Teleology and Value

To paraphrase Hank Rearden, the evaluation of an action as practical depends on what it is one intends to practice. Now I don't take that to be an endorsement of hog-wild Humeanism, but the kernel of truth in that statement is that the nature of our end determines the rationality of one's means. The dog-man is irrational because his choice of means are maladapted to his end--his end of survival is being subverted because he is choosing ill-suited means. The hypothetical poker player, however, understands that survival, and furthermore surviving in decent shape, with good mental and physical health, a sharp mind and so on are values to him. Therefore he pursues these things, just like an Objectivist. However, this complex of values is itself a means to another, more ultimate value, viz. playing poker. An Objectivist is going to say that somehow it is irrational to treat the complex of values directed at sustaining one's life (such as the health and mental acuity pursued by the poker player) as a means, because life is the final end--by being a final end, all rational values are means to it, and nothing else. And this is the premise I question.

Post 21

Saturday, January 22, 2005 - 11:01pm

The dog-man is irrational because his choice of means are maladapted to his end--his end of survival is being subverted because he is choosing ill-suited means.

But why can't he be a dog-man as his end? Isn't 'his end', his ultimate value? Aren't you questioning whether people can choose an ultimate value which is not related to one's survival?

The hypothetical poker player, however, understands that survival, and furthermore surviving in decent shape, with good mental and physical health, a sharp mind and so on are values to him. Therefore he pursues these things, just like an Objectivist. However, this complex of values is itself a means to another, more ultimate value, viz. playing poker.

But if the poker player places his poker playing on a higher level than his own life, then isn't he doing the same thing the dog-man is doing? If playing poker really is more valuable to him, then he could find himself in a position where he would give up his life in pursuit of poker -- if he had to choose between the two.

It seems to me that the only difference between the two examples is that the dog-man example more obviously puts the man's life in jeopardy, whereas it would take a highly unusual circumstance for the poker player to find his life in jeopardy by pursuing poker.

Craig

Post 22

Sunday, January 23, 2005 - 9:04am

Ryan Hacking writes:

An Objectivist is going to say that somehow it is irrational to treat the complex of values directed at sustaining one's life (such as the health and mental acuity pursued by the poker player) as a means, because life is the final end--by being a final end, all rational values are means to it, and nothing else. And this is the premise I question.

Ayn Rand wrote in "The Objectivist Ethics":

It is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. [emphasis added]

Perhaps you missed that phrase "an end in itself".

The only choice one has as regards his ultimate goal is whether or not to pursue it. What it is, is given by the facts of reality and is not open to choice. How one pursues it, however, is.

Post 23

Sunday, January 23, 2005 - 5:27pm