| | The nature of Japan's willingness to surrender has been called into question, so:
"July 1945 - Japan's peace messages...
July 11: "make clear to Russia... We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war; we hope to terminate the war".
July 12: "it is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of the war".
July 13: "I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs to communicate to the [Soviet] Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war" (for above items, see: U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873-879).
July 18: "Negotiations... necessary... for soliciting Russia's good offices in concluding the war and also in improving the basis for negotiations with England and America." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/18/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
July 22: "Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the war through the good offices of the Soviet Government." The July 21st communication from Togo also noted that a conference between the Emperor's emissary, Prince Konoye, and the Soviet Union, was sought, in preparation for contacting the U.S. and Great Britain (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/22/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
July 25: "it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter." (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1260 - 1261).
July 26: Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, to the Soviet Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lozovsky: "The aim of the Japanese Government with regard to Prince Konoye's mission is to enlist the good offices of the Soviet Government in order to end the war." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/26/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives). "
This can be found at: http://www.doug-long.com/ Without a doubt, Japan should have flown the white flag and surrendered ~directly to America~. But they didn't. And they dealt with the consequences of it. As has been pointed out numerous times in this discussion, hindsight is an amazing reference when one wants to know the right thing to do in a war. Truman ~without a doubt~ knew what it would take to get the Japanese to surrender. Japan didn't need a threat, or a bluff, or a demonstration--though these things couldn't have hurt. All it needed was a guarantee that the Japanese way of life would not be demolished. Would any of us, in a similar position--just try really hard to imagine such a ridiculous thing--not make such a demand? Would whomever we were at war with be correct, militarily or otherwise, in dropping atomics on us for being obstinate about maintaining our way of life? And I am not falling into a pit of moral or cultural equivalence. Look around and ask yourselves how easy it is for even self-loathing ~savages~ to give up their way of life, and how much to the death they will defend it. Dr. Sciabarra has noted this, I believe. (Ugghh...I hate hypotheticals, and name-dropping...)
Yes, Japan should have surrendered. Yes, they did attack us first. Yes, they should have expected the Allies to use whatever means necessary to demolish their capability to make war. But was an atomic attack necessary, especially if Japan would have fallen anyways:
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." --The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, July 1946. A panel commisioned by Truman to investigate the bombings.
and
"...It is possible, in the light of the final surrender, that a clearer and earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Emperor would have produced an earlier ending to the war..." and "...Only on the question of the Emperor did Stimson take, in 1945, a conciliatory view; only on this question did he later believe that history might find that the United States, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war..." ---Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, 1948, His memoirs, ghost-written by McGeorge Bundy.
All of this can be found at the same website. There's more if anyone wants to take a look. Call the writer's objectivity into question if you like.
There. We've all stated our cases. Didn't I say there wouldn't be much agreement on such a hot-button issue, for whatever reasons?
J
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