RoR: Forum

Greetings.

I have noticed the all-too-frequent utility of the word "humble" in this article.

Whatever anyone else may think, I do not consider humility a virtue. A rational individualist must have the utmost unfettered pride in his own reasoning powers; this is not to say that he must feign omniscience. This article validly points out that a man's mind can make honest mistakes by functioning with incomplete data, but humility is not the solution to this dilemma. Rather, an undaunted, purposeful, and, above all, self-ennobling effort to achieve cognizance of the necessary data is in order.

I agree that the rational man must seek to examine the possibility that his understanding of a given subject may be incomplete. This is no rationale for humility, which would imply that his understanding of a matter will always be inherently incomplete. The latter assertion seems to agree in spirit with the work of Karl Popper, the filosofer of science who thereby elevated the Humean notion of the invalidity of induction to the level of a postulate and incapacitated a crucial means of attaining scientific knowledge.

These were some preliminary thoughts on this article; it was an interesting effort by Mr. Reasoner, and certainly brings forth arguments as to the necessity of having adequate empirical data to support empirically grounded assertions. Nevertheless, I think there are certain Popperian implications in this article which I cannot agree with.

I may comment further in the future.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 1

Saturday, July 3, 2004 - 2:00pm

Stolyarov,

What term, then, would you use as an antonym for "overconfidence" or "arrogance"? Because that's what I was shooting for with the use of the term "humble".

Would "grounded" suffice?

Post 2

Saturday, July 3, 2004 - 4:26pm

What term, then, would you use as an antonym for "overconfidence" or "arrogance"? Because that's what I was shooting for with the use of the term "humble". Would "grounded" suffice?

I like how BB&T explained "Pride" at http://www.bbandt.com/philosophy/values.html#pride as follows:

Pride is the psychological reward we earn from living by our values, i.e., from being just, honest, having integrity, being an independent thinker, being productive and rational. Aristotle believed that �earned� pride (not arrogance) was the highest of virtues, because it presupposed all the others. Striving for earned pride simply reinforces the importance of having high moral values. Each of us must perform our work in a manner as to be able to be justly proud of what we have accomplished. BB&T must be the kind of organization with which each employee and client can be proud to be associated.

So the appropriate antonym for "arrogance" is "earned pride".

Post 3

Saturday, July 3, 2004 - 4:29pm

Greetings.

Yes, "grounded" would be a good choice of word; "considerate" would be another good word to use to carry the meaning you intend. I am using here the second definition of "considerate," as provided by Dictionary.com: Characterized by careful thought; deliberate.

In that sense, it may at times be acceptable for a scientist to ask himself, "What could be wrong about this idea?" without eroding his personal pride or his resolve to discover the entire truth about a subject. (Though, on a side note, it is no pretext for a government regulator to ask the same question with regard to the endeavors of the scientist.)

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 4

Saturday, July 3, 2004 - 5:18pm

This is much of what is at the heart of Objectivism: Violent disagreements that boil down to differences in what is meant by a term. Too often, both sides really have the same sentiment, but each of them may personally define a given term to mean something completely antithetical to what the other meant.

I can see one reason now why wars may be continually fought... each side needs to establish ONE language, where each word means ONE thing to everybody, so that there is no confusion and no needless strife.

I believe the term for that is a "controlled vocabulary".

It's a shame to me that all it takes is a few sadistic weasels out there to use a perfectly good and upstanding term to describe something cruel and evil that they're doing, and then that perfectly good term takes on a bad connotation.

For example, we can't use "faith" anymore, because too many sadistic religious weasels have used that term to achieve their childish and cruel kicks at the expense of others... even though it's a perfectly good term.

The same thing goes for Hitler's mustache, and that term "humility"... Bad people ruin everything for everybody.

(Edited by Orion Reasoner on 7/03, 5:22pm)

Post 5

Sunday, July 4, 2004 - 10:43am

I once saw a comment on an Objectivist mailing list which stated, in more or less these exact words, that philosophy should have veto power over science. I consider this to have been one of the most irrational ideas I have ever encountered.

This article is an important reminder that the basis of Objectivism is reality (not any abstract premise), and that one cannot argue as an Objectivist without this as the ultimate foundation of all one's concepts. The empirical evidence of the senses and of experience must be accepted as valid, even if it appears to contradict some philosophical premise. If it can be shown unambiguously and indisputably through an empirical process that God exists, or that particles magically change their properties without cause, or that men are less free under capitalism than under socialism, then philosophy must be revised to accommodate these empirical facts.

But it doesn't make sense to suggest that the necessity of empirical evidence entails a �limitation� (or �failure�) in reason. Reason is a mental process by which the facts of reality can be understood, either by deriving abstractions from those facts (induction), or by extrapolating predictions about reality from abstractions (deduction). Reason cannot exist without those facts of reality on which to operate. This is not a limitation of reason, but a fundamental part of its nature.

What I must take issue with about this article is the characterization of the author's examples as �limits of prevailing reason� or instances of �reason... only mucking things up.� Reason did not fail here�it was simply operating on incorrect information. Even perfectly correct reason can produce invalid conclusions, if the premises on which it works do not accurately reflect reality. Garbage in, garbage out. This does not change the fact that the earlier reasoning was completely correct, given the information then available. What was required was not any revision of reason itself, but only a correction to the information on the basis of which reason was operating.

(There is a relevant passage in OPAR, p.171-175, �Certainty as Contextual�.)

Post 6

Sunday, July 4, 2004 - 6:51pm

Yes, but could not having correct information also be the fault of poor reasoning to begin with? Bear with me...

After all, doesn't a person who is taking the responsibility to employ truly contextual and comprehensive, sound reasoning stop to consider that he or she should take responsibility for having the correct information to begin with?

I mean, if a person makes a choice in her or her life to behave as a passive computer, and only evaluate what is received rather than being aggressive in monitoring the validity and quality of what information they are being fed to begin with, then that to me seems to be part of their poor reasoning choice that they are perfectly justified and safe in limiting their scope of validity vigilance.

I'm saying here that the process of "reason" encompasses far more than just that little "garbage in, garbage out" process that occurs whenever you process whatever information you're fed... it's also scrupulously examining what you're being fed, before you even enter into that process.

The degree to which your reasoning succeeds or fails, depends on what you choose as the scope of your reasoning. You have to choose wisely. That's "the restriction of reason".

Post 7

Monday, July 5, 2004 - 9:04am

Nature, I love your name! Welcome! In this connection you may wish to see my SoloHQ article �Errors of Modern Science��A Philosophical Magic Act.

[For some reason a link won't take, so see my profile page.]

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 7/05, 9:07am)

Post 8

Monday, July 5, 2004 - 4:39pm

Orion writes:
>This is much of what is at the heart of Objectivism:� Violent disagreements that boil down to differences in what is meant by a term.

Orion, I am completely in agreement here. The problem lies, in my view, in Objectivism's adoption of Aristotle's methodology. This method mistakenly places emphasis on *the meanings of words* (ie:definitions), and not on *problems to be solved*. The result is acres of blab, and the strangulation of genuinely new ideas.

As I wrote a while back:
"I can't help thinking (Aristotelian scholasticism) is holding the philosophy back far worse than the "statists" or Leonard Peikoff ever will."

This problem is not restricted to Objectivism, but covers all philosophy, due to Plato and Aristotle's overwhelming influence. It's just particularly bad in Objectivism, due to the closeness of its association to the Big A.

If you have not been following my posts on this subject, (which have been mixed in with many others in a marathon thread "A Pre-Emptive Dialectic etc"...;-)) I believe you might find them interesting. I apologise in advance for their length, but I wanted to cover the subject thoroughly, starting from the Aristotelian background. Or, better still, read Karl Popper's original brilliant attack on empty Aristotelian windbaggery in "Two Kinds of Defintions" (in "Popper Selections", also Chapter 11 of "The Open Society And Its Enemies") from which I've shamelessly pinched my angle. He demonstrates logically why the quest for precision in definitions, far from creating more precise arguments, leads to *exactly the opposite* result!

Post 35, Post 94, Post 124

(In Post 82 William Nevins attempts to rebut the "infinite regress" part of Popper's argument. In Post 124 I believe I successfully defend it. At any rate, he has not responded so far )

- Daniel

Post 9

Monday, July 5, 2004 - 7:41pm

Daniel,

What is a concept?

Regi

Post 10

Monday, July 5, 2004 - 7:50pm

Regi writes:
>Daniel,
>What is a concept?

An error inherited from Plato and Aristotle. Why do you ask?

- Daniel

Post 11

Monday, July 5, 2004 - 8:41pm

Daniel,

>What is a concept?

An error inherited from Plato and Aristotle. Why do you ask?

What is an error inherited, that there are concepts, or something about concepts.

The reason I ask is because you keep making assertions about things like definitions, but do not mention what definitions define. If not concepts, then what?

Regi

Post 12

Monday, July 5, 2004 - 9:06pm

Greetings.

Beware of Popper, my friends! His mistakes have led to the following:

1) His essential agreement with the logical positivists has led him to throw metafysics and ethics out of filosofy. (Hence Mr. Barnes' denunciation of Aristotelian conceptual precision).
2) He has amplified the errors of the logical positivists by claiming that even the principle of scientific verification proposed by the positivists was false.
3) He has voiced agreement with David Hume that the rising of the sun cannot be attributed to a precise, predictable natural law. He has thus implied that universal happenings occur out of chaos or the whim of some entity rather than by objective principles.
4) He has denounced the very possibility of obtaining certainty and genuine knowledge about the external world. The only thing we can base our theories on, he claims, is the ignorance of not knowing our mistakes!
5) He has thereby adopted a dreary view of man as of an entity always doomed to incompleteness in whatever endeavor he pursues.
6) He has once again embraced that age-old double-bind: man is either omniscient or inherently doomed to "incompleteness" and imperfect accuracy in his scientific theories. Objectivism rightfully rejects this dichotomy, as it recognizes that man is able to be wrong or not fully aware, but he is also able to be right and fully aware. I am fully aware that the Earth moves around the Sun in an elliptical orbit, for example, as a result of the discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, and Keppler. I am certain of this fact. No new datum can reverse the truth of this assertion, as it has been empirically demonstrated beyond doubt.
7) Moreover he has turned his focus toward "solving problems" without defining concepts. I ask: What problems? How do we recognize these problems? On what basis can we interpret these problems? What is the exact nature of the constituents of these problems? What is the exact nature of the constituents of working solutions? What is defined as a working solution? What is a problem? What is?

Popper's answer? Blank-out. And without clearly and unambiguously defined concepts, that will always be his answer.

The filosofer must set the fundamental groundwork of definitions and conceptual hierarchies. The task of applying them can fall to more specialized branches of the sciences; they can handle these tasks, but nobody else can do a filosofer's job.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 13

Monday, July 5, 2004 - 9:52pm

Regi writes:
>The reason I ask is because you keep making assertions about things like definitions, but do not mention what definitions define. If not concepts, then what?

The meaning of words, of course.

Now, let me guess: perhaps your next question is "what do you mean by 'meaning'"?

In which case you will be illustrating my main point with a prime example.

- Daniel

Post 14

Monday, July 5, 2004 - 10:15pm

G Stolyarov writes:
>Beware of Popper, my friends! His mistakes have led to the following
1) His essential agreement with the logical positivists has led him to throw metafysics and ethics out of filosofy. (Hence Mr. Barnes' denunciation of Aristotelian conceptual precision).

Oh, rilly? This comment is roughly on a par with a statement like "Ayn Rand agreed with Immanuel Kant on most major issues".

Beware of Stolyarov, gentle reader! Truly, he is talking through his golden hat...;-)

- Daniel

Post 15

Tuesday, July 6, 2004 - 3:24am

Daniel,

>The reason I ask is because you keep making assertions about things like definitions, but do not mention what definitions define. If not concepts, then what?

The meaning of words, of course.

Now, let me guess: perhaps your next question is "what do you mean by 'meaning'"?

No. My next question is, what are words?

Regi

Post 16

Tuesday, July 6, 2004 - 8:11am

Greetings.

Ayn Rand did not disagree with Kant on everything; both she and Kant, for example, supported laissez-faire capitalism, individual free expression, limited government, the objectivity of science (the difference there was that Kant excluded science from the "noumenal" realm, while the application of Rand's theories would render everything open to scientific study, either by a natural science or a foundational science, like mathematics or filosofy).

Kant was not nearly the "embodiment of evil" that Rand and Peikoff would have us believe. Moreover, in his personal life and habits, Kant was more of an Objectivist than many of those who claim themselves to be Objectivists.

Johann Gottfried Herder, in his "Letters on the Advancement of Humanity," writes, "I have enjoyed the good fortune to know a philosopher, who was my teacher. In the prime of his life he had the happy cheerfulness of youth, which, so I believe, accompanied him even in gray old age. His forehead, formed for thinking, was the seat of indestructible serenity and peace, the most thought-filled speech flowed from his lips, merriment and wit and humor were at his command, and his lecturing was discourse at its most entertaining. The history of nations and peoples, natural science, mathematics, and experience, were the sources from which he enlivened his lecture and converse; nothing worth knowing was indifferent to him; no cabal, no sect, no prejudice, no ambition for fame had the least seductiveness for him in comparison with furthering and elucidating truth. He encouraged and engagingly fostered thinking for oneself; despotism was foreign to his mind. This man, whom I name with the utmost thankfulness and respect, was Immanuel Kant; his image stands before me to my delight."

So no, Mr. Barnes, your comparison w.r.t. to my original claim does not hold. Rand and Kant differed, moreover, on far many more points than Popper and the positivists. The essential difference between the latter was that the positivists embraced the so-called verification principle, a vestige of scientific objectivity, while Popper rejected it. Popper embraced almost every other error expounded by the positivists, while turning into an error what bit of truth the positivists had managed to stumble upon. His doctrine was the next step in the fall of science from the heights of objectivity.

(By the way, I do not consider Popper "evil," just as I do not consider Kant "evil." Popper's critique of totalitarian societies was a worthy effort, if somewhat mistaken in its particulars. But, if one evaluates the damage done to filosofical objectivity, Popper's doctrine has inflicted far more of it than Kant's.)

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 17

Tuesday, July 6, 2004 - 8:13am

No time to fully dive in here ("So what else is new?") but since the subject of the usefulness of definitions has come up, I want to give the gist of my own reply to Orion's article in the form of Ayn Rand's definition of reason:

Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses.

Post 18

Tuesday, July 6, 2004 - 10:54am

I honestly believe that all the issues raised in this article have been answered fully by Peikoff in Understanding Objectivism. It's simply the rationalist/empiricist dichotomy rearing its ugly head... and Daniel is doing his best to try to combat the rationalism that most new-comers to Objectivism grapple with. Most new "Objectivists" - in order to overcome the concrete-bound psycho-epistemology that most people have - tend to emphasize the abstract and the dryly philosophical while shunning experience. Such an error is no small matter; it indicates a profound misunderstanding about the nature of reason and the process of concept formation... and it can produce larger problems further up the philosophical hierarchy (such as an implicit moral/practical ethical dichotomy).

This issue aside, I think that Daniel would profit from re-reading the chapter in OPAR on objectivity, paying close attention to the way in which the concept is used and how it is applied. Daniel seems to be giving the concept a metaphysical essence rather than an epistemological one, and this will ultimately lead to problems down the line.

Post 19

Tuesday, July 6, 2004 - 2:08pm