Deconstructing Popper's Falsification and Vienna Circle Verification

Steve:

Isn't the tiniest measurements of how many photons of light hit my eye versus how many hit someone else's eye of no import as long as we both reach a common understanding of what we are perceiving?

I think that is correct - and applies to the orginal 'color-swap' discussion. It has no consequences, because 'the sky is always blue' and we both agree on that -- even if your blue is really my orange, or even, a color I've never imagined.

My point is not that this is likely; it might very well be unlikely, because of William's observation. (We're all basically equipped with the same or similar wetbits.) My real point is yours -- it is without consequence, even if true.

But this ultimate question is currently not verifiable. Maybe, with some future technology, we will be able to directly share perception and cognition. With current technology, we can only indirectly do so-- mainly via words and pictures. But even pictures fail as a means of verifying perceived color, because ultimately we are scrounging around our palettes for the goo that is the same perceived color as the sky when we paint the sky, and we choose the same goo.

Imagine a technology that allows us to transplant the human eye at ever deeper levels of integration into the human brain. Corneas... retina...complete eyeball and optic nerve... all the way back to the visual processing circuitry in the brain, which ultimately presents the high level results of all that processing to ... what?

To our cognitive/perception higher order wetbits. That which responds to the stimuli being presented and ordered and processed, and which constructs out of all that an image of the world. In the case of visual processing, using that fraction of the spectrum between IR and UV but not beyond either...

Ditto our aural processing subsystem, which is frequency limited.

And, we do so with processing bias, as evidenced by the image above. Our higher order neural nets can be self reprogrammed to value the inputs of the lower order networks differently. We choose what to 'value' -- literally I think, the weigtings of the lower level neural network inputs to our higher level neural networks.

Same thing happens to our ears in a crowded room.

None of this changes reality in the least. But it does shape our perception of that reality.

How would our perception of reality change if we could remotely sense 'mass' or directly sense 'velocity' instead of 'acceleration?' Would that shape how mankind reshapes the world? I think so.

So must our biases.

Post 41

Friday, May 20, 2011 - 4:45pm

William:

Check here:

From source: http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_proof.html

having trouble embedding from this server, so just go to page above by cut-paste URL into your browser.

It's not your eyes...looks blurry to me, too. Artifact of scaling from alternate host... look at the original source at the link above.

regards,
Fred

(Edited by Fred Bartlett on 5/20, 5:26pm)

Post 42

Friday, May 20, 2011 - 6:08pm

Thanks, Fred. That's another way to see it. I think what's going on here is the following:

With B, you�re looking at it in relation to a dark background � surrounded by darker squares due to the shadow of the cylinder � and with A, you�re looking at it in relation to a lighter background without the shadow of the cylinder. So the shadow of the cylinder makes the light square (B) look darker than the light square in the lower righthand corner (say), and the absence of the shadow makes the dark square (A) look lighter than the dark square covered by the shadow to the left of B.

Post 43

Saturday, May 21, 2011 - 7:55am

William:

You might be able to argue that since subjective experience depends on the objective properties of one's sensory faculties, if the objective properties are the same, the subjective experiences must be the same, since the same causes must produce the same effects.

And yet some of us like chocolate and some of us like vanilla.

Our processing of sensory stimuli in real time is layered, and lower level networks pass on results as inputs to higher level networks, with the ability in the highest levels of processing to weight the lower level inputs differently -- not just from each other, but from one moment to the next in the same individual.

Not only that, but we dream. We imagine. We are not limited by real time real world sensory inputs, in terms of what we can imagine. (What can be is limited by what can be, but what we can imagine is not. Which is why what can be is not limited by what already is.)

Some/many of our conclusions are path dependent not just deterministic. Given the complexity of the brain and its layered, self reprogrammable networks, and the ability to not be limited by real time real world sensory input, what is a realistic estimate of the total possible number of paths?

I don't see much evidence at all of mankind as deterministic unspoolers of an already written future.

We choose what to value. Literally, within our highest level neural networks like constructs, how to weight the outputs of our lower level processing networks.

regards,
Fred

Post 44

Saturday, May 21, 2011 - 9:15am

Sorry for the thread abuse.

Re: (p or q) p therefore (not q) or (not p) therefore q

It is totally dependent on the ability to accurately construct examples of (p or q) which permit that determinism.

Not all examples of (p or q) fit that requirement.

"The not nothings itself" doesn't even get into the courthouse, much less, make it onto the jury, except in the most trivial way, as in:

p: "The not nothings itself" is gibberish.

q: "The not nothings itself" is not gibberish.

p. Definitely p. Asserted without controversy, unless someone shows up to demonstrate q.

Introducing a statement such as "The not nothings itself" into a discussion of constructed logic is itself gibberish.

It certainly bears no relationship to the kind of discipline necessary to successfully construct an example of (p or q) that has those logical consequences.

It is an example of 'n/a'

It is an example of 'garbage in, garbage out.'

This happens a lot when philosophers stumble into (and out of) mathematics and logic. Xeno's non paradox paradox was one example. I posted that elsewhere, along with another example.

I'm beginning to form the opinion that what happens to folks who flunk out of math and logic courses are, they become Heideggers and just wing it.

Of course, the folks who write the history books tell us otherwise. It was the philosophers who gave us the math and and logic.

Well, let me suspend my disbelief as a I ponder where 'those who wrote the history books' came from, and what their incentives were in this fanciful retelling...

regards,
Fred

Post 45

Saturday, May 21, 2011 - 10:52am

Fred, you are truly a heavy weight on this forum.

Sam

Post 46

Sunday, May 22, 2011 - 7:58am

Guys,

Let's say that when you play a "C" chord on a piano or a guitar, that someone hears it as an "F" chord. Could you -- with science and unlimited investigation -- ultimately discover or verify this?

Let's say that when someone smells a rose, that it smells to them like sulfur. Could you -- with science and unlimited investigation -- ultimately discover or verify this?

Let's say that when someone feels heavy-grain sandpaper, that they feel it as if it is a smooth surface. Could you -- with science and unlimited investigation -- ultimately discover or verify this?

Let's say that when someone tastes chocolate that it tastes like Tabasco sauce. Could you -- with science and unlimited investigation -- ultimately discover or verify this?

My answer to these 4 questions is yes. What are you guys' answers?

Ed

Post 47

Sunday, May 22, 2011 - 10:33am

Yes, it could be verified by identifying differences in their sensory faculties, which produce the differences in their sensory experiences -- just as differences in the shape and quality of the human lens produce different visual experiences. This is precisely what I have been arguing in Posts 13, 25, 30 and 36. I didn't realize this initially, but have since changed my mind.

Post 48

Sunday, May 22, 2011 - 11:13am

Ed and Bill:

I think you have both missed Fred's point that was so aptly presented with his optical illusion example. It is the passed experiences and familiarity with chessboard grids that cause our mistakes in perception. Are you saying that because we "all" have such experiences that we will "all" have the same erroneous perception? What about Tarzan of the apes before he ever had access to a book or such things? Would he perceive the same effect?

Or are you suggesting that if we control all of the experiences of two people that you can demonstrate that they will have the same sensory experience? I would then counter that it is impossible to control all the experiences of two people.

Have I mis-interpreted you, Fred?

Sam

Post 49

Sunday, May 22, 2011 - 4:22pm

Sam,

I don't think it's our past familiarity with chessboard grids that explains the illusion.

Rather it's that with Square B, you�re looking at it in relation to a background of darker squares which, due to the shadow of the cylinder, are objectively darker than Square A, so that B appears lighter than A, because B is contrasted with squares that are even darker than B, whereas A appears darker than B, because A is seen in relation to a background of lighter squares.

It's the difference in the contrasting backgrounds of the two squares that explains why one square appears darker than the other, even though when the two squares are set against the same background, they appear to be the same color. I think the eye automatically adjusts its perception of an object to accommodate the background of the object in which the perception takes place.

On the chessboard, the two squares would look different to Tarzan too.

Post 50

Sunday, May 22, 2011 - 9:16pm

Bill,

I think the eye automatically adjusts its perception of an object to accommodate the background of the object in which the perception takes place.

I agree. It's funny how proper concepts are built like that, too -- always a differentiation of at least two things from a third thing (or from a lack of things). Apparently, the eye "knows" how to form proper percepts, though we have to teach ourselves -- or learn -- how to form proper concepts.

Ed

Post 51

Sunday, May 22, 2011 - 10:11pm

A related excerpt:

How do you prove photography to a blind man?

� Give the blind man a camera, a tripod and a remote shutter release. (Ideally the camera is a Polaroid, or a digital with an instant picture facility.) Everyone leaves the room but the blind man. He takes a picture of himself, and holds up a number of fingers (1 to 5) at random. The sighted person comes back into the room, looks at the picture and says �you were holding up X fingers�. If he gets the right number, and continues to do so every time this experiment is performed, the blind man will eventually conclude that photography is real. Technically, he will conclude the hypothesis that �a camera can record a visual image�, might be true.

He will want to repeat the experiment with different rooms and different sighted people. He will want to tighten his controls to make sure no one can see through the window or the keyhole. He will want other blind friends of his to do the same experiment successfully. But essentially, he will be convinced by this method.

From:
Related RoR thread

or from:
Direct link to essay

Ed

Post 52

Monday, May 23, 2011 - 5:15am

Sam:

I think our past familiarity might shade(no pun intended) our bias to classify the image into something known, but I think there is more to it. I suspect that our brains have a bias to categorize via comparison/differences. To find patterns. Same and different. But with a bias towards pattern detection.

There is a pattern of light/dark apparent in a checkerboard, even if you don't know what a checkerboard is. The diagonal ranks of alternating light/dark form a pattern, that suggests 'same' and 'different.'

There is a subtle shadow from the not so subtle cylinder, which results in the dark square in full light being rendered the same shade of grey as a light square in shadow(as William points out in his neighborhood description.) The transition square above B is both in light and shadow, but mostly in shadow.

This produces conflicting visual evidence: "same or different." One based on the recognition of pattern, the other based on measurement of absolute grayscale.

Without additional knowledge -- and normally to our benefit in most circumstances in nature -- we value the pattern detection more than the measurement of absolute grayscale.

But it is possible for the same individual to see those squares as obviously the same shade of gray, and the same individual to see those squares as obviously different shades of gray. Because of our bias towards pattern detection, I think, we normally see them as different.

Our specific knowledge of checkerboards as objects reinforces this bias, but I think the bias for pattern detection would still exist in primitive man. It is how he detected the lion in the grass. It was crucial to his survival. Even when the lion was the same color as the high grass.

We can run this experiment ourselves, but can only hypothesize running it with someone who had no knowledge of a checkerboard.

William, try this: look at the middle of the image, and then defocus a little, and try to see A, B and the dark square that is second from the right on the bottom all at once. Don't 'focus' on them, but rather concentrate on seeing them as a whole. When I do that, I see all three of them as having the same shade of gray. And having done that a few times, now when I look at the image it is actually harder for me to see the squares as being different shades of gray. I have to kind of ... I can't even describe it, but 'struggle' a little to see them as different.

It is a strange example of the brain re-tuning itself for a known images. It's kind of fun, in that it exposes the reprogrammability of our cognitive circuitry.

regards,
Fred

Post 53

Monday, May 23, 2011 - 5:59am

Ed:

Where your examples have objective consequences, they could be demonstrated.

Example: I like the way a rose smells, I don't like the way sulpher smells. It (xulpher or acid) objectively burns the lining of my nose -- actually causes physical damage. It is why I don't like the smell of sulpher. A rose does not.

If that which smelled like a rose burned by nasal passages, I would not like that which smelled like a rose. But I would still be able to function in the world entirely consistantly if my rose was your sulpher, as long as the substance that was sulpher or 'like sulpher' always smelled the same to me, and vice versa.

There has to be an objective contradiction before there is any consequence, as in, "your square is my triangle."

Not "your chocolate is my vanilla." Because indeed, some people like chocolate more than vanilla, and vice versa.

Your rose smell is my lilac smell? No consequence. As long as everything that smells 'like a rose' smells 'like a rose.' Your green is my color only I see? No objective consequences. (Maybe not likely, but no objective consequences even if true.)

If the only way we can communicate our internal perceptions is via consitent comparison to other external objects, then all we can scientifically confirm is that our perceptions are consisitent. Only when these hypothetical misaligned perceptions have objective consequences can we prove them(and only then do they have any consquences at all to anybody anywhere.)

It's easy to see that 'your square is my triangle' leads to objective contradictions. 3 is not equal to 4.

But describe your scientific experiments for your other examples. Are they comparative only, or do they expose any contradictions? Maybe some do and some don't...but at first glance they all seem comparative.

Like, the sky appears blue. Like the ocean.

I at first thoguht that there could be an objective consequence to the perception of notes, in regards to ordering, but that isn't true either, as long as our perceptiosn are each orderable(for example. each off by an octave. No consequnce -- we could hire each other to tune our pianos, and not be able to tell the difference in the objective end result. Only if our perceptions were scrambled and not merely offset from each other.

regards,
Fred

Post 54

Monday, May 23, 2011 - 8:00am

I want to make the point that we are conditioned far more than is generally acknowledged. As an example, consider the act of learning to read. Once we have learned to read it is impossible to un-learn it, i.e. to see the lines merely as lines in the same way as we did before the learning occurred. We are compelled to interpret the scene. I suppose that one could de-focus one's eyes in the same manner as Fred is suggesting but in both cases it requires a conscious effort and the effort would have to take place after recognizing that the scene was text, or a 3-dimensional representation, not before.

Sam

Post 55

Monday, May 23, 2011 - 11:08am

Sam:

To your point, an example that keeps popping up is how we recognize text. When I write and then must proof my own work, I found that if I radically change the font(today easy to do), it tends to force me to freshly 'see' the text anew as individual words, and I'm able to find errors much easier. If I don't, then I tend to recognize blocks of text at a time, especially if it is a block of text that while writing I've already gone over several times.

This isn't a perfect 'trick,' but I find it helps. I think it speaks to how we read text, or at least, how I read text.

Our brains train themselves to take shortcuts. We substitute higher order patterns for collections of detailed lower order patterns.

I even detect that in the memory muscle associated with typing. We don't necessarily think of typing a word or phrase as individual letters. I think we often think in terms of typing whole words or even phrases. I can detect that in my own typing sometimes when I go back and proof it. I often detect phrasing errors, not only spelling errors. It's as if I accessed a slightly similar memory muscle phrase, when I intended one very similar, and instead of individual spelling errors, an entire word or even phrase is substituted--correctly spelled, but misplaced. As if, when accessing whatever memory muscles drive my fingers, something got slightly scrambled--and an entire phrase was misplaced, not just a single letter.

I call that 'my fingers seem to have minds of their own when I'm trying to type fast.' And they shouldn't. They are not that smart, just fast...

regards,
Fred

Post 56

Monday, May 23, 2011 - 12:37pm

Fred,

"We substitute higher order patterns for collections of detailed lower order patterns"

There is another, powerful reason for having that 'subroutine' available. We must be continually condensing memory content. Simple calculations of the bits of data per second coming in via the various senses tell us our maximum bandwidth and therefore how much 'storage' we'd need if we didn't condense. Memory must actually be a very active process with continual condensing to more and more general or symbolic representations.

I see someone in a plaid shirt and remember all the details - I can recall the type of buttons, the colors and pattern, and I might be able to recall details behind the person in the background, but only for a short time. After that it starts going generic and my mind might substitute generic, reddish-plaid pattern to replace the actual image, and a while later I might just see the face of the person in a generic shirt (i.e., one manufactured on demand, as needed by the mind to give me an image).

Post 57

Tuesday, May 24, 2011 - 8:34pm

Fred,

There has to be an objective contradiction before there is any consequence, as in, "your square is my triangle."

Not "your chocolate is my vanilla." Because indeed, some people like chocolate more than vanilla, and vice versa.

Your rose smell is my lilac smell? No consequence.

Okay, but I would qualify your "consequence" to read "current consequence." In the future, it may become consequential to get onto the same page, perceptually. There's possibly an ultimate consequence, even if there isn't a proximate one.

If the only way we can communicate our internal perceptions is via consistent comparison to other external objects, then all we can scientifically confirm is that our perceptions are consistent.

Right, but that's a big "if" to posit when we are discussing the future (the "ultimate").

But describe your scientific experiments for your other examples. Are they comparative only, or do they expose any contradictions?

... there could be an objective consequence to the perception of notes, in regards to ordering, but that isn't true either, as long as our perceptions are each orderable(for example. each off by an octave.

Right. If I play a "G" chord and you hear a "C" chord, then when I write a song based on a chord progression, say, of G, D, and A-minor (e.g. "Knockin' on heaven's door" by Bob Dylan) -- then you will say the song sucks, because it doesn't have correct melody.

It's more musical than scientific, but it'd still tip us off that you hear "wrongly." Colors could be like that too, where differences could matter if they aren't the "right kind of" differences. Because of the sheer numbers, it is much more likely that they will be the wrong kind of differences than the right kind. In music, you have got to be off by exactly 8 notes -- any more or any less and there are immediate consequences.

I would think that with colors, ultimately, there would be consequences.

Ed

Post 58

Wednesday, May 25, 2011 - 8:07am

Ed:

1] What if our individual perceptions of notes were off by one octave(as an example)?

2] What if I liked some music and you other music? What if I liked chocolate, and you vanilla? Would that be evidence that we perceived music(or taste)differently, and reached different conclusions from the 'same' sensory stimuli?

3] Our perceptions of vibrating sound waves -- real physical events, small pressure perturbations that reach our ears -- are converted to 'sound.' Nerve impulses to our cognitive circuitry. As long as that conversion is consistent and ordered, we can jointly interact and appreciate the same music and even reproduce the same(in the sense that we each consistently perceive the same music)from the same notes.

Sound is much more complex that pure waveforms at some frequency-- there is attack and decay, the time history of the amplitude of the waveforms. But, it is difficult to imagine an objective consequence to actual subjective differences in perception...say, being an entire octave off -- other than, some of us prefer chocolate over vanilla.

Some of us prefer Mozart to Rap.

I'm not seeing the obvious comparison to objective contradiction(such as the triangle/square, 3/4 contradiction.) That doesn't mean there isn't one, just that, I don't see it yet.

regards,
Fred

Post 59

Thursday, May 26, 2011 - 8:03am