Teleology and Value

I have had some questions regarding teleology lately, so I decided to post them here in hopes of clarification. Generally speaking, there are two theories of teleology--the propensity account of function and the etiolotical account of function. On the propensity account, the function F of valuation V for organism O is the goal V currently serves in the life cycle of O. The function of the peacock’s display of plumage is the goal it currently serves in the peacock’s life cycle (i.e. sexual attraction). On the etiological account, the function F of valuation V for organism O is the goal V was selected for in the life cycle of O’s evolutionary ancestors. For instance, the function of a heart’s activity within a human is the goal the activity was selected for in our ancestors (i.e. the satisfaction of cellular needs).

In non-human life, these accounts tend to converge because these organisms are currently acting for survival and reproduction and their natural capacities were selected for the sake of survival and reproduction—e.g. a peacock’s plumage was selected for promoting sexual fitness and still serves that purpose because a peacock is also currently acting for sexual fitness.

Which account of teleology does Objectivism employ to make its claims about the nature of value? LP writes, “Remaining alive is the goal of all values.” We can reformulate this as “The function F of valuation V for any organism O is survival.” Which account of teleology are we using here? On the propensity account, LP’s statement is false in the case of humans—clearly not all acts of human valuation are directed at survival (if they were, there would be no need for moral guidance.” On the etiological account, LP’s statement also seems false—not all of our capacities were selected for the sake of survival; many were selected for the sake of genetic fitness. So I think an Objectivist would respond by saying that the particular ends that we were adapted to promote are not relevant—it is the concept of life that generates the concept of value, as Rand writes. Yet if we sever the concept “value” from particular instances of valuation, how can we make sense of the claim that life is not merely a necessary precondition of valuation, but that sustaining life is the goal or function of valuation as such?

Post 1

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 8:12am

Hi Ryan,

Here's my understanding of this topic. A heart and plumage cannot be 'valuated' outside the context of life. We might attribute their existence to the fact that they have helped survival or reproduction, but in isolation, they are void of (teleological) purpose.

It doesn't so much matter what they were selected for -- that is, the process or set of circumstances that precipitated their existence. They can be still measured good or bad only with reference to life. Why? We could measure the heart or plumage with the standard as reproduction, and here we could say whether they are good by whether they increase reproductive success. But this valuation doesn't make sense in terms of teleological ethics because 'reproduction' is not an agent, not a valuer. Only life is. And because life is the only valuer, then all things are to be valuated with reference to it. Like Protagoras said, "Man is the measure of all things."

I hope this helped some. I feel I've either misaddressed your inquiry, and/or I've given you an incomplete response. Let me know which is the case.

Jordan

Post 2

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 12:04pm

Hi Jordan,

You wrote:

We could measure the heart or plumage with the standard as reproduction, and here we could say whether they are good by whether they increase reproductive success. But this valuation doesn't make sense in terms of teleological ethics because 'reproduction' is not an agent, not a valuer. Only life is.

So I think you are saying something along these lines: Being a thing that can reproduce does not make that thing a "valuer"--only being a living thing makes something a valuer. I agree with that--a neutered dog cannot reproduce but is certainly a valuer. In contrast, once the dog dies, it ceases to be a valuer. Yet this seems to be saying only that being alive is a necessary and sufficient precondition for something being a valuer. But how do we move from "Life is the necessary and sufficient precondition for valuation" to "Life is the goal of valuation"?

Post 3

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 3:46pm

Ryan,

Yeah you got what I was trying to say.

But how do we move from "Life is the necessary and sufficient precondition for valuation" to "Life is the goal of valuation"?

That's a good question, and scholars offer several different answers, which Chris Sciabarra discusses on pgs 240-243 of his Ayn Rand: The Russian radical. I think the stronger argument tends to be reductio ad absurdum. It runs like this: (1) A rational ethics is a consistent one. (2) We have two fundamental, mutually exclusive, and jointly exhaustive options available to us -- live or die. (3) We cannot at the same time choose death and other values because (a) death negates the possibility of all other values because (b) values can exist only in the context of life. So (4) if one is to have a rational ethics, then one should ultimately choose life.

I think I also read from Sciabarra the idea that life -- as a necessary and ever-present means for values and valuation -- bleeds into every end. In this sense it is ultimate. (Thinking aloud: This sort of reminds me of the Thomists' First Cause argument, which discusses God as the primary and underlying cause of all things. Now don't get me wrong. I'm atheist. I just see a parallel.)

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 12/29, 6:20pm)

Post 4

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 5:01pm

Jordan,

You wrote:

(1) A rational ethics is a consistent one. (2) We have two fundamental, mutually exclusive, and jointly exhaustive options available to us -- live or die. (3) We cannot at the same time choose death and other values because (a) death negates the possibility of all other values because (b) values can exist only in the context of life. So (4) if one is to have a rational ethics, then one should ultimately choose life.

Yet what about a response like this: "I concede that life versus death is the fundamental alternative in the sense that the choice to live is what enables me to be a valuer, that is, choosing to live allows me to pursue any end regardless of what they might be. However, I will choose to value life as a means to playing poker. I will work to preserve myself, not as an ultimate end, but as a means to playing poker. I recognize that life is the necessary and sufficient precondition for valuation--in your words, death negates the possibility of all other values because values exist only in the context of life--so I will choose to exist in the realm of life, but only because doing so allows me to play poker."

Post 5

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 6:20pm

Hi Ryan,

I think that according to O'ism every goal/value is either pro-life or pro-death. In every choice we make, we're either choosing a little life or a little death. So if we choose to live in order to pursue a pro-death goal/value, then we're actually choosing to live while at the same time choosing to die -- a contradiction.

I think non-O'ist formulations of how life relates to valuation are easier to swallow, but discussing them would bring us too far afield.

I recommend that excerpt from Sciabarra for more info on this topic.

Jordan

Post 6

Wednesday, December 29, 2004 - 9:02pm

Hi Jordan,

Thanks for your response. Just let me know if I am belaboring this point and you want to drop it, but here is my initial reaction. You wrote:

I think that according to O'ism every goal/value is either pro-life or pro-death. In every choice we make, we're either choosing a little life or a little death. So if we choose to live in order to pursue a pro-death goal/value, then we're actually choosing to live while at the same time choosing to die -- a contradiction.

But suppose my hypothetical poker player responds, "Since I hold playing poker as my ultimate goal, my choosing an action that lessens my survival prospects but enhances my poker prospects is not a contradiction. Vision, we might say, is a necessary precondition for playing poker and therefore I value it. But if playing poker all day damages my vision, so be it--I only value vision insofar as it enables me to play poker. If there is the choice between improving my vision and playing poker, I will always choose poker. I will maintain my vision only to the minimum extent required for poker. In your terms, every goal/value is either pro-vision or anti-vision. In every choice we make, we're either choosing a little pro-vision or a little anti-vision (i.e. actions that somehow lessen one's ability or chances to play poker). But once pursuing a pro-vision course of action is antithetical to pursuing poker playing, I abandon the pro-vision course because vision is only a means to my end of playing poker.

Valuing pro-death actions is a contradiction only if life is my ultimate goal--but that is precisely the point at issue. If I choose poker as my ultimate end, it is perfectly acceptable to pursue anti-life ends (although I must maintain some minimal level of life, as it is required to play poker) if they promote my poker playing, just as it is not contradictory to damage my vision (although I must maintain some minimal level of vision, as it is required to play poker) if doing so increases my poker playing.

Post 7

Thursday, December 30, 2004 - 3:24pm

Hi Ryan,

I think you're right to belabor the point. To be sure, the O'ist views that I know on this topic don't really work for me. Still, I'm trying to cast them in the best light possible.

*

The choice between pro-vision and anti-vision is not fundamental, neither is pro-poker or anti-poker. The only fundamental choice is between life and death. And that choice permeates all others. Perhaps it would make more sense here to treat the ultimate choice as meaning fundamental rather than final. An ultimate end is not one to which all others lead (and I'm contradicting Rand here), but rather a quality that must be sought first and always before others, if others are to be sought at all or with any measure of success.

If we undermine a necessary and omnipresent means (life), we screw over every other value/end. So we ultimately -- that is, first and always -- should secure such a means, or else we jeopardize all others. By viewing an ultimate end in this manner, we're viewing life as both means and an end. It's a means because it makes all other values possible. It's an end because we must achieve it first and always before achieving any others.

*

To address a small point in your example, if the agent values playing poker more greatly than vision, then pursuing poker at vision's expense wouldn't be a contradiction; it'd be a trade-off, a gain, not a sacrifice.

Jordan

Post 8

Tuesday, January 4, 2005 - 1:33pm

Hi Jordan,

You wrote:

The choice between pro-vision and anti-vision is not fundamental, neither is pro-poker or anti-poker. The only fundamental choice is between life and death. And that choice permeates all others. Perhaps it would make more sense here to treat the ultimate choice as meaning fundamental rather than final. An ultimate end is not one to which all others lead (and I'm contradicting Rand here), but rather a quality that must be sought first and always before others, if others are to be sought at all or with any measure of success.

If we undermine a necessary and omnipresent means (life), we screw over every other value/end. So we ultimately -- that is, first and always -- should secure such a means, or else we jeopardize all others. By viewing an ultimate end in this manner, we're viewing life as both means and an end. It's a means because it makes all other values possible. It's an end because we must achieve it first and always before achieving any others.

Hmm, if we abandon the view that life is an ultimate end in the sense of the end toward which all subsidiary ends lead, then what is left of Rand's metaethics? Life is the standard of value because it is the ultimate end on the Randian view. I think we can characterize life as a universal means to any value, but this is merely to restate that life is the necessary and sufficient condition of valuation. There is a difference between holding life as a value and thus maintaining it at some minimal level so that I can play poker and holding life as the summum bonnum and structuring all of your endeavors to sustain and advance your life. Surely a rational valuer must hold life as an end, almost any philosopher would agree, but the radical claim of Rand's metaethics is that a rational valuer must hold life as the ultimate end. Here is another analogy, let me know what you think.

Anatomists discover that across all animals, a certain composition of skin tissues (call it XYZ) gives rise to the existence of taste buds. They conclude that XYZ always gives rise to taste buds and only XYZ can give rise to taste buds. We can say that embodying the property XYZ is the necessary and sufficient condition for tasting. Therefore, for anyone who wants to engage in tasting, they ought to maintain XYZ. But we are not justified in concluding that the ultimate goal of tasting is to maintain XYZ. It seems like the formal structure of this argument and Rand's are the same. I'll schematize:

(1) Skin tissue composition XYZ necessarily gives rise to taste buds (and thus tasting).
(2) Only skin tissue composition XYZ gives rise to tasting.
Sub-conclusion A: Possessing skin tissue composition XYZ is the necessary and sufficient condition for tasting.

(1) If some condition is the one necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of some activity, then that condition must obtain for that activity to exist.
(2) Possessing skin tissue composition XYZ is the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of tasting (from sub-conclusion A)
Sub-conclusion B: Skin tissue composition XYZ must obtain for an organism for tasting to exist for that organism.

(1)If some condition must obtain for the existence of an activity, then an agent seeking to engage in that activity ought to obtain that condition.
(2) Skin tissue composition XYZ must obtain for an organism for tasting to exist for that organism (from sub-conclusion B)
Conclusion C: An agent seeking to engage in tasting ought to obtain (that is, achieve or maintain) skin tissue composition XYZ.

I think you schematize the Randian metaethical argument by simply substituting "life" for "skin tissue composition XYZ" and "valuing" for "tasting."

My question is how do we move from conclusion C, which states only that an organism ought to maintain skin tissue composition XYZ, to the conclusion that all of an organism's actions ought to be directed at maintaing skin tissue composition XYZ?

To clarify, the analogy isn't perfect in that skin tissue composition XYZ probably doesn't admit of degrees of success in the way that life does. So just assume that there is some minimal level of XYZ that still gives rise to tasting (and doesn't affect the quality of the tasting) even though one could perhaps still pursue some greater level of XYZ. And not to go too far afield, because this is a problem with the analogy and not my formal argument I think, I think I'm okay to assume that a lower level of XYZ wouldn't affect tasting because in my original example of poker, we can assume that you can be a great poker without being an Objectivist (i.e. devote all of your efforts to maintaining your life)--only some minimal level of life is required for playing poker.

Post 9

Wednesday, January 5, 2005 - 6:45am

Hacking,

I know what you're trying to say. This is a serious sticking point for students and scholars.

But let me give you yet another approach. I think Rand thought that if we consistently pursued and achieved life, then happiness would necessarily follow. So we could start from a hypothetical imperative: if we want to be happy, then we should pursue and achieve life. (I think she took for granted that people wanted happiness.)

She also thought that full happiness was necessarily impossible if one did not consistently pursue and achieve life. To Rand, happiness is a state of non-contradictory joy. If we choose a pro-death value and a pro-life value, then we're choosing contradictory values and hence cannot be fully happy. (She also took for granted that people wanted full happiness over fragmented or partial happiness.) So if we're not always and primarily pursuing life, then we are being inconsistent and cannot achieve full happiness. Here, the ultimate value is the only value that can necessitate full happiness.

I think that might be the best I can do.

You might be interested to know that other students of O'ism construe the relationship between life and happiness altogether differently. Check out Ari Armstrong's The (Five) Objectivist Ethics: http://www.freecolorado.com/ari/iphil/5oethics.html

Jordan

Post 10

Saturday, January 15, 2005 - 8:41pm

There's a difference between Life as the standard of value and Survival as the standard of value. It is survival that makes all values possible, but Life for an amoeba and Life for a dog and Life for a human are all very different things. Now Life for a human is vast and largely undefined, but I suggest that the answer to the poker player's dilema is that playing poker is a part of his Life. This leads to the question, why does he want to play poker? Perhaps he has visions of making lots of money, buying that new car and that expensive house, being able to life his Life more fully without laboring from 8:00am to 6:00pm every day, having money for his kids college educations, etc. Isn't playing poker a part of living Life as a human?

But the question as I see it is this: is human activity which isn't related to Life in any measurable sense, permissible under an Objectivist ethics? If a person dedicated his life to snow skiing, day after day, over and over, while holding a job simply so he could survive and ski, then would this be permissible activity under Objectivist ethics? The person would essentially be turning recreation, (which for the sake of argument, is a necessary activity for a long and healthy life), into an obsession. Rand argued that having a productive career was an essential aspect of living an Objective life. It seems to me that this sort of behavior, living for the sake of skiing, which is not related in any way to living a long-term, conceptual, human, life, is just hedonistic and outside of the requirement for Life as a human.

The idea is that humans should be that which human nature requires. Survival is the necessary precondition for Life, but Life as Man qua Man is the standard for his ethical system.

Craig

(Edited by SnowDog on 1/15, 8:53pm)

Post 11

Saturday, January 15, 2005 - 8:53pm

Craig,

You wrote:

Survival is the necessary precondition for Life, but Life as Man qua Man is the standard for his ethical system.

But how do we move from "survival is the necessary precondition for value" to "life as man qua man is the standard for his values"? I imagine the response is along the lines of what you wrote--that survival for a human being is a vast and complex affair. However, the poker player can concede that. He works for the things that human life (in all of its vastness and complexity) requires, but only as a means to playing poker. So my question is, how can he be accused of irrationality? He understands that survival is a precondition for valuation, so he secures survival so that he can value. However, given that he has secured survival, how is he irrational in devoting this valuation to poker playing?

Post 12

Saturday, January 15, 2005 - 9:25pm

He works for the things that human life (in all of its vastness and complexity) requires, but only as a means to playing poker. So my question is, how can he be accused of irrationality? He understands that survival is a precondition for valuation, so he secures survival so that he can value. However, given that he has secured survival, how is he irrational in devoting this valuation to poker playing?

As I understand the question, can one value an activity which is completely independent of his need to survive *as a human*? Isn't this the same thing as asking, can one engage in any activity one chooses, even if one has no reason whatsoever for engaging in the activity? Can desire, itself, without reason, be a justifiable motivation for action? Should we act without reason?

I think the answer is no. The poker player is irrational because he is not pursuing the Life of a human. His survival might be secure, but survival is not the standard of value -- his life as a conceptual human being is this standard, and playing poker for the sake of playing poker is not an activity in pursuit of this standard. Hence he is irrational and hedonistic.

In real life, can you imagine such a person? I'm not talking about some poker player who makes a career out of playing poker, and thereby supports his life through this means, but rather I'm talking about someone who lives his life to play poker, without winning, day after day, holding a job simply to play poker. Don't we call people like this, "obsessive gamblers"? Take any activity -- back to skiing -- isn't this obsessive, compulsive, behavior, and don't we consider it a type of mental illness?

Now the question begs, what is the Life of a Human? How do we know it when we see it? For if the activity lies within which nature requires of the human animal, then our activities fulfill our destiny, make us human, and are rational. But how do we delineate the hedonistic activity from the rational activity? I don't know.

Craig

Post 13

Saturday, January 15, 2005 - 9:55pm

But how do we move from "survival is the necessary precondition for value" to "life as man qua man is the standard for his values"?

I find this to be an interesting question. Survival is a necessary precondition for value, but it's not the only precondition for value, is it? The amoeba is alive but his actions are automatic. He doesn't have values. Even the dog seems to act for the moment, on information from his physiology. He doesn't value, does he? He gets hungry -- he eats. He gets tired -- he sleeps. Doesn't valuation require the life of a conceptual, volitional, living entity, such as a human being? Doesn't it require a view of the future?

So can't we get from 'survival is the necessary precondition for value' to 'life as man qua man is the standard for his value', by keeping the context that 'life as man qua man is the precondition for value' AND 'life as man qua man is the standard for his value'. Isn't it the same thing? We value that which we are, because we are, and wish to live life as we are -- as our nature requires?

Craig

Post 14

Sunday, January 16, 2005 - 2:09pm

Hi Craig,

Thanks for your input. Not to be a jerk and belabor the point, but what about this:

Survival is a necessary precondition for value, but it's not the only precondition for value, is it? The amoeba is alive but his actions are automatic. He doesn't have values. Even the dog seems to act for the moment, on information from his physiology. He doesn't value, does he? He gets hungry -- he eats. He gets tired -- he sleeps. Doesn't valuation require the life of a conceptual, volitional, living entity, such as a human being? Doesn't it require a view of the future?

So can't we get from 'survival is the necessary precondition for value' to 'life as man qua man is the standard for his value', by keeping the context that 'life as man qua man is the precondition for value' AND 'life as man qua man is the standard for his value'. Isn't it the same thing? We value that which we are, because we are, and wish to live life as we are -- as our nature requires?

I think that Rand, Peikoff, et al want to say that life, for any organism (conceptual or otherwise) is its ultimate value. In OPAR, Peikoff writes that "Remaining alive is the goal of all values"--for all organisms. Because value, for Rand, means simply that which one acts to gain and/or keep, and non-conceptual organisms act to gain and/or keep things. So I think that Rand would say that only survival is the precondition for valuation, otherwise she would be commmited to the idea that only people who lived life as man qua man actually value, which would mean that people who live rationally value, and I don't think she wants to say that. And surely the poker player is living life as man qua man--he uses his conceptual faculty to play poker, he eats food rather than attempting to get energy from the sun via photosynthesis, etc.

Post 15

Monday, January 17, 2005 - 1:49am

But how do we move from "survival is the necessary precondition for value" to "life as man qua man is the standard for his values"?

Thank you for belaboring the point. Though I don't know if I can add any new information to the subject, I am fascinated with this question and appreciate the significance of it.

We can use any definition for a word that we choose, as long as we use it consistently. So I'll keep the definition that Rand gave us for value as 'that which one acts to gain and/or keep'. What I didn't realize was that volition is removed from this definition. Without volition, value is then ANYTHING that a living organism would act to gain and/or keep. So a plant values sunlight; and an amoeba values -- whatever an amoeba values. The only thing required for value is a living organism and an action from it, and we then have a value. [The dog walking across the street values something on the other side, (at least temporarily), or he wouldn't walk across the street? Can we say this?]

So Life requires value and then we ask ourselves what things should a human value to maintain HIS Life. Since there's no information in the definition of value that can help us answer this question, we can't find this answer through deduction. But we can observe that different types of life require different types of values. The dolphin might value the open sea as its home, but humans can't do that, and likewise can't place the same value on it. Birds fly. Fish swim. Every living thing requires values unique to its life form. Here's where I think I disagree with you: It is not just 'survival' that is the necessary precondition for value. It is life as a specific entity. While we can say that in order to value 'anything', one must be alive. It is one's specific Life that requires specific values and the values that it should seek are the values conducive to its specific form of Life. Just because something is alive doesn't mean that it shares the values of all other living things.

So to answer the question, "What is the standard of value for Life as Man qua Man?", we have to look at the nature of man as a human being, to answer that question. But this is as far as I can go with the argument because I don't know all of the types of values humans require to live life as humans. We can generalize in a lot of ways through observation, and by looking around we can see that humans need food, water, shelter, and clothing. They need companionship and love. They need 'reason', 'purpose', and 'self-esteem'. But to be more specific, is to move into the uncertain, because the life of Man qua Man is too complex. Your hypothetical poker player may be doing no wrong, but if he is playing poker at the expense of his long-term survival, then the value he places on playing poker may be incorrect since such a value is not required for his life as Man qua Man. Only he can answer that, but Reason is man's primary tool of survival, and if he is acting to play poker without reason -- not in any way which would support his long-term life -- then his action becomes questionable and may be arbitrary and destructive. Again, we see this sort of thing in real life: people addicted to certain types of behavior for which, when they are finally freed of these addictions, are very grateful in the long run. I used to smoke cigarettes. It took me fifteen years to quit, and I am now EXTREMELY glad to be free of them.

Volition is the key to human morality. Objectivism simply says that if you want to live life as a human, then value those things conducive to human life. These values become the Good. Seek the Good and you will live a long, good, life. Act otherwise, and you're acting outside of an objective ethical system, which just means that your life may not be as long or as rewarding.

So to answer the question, how do we get to "life as man qua man is the standard for his values"? We have to observe his nature.

Craig

Post 16

Monday, January 17, 2005 - 7:58pm

Craig,

Thanks for the post. Maybe this will clarify the point:

(1) An ultimate value is the final goal for which all other goals are means.

So whatever one's ultimate value is, all of one's other goals will be means to it. So the poker player can say, playing poker is my ultimate value--I pursue a lot of goals that aren't playing poker, but I pursue them only as means to playing poker. It seems like he can take on board all of what you said:

We can generalize in a lot of ways through observation, and by looking around we can see that humans need food, water, shelter, and clothing. They need companionship and love. They need 'reason', 'purpose', and 'self-esteem'. But to be more specific, is to move into the uncertain, because the life of Man qua Man is too complex. Your hypothetical poker player may be doing no wrong, but if he is playing poker at the expense of his long-term survival, then the value he places on playing poker may be incorrect since such a value is not required for his life as Man qua Man. Only he can answer that, but Reason is man's primary tool of survival, and if he is acting to play poker without reason -- not in any way which would support his long-term life -- then his action becomes questionable and may be arbitrary and destructive.

So he values reason, purpose, self-esteem, water, shelter et al as means to his long term survival. For the Objectivist, the story ends here. But the poker player says, "Sure, I value reason, purpose, etc so that I can live a long life, but I want to live a long and healthy life as a means to playing poker for the next 80 years." The Objectivist says that living life qua man is the ultimate goal; the poker player is going to say its something he should value, but only as a means to his ultimate goal of poker playing. Is he being irrational?

Post 17

Tuesday, January 18, 2005 - 7:23am

Ryan Hacking writes:

The Objectivist says that living life qua man is the ultimate goal; the poker player is going to say its something he should value, but only as a means to his ultimate goal of poker playing. Is he being irrational?

Yes. It is possible to live without playing poker. It is not possible to play poker without being alive. An ultimate value, like all values, must be based on the facts, not whim.

Post 18

Tuesday, January 18, 2005 - 7:37pm

Sure, you must be alive to play poker and you need not play poker to be alive. Expressed more formally, being alive is a necessary precondition of playing poker, and playing poker is not a necessary precondition of being alive. I'll go you once step more and agree that being alive is a necessary precondition of all values. And playing poker is a necessary precondition of perhaps only a handful of values. But the ultimate value is the final goal to which all other goals are means. X being a necessary precondition of all goals does not entail that X is the final goal to which all other goals are means. Furthermore, X not being a necessary precondition of all goals does not entail that X is not the final goal.

Post 19

Wednesday, January 19, 2005 - 2:35am