RoR: Forum

Daniel wrote:
>OK - so let's hear a decent *counterargument* then!

Mr S replied:
>Let us presume that intelligent green Martian >hippopotamuses demand that all Earthlings adopt laissez-faire >capitalism.

I rest my case!

Mr S continues:
>By the way, "problem" is a concept.... Do you see how Popperian >thinking defeats itself?

Call it what you like. The only way I'd defeat myself here would be to be drawn into a debate over the meaning of words, rather than arguments. And, leaving the silliness of the example aside, your argument above entirely misses the mark anyhow.

Firstly, the idea that problems cannot be solved without "firm, interrelated, and encompassing" philosophical outlook is baloney, as mankind - along with all other animals - has been solving problems since the year dot without anything like that outlook (if they had, Ayn Rand would have been redundant - along with all other philosphers!).

Secondly, focussing on problems instead of words is does not entail *pragmatism*, though of course our suggested solutions should be practical (unless you think they should be impractical?) The focus on problem-situations is aimed at avoiding many of the trivial issues related to language and its vagaries. These are mostly timewasting, and cloud more important issues (although pedants love purely verbal problems as much as Brer Rabbit loved his briar patch)

- Daniel

BTW, given that a concept is “a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted” , could explain exactly how you arrive at a concept like "problem"? Can you just step us through the process here? What units do you use, what are the distinguishing characteristics, what measurements do you leave out?

- Daniel

Post 41

Sunday, July 11, 2004 - 9:15pm

Greetings.

Mr. Barnes, you ignore the point of my green hippopotamus argument. With an approach geared toward "solving problems" as the primary objective, the Popperian thinker will embrace anything that might have a remote chance of "working" to "solve" a "problem," even though he has not defined the above three terms for himself and thus does not know what exactly they mean! Thus, an extreme case of this mentality may be led to invent the green hippopotamus ploy to try and get laissez-faire capitalism embraced. He will fail, and his attempt will be ridiculous, but so is the focus on problems without a focus on meaning, and so will that approach ultimately fail.

Mr. Barnes wrote: "Firstly, the idea that problems cannot be solved without 'firm, interrelated, and encompassing' philosophical outlook is baloney, as mankind - along with all other animals - has been solving problems since the year dot without anything like that outlook..."

Man has also been solving problems prior to Aristotle's discovery of the Scientific Method, as well as during the Dark Ages, when this discovery was lost to the Western world. Do you suggest that we emulate the example of these eras?

Note that in every age that did not accurately explain what and why things are, the pace of progress has been pitiful. For some 4000 years, from the Neolithic Revolution to the 5th century BC, technological advancements were minor, if existent at all. Once, however, the Greek Golden Age came about, men such as Thales, Socrates, Aristotle, Pythagoras, Hippocrates, Euclid, and Archimedes devised systems of thought in their respective fields that derived from fundamental questions and fundamental premises. The result was some six hundred years, until the statism of the Roman Empire, that witnessed immense technological and economic growth. During the Dark Ages, these systems, and the fields of metafysics, were lost, and progress virtually stopped. The Renaissance was sparked largely by Thomas Aquinas' rediscovery and translation of Aristotle, and his creation of a doctrine that altered the face of the Catholic Church from a faith-based monster to a more tolerant, rational, if still flawed entity. Further centuries saw the building of more filosofical systems and, consequently, greater scientific progress. Were it not for the revival of Aristotelian thought, the Renaissance, and science as we know it, would never have existed.

If you try to solve problems without clearly defining and categorizing the existents and fenomena you observe, you will concoct green hippopotamus theories yourself. Man has the epistemological need to explain what happens and why. Either he does it rigorously and systematically, like Aristotle, Rand, or any rational scientist, or he does it arbitrarily, invoking "the word of God," "intuition," "possession," "leaps of faith," or any other superstition that pervaded mankind's bleaker eras. As Rand pointed out, everyone has an implicit filosofy on every level, from metafysics to politics and esthetics. The choice is not whether to have a underpinning to one's actions, but whether to have a firm one. He who does not seek to establish an explicit, conscious filosofy of everything, will end up arbitrarily absorbing whatever hash his social paradigm feeds him, which will imply numerous internal contradictions, confusions, and the non- or anti-intellectuality typical of the lowest common denominator.

Mr. Barnes wrote: "Secondly, focussing on problems instead of words is does not entail *pragmatism*, though of course our suggested solutions should be practical (unless you think they should be impractical?)"

What in the world does practical mean? Can you please tell me what it means without a definition? I could give you my definition of practicality, but, seeing as I consider it a concept, your theory could never accomodate it. How do you know what practicality is and what being practical entails? How can you even try to know this without conceding that there are definite, objective, and precise filosofical underpinnings to any endeavor that involves this "practicality"?

Mr. Barnes wrote: "BTW, given that a concept is “a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted” , could explain exactly how you arrive at a concept like "problem"? Can you just step us through the process here? What units do you use, what are the distinguishing characteristics, what measurements do you leave out?"

Very well. Let us begin with an observation that is supplemented by an already existing knowledge of the filosofy of rational self-interest. Human beings seek to pursue their self-interest. Often they encounter situations that are conducive to this self-interest, and at other times they encounter situations that are detrimental to it. The characteristic of being detrimental to one's self-interest is what distinguishes a given set of fenomena, i.e. problems, from all other fenomena, that are either beneficial or neutral w.r.t. one's self-interest. The measurements we leave out are the magnitudes to which problems can be detrimental to one's self-interest. For example, a plague epidemic in one's city is more detrimental to one than a scrape on one's elbow. Yet, we can consider both to be problems that can be solved, "solved" meaning to be brought into such a state of events as to no longer pose any detriment to one's self-interest.

I do not see what your problem with this is! :)

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 42

Monday, July 12, 2004 - 9:12am

BTW, given that a concept is “a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted,” could you explain exactly how you arrive at a concept like “problem”? Can you just step us through the process here? What units do you use, what are the distinguishing characteristics, what measurements do you leave out?

Think of the things you presently refer to as problems. At one point early in your life you had encountered several of these and noticed their similarities and differences. These are the units, which you integrated when you first grasped the word (more exactly, the concept) “problem.” Basically, the units were any situations or questions that required thinking on your part. These are the distinguishing/integrating characteristics. Stolyarov is right that one of the measurements left out is the magnitude of the problem (be it noted: he is defining “problem” only in a certain narrow sense of the word). But other omitted measurements are the difficulty of the problem, what the problem’s subject matter is--a math test? how to survive on the moon? how to maximize profits?--etc.

One might ask: How is “subject matter” a measurement? Are the differences between a problem on a mathematics exam, the problem of how to live on the moon, and the problem of improving the bottom line differences in the degree of something? Yes, ultimately they are. One must remember that all concepts rest, in the end, on the evidence of the senses, and our first differentiations are between sensory impressions. Within the sense of sight, colors are based on the wavelengths of light, a measurable phenomenon. To distinguish sound from sight, we rely (not consciously) on the differences in the brain mechanisms that result in two different states of awareness. These are very complex, but reduce to measurement differences between the things involved in these states.

And so on up the conceptual chain. As one goes higher and higher, with various types of qualities getting in on the act, it becomes more and more difficult to see omitted variations as a measurement issue. This is understandable. For some, it may be congenial to think of them as variations of expression of the characteristics in question. Thus, the essential elements of a problem can be manifest as how to find the root of an equation, how to supply air pressure and oxygen to an astronaut, or how to minimize expenses. These are the different “measurements” of subject matter.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 7/12, 10:19am)

Post 43

Monday, July 12, 2004 - 9:53pm

Mr S writes:
>Mr. Barnes, you ignore the point of my green hippopotamus argument.

I must have been distracted by their ballet dancing...;-)

>With an approach geared toward "solving problems" as the primary objective, the Popperian thinker will embrace anything that might have a remote chance of "working" to "solve" a "problem," even though he has not defined the above three terms for himself and thus does not know what exactly they mean!

Mr S, this is my very point: I do not *need* to know "exactly" what those terms mean. I know *roughly* or *approximately* what they mean and that is quite enough. Let me get this clear: I am not against words, definitions or dictionaries!! Like any tool, they are all perfectly useful so long as we understand their limitations.

What I am against is the idea that *precisely defining words will lead to precise arguments*. For, despite the prima facie reasonableness of this, it is actually a *logical fallacy* that leads to the opposite - to very imprecise arguments, and a potentially infinite regress. It is this problem (ie: that any definition requires an additional term, which then requires an additional definition, which then requires another term, and so on...) that you will have to demonstrate does not exist in order to prove me wrong.

>Man has also been solving problems prior to Aristotle's discovery of the Scientific Method, as well as during the Dark Ages, when this discovery was lost to the Western world. Do you suggest that we emulate the example of these eras?

But Mr S, if my above argument is correct, Aristotle's philosophy is neither "firm, interrelated" or "encompassing". It is, in fact, fundamentally flawed. Nonetheless, it has still been useful in the growth of knowledge, and was undoubtedly a better theory than much that preceded it. Hence the steps forwards that accompanied it. See? Perfection isn't the issue.

>If you try to solve problems without clearly defining and categorizing the existents and fenomena you observe, you will concoct green hippopotamus theories yourself.

And if you spend all your time defining your terms - and you must do this, unless you arbitrarily stop at some point - you will never get around to concocting anything useful at all! Not even green hippos.

>He who does not seek to establish an explicit, conscious filosofy of everything, will end up arbitrarily absorbing whatever hash his social paradigm feeds him, which will imply numerous internal contradictions, confusions, and the non- or anti-intellectuality typical of the lowest common denominator.

"Theories of everything" can tell us nothing.

>What in the world does practical mean? Can you please tell me what it means without a definition?

See my para 1&2 above. Words have meanings. They are just vague, and we should not waste time pretending that which is vague is actually precise.

- Daniel

Post 44

Monday, July 12, 2004 - 10:58pm

Rodney writes:
>Think of the things you presently refer to as problems.

Let's see:
An argument with my wife; a chess problem; a technical glitch with my computer; and from Mr S, a scraped elbow and a plague city.

Rodney continues:
>..all concepts rest, in the end, on the evidence of the senses, and our first differentiations are between sensory impressions...(like)... wavelengths of light, a measurable phenomenon. To distinguish sound from sight, we rely (not consciously) on the differences in the brain mechanisms that result in two different states of awareness. These are very complex, but *reduce to measurement differences between the things involved in these states*.

OK, so now I must omit the measurements of the "units" involved (ie: so everything measures zero). But I have to admit this all seems incredibly vague. Firstly, what exactly *are* the units involved? What "sense impressions" am I supposed to be integrating/differentiating? The light waves reaching me from my wife? Her mental processes - and mine? The feel of the chess pieces? The electricity in my computer? My fearfulness of the plague? Jeez, where's the CCD here?

Secondly, even if I can identify the "units" I'm somehow supposed to be integrating/differentiating (say, my wife's thought patterns, which have lead to the argument, and the position of the chess pieces in the game, and the bacteria of the plague) if I have omitted their measurements (ie: whatever they are, they all have zero proportions) then I surely am integrating or differentiating *nothings*!

Finally, if this all this happens unconsciously from birth - and no doubt it must - what is the role of *conscious* reason in this process of conceptual integration? Do I learn to consciously reason, and upon learning it have to go back and start consciously integrating lightwaves according to the laws of formal logic? Or are you saying we are all born with reason-based conceptual integration already functioning, but the exposure to a world full of corrupt philosophy destroys this - so we can no longer integrate/differentiate the zero measurements of lightwaves properly? I must say, rather than a solid bedrock upon which the one true philosophy is unerringly built, the whole idea seems entirely loose and speculative (of course, that's not a bad thing in *my* book!)

>And so on up the conceptual chain. As one goes higher and higher, with various types of qualities getting in on the act, it becomes more and more difficult to see omitted variations as a measurement issue.

Whew! You're not kidding. It's getting difficult to see much at all...;-)

- Daniel

Post 45

Tuesday, July 13, 2004 - 9:30am

Daniel, when I said “Think of the things you presently refer to as problems,” I was asking you to think of the units of the concept. Thus, how to resolve the argument with your wife, how to achieve checkmate, and how to fix your computer are the units subsumed under the concept of a problem—in other words, they are examples of problems. These are differentiated from everything else, and integrated with each other, on the basis of their differences from such things as inconveniences, ecstasy, and cats, and their similarities with each other.

Now, as Ayn Rand has said, similarity is the relationship between two things which have the same characteristics but in different measure or degree. In the case of problems, what they all have in common is the fact that they are questions or situations that require thought on your part to resolve. How they differ is obvious: the severity of the problem; the difficulty of the problem; the subject matter of the problem (your marital relationship, a chess game, your computer’s health); etc. These are the “measurements” mentally omitted in the formation of the concept. Every problem has a severity of some degree, every problem has a difficulty of some degree, and every problem has some subject matter (which in the last analysis, as I tried to explain, is a complex matter of differences of degree).

I hope this is clearer. Let me deal with each of your requests in the paragraph I quoted in turn:

1. “[C]ould you explain exactly how you arrive at a concept like ‘problem’?” By observing particular problems (not yet having formed the concept), noting what they all have in common and how they differ from everything else, and uniting them on this basis while ignoring everything else about them—the particular degree to which they have these essential qualities. By implication, I am fitting them into the genus-and-differentia categories of a formal definition, whether or not I actually formulate one.

2. “What units do you use?” The particular problems themselves; in this instance, the actual “how to” items listed above. Strictly speaking, I do not use them but start to regard the particulars as units.

3. “What are the distinguishing characteristics?” These correspond to the differentiae. One first needs a genus, which here is “questions” or “situations.” The differentiae are the fact that the questions or situations demand to be considered, solved, or answered—that they require thought on your part. Not all questions and situations require you to think, and not all those that do are present to your mind now in exactly that way, so you would not conceive of them as problems.

4. “What measurements do you leave out?” All the measurements of all the differences between the units: the subject matter of your thought, the intensity of the thought required, and the importance of the issue you are considering (there may be other things here; I am writing quickly). You leave them out because, although every problem has these, the concept of a problem subsumes every problem there ever was, is now, and ever will be.

Digression on definitions: I agree with you, Daniel, that in many, many contexts it is not necessary to make constant or conscious reference to definitions. But in intellectual discussions, especially those in philosophy, definitions become crucial. Most words have several senses, and in many cases the differences between them are subtle. If one does not keep one’s mind in focus with clear definitions, it is very easy to fall into the logical fallacy of equivocation.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 7/13, 5:35pm)

Post 46

Thursday, July 15, 2004 - 10:49am

Greetings.

Mr. Barnes: Mr S, this is my very point: I do not *need* to know "exactly" what those terms mean. I know *roughly* or *approximately* what they mean and that is quite enough.

Mr. Stolyarov: The crucial point to realize is that you do not. Ayn Rand wrote, and stated during her workshop on epistemology, that, if one is unable to clearly and precisely formulate an idea in words, one does not truly have a grasp on that idea. Vague or approximate inklings are not enough. That would be like trying to design an automobile with only a rough idea of how to build it. During the "Rational Defense of Marriage" debate, I defended the need for relationship contracts by comparing the situation of a non-contractualized relationship to the creation of an advanced machine without a precise blueprint. Even if one has the technical skills to do it, one is far more likely than not to fail because of an inadvertent error that could have been averted had one paid greater attention to the constituent parts of the machine to be put together.

Let me give a few examples:

* A lot of politicians like to claim that the world "AIDS epidemic" is a "problem," and a problem that must concern me and you. From my lifestyle choices, I know that I am invulnerable to the disease, as are most intelligent upper-middle-class individuals in developed countries. I hope I make a reasonable assumption that you are in a similar position. Well, is the AIDS epidemic a "problem," like the politicians claim? And is it worthy of hurling taxpayers' money toward? Objectivism, extrapolated, provides a consistent answer. How does your thinking treat the issue?

* A lot of "sociologists," "psychologists," and politicians also claim teenage computer game playing to be a "problem." (Granted, this comes from a biased source: I enjoy an occasional hour of military strategy or emprie-building games on the computer.) Yet, even the most vacuous of these games serve to keep many of the less refined teenagers off the streets, away from bars, night clubs, whorehouses, and drugs. Moreover, the more advanced computer games assist in the development and application of a strategic, logical mode of thinking that follows definite rules in a given context. How can you answer whether or not this tendency is a "problem" without knowing precisely what constitutes a problem in the first place?

You may, with your vague and imprecise notions of what a problem is, be able to pinpoint some obvious instances (say, a case of cancer in one's family, or a persistent conflict in one's mind about whether or not the Big Bang Theory is accurate), but what about the "borderline" cases, where different people, coming from different premises, can make different classifications? Do you not agree that some of these classifications are correct, and others wrong? Moreover, do you not agree that a particular method, a scientific system (I use "scientific" to refer, in this context, to a foundational science, like filosofy or mathematics, not a natural science, which is derivative of a foundational science), is needed to determine which interpretations are right and which are wrong?

(The AIDS and computer game issues are two examples of current, relevant issues of personal concern that are left unanswered by the Popperian approach. Rand never explicitly addressed them, but Objectivist principles very well can, as they can be applied to every other issue. The best argument thus far w.r.t. AIDS comes from Mr. Firehammer's Autonomist. As for the best argument concerning computer games... I suppose that task is incumbent upon me.)

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 47

Thursday, July 15, 2004 - 1:03pm

Greetings.

Furthermore, I would like to address Mr. Barnes' argument about infinite regress given an emfasis on precise definitions.

Mr. Barnes wrote: "And if you spend all your time defining your terms - and you must do this, unless you arbitrarily stop at some point - you will never get around to concocting anything useful at all! Not even green hippos."

But you see, Mr. Barnes, Objectivism does not arbitrarily stop at some point. It deliberately stops where it is impossible to go further or become more fundamental! It stops, that is, at the axioms of metafysics: existence, identity, and consciousness. These axioms are irreducible further. They cannot be proved, but they are verified with one's every contention and action, even in the very attempt to deny them. One cannot analyze anything more thoroughly than when one has linked it to the proposition that existence exists! Rand has been able to do this with the entirety of her fundamental insights in epistemology, ethics, politics, and esthetics, and has left a known set of relationships to the principal axioms that can be used for further extrapolation of Objectivist thought. For example, it is already known how laissez-faire capitalism is linked to the three axioms, and thus we are left with a far more targeted "problem" than merely "What is the best social structure?" Rather, the problem becomes much clearer: "What is the best way to implement laissez-faire capitalism?" Rand offered even more guidance, and allows us to ask questions like "What is the best way to do away with compulsory taxation?" or "How do we best go about privatizing education?" And each answer we devise when we pay heed to the known fundamentals is going to be firm every step of the way. You cannot build the 100th floor of a skyscraper without having a foundation, a steel frame, and the other 99 floors! This analogy helps understand why an interrelated, consistent filosofical structure is so necessary.

And no, I do not believe that definitions can be used, but with "limitations." Should we artificially impose "limitations" on how stable the frame of a skyscraper can be? Should we put in a few pieces of steel here and there, but avoid riveting them together for fear of "infinite regress" to the ground (It is a long way from the 100th floor!) or mold the steel into a shape that only "roughly" resembles the frame we want, because we need only have an approximate idea of how it should look like?

If you do not want that sort of treatment to be afforded the buildings you live and work in, why allow it to pervade a far more proximate and fundamental realm, the structures of your mind?

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 48

Saturday, July 17, 2004 - 9:04pm

Mr Stolyarov, there appears to be a persistent confusion at the heart of your replies on this topic. The confusion is over this:

Mr Stolyarov quotes:
>Ayn Rand wrote, and stated during her workshop on epistemology, that, if one is unable to clearly and precisely formulate an idea in words, one does not truly have a grasp on that idea.

The point you have been missing, Mr S, is that I *agree* with this! The very thing I am trying to show you that this aim of “clearly and precisely formulating an idea
in words” is not the same as *arguing over the definitions of words*, and is in fact defeated by this process (Of course, Ayn Rand does not seem to have realised this either – that her aim would be defeated by her chosen method). As I have clearly demonstrated already (eg: post 124 in "A Pre-Emptive Dialectic...", among many others), debate over defintions leads to the *opposite* of clarity and precision: to arguments over ever-foggier defining terms, and to a potentially infinite regress.

Now, it turns out your ultimate appeal to axioms like “A=A” fails to get you out of difficulties in any way. For, even if it did ultimately block the regress of definitions, by the time we reached it we would long ago have forgotten what it is we were debating! So this can hardly be said to add to “clarity and precision” of arguments. Furthermore, even if we allow this is the case, in fact *any appeal to axioms destroys your whole point*. For you may not realise that you can choose to take this option at *any* point in the regress; even at the beginning, by simply saying “a problem is a problem”! Unfortunately, no matter when you take this option – straightaway or after however many regressive steps - it immediately undermines your basic claim, which is that defining your terms leads to ever greater precision. Because if you appeal to A=A, your second term is the same as the first; therefore, you must admit *you have added no greater precision with your method than when you started*!

So much for your logical argument. Now, taking your analogy - the design of an automobile – it becomes clear that this supports my point of view, and not yours. For when designing an automobile, almost nothing rests on the word “automobile” itself (which, after all, just means “self-moving” in its root form, so is a very vague formulation anyway). And engineers and designers don’t sit around arguing about the “true definition” of the words “bolt” or “chassis” or “suspension” or such like. Their focus is on the problems to be solved, like “how do we best hold these parts together”, or “how can we make the ride more comfortable?”. They then put forward plans and proposals on how to best solve these problems. (If greater accuracy is required for a term like “bolt” in the context of solving a specific problem, an additional description like “3mm” gets added to it. They know roughly the meaning of the word “bolt” - the question of its “true meaning” could not be less important. One can see if the design of automobiles had been left to devotees of Aristotelian method, we would all still be walking!)

Similarly, your “AIDS” and “computer games” do not make your point; rather, they make mine again, in that they are not *problems in themselves* (by definition, as it were). Actually, the problems (of which there are many) are things like “How can AIDS be cured?” or “how can I avoid catching AIDS” or “How should people with AIDS best be cared for?”. So you can see, the issue is one of *problem-situations*, not the absolutely precise definition of words.

I suppose at this point, I should also mention that the logically regressive nature of the essentialist method is merely the first of *three* problems that admirers of this method can, as Popper remarks, “neither escape or solve.”

1)The problem of distinguishing between mere verbal conventions and “true” definitions.

2) The problem of distinguishing between “true” and “false” definitions. (and this applies to vague terms like “life”, “freedom”, “democracy” - or even simple terms like “puppy”!) This turns out to be logically impossible - and incidentally this problem defeated even the inventor of logic himself, Aristotle; for it is the very reason he had to resort to his mysterious “intellectual intuition” to tell true definitions from false ones, and thus preserve his system! (Now, I know you will probably not believe it when I say this! So I intend to examine these first two problems in more detail over the next few posts.)

3) The third is the regressive nature of definitions, where time is wasted in endless preliminaries arguing over the meanings of words, and not proposals for solving problems. This we have now discussed at length, and I hope you are starting to see this particular argument is very sound.

Now, despite all this,you may still sincerely believe that arguing over definitions really does improve the precision of your arguments; or you may think it is “self-evident” that it does, as it was once thought “self evident” that the sun went around the earth; or you may have picked this idea up from your environment, or you might have been told this rather forcefully and dogmatically, and find it difficult to give up once taken to heart, even in the face of logical arguments you cannot refute. You may think it is the foundation of many other important things you believe, and that giving up this method will mean giving up these things too (this is not necessarily the case, however)

But I am afraid you will have to give this idea up eventually. For it is the price of being rational that a beautiful, dearly held theory must finally fall in the face of a single ugly fact. And as I think I can demonstrate, there not just one, but *three* rather ugly facts that essentialists must face, and must finally admit that they can do nothing about.

And of course, the definition of a phanatic is, roughly, one who clings to his arguments in spite of the phacts….;-)

-Daniel

Post 49

Sunday, July 18, 2004 - 2:50pm

Greetings.

Mr. Barnes: Mr Stolyarov quotes:
>Ayn Rand wrote, and stated during her workshop on epistemology, that, if one is unable to clearly and precisely formulate an idea in words, one does not truly have a grasp on that idea.

The point you have been missing, Mr S, is that I *agree* with this! The very thing I am trying to show you that this aim of “clearly and precisely formulating an idea
in words” is not the same as *arguing over the definitions of words*, and is in fact defeated by this process

Mr. Stolyarov: Let me try to clarify your stance here. You agree with my statement, and thus would likely see no problem with giving a formulation such as, "I seek to create an automobile, which is a land-based vehicle performing transportation services in the absence of manual exertion to serve as its motive force." Surely, the first inventors of the automobile had to use similar terms to explain to customers and other relevant persons what they were undertaking. But you would take issue with a corollary discussion that then attempts to define "vehicle," "transportation," "motive force," "land," "manual," or "seek."

Am I correct to infer this?

Mr. Barnes: Now, it turns out your ultimate appeal to axioms like “A=A” fails to get you out of difficulties in any way. For, even if it did ultimately block the regress of definitions, by the time we reached it we would long ago have forgotten what it is we were debating!

Mr. Stolyarov: Man is not infallible, and even the best of men can at times lose themselves in the complexity and multifaceted nature of a debate, so as to lose sight of the original thesis discussed. This has happened to me before, and I have observed it happen on certain SOLO threads. Though I see this scenario as a valid possibility, I do not see it as a necessary one. For example, a sufficiently strong will to retain structure in the debate and not drift away on tangents could allow a systematic examination of the multi-level hierarchy of terms and definitions involved. This is why a written argument is much more efficient than a spoken one. The nature, context, and aims of the debate are well documented and can be easily referenced to guide the debate's further structure. Thus, I see no inevitability in losing focus by trying to uncover everything concerning a given subject matter, right down to the fundamentals, in a discussion such as this one.

Mr. Barnes: Furthermore, even if we allow this is the case, in fact *any appeal to axioms destroys your whole point*. For you may not realise that you can choose to take this option at *any* point in the regress; even at the beginning, by simply saying “a problem is a problem”!

Mr. Stolyarov: I do not share this view, and I challenge you to give me any scenario that you would consider to result in infinite regress if its constituent definitions were to be dissected, so that I may demonstrate where exactly I would choose to claim recourse to the axioms and why.

Moreover, the identity axiom of Objectivism are inextricably tied to three corollary propositions in ontology, which Mr. Firehammer did a great service to point out in his treatise on Perception.

These are, using Mr. Firehammer's words, the three propositions:

The first corollary of identity: Anything that exists must have some qualities.
The second corollary of identity: Anything that exists must be different in some way from everything else that exists and have some quality or combination of qualities no other existent has.
The third corollary of identity Anything that exists must have some relationship to everything else that exists.

In any discussion, we refer to existents. A concept, such as a "problem" is an existent much as a concrete, such as a "cat," is. When we define an existent so as to fulfill the three propositions of ontology for that existent, and to leave no confusion as to what the constituent terms involved are, then we have fulfilled the task of precisely defining our terms, and can move on to applying them in a similarly precise manner.

So, for a problem, 1) What are its qualities? 2) How is it differentiated from all other existents? 3) How is it related to everything else that exists?

Until we can answer those questions, we cannot use term "problem" with full accuracy. There are bound to be mistakes, and some of those mistakes can be tragic.

Which brings me to my next point.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 50

Sunday, July 18, 2004 - 3:10pm

Greetings.

Mr. Barnes: Similarly, your “AIDS” and “computer games” do not make your point; rather, they make mine again, in that they are not *problems in themselves* (by definition, as it were). Actually, the problems (of which there are many) are things like “How can AIDS be cured?” or “how can I avoid catching AIDS” or “How should people with AIDS best be cared for?”. So you can see, the issue is one of *problem-situations*, not the absolutely precise definition of words.

Mr. Stolyarov: You have able, for yourself, to decide that AIDS is not a problem in itself, and I agree with you on this. I think that the questions you ask and put forth as problem scenarios are far more accurate than the rantings of politicians that condemn AIDS per se as a problem, to be solved by pouring taxpayer money at it. However, how do you justify your stance, in the context of identifying a "problem"? If you have only an "approximate" or "practical" idea of what a problem is, on what grounds do you assert that AIDS is not a problem in itself, but the questions you put forth are?

Moreover, how would you defend yourself against the politicians I had mentioned, when they put forth their newest Big Brother scheme? Would Popperian thinking allow you not only to claim that AIDS per se is not a problem, but why you can legitimately say that? My thinking certainly would impel me to try.

Mr. Barnes: 1)The problem of distinguishing between mere verbal conventions and “true” definitions.

Mr. Stolyarov: 1) The solution of establishing logical consistency in the uses of a given word. These uses, in the context of a rational discussion, must be non-contradictory, and must define an existent as per the three ontological propositions.

For example, the use of the word "selfishness" in the true, Randian sense involves neither coercion for the benefit of self, nor the allowance of coercion for the detriment of self. Yet, the popular and flawed connotation of selfishness presumes that the former tendency is true. These two things cannot coexist, and thus, we must discard the popular connotation in favor of the genuine meaning of the concept, since selfishness can be defined via the three ontological propositions:

1) It has the qualities manifested by individuals pursuing their own interests.
2) It is distinguished from sacrificing others on behalf of self, and sacrificing self on behalf of others.
3) It has a relationship to the behavior of all entities with volitional consciousness, which exist in the absolute reality and can interact with all components of said reality.

Mr. Barnes: The problem of distinguishing between “true” and “false” definitions. (and this applies to vague terms like “life”, “freedom”, “democracy” - or even simple terms like “puppy”!) This turns out to be logically impossible - and incidentally this problem defeated even the inventor of logic himself, Aristotle; for it is the very reason he had to resort to his mysterious “intellectual intuition” to tell true definitions from false ones, and thus preserve his system!

Mr. Stolyarov: Aristotle merely lived at a very early stage in the development of filosofy and did not have the firm intellectual foundation for logically (as opposed to "intuitively," whatever quality that denotes) determining the truth or falsity of definitions. It is accord with the most fundamental propositions possible, i.e. the axioms (Does this existent exist? Does it have a definable nature/identity? Can man consciously perceive it?) and the inextricable corollary ontological propositions (What qualities does it have? What distinguishes it from everything that is not it? What relationship has it to existence?). Inconsistent or flawed definitions cannot answer this. A democracy is supposed to be a warm, fuzzy term connoting "freedom" in the modern political lingo, but what distinguishes it from other forms of government? The unlimited ability of the majority to do whatever, including violate the liberties of the minority! Thus, there is an internal conflict in this definition, and examining the propositions that its advocates would present to meet the tests presented by the first and second ontological corollaries, one would find that their answer for the first would contradict their answer for the second. A true definition passes the tests immaculately.

Aristotle did not know this, and could be forgiven, but we have the benefit of accessing the innovations of Rand and Firehammer, whose discoveries have given us the ability to systematically approach the matter.

Now everyone following this debate may understand my immense enthusiasm for Mr. Firehammer's formulations in "Perception." Without them, I might well have been disarmed by Mr. Barnes in this debate. But I am not beaten yet, for it is a fortified Objectivism (yes, I know Mr. Firehammer would not approve of that terminology) that he must challenge!

Mr. Barnes: (Now, I know you will probably not believe it when I say this! So I intend to examine these first two problems in more detail over the next few posts.)

Mr. Stolyarov: Please do. I am interested in seeing what you have to say, and how you respond to the case I had built here.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

Post 51

Sunday, July 18, 2004 - 6:59pm

I suppose Daniel will get around to answering me, but I would like to inform him that my last post was intended only as a clarification of my post before that; it did not try to address his reply to that first post--which reply indicated that I had not been understood.

In essence, I was not describing any way of addressing problems, I was merely describing the process by which all concepts are formed. Then, I went on to explain how the ideas of units, distinguishing characteristics, and omitted measurements fit into the theory--since Daniel expressed confusion on that.

Definitions are only intended to solidify or point out what you mean by concepts/words. They are a supportive background (unless one is engaged in formulating new concepts and defining those). If in the course of a reasoning process you equivocate, if you change the referents of your words or concepts by accident or on purpose, you start not knowing, or start evading, what you are talking about. Keeping your concepts straight is only one part of reason, but it is something that it is very easy to fail at in intellectual contexts.

A very simple example is how to answer those who ask: "If a Creator does not exist, who created the universe?" or "Where did the universe come from?" or "Why does anything exist at all?" The first two questions equivocate (switch between two definitions of) "universe," while the second ignores the definition of "why."

Post 52

Monday, July 19, 2004 - 2:32am

Daniel wrote:
>“What measurements do you leave out?”

Rodney wrote:
>All the measurements of all the differences between the units: the subject matter of your thought, the intensity of the thought required, and the importance of the issue you are considering (there may be other things here; I am writing quickly). You leave them out because, although every problem has these, the concept of a problem subsumes every problem there ever was, is now, and ever will be.

Rodney, I appreciate your reply, and hope to get back to this soon. Like you, I am a little short of time currently!

Suffice to say for now, the situation appears to be rather like the film critic Pauline Kael's famous comment about the movie "Heaven's Gate". She said, "I can see what I'd cut out. The problem is that I can't see what I'd keep!"

- Daniel

Post 53

Monday, July 19, 2004 - 8:03am

Is that the only part of my posts you are going to answer?

Post 54

Monday, July 19, 2004 - 2:07pm

Rodney wrote:
>Is that the only part of my posts you are going to answer?

I was going to cover *all* your remarks in post 45, unless there's something you specifically want me to comment on?

I'm tied up on a project till next week however, but I will come back to it after that...;-)

(Ditto with Mr S. And thanks for your replies!)

regards

Daniel

Post 55

Monday, July 19, 2004 - 3:08pm

No, I was just wondering why you quoted only that one section, but I think I get it now.

I'm a bit relieved, because I can't give my full mind to these discussions. I don't know why I keep diving in!

Post 56

Friday, July 23, 2004 - 7:09pm

Mr. Stolyarov:
>Let me try to clarify your stance here. You agree with my statement, and thus would likely see no problem with giving a formulation such as, "I seek to create an automobile, which is a land-based vehicle performing transportation services in the absence of manual exertion to serve as its motive force." ..." Am I correct to infer this?

Greetings Mr Stolyarov:

With this example, you are definitely getting there! For your “first inventors” did not sit around aguing about what the true “definition” of the concept “automobile” was before they picked up a spanner. It is also worth pointing out that they did apparently did not feel it necessary to "check their premises" to verify if their concept “automobile” was based on "the facts of reality", or was really just a floating figment of their imagination to be suitably pooh-poohed. And it is probably just as well, given that prior to its invention an automobile had approximately the same epistemological status as a mermaid. So you can see if they had been true Aristotelian Objectivists, they would probably still be talking - and we would still be walking!

Now, as your example shows, the term “automobile”is of no serious significance to our inventors, and is simply the answer to the question “what shall we call a land based vehicle that is self powered?”

And here we arrive at a very important distinction: between the Aristotelian method of definition, which I will call "methodological essentialism" - and the alternative: the scientific method, which I will call "methodological nominalism" (to distinguish it from its metaphysical version).

Now, let’s examine the difference. In the Aristotelian method, (which we call the “ordinary method” in deference to this ancient bad habit we have all inherited) the definition reads from *left to right*. It starts with the question of the *term* ("automobile") on the left hand side , with the answering *defining formula* ("..a land-based vehicle performing transportation services in the absence of manual exertion to serve as its motive force...") on the right. As you know, the definition in Objectivism, as per Aristotle, contains all our knowledge of the concept, plus all the other concepts (symbolised by words) that are subsumed within that concept - in the case of “automobile”, those subsumed concepts might be “spoke”, “wheel”, “screw”,”axle”, “seat”, “brake” etc; plus, I suppose, the concepts governing internal combustion, accelaration, inertia etc; and aesthetic concepts regarding colour, design; and so forth. And of course, it implicitly contains all the concepts we don’t yet know about and may not know for a very long time, if ever, such as the ultimate nature of its atoms or of the forces that act on it such as gravity.

Now you can immediately see the Aristotelian method, if applied consistently, becomes impractical in the extreme, as it turns even a very short simple story like “automobile” into a very long, very complex one (which was pointed out at the time by Antisthenes, much to Aristotle’s annoyance) and a happy hunting ground for pedants and verbalists of all stripes. Perhaps worst of all, even after expending much time and trouble as per above, this method’s defenders must also admit their definitions will always be necessarily incomplete (see note 1 below), as we simply don’t know what it is we don’t know about a concept! At this point, what follows this a forced retreat to handwaving arguments, various mutterings about “complex high-level conceptual integrations”, and so on, signalling that we have come full circle, and the return to the original vagueness of the term is complete!...;-)

Whereas the modern scientific method, such as our inventors use, is the *exact opposite*: for assumes from the start that our knowledge is incomplete, thus allowing us to cut to the chase! With this method, the definition reads *from right to left*: from the question “what shall we call a land based vehicle that is self powered?” on the right hand side to the answer, the term “automobile”, on the left. So it makes a long story (as long as you like!) very conveniently short. Also as opposed to the essentialist method, the scientific definitions do not contain any knowledge at all - they merely introduce words as arbitrary labels that can be used and adapted for convenience, and thrown away once they have are no longer useful (like a “landau” after the automobile was invented!). Further, there is no loss to our knowledge at all by eliminating definitions from our arguments, as we can always reintroduce a longer explanatory formula if and when it is required. But this is not nearly as necessary as it is in Aristotle's version, for you can see whole the primary focus of argument is shifted; it is now is on “what is the problem to be solved?”, not “what is the ultimately true defintion of your word?”. And so with this method, knowledge can be advanced by focussing on real problems, and pedantry is now in its rightful place on the back-burner!

(It is worth stressing once again that this adoption of nominalism is one of *method*, and does not necessarily entail a metaphysical nominalism; just as in Objectivism Aristotle’s essentialist method is pressed into service for Conceptualist metaphysics)

Mr Stolyarov writes:
>I challenge you to give me any scenario that you would consider to result in infinite regress if its constituent definitions were to be dissected, so that I may demonstrate where exactly I would choose to claim recourse to the axioms and why.

I am happy to take you up on your challenge! However, I’m not sure you’ve fully taken on board my point: that if the purpose of definitions is to increase the precision of terms, the minute he resorts to using an axiom, *the essentialist has admitted defeat for his method*! For with an axiom your second term is the same as your first, therefore adds no precision at all. So it doesn’t matter *when* you repair to an axiom; all it means is that your method breaks down either sooner, or later. Up to you!

Now, as a kind of last ditch effort in the face of this, the essentialist might still attempt to argue that when one arrives at an axiom ( for example, “Existence is existence” or “Existence exists”), one has arrived at the very acme of precise language, where meaning is as clear as crystal, and not even the slightest confusion is possible. But I would claim the opposite - that this formulation is as woolly as any other, and probably worse! And as an prime example of a typical confusion from this formulation, I will quote none other than Ayn Rand herself, from the IOE (Chapter:”Concepts as Mental Existents”):

“I want to stress this; it is a very important distinction. A great number of philosophical errors and confusions are created by failing to distinguish between consciousness and existence...”

Now here she has clearly said “consciousness” is very different from “existence”; therefore, it is not part of existence; it is not among the group of things that exist; *therefore it does not exist*! As I don’t doubt that Rand believed in the existence of consciousness, we can assume by existence she actually meant physical reality,as opposed to the non-physical nature of consciousness.

So here’s Ayn Rand, despite being in full possession of the axiom “Existence exists” using the term “existence” in a confusing, ambiguous, and contradictory way. And not just casually or accidentally, but in a way that survived editing, proofreading and numerous editions of publication in a book that claims to be the basis of her philosophy. So I put it to you: if *she* can’t get absolute verbal clarity from an axiomatic definition that is fundamental to her philosophy, *who are we to try*?!

Mr Stolyarov continues:
>Moreover, the identity axiom of Objectivism are inextricably tied to three corollary propositions in ontology, which Mr. Firehammer did a great service to point out in his treatise on Perception.
>These are, using Mr. Firehammer's words, the three propositions:
1)The first corollary of identity: Anything that exists must have some qualities.
2)The second corollary of identity: Anything that exists must be different in some way from everything else that exists and have some quality or combination of qualities no other existent has.
3) The third corollary of identity Anything that exists must have some relationship to everything else that exists.

In reply, I unequivocally endorse the truth of Mr Firehammer’s 3 ontological corollaries. Where I differ, along with The Editor it seems, is that I do not think they are a new, original or even interesting discovery in any way whatsoever. For all they add up to is this: if a thing exists, it must have some qualities; and must be different from other things; but also similar to other things. In other words, *the same old problems* philosophers have been grappling with since year dot, adding no discernable advance at all.

There is no doubt, however, that one of the great benefits of the Aristotelian method for one’s ego is that it offers the illusion that one can solve the great questions of philosophy merely by begging them!

- Daniel

(1)Ayn Rand was fully aware of this problem, of course, and had to invent a fudge in order to “save the phenomena” of absolute certainty. She called this the “contextual theory of knowledge”.

Post 57

Sunday, July 25, 2004 - 4:13pm

Greetings.

Mr. Barnes: It is also worth pointing out that they did apparently did not feel it necessary to "check their premises" to verify if their concept “automobile” was based on "the facts of reality", or was really just a floating figment of their imagination to be suitably pooh-poohed. And it is probably just as well, given that prior to its invention an automobile had approximately the same epistemological status as a mermaid.

Mr. Stolyarov: But the inventors did have an already present understanding of what transportation was in the pre-automobile status-quo, how an automobile could affect transportation, and why this would be beneficial and appealing. They knew that putting together certain parts that could be manufactured in this world would result in a more effective means of transportation. They could almost certainly explain this explicitly to the workers that constructed the first automobiles, as well as the clients that took the initial risk of purchasing or investing in them.

Mr. Barnes: Now, as your example shows, the term “automobile”is of no serious significance to our inventors, and is simply the answer to the question “what shall we call a land based vehicle that is self powered?”

Mr. Stolyarov: You are right to say that the idea of the actual entity came first, before the name. But it is also thus in a filosofical exploration. For example, because I had coined certain terms of my own, I can recall my own logic. In the abortion debate, I thought of the notion that a fetus is not a mere potential, but will definitely be born absent human or circumstantial intervention. Only then did I devise a name for this condition, “futuristic certainty.”

Thus it is with any Aristotelian filosofer. For the Aristotelian, reality comes first. He perceives certain entities and fenomena, and seeks to categorize and classify them in a systematic, consistent manner. When he first discovers something, he identifies its nature first, then gives it a name. But when he has only second-hand information about something, from someone else, he hears only the name. Naturally, he wants to know what is the nature of that, which the name describes. Hence, he insists on hearing the definition.

Mr. Barnes: As you know, the definition in Objectivism, as per Aristotle, contains all our knowledge of the concept, plus all the other concepts (symbolised by words) that are subsumed within that concept - in the case of “automobile”, those subsumed concepts might be “spoke”, “wheel”, “screw”,”axle”, “seat”, “brake” etc; plus, I suppose, the concepts governing internal combustion, accelaration, inertia etc; and aesthetic concepts regarding colour, design; and so forth. And of course, it implicitly contains all the concepts we don’t yet know about and may not know for a very long time, if ever, such as the ultimate nature of its atoms or of the forces that act on it such as gravity.

Mr. Stolyarov: The designers of the automobile must have had quite intricate awareness of all of those subsuming concepts. Moreover, Objectivism does view concepts as open-ended. It acknowledges that our present knowledge about a concept is not final, and that the metaforical “file folder” that is the concept may be filled with more information in the future. (For example, a new shape or engine structure invented ten years later would create a set on new entities which also fall under the concept “automobile.”)

It is possible to produce effective results not knowing everything about a subject or entity. That is granted. However, one should try to know as much as possible in the given context! Definitions are important for this purpose: they enhance one’s knowledge of the entity in question and its constituents, as far as our empirical observations to date permit, when such an entity as an automobile is concerned. An abstraction, on the other hand, does not need further empirical observations to render its explanation complete (it only needs initial universally accessible observations about reality, which give rise to the axioms). It needs further individual thought. Definitions are the only lines along which such thought can systematically proceed.

Mr. Barnes: Now you can immediately see the Aristotelian method, if applied consistently, becomes impractical in the extreme, as it turns even a very short simple story like “automobile” into a very long, very complex one…

Mr. Stolyarov: Ah, but the automobile is a very long and complex story, made possible by thousands of years of human technical progress, and the integration of its components, as well as a scientific understanding of certain fundamental laws of fysics that went into its construction. Its creators had to consider all of these things. Only we, who do not create automobiles, but rather use them for our convenience, can afford to use intellectual shorthand and attempt to render our explanations more concise and cursory. Give an automobile engineer the requirement to produce as cursory a blueprint as possible, and you will never build an automobile.

Each concept contains a very long and complex story within its file folder. Rather than shun this complexity, each man specializing in particular entities or concepts needs to learn it. You would not want heart surgery to be made “a short and simple story,” you would want the surgeon to know why he uses the tools he does, what the nature of your heart and surrounding organs is, and what past explorations existed in that field. Similarly, you would want the filosofer to know the true meaning of selfishness, or freedom, or progress, or practicality, for he performs a metaforical surgery on the very heart and soul of mankind itself.

Mr. Barnes: Further, there is no loss to our knowledge at all by eliminating definitions from our arguments, as we can always reintroduce a longer explanatory formula if and when it is required.

Mr. Stolyarov: This is because an inventor deals with concretes. The concretes to be defined and redefined are still there if definitions change. The filosofer deals with abstractions, which are exclusively organizing tools for the human mind; non-human entities do not have abstractions. The only way abstractions can be organized is by means of a hierarchy of definitions. You destroy the definition, and you destroy the very meaning and importance of a word, so that it can be thrown around with such casual negligence as the terms “love” and “freedom” are, which allows demagogues to equate them with “unconditionality” and “subjective psychological comfort.”

Mr. Barnes: However, I’m not sure you’ve fully taken on board my point: that if the purpose of definitions is to increase the precision of terms, the minute he resorts to using an axiom, *the essentialist has admitted defeat for his method*! For with an axiom your second term is the same as your first, therefore adds no precision at all. So it doesn’t matter *when* you repair to an axiom; all it means is that your method breaks down either sooner, or later. Up to you!

Mr. Stolyarov: All right, how about this:

We ask, “What is a cube?”

*A cube is any three-dimensional entity that is equal in its measurements of length, width, and height, and consists of six planar surfaces at right angles with each other.

*A right angle is the measurement of 90 degrees out of 360, where 360 degrees is the measurement of an angle spanning a full circle.

*A three-dimensional object is any entity, the relationship of whose parts can be expressed by a set of three mutually independent parameters.

*A planar surface is the external part of an entity that exists in only two dimensions, i.e., can be expressed by a set of only two mutually independent parameters.

*An entity is anything that fulfills Mr. Firehammer’s ontological corollaries (see above). [This is equivalent to a referral to the axioms. The word “entity” has come up in the definition, and it can be described by ontology, which is inherently linked to the axiom of existence.]

Where is the infinite regress, or lessening of precision?

This is a fairly simple description, and many objects and concepts would require a far lengthier chain of definitions. So be it. The men who specialize in creating/studying such objects or concepts have all their lives to do this and do it well!

Do you have any other entities for me to analyze, so as to point out where to refer to the axioms?

Mr. Barnes: Now here she has clearly said “consciousness” is very different from “existence”; therefore, it is not part of existence; it is not among the group of things that exist; *therefore it does not exist*! As I don’t doubt that Rand believed in the existence of consciousness, we can assume by existence she actually meant physical reality, as opposed to the non-physical nature of consciousness.

Mr. Stolyarov: What Rand meant was that consciousness does not generate that, which is perceives, or that, which is outside it. It cannot directly alter fysical matter outside itself. I would use the term “external reality” rather than “existence” to describe what is outside of consciousness, to be more precise. I grant that Rand could have used certain formulations that were far from immaculate. Even great thinkers can make slight innocent errors of terminology.

Mr. Barnes: So here’s Ayn Rand, despite being in full possession of the axiom “Existence exists” using the term “existence” in a confusing, ambiguous, and contradictory way. And not just casually or accidentally, but in a way that survived editing, proofreading and numerous editions of publication in a book that claims to be the basis of her philosophy. So I put it to you: if *she* can’t get absolute verbal clarity from an axiomatic definition that is fundamental to her philosophy, *who are we to try*?!

Mr. Stolyarov: So, by that same logic, if she could not restrain herself from the self-destructive practice of chain smoking, who are we to try? I think it is a moral crime for a man to think it metafysically impossible for himself to become more efficient, successful, and right at anything, than a great person of the past had been. We have only the integrity of our own minds and our own reason to serve as our guides, and there is nothing that limits their potential to what has already been reached by somebody else.

We also have the benefit of progress, in all areas of existence, that great individuals of the past did not enjoy. Rather than constructing these earlier steps of progress, we already have them accessible, and can build upon them, so as to minimize our errors. An ordinary engineer today might not be as mentally brilliant as the architects who constructed the Pyramids or the Parthenon, but the knowledge and technology at his disposal are so colossal as to enable him to construct an office building surpassing any ancient structure in both scope and intricacy.

Mr. Barnes: For all they add up to is this: if a thing exists, it must have some qualities; and must be different from other things; but also similar to other things. In other words, *the same old problems* philosophers have been grappling with since year dot, adding no discernable advance at all.

Mr. Stolyarov: Actually, this is quite an advance from millennia of intrinsicism (Platonism) and subjectivism (relativism), which did not acknowledge the ontological corollaries. The third way of Objectivism was hinted at by Aristotle, but consistently integrated only by Rand, and even then without a systematic ontology. Firehammer’s contribution has been to finally formulate the foundations of this ontology.

Mr. Barnes: Ayn Rand was fully aware of this problem, of course, and had to invent a fudge in order to “save the phenomena” of absolute certainty. She called this the “contextual theory of knowledge”.

Mr. Stolyarov: What is so improper about absolute certainty? I am absolutely certain that 2+2=4, that space is Euclidean, that I am alive, that I think, that the Earth contains water, and of thousands of other things. There are, indeed, matters on which I am not entirely certain due to incomplete evidence, but it is possible to be entirely certain of the truth of a given proposition.

I am
G. Stolyarov II

The Prologue: http://www.geocities.com/rationalargumentator/eac_prologue.html

Chapter I: Protector's Summons: http://www.geocities.com/rational_argumentator/eac_chapter1.html

Order Eden against the Colossus at http://www.lulu.com/content/63699.

Post 58

Tuesday, July 27, 2004 - 3:58am

>Mr. Stolyarov writes: You are right to say that the idea of the actual entity came first, before the name.

Yes - I agree. As you put it here, the name is a mere label, nothing more.

>Mr Stolyarov: It is possible to produce effective results not knowing everything about a subject or entity. That is granted.

Well, we agree here also! But granting this destroys your basic claim: which is that *absolutely precise* (or absolutely complete) definitions are required before knowledge can progress. Recall that the definition must contain all knowledge about a term, and leave nothing out, in order to qualify as being *absolutely precise* .

I would argue, and you would perhaps agree, that this is not even possible. So it is very fortunate that it is not necessary either!

>Mr Stolyarov: You destroy the definition, and you destroy the very meaning and importance of a word...

And I say again: I am not “destroying” definitions! They are very useful if used in the way I describe; the scientific nominalist way, that reads from *right to left*, (as opposed the the essentialist way, which reads from left to right) and acknowledges in advance that the word is a mere label for incomplete knowledge, and captures
no “essence” of any concept.

Mr Stolyarov then attempted to define the single term “cube”. In doing so he appealed to 6 short paragraphs containing around 150 additional words. The final of these paras made a further appeal to 3 additional corollaries.

He then asked: “Where is the infinite regress, or lessening of precision?”

In reply, playing the consistent Aristotelian, I quite legitimately demand additional definitions of each of those additional words before we can begin our debate - or at very least the nouns, verbs and adjectives, as I do not wish to be *too* pedantic...! Of course, these new definitions must also include include other new terms too, and cannot be axiomatic - otherwise your method's claim to enhanced precision automatically fail! And then same again with these terms, etc etc.

So there is your regress.

Further, by the time we have moved from the single, relatively specific term “cube” under discussion, to the 3 additional corollaries, you will note we have now moved from discussing “something” (a cube) to, quite literally, “anything”!!

And there is your loss of precision. See what I mean?

Later, I dissed Regi’s corollaries for being very very old wine in not very new bottles: “For all they add up to is this: if a thing exists, it must have some qualities; and must be different from other things; but also similar to other things. In other words, *the same old problems* philosophers have been grappling with since year dot, adding no discernable advance at all.”

Mr. Stolyarov responded by saying:
>Actually, this is quite an advance from millennia of intrinsicism (Platonism) and subjectivism (relativism), which did not acknowledge the ontological corollaries.

I don’t really see how. Platonism, for example is a theory designed to answer exactly the problems posed above. They certainly acknowledged them - they just didn't call them "ontological corollaries".Regi has rephrased these problems to make it sound like they are *solutions*! This is particular type of philosophic insight is called “begging the question”....;-)

- Daniel B.

Post 59

Tuesday, July 27, 2004 - 2:21pm