concept of impetus by the modern concept of inertia was not an event that made Newtonian mechanics possible. Instead, the replacement was a slow process whose completion marked the end, not the beginning, of the formation of Newtonian mechanics.

 Harriman claims that Newton needed a superior understanding of momentum (mass x velocity) in order to discover/formulate his laws.
Momentum is "mass x velocity", and Buridan understood "velocity" (leaving "mass" misunderstood).
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Therefore, Harriman claims that Newton needed a superior concept of "mass" than Buridan (in order to discover/formulate his laws).

Harriman claims that Newton needed a superior concept of "mass" than Buridan (in order to discover/formulate his laws).
But Newton believed in Buridan's original concept of an "internally-propelling" impetus (which dissipates as a result of frictional forces).
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Therefore, Newton -- when formulating his laws (which make use of a refined concept of "mass") -- didn't have a superior understanding of "mass" than did Buridan

Even though Harriman really did write about how Galileo understood resistance enough to formulate a useful experiment and preliminary conclusion ...

Because Harriman didn't include all nonessential details to this argument ...
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Harriman still got something "wrong" -- and, therefore, it's not a big deal that McCaskey's main point (about Harriman supposedly glossing over Galileo's integration of 'resistance') is totally false.

Harriman's narrative is too simple.
It doesn't go on and on about the back-and-forth that Galileo went through in his writings. Impetus first, then inertia, then back to impetus for 20 years.
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Therefore, because Harriman's account isn't as detailed as a text devoted solely to the historical study of Newton -- even if the differences don't, actually, matter (because of not being essential to the argument) -- then Harriman is "wrong."