RoR: Forum

Will answer in due course, Daniel, but please note that Mr. S's ideas, approach, and terminology are not mine and generally speaking not those of Objectivism. (However he is not always wrong and often is a good "argumentator.") I would not stand behind all his views even on this thread. My purpose is just to combat some of the criticisms you have made.

Post 81

Monday, August 2, 2004 - 11:49am

Rodney writes:
>...please note that Mr. S's ideas, approach, and terminology are not mine and generally speaking not those of Objectivism...I would not stand behind all his views even on this thread.

Accepted, of course. But do you and Objectivism agree with this specific statement below?

>Mr S: I say that a particular definition could be incomplete with reference to all the facts of reality, but it is entirely complete within the context of man's present knowledge.

- Daniel B

Post 82

Monday, August 2, 2004 - 12:58pm

I don't know. I would want to study the context once more. That has to wait for now. My quick answer is: it looks like a good example of what I meant when I said "completeness" is an inapplicable standard (in senses 2a and 6a of that dictionary excerpt).

Post 83

Monday, August 2, 2004 - 4:52pm

>Mr Stolyarov wrote:
"I say that a particular definition could be incomplete with reference to all the facts of reality, but it is entirely complete within the context of man's present knowledge."

Rodney wrote about it :
>I don't know (if I agree or not). I would want to study the context once more. That has to wait for now. My quick answer is: it looks like a good example of what I meant when I said "completeness" is an inapplicable standard

So, if this is a "good example" of using an entirely "inapplicable standard", Mr Stolyarov must be talking utterly meaningless nonsense, no? Just as if, to use your other example, he were talking about the "intellectual honesty of a chair".

Yet surely if one is talking blatant rubbish, (like the intellectual honesty of a chair!) one doesn't need to painstakingly "study the context" to determine it? Why all the pondering? Would you say you "don't know" when asked about the intellect of a chair? So is it nonsense or not? Yes or no?

If you think it is nonsense-talk, then I think you should tell us how he *should* be putting the situation, according to you and Objectivism. No great analysis - I'm sure that can wait. Just a simple clear statement will do.

- Daniel B

Post 84

Monday, August 2, 2004 - 6:21pm

Sorry, cannot give a quick answer, because the context might show that he was defending a fact I did believe, but unfortunately by means of terminology he had adopted (perhaps from you or from other philosophers) that implies things I do not believe (which is why one reason definitions are so important). Those implications, yes, would be nonsense, for the very reason I state. But it would mean that he simply took a wrong tack in trying to defend something I think is true. That happens quite a bit, and I think it did happen here.

There are other reasons. One is that I am a slow switcher between editorial work and philosophic discussion.

Post 85

Tuesday, August 3, 2004 - 2:21pm

While Rodney is warming up on the bench I might as well go for a quick summa to date, and then address what is left of his argument.

1) Firstly, it seems that my outrageous claim that "checking your premises" is, contrary to popular prejudice, a complete waste of time has proved outrageously successful. So far so good! It is early days, but we may yet see a victory for reasoned argument over mere dogma on this issue.

2) Rodney's main claim - that in order to call concepts "incomplete" one is compelled to use the "inapplicable" standard of "omniscience" - I believe I have also shown to be false. This is because we can simply use a *different* standard to achieve the same thing; that is the standard of *our experience* - of learning something we didn't know before, or finding out something we thought true was false. From our *experience* of learning, and of being wrong, we can conclude that our concepts were incomplete, and by the same token probably still are.

But as I have been apparently "scattershot" (...;-)) to date, so I will now try to be as thorough as possible.

To this end, I further propose 3): That the claim that the standard of "omniscience" is an "unfit" or "impossible" or "inapplicable" one to human knowledge *can itself be shown to be false*, so that there is no need to repair to a different standard anyway! In other words, contra Rodney, we are perfectly able to use terms like "absolute knowledge" or 'omniscience" or "all the facts of reality" or similar to make perfectly meaningful arguments about anything we like, concepts included, and not violate any laws of reason or metaphysics whatsoever.

This is very easy to demonstrate, because it seems both Rodney (and Ayn Rand for that matter) have forgotten there are things called "hypotheses" and in turn, things called "hypothetical arguments". These, as every first year science student will know, are essential to all scientific enquiry, and consist of imaginative construction of conjectures, which can in turn be tested by both argument and observation to discover how close they have come to the truth.

Here is an example of a hypothesis: "Humans do not know everything in the universe". And due to our growing knowledge of the vastness and complexity of the universe, this hypothesis can considerably strengthened to something like: "Humans only know an infinitesimal fragment of the universe". Both reason, and observation have, since Medieval times, only supported or increased the strength of this hypothesis, so we have every reason to assume it is true. We can therefore quite legitimately use it as a comparison to human knowledge, and of course concepts too, as they are allegedly the only way we can have any knowledge. In doing so, we can appeal to a "hypothetical argument" like this: "Assuming there are far more facts in the universe than we know, we can say human knowledge is incomplete; therefore the concepts which make up this knowledge can *also* be said to be incomplete".

Now, perhaps it could be protested that *hypotheses themselves* are mere "coffee-shop" philosophy; timewasting exercises in "intellectual masturbation" - like the hypothesis that a chair could have intellectual honesty - and that in using them one gives up all true standards, as our hypothetical chair is just the same fantasy as our hypothetical vision of our ignorance of the universe. And this is in fact what Rodney has suggested: that they both are "good examples" of completely inapplicable standards, and therefore are both equally illegitimate and should be done away with.

But actually, it is *the protester* who gives up all standards by making this comparison. For our vision of a vast, complex universe is a *strong* hypothesis, well supported by reason and experience; whereas the "intellectual chair" is an utterly feeble "coffee shop" one, which can be falsified instantly as chairs are not even alive, let alone having brains.

All this seems trivial and simple enough to the non-Objectivist. Yet Rodney, apparently well armed with this mighty intellectual method, *cannot tell the two apart!* At first glance, he says, they are both as bad as each other. Or perhaps he might be able to, he says, given sufficient time to ponder! One can only ponder in turn that if this is this is one of the advantages of his method, one would hate to see the disadvantages!.

In short, in order to prove his point now, Rodney has to do away with either a) critical standards for hypothetical arguments or b) hypothetical arguments themselves. Either way, he gives up *scientific enquiry* - perhaps to replace it with his method, which cannot tell a weak idea from a strong one! I for one do not envy this task...;-)

So now, I think I have shown that his claims fail at every point. Perhaps the only thing left I could do is show 4): that Rodney unwittingly appeals to this same standard he claims is "metaphysically impossible" anyway to make his own arguments. But as I have said before, I think that is obvious enough simply from reading his examples, (like the "meteorite"), but I could probably make this a little clearer when I get time.

- Daniel B

Post 86

Tuesday, August 3, 2004 - 3:40pm

Greetings.

I would like to make a few comments w.r.t. the development of this discussion and the oft quoted statement of mine: �I say that a particular definition could be incomplete with reference to all the facts of reality, but it is entirely complete within the context of man's present knowledge.�

I stand by that statement because I have merely used �completeness� in a different manner from Mr. Rawlings, who used it solely to imply �omniscience.� My standard of completeness is �encompassment of all available information.�

A concept is a metaforical file folder that holds all information we know about an existent. But before we can accurately use that concept, or know what we are talking about, we need to know what information this file folder holds. This requires either chains of logical reasoning or empirical review of the information we have accessible to us. This information need not be the entirety of the information in the universe that pertains to the given existent, but there is nothing that inherently prevents information known from equaling information available. I know everything that is needed to define the concept �cube.� My definition is absolutely and utterly complete and perfect, no matter what future uses of cubes I discover. (This is because what a thing is and how a thing may be used are two different things. How a thing may be used follows from what it is, but it does not constitute its identity.)

This is what I mean, that there may be no ambiguity. I still think Mr. Barnes is mired in the false dichotomy: �Either all concepts contain all possible information about the existents they represent, or no concepts contain all possible information about the existents they represent.� Aristotle went to great lengths to point out why this is a logical error. He came to the insight that the contradictory statement of �All is X� is not �Nothing is X,� but rather �Not all is X.� So the contradictory of �All concepts are complete� is not �No concept is complete,� but �Not all concepts are complete,� which is not anything that is being argued here.

My claim is as follows: �Some concepts are complete, and all concepts could be complete.� I will repeat a claim that has yet gone unanswered by Mr. Barnes:

�It is concrete-bound to think that simply because we are not yet certain of something, we will never be certain of it. Man�s knowledge advances fenomenally, and opens new worlds to human insight and understanding�to sit today in our armchairs and claim that this and that will never be possible is indeed to feign an omniscience that we do not have!�

The above, by the way, is my principal objection to Popperian thought.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Editor-in-Chief, The Rational Argumentator

Proprietor, The Rational Argumentator Online Store

Author, Eden against the Colossus

Post 87

Tuesday, August 3, 2004 - 4:41pm

Daniel, I don�t think you have earned the intellectual right to adopt that tone. I may be *seeing stars* but not intellectually. Furthermore, I have said I am busy (I have eleven chapters of an economics text that have to be done yesterday), and also that I don�t like to make statements out of context.

If you go on in that style (the elementary school instructor telling us all �what everyone knows�), I will stop answering. I don�t need this at this point. I suspect this is why you have been left alone to peter out on other threads.

Post 88

Tuesday, August 3, 2004 - 8:45pm

Rodney writes:
>Daniel, I don�t think you have earned the intellectual right to adopt that tone.

Well, I'm sorry, but aren't you making some pretty strong claims? For example, that it is "metaphysically impossible" to make a simple statement like "concepts can be incomplete"!

>If you go on in that style (the elementary school instructor telling us all �what everyone knows�), I will stop answering. I don�t need this at this point.

This is, of course, entirely your right. The fact is, however, that I find such claims frankly incredible, and this is no doubt shining through in my criticism of them. But certainly, these criticisms could be wrong.

>I suspect this is why you have been left alone to peter out on other threads.

That certainly could be one explanation...;-)

>Furthermore, I have said I am busy (I have eleven chapters of an economics text that have to be done yesterday), and also that I don�t like to make statements out of context.

No hurry. Just trying to be thorough!

- Daniel

Post 89

Tuesday, August 3, 2004 - 9:55pm

Mr S writes:
I will repeat a claim that has yet gone unanswered by Mr. Barnes:
�It is concrete-bound to think that simply because we are not yet certain of something, we will never be certain of it."

But Mr S, that is not a good argument for uncertainty of knowledge anyway! And note: neither does it necessarily follow that because we can be certain of some things, we can be certain of everything either! So your comment is simple speculation - which is of course, no problem in itself!

Why, then, do I think our knowledge is uncertain? While there are many reasons, the most obvious is merely this: *humans are fallible*. This just means we can make mistakes, even about the things we are most certain about (which naturally includes this theory, yes ...yawn...)

That is really all you need say. But if you wanted an additional reason to subscribe to uncertainty as a general principle, it is also that we simply *do not need absolute certainty for knowledge to progress*. We can, and do, and have progressed with rough and vague ideas - in fact the whole point is to eternally improve them. That is why the search for knowledge is an inspiring, never-ending quest.

>Man�s knowledge advances fenomenally, and opens new worlds to human insight and understanding�to sit today in our armchairs and claim that this and that will never be possible is indeed to feign an omniscience that we do not have!�

But of course! I advance it, as with all things, as a conjecture that could someday be proven wrong. But I think there are strong reasons to believe it could be correct too. For example, here's a simple formula that roughly describes how Critical Rationalists describe the progress of knowledge:

p1---TT---EE---p2

p1 stands for a problem to be explained

TT stands for the development of a tentative theory.

EE stands for the process of error elimination, of testing the theory by argument and experience

p2 stand for the new problem(s) generated by the process, which could be greater, smaller, deeper, shallower, etc.

So you can see that the act of problem-solving is also an act of *problem-generation* - thus tending to suggest that there will never be a time when we have solved all problems.

- Daniel B

Post 90

Wednesday, August 4, 2004 - 5:21am

So you intend to continue in that style?

Post 91

Wednesday, August 4, 2004 - 3:41pm

Rodney writes:
>So you intend to continue in that style?

Rodney, I intend to say *exactly* what I think, nothing more or less, and I expect the same of you.

If I think what you are saying is utterly stupid or deeply sensible, wise or foolish, profound or inane, penetrating or impotent, black or white or mauve, rest assured I will say so, as clearly and unequivocally as I can. In return, I sincerely hope you do the same.

Would you have it otherwise?

- Daniel B

Post 92

Wednesday, August 4, 2004 - 5:00pm

So: you intend to continue in that style?

Post 93

Wednesday, August 4, 2004 - 5:46pm

>So: you intend to continue in that style?

Absolutely! And you free to not answer my criticisms for stylistic reasons, or for any reason you like. You don't have to explain. It is entirely up to you.

- Daniel B

Post 94

Friday, August 6, 2004 - 1:03pm

To anyone still reading:

Well, I have been silenced. I do not plan to answer DB�s most recent comments on the topic of definitions, and particularly his most recent discussions of my posts (or rather of a small selection from my posts). DB should not assume that this is because of the power and eloquence of his arguments. I had been drafting extensive notes on my planned reply. (For example, his characterization of the scientific method, while common nowadays, bears no similarity to how science actually proceeds. DB�s �method� is really prescriptive, not descriptive. See my article �667� for some clues to my view.)

My departure is solely due to the incredibly offensive tone he has adopted, and his seemingly fundamental inability to admit making an error.

We are all sarcastic and insulting at times here, of course, but surely there is a limit on a moderated intellectual forum.

I have decided that, if DB can be like this even at moderated status, it is not worth the anguish and the loss of my editorial productivity to remain, despite the real pleasures at SOLOHQ. After all, he may pop up at any time, on any topic, making points that I will be unable to address due to feelings of animosity.

I will be tying up a few loose ends around here, however. There will perhaps be a couple more posts. This definitely not a case of �It�s either him or me.� It is just a matter of what I personally can and cannot do.

Post 95

Friday, August 6, 2004 - 7:00pm

Rodney,

I for one would wish you to stay. Your contributins have been consistently worthwhile! If you do move on please let me know how I might contact you!

Ethan

Post 96

Friday, August 6, 2004 - 10:08pm

Greetings.

I might get around to addressing a few more of Mr. Barnes' comments later, as I myself am quite busy at this time. However, Mr. Rawlings, I, too, would like you to remain on SOLO. One personality conflict in your case should not warrant leaving, as my many personality conflicts with some of the most authoritative figures on this forum demonstrate.

If, however, you are not convinced, and would still like to engage me in a nice intellectual discussion, I will certainly welcome one on The Rational Argumentator Forum: http://rationalarg.proboards24.com or in The Rand Cafe: http://randcafe.proboards23.com.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Editor-in-Chief, The Rational Argumentator

Proprietor, The Rational Argumentator Online Store

Author, Eden against the Colossus

Post 97

Saturday, August 7, 2004 - 4:01am

Rodney writes:
>Well, I have been silenced....My departure is solely due to the incredibly offensive tone (Daniel B) has adopted, and his seemingly fundamental inability to admit making an error.

Rodney, please don't take on so. As you say, my status is moderated, and I have absolutely no complaints about this. Further, I've been on a few discussion groups in the last ten years, and the moderation on this one is absolutely fine - I think everyone who's been moaning about it just needs to get a grip, you included. As a result, what I've said in this debate is in no way "incredibly offensive", though if you think I'm going to tiptoe round the obvious absurdity of your argument, you are arguing with the wrong guy. Remember, you're part of a philosophical movement that not only makes very strong claims about itself, but has unsparingly damned almost every other philosophy before or since. So if you're going to dish it out - and Objectivism most surely does - you'd better be prepared to take it too.

>I have decided that, if DB can be like this even at moderated status, it is not worth the anguish and the loss of my editorial productivity to remain, despite the real pleasures at SOLOHQ. After all, he may pop up at any time, on any topic, making points that I will be unable to address due to feelings of animosity.

Look, there is no doubt you are a perfectly intelligent and highly sensitive fellow, even if you have got a hold of some deeply wrong-headed ideas. I've enjoyed talking to you in the past, and am quite suprised you've taken this route - I was expecting you to come out swinging. Personally I have no wish to destroy your enjoyment of this forum, and get no pleasure at all from this idea. After all, it's your philosophy, not mine. So I'm more than willing to drop out of this forum myself, so there'll be no threat that my "popping up" will cause you unnecessary grief. I'd just ask the list owners to erase my membership - I'm not sure how to do it myself? - and I'll just stick to reading the odd article as a non-member. No problem whatsoever.

In passing, my thanks to the list owners, moderators, and everyone I've agreed and disagreed with over the last little while. I also think the recent idea floated by The Editor about getting someone representing SOLO and Objectivism "out there" is a good one. In my experience Objectivists tend to keep very much to themselves on the internet - they've hardly ever shown up on my other lists, which have been quite varied - and ultimately this is probably not a good thing.

regards

Daniel B

Post 98

Saturday, August 7, 2004 - 6:40pm

A distilled recap of the foregoing problematic discussion, along with a "post summary" for each relevant excerpt:

Post 65-(from Rawlings)
"Concepts are created by humans to stand for certain types of existents that we observe in reality, types that we specify by means of a definition. Definitions perform two tasks: integration with previously observed reality (the genus) and differentiation within it (the differentia). Thus, a meteorite would be defined as a meteor that has fallen to earth. How is this incomplete or approximate merely because we have not seen every meteorite that ever existed or will exist, or because we do not specify where it lands or how big it is?

So you see, for a concept, completeness or incompleteness is an inapplicable standard in the manner implied. Precision is scarcely more appropriate; since man creates concepts himself, there is never any problem with precision for a concept per se, if one does not demand omniscience."

" ... the essential qualities captured by a definition are merely a means of pointing out what class of existents the concept encompasses."

Post summary: Concepts are thinking tools required for making distinctions of things. In this purpose, their level of completeness is not crucial, but their ability to be used to classify some things within - and from - other known things, is.

Post 68-(from Barnes)
"Rodney writes:
>So you see, for a concept, "completeness" or "incompleteness" is an inapplicable standard in the manner implied.

So you are simply saying a concept can be neither "complete", nor "incomplete".

Can you see what is wrong with this claim?

- Daniel B"

Post summary: The inapplicability of a nonessential is the same thing as nonexistence of a nonessential (if it doesn't apply to a regarded purpose, it goes out of existence). Also, the purpose of concepts can be ignored as a standard to judge "applicability."

Post 69-(from Firehammer)
"The�"meaning" of a concept is only whatever it identifies, and nothing more. How much we know about what a concept identifies is irrelevant.�The concept banana identifies the very same thing, whether it is the concept of a child or a botanist.

There is a sense in which the definition of a concept is irrelevant, so long as the person using the word for the concept it represents, knows�exactly what�existents (whether material or mental)�the concept�identifies. Definition is only significant when the referents of a concept are in question. Then the definition must be made very explicit to avoid ambiguity or confusion, but this is the exception, rather than the rule.

Rodney suggests you do not really understand the nature of concepts. I think you do, really, but tend to evade that knowledge in your discussions. What do you think?"

Post Summary: A simple and direct question regarding the nature of concepts.

Post 71-(from Barnes)
"Regi writes:
>Rodney suggests you do not really understand the nature of concepts. I think you do, really, but tend to evade that knowledge in your discussions. What do you think?

Well, Regi, here's the thing: it *is* rather difficult to understand what Rodney is talking about when he insists the nature of concepts is as follows:

Rodney: 'So you see, for a concept, 'completeness' or 'incompleteness' is an inapplicable standard in the manner implied.'

But let me try anyway. To me, this can only mean one thing: that Rodney believes a concept can neither be *complete*, nor *incomplete*. Clearly then, if one is to understand a concept, *one must give up reason in order to do it*!"

Post Summary: A shifty attempt to avoid Regi's direct question by marshalling some nonessentials spoken by another person (revealing note: other's words are not required to answer the question) Picture this: Barnes is on the stand in court and asked about his understanding of concepts. Would his response (that all and only of what he understands about something is that which someone else had once said about it) fly?

Post 72-(from Rawlings)
" ... in my sentence

So you see, for a concept, completeness or incompleteness is an inapplicable standard in the manner implied.

you perceive an outright contradiction (applying Aristotle�s rule of the excluded middle apparently!), and ask whether I can possibly really mean it, and that I am confused and do not know what I am talking about. You missed the relevance of the clause �in the manner implied.� This was a reference to my two previous paragraphs, where I pointed out that the implication of your view is that our definition of meteorite is incomplete because we have not seen every meteorite that ever existed or will exist, or because we do not specify where it lands or how big it is.

My response to that was to say that �completeness� in that sense is an irrational standard by which to judge a concept. The idea is inapplicable. Go to the definition of this word�definitions are important�you will see that it means unable to be applied, not appropriate, not fitting, not proper."

Post summary: Concepts are thinking tools required for making distinctions of things. In this purpose, their level of completeness is not crucial, but their ability to be used to classify some things within - and from - other known things, is.

Post 73-(from Thompson)
"Daniel, I request that you publically admit that Rodney does indeed have a point regarding incompleteness being an irrelevant standard IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS DISCUSSION.

Of course, you are free to continue to attempt to merely portray his words as if they (in this context) violate the law of the excluded middle, and thereby exempt yourself from having to answer his points - as a shyster lawyer might choose to do. But I would simply like to alert you to the potential for judgment (by myself, and possibly by others) which such action will inescapably entail."

Post summary: Concepts are thinking tools required for making distinctions of things. In this purpose, their level of completeness is not crucial, but their ability to be used to classify some things within - and from - other known things, is.

Post 74-(from Barnes)
"You originally said that neither �completeness� *nor �incompleteness�* were applicable to concepts. You�re now saying, however, that only �completeness� of knowledge (or omniscience) cannot be applied as a standard, and indeed, your �every meteorite ever� example shows this very point - that *completeness* of knowledge is an impossible standard to reach, and that we cannot know everything.

Now I would certainly agree with you here ... But by saying this, and by using this very example, you are simply applying the standard of *incompleteness* of knowledge - that we cannot know everything - to concepts (hence, obviously, the necessity for them to be �open-ended� as Mr Stolyarov claimed). Unfortunately, this is precisely the *other* standard you previously insisted cannot apply either!

So you are still very much stuck in the excluded middle, and as I have shown, the context of your example changes nothing, nor did it when I first read it."

Post summary: The inapplicability of a nonessential is the same thing as nonexistence of a nonessential (if it doesn't apply to a regarded purpose, it goes out of existence). Also, the purpose of concepts can be ignored as a standard to judge "applicability."

Post 77-(from Rawlings)
"I have not changed my story at all, Daniel�but perhaps my meaning is clearer to you now? Are you satisfied with my �new story�? Do you now understand? If so, do you now agree?"

Post summary: Concepts are thinking tools required for making distinctions of things. In this purpose, their level of completeness is not crucial, but their ability to be used to classify some things within - and from - other known things, is.

Post 78-(from Barnes)
"However, it turns out the idea that Rodney and Mr S are parroting - that you need to appeal "omniscience" as a standard if you want to describe human knowledge as �incomplete� - is a false one anyway."

"Therefore, to return us to our original point:
Why do you and Mr S insist on "complete" and "precise" definitions (rather than "incomplete" and "inexact" definitions, as I propose) when such standards are either a)inapplicable to (as you claim) or b) not achieveable for (as I have shown) the concepts they are supposed to be describing?"

Post summary: The inapplicability of a nonessential is the same thing as nonexistence of a nonessential (if it doesn't apply to a regarded purpose, it goes out of existence). Also, the purpose of concepts can be ignored as a standard to judge "applicability."

post 79-(from Barnes)
"As a one Critical Rationalist I am acquainted with remarked, the IOE is "the worst book Rand ever wrote, not worth the paper its written on". And he should know, being a very enthusiastic Objectivist when he was very much younger (even met Rothbard way back when etc). Underneath it all, it basically is a method of question-begging, which makes it seem - superficially at least - all-answering."

Post summary: People who were Ojectivists when they were younger (especially if they've met people like Rothbard) should know the real value of IOE (others only have uncritical "sentiments"). If you haven't signed on to the Rand bandwagon until after first becoming a wiser adult (or failed to meet influentials like Rothbard), then you missed the boat - you won't have the "gift." Also, you can make claims (e.g. question-begging) without evidential substantiation in philosophical forums (or at least THIS ONE), and you won't have to marshal support for your claims - evidential support is not really very important at all when discussing world views.

Ed

Post 99

Sunday, August 8, 2004 - 3:53am