| | P M H,
One problem that occurred in a previous debate on the same issue is that multiple "definitions" are given for rights, even by Rand. The concept is difficult to describe in a single sentence. The theory or principle of individual rights is not some first order concept we can point out in reality. It is the product of a complete moral theory, with historic information, semantic concerns, etc. Giving it a one sentence description is not going to provide all of the relevant details. At best, it's used to identify some key aspect of it and differentiate it from other concepts in order to provide clarity. In the previous debate, there were several quotes from Rand on the nature of rights. In one, she described it as a condition of existence. In another, she called it a moral principle. And a moral concept. Elsewhere, I believe she referred to it as a moral claim. If you take any one of these descriptions as definitive, it will appear to contradict the others when in fact each description is merely describing some facts about it.
Similarly, saying that rights are "moral principles that describe human freedom in a social context" is true, but not complete. As a moral principle, it says more than that there is a such thing a human freedom in a social context. Moral principles describe causal connections, which this 'definition' doesn't even mention. As a moral concept, rights should describe morally appropriate behaviors, which this definition doesn't discuss or even hint at. Taken in isolation, this is not a useful definition, and if you try to change the concept to be consistent with it, it empties the concept of all of it's important insights.
You suggested the alternative of taking this nearly useless view of rights as a given, or throwing away the definition. A better alternative is to realize that a definition doesn't describe a concept in detail, but attempts to identify the concept and differentiate it from other concepts. If someone gave this 'definition', we would know what they were talking about. But we'd know because we're already familiar with the concept, and this definition allows us to understand which concept you are referring to. But the definition doesn't fully describe the concept, nor the moral and philosophical foundations including the arguments that give rise to it.
On your response to Bill, I don't like the attempt to claim that we are "respecting his choice" by punishing the murderer. His consent is not needed, and trying to argue that he is somehow "ultimately" consenting to punishment is so far a stretch that any actual violation of rights could be called consent. Nor should we delude ourselves into thinking that he would accept being killed himself with joy and open arms. And what happens if he changes his mind?
No, we don't punish the murder to acquiesce to his will. We don't expect or demand that he desires. We use retaliatory force because it is in our interests, not his. His desire to murder but not suffer consequences is not our concern. Our own lives, and the harmony of interests that makes them possible, is our concern.
Ed, one thing to note is that while the harmony of interests is important, it does not excuse any use of force. There are places where someone may be rude, which breaks down that harmony of interests, but we wouldn't be justified in using force.
Also, I think I see why Bill thinks your are complicating things. You've previously stated that the murderer's rights remain unchanged. While you claim to have a new position, you've avoided wording it to say that his rights are reduced/gone. Mostly you've focused on the point that retaliatory force is appropriate, and doesn't violate rights. But that is consistent with saying that his rights still exist 100%, but that retaliatory force magically doesn't violate them. Even with your posts suggesting agreement, it isn't clear that you aren't still using strange definitions that attempt to achieve the same outcomes but aren't consistent with the 'normal' usage.
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