| | I agree, Ed. Tracinski is ignoring the more important point that philosophy proper (not philosophers) should prescribe the epistemological standards governing the other sciences. He writes, "Reluctantly, I have concluded that the error does go back to Ayn Rand, particularly this analogy from her essay 'For the New Intellectual'":
The professional intellectual is the field agent of the army whose commander-in-chief is the philosopher. The intellectual carries the application of philosophical principles to every field of human endeavor. He sets a society's course by transmitting ideas from the "ivory tower" of the philosopher to the university professor—to the writer—to the artist—to the newspaperman—to the politician—to the movie maker—to the night-club singer—to the man in the street. The intellectual's specific professions are in the field of the sciences that study man, the so-called "humanities," but for that very reason his influence extends to all other professions. Those who deal with the sciences studying nature have to rely on the intellectual for philosophical guidance and information: for moral values, for social theories, for political premises, for psychological tenets and, above all, for the principles of epistemology, that crucial branch of philosophy which studies man's means of knowledge and makes all other sciences possible.
Tracinski then states: Substantively, the wrong premise here—which is expanded upon in the rest of her essay—is Ayn Rand's idea of the division of labor between the intellectual and his audience. Yes, there is such a division of labor, and there are incalculable benefits that come from making it possible for some men to devote their full-time effort to the study and transmission of ideas. But this is one case where the division of labor has limits: a man's thinking about the most important issues of life cannot be outsourced to others or handed down to him on some transmission belt from the ivory tower. Ayn Rand is not saying that people should accept a philosopher's ideas on faith, as though he or she were a philosophical authority figure. She is saying simply that it is the philosopher's role to investigate the science of fundamental standards and values and to advise others of his or her conclusions; but that others, in consulting the philosopher for guidance, should take care always to use their own judgment in evaluating those conclusions. In particular, in the current context, I would note that a scientist has to be an expert in epistemology in his own right—and historically, the scientists have been much better epistemologists than the philosophers. In my view, we would be much better off if the scientists did not rely on the philosophers for their ideas on epistemology, but rather if the philosophers relied on the scientists. They could make a good start by studying Galileo and Newton. He's missing the point. To be precise, philosophy is itself a science -- the broadest and most fundamental of all the sciences. Secondly, Insofar as physical scientists have adopted certain epistemological standards that happen to be superior to those of certain philosophers, the scientists are acting in a philosophical capacity; they are donning their philosophical hat, so to speak, and are functioning as physical scientists qua philosophers. But epistemology is not the fundamental province of the physical sciences; it is the province of philosophy proper. Stylistically, the problem with this passage is the comparison of the philosopher to a general giving orders to his troops. You can see the potential for mischief, and I think we can now understand how Ayn Rand's successors believe that when they announce a philosophical conclusion, other intellectuals are supposed to salute smartly and stick to their marching orders. Again, he's reading too much into her writing and is ignoring everything else she has said. Rand would be the last person to present herself as a some kind of ideological general whose job it is to give philosophical marching orders to her "troops." Tracinski's construction of Rand's writing is at odds with everything else she has said about the importance of relying on one's own judgment and not accepting anything on faith. It also ignores her article, published in the February 1965 issue of The Objectivist Newsletter, "Who is the final authority in ethics?" In that article, Rand writes,
[T[his question "is usually asked in some formulation such as: 'Who decides what is right or wrong?' . . . The answer, here as in all other moral-intellectual problems, is that nobody 'decides'." Reason and reality are the only criteria . . . Who determines which theory is true? Any man who can prove it." . . . In politics, in ethics, in art, in science, in philosophy -- in the entire realm of human knowledge -- it is reality that sets the terms, through the work of those men who are able to identify its terms and to translate them into objective principles.
(Edited by William Dwyer on 10/06, 9:07pm)
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