| | Thanks, Teresa!
The guy who brought up Objectivism's alleged lack of specificity also believes that rights do not exist (he never defined the term, however), even after I described them as being basic social constructs and nonexistent when one is in actual isolation, as well as when no humans exist. Perhaps I did Objectivism a disservice by reluctantly calling them "natural rights"-- natural because they exist (or do they?) when at least two reason-capable humans exist in proximity, and more basic to everything else in any mutually-productive interaction. However, apparently the term "natural rights" commonly connotes/denotes something entirely different, which is why I was reluctant to use it.
That, unfortunately, is one of the problems I'm facing. Perhaps it is because I haven't read much on the subject in a little while. Both of the guys were asking me this: if rights are a mental construct, how could they exist when there are at least two reasoning humans but neither has conceived of the idea? (I added some of that myself, but that's basically what they were asking.)
Also, I think I'm onto something in regards to the "no-rights guy"'s claim. So far I have not done anything but take note of what thoughts I could remember, but I believe I was able earlier to connect his claim to the primacy of consciousness. Help me not, though. I would like to do this on my own (if I ever get back to it!).
On another note, I realized that since philosophy is a tool, the axioms should be as clear as possible, which I don't think they (or at least the first) are with Objectivism. I think that, since words developed to describe objects and processes (*sigh* can we accept this before forming axioms, I wonder?), the axioms should cater as much as possible to our senses. Suppose I pointed to a mountain and grunted (pretending I'm a caveman :) ). That grunt would thereafter be associated with that mountain, or mountains in general. That grunt, because it is of the lowest order of abstraction, would be the best thing to use in an axiom. "Existence exists". While that is a good axiom, I think it does the whole philosophy harm by using a higher order abstraction (i.e. existence). I guess I'm just not one for redundancy! Besides that, existence is a blanket term for all things (not just one, but a group, the largest group) that our senses tell us about or for which we can deduce the existence of from prior observations.
Is my thinking on axioms too simplistic, since we obviously encounter more things than just a "grunt" (mountain) at one time? Or is it better, in a way, since saying "existence exists" is not only redundant, but an illegal kind of redundancy when trying to define anything else (e.g. can't use a word in its own definition, or any of its derivative verbs)? One should note here, however, that my comments presuppose the validity of the senses, making that an axiom.
Ha, well that brings me to a ridiculous proposition made by another member of the philo club -- that we can't know anything. What flawed thinking!
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