RoR: Forum

Stephan Kinsella:

Jetton: "Isn't this an example of the mind/body dichotomy? Doesn't it assume volition could not be implemented by one the 4 forces?"
Wow. I don't know what to say about this. Be "implemented" by? You can't mean the forces are acting beings that do this. So what can the comment possiby mean. Can you really not see that if the 4 forces govern the movment of particles, we are determined, not free?

You didn't elaborate on your "wowing" my mind/body question. It was in reaction to your saying in post #14 that the idea of "downward causation" disturbs you. You didn't address "upward causation", but a claim of "no downward causation" is tantamount to a one-sided mind/body dichotomy.
As for volition and the 4 forces, in post #14 you stated your belief that "if there is really volition, it is as if there is a fifth physical force that is exerting change on the particles of the brain." To me it is not far-fetched to hypothesize that volition (choice, mentally) affects the brain by means of electromagnetic force. After all, neurotransmission occurs by electro-chemical means.
Information processing is my preferred perspective on the mind-brain or mind-body issue, but it doesn't shed much light on the mental-physical distinction or the nature of volition.

Post 41

Wednesday, July 20, 2005 - 4:54pm

I wrote to Dean and Sarah:
>Now, before I go much further, would you mind outlining your respective positions just so I know where you're coming from?

The reason I ask is that you both seem quite categorically opposed to dualism, so I figure you must advocate some particular form of materialism/physicalism. It would save me a fair bit of donkeywork if I know clearly what your opposing positions are (there are several possibilities).

Otherwise if you'd prefer to postpone the discussion for time or other reasons that's fine by me.

- Daniel

Post 42

Wednesday, July 20, 2005 - 5:12pm

Daniel,

I'm getting around to it... the real world can delay things sometimes.

Sarah

Post 43

Wednesday, July 20, 2005 - 5:20pm

Sarah:
>I'm getting around to it... the real world can delay things sometimes.

No hurry *at all*. Kinda busy myself right now. Whenever y'all 're ready.

- Daniel

Post 44

Wednesday, July 20, 2005 - 8:48pm

Merlin, either you don't understand the exact problem I am referring to, or I am unable to find a way to be communicate it be properly to you.

Post 45

Sunday, July 24, 2005 - 11:46am

I gather few are having much trouble with Roger Bissell's value determinism, given that my post about how those values are recognized as such if one hasn't chosen to think has been ignored. But this is a serious problem: the forming of values--conceptions of what is good, what is not, etc.--is a human activity that may or may not be taken up by people. Some are, as Rand would put it, in a state of "blank out," some focus and learn that X is of value, Y is not, etc. Value determinism suggests that no such activity is required--values just are; we have them imbedded in us so they then determine that we will pursue them and what they require. This also implies that when someone values, say, theft over honest work, that's not his fault--it is just what is imbedded in him, innate to his value system, as it were. (This is where immorality, criminality become illnesses, just as was argued by the famous American trial lawyer, Clarence Darrow.)
Value determinism also assume that valuation--value judgment--does not involve concept formation but that concept formation occurs because innate values drive one to form concepts. This is circular. And that's a serious problem.

Post 46

Sunday, July 24, 2005 - 12:00pm

Stephan,

As I am not terribly active on SOLO, I'm a latecomer to this discussion. In fact, I got active on the slightly more recent thread on "Emergent Properties" before realizing that many of the same issues were getting discussed over here.

So I hope that my comments on your posts #14 and #17 have some chance of being current.

In your #14 you said:

The problem I have always had with the notion of volition is that it does seem to require a type of "downward causation," which notion continues to disturb me. I think Sperry has some thoughts along these lines, as does David Kelley in an old taped lecture series on free will.

If the notion of downward causation is legitimate, it doesn't just apply to conscious human choices (or "volition").

It applies to candle flames, Benard cells (a type of convection pattern that arises in a heated liquid), life, and to knowledge and motivation in frogs and squirrels, not just to conscious decision-making by human beings.

Assuming the subatomic constituents of the brain are indeed governed by the 4 physical forces--gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak nuclear forces--then the position of the particles that make up the brain over time are dependent on mechanistic forces. Even if there is an uncertainty aspect, that just adds randomness. Our behavior is clearly a manifestation of the movement of the particles of our bodies. It seems to me undeniable that to have true volition, one's "mind" or "brain" as a whole must influence the motion of the particles that make it up. But it seems to me that this implies that if one were to examine on a subatomic level, the particles inside the brain, then take a given particle: its path must not be influenced solely by the 4 forces; if it is, then we are determined (or, at best, semi-random), not volitional.

Although you refer to a 20th century theory of 4 physical forces, your framing of the problem here is more characteristic of the 17th century. Everything is matter in motion; matter ultimately consists of little particles; only the little particles and the forces acting on them can have causal power.

As far as I can see, your argument simply presupposes the truth of physicalism. Or to put it a little diferently, it presupposes the truth of a pretty strong form of reductionism (possibly the eliminative variety; possibly epiphenomenalism with an explicit acknowledgment of "causal drain" all the way down to the microphysical level.)

For if someone comes along and tries to point how a candle flame has an emergent property of self-maintenance--so that the organization of processes that make up the flame affects where the oxygen molecules go, or where the CO2 molecules go, etc.--you could respond with the exact same challenge to identify a "5th force."

In your post #17, you respond to James Heaps-Nelson (post #16) as follows:

Jim: "Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine has written a book "The End of Certainty" detailing how quantum and classical perturbations "bubble up" through thermodynamically irreversible reactions in far from equilibrium chemical systems. These systems can conceivably give rise to top-down control mechanisms which are not controlled from the bottom."

Stephan: I don't see how this assertion changes the point made above. To the extent this is not merely a metaphor, then it seems to be a spooky thing.

Prigogine has been a significant contributor to emergentism; Benard cells are one of the phenomena he studied. The kind of rigorous work he did cannot be written off as metaphor. And I think a bit more examination is called for, before issuing the verdict that that the top-down control mechanisms of a Benard cell are merely "spooky."

Robert Campbell

Post 47

Sunday, July 24, 2005 - 12:21pm

In response to Abolaji Ogunshola's post #23:

Are animals also agents?

Surely. They are goal-directed systems with knowledge and motivation.

What about books and chess playing computers?

Surely not. Books need a (highly) intelligent agent to interpret them. So, I would argue, does Deep Blue or some other chess-playing computer, though this is a more contentious issue.

Planets and stars?

Emergent properties, yes; agenthood, no--unless most of us are overlooking something important about them.

The real problem with "agent causation" is that its sole purpose in philosophy is to justify libertarian freewill. At least, the reductive materialist has done something to advance science in the last century. Hopefully, one day, the defenders of "agent causation" will do the same

Roger's target essay defends agent causality, as he reminded readers of this thread in one of his posts. My impression is that Roger structured the essay so as to practically hit the reader over the head with agent causality. So contrary to what you read or hear from a lot of analytic philosophers, including some of my colleagues, agent causality is not sufficient for incompatiblistic free will.

Moreover, agent causality falls pretty easily out of an emergentist treatment of psychology. (Although that may not be the only way to get it--Roger's essay does not directly address emergence, unless I missed something there.)

Robert Campbell

Post 48

Sunday, July 24, 2005 - 12:30pm

In response to Abolaji Ogunshola's post #8:

Anyone who compares Machan's sustained polemic against determinism to Dennett's discussion of why determinism is feared, why free will is desired, and how best to resolve the issues, is free to make up his mind as to what approach he prefers.

Wouldn't the best way to handle this be a book discussion of Dennett's Elbow Room (or if the Dennettites regard it as a qualitative improvement, Dennett's second go-round with free will, in Freedom Evolves)? Dennett has presented a sustained argument, and it needs to be addressed as such.

I've made up my mind and unabashedly stated my opinion. I do not apologize for it, and I will debate the issue with anyone at any time or place in August.

If it can be done as a book discussion, I'll be an eager participant.

Robert Campbell

Post 49

Sunday, July 24, 2005 - 12:49pm

Tibor,

I see some wider problems with "value determinism" of the sort that Roger is proposing.

The problem is not that Roger is positing "innate values." A newborn baby is already goal-directed. The newborn's goal structure is most unsophisticated, but such goals as getting fed, getting contact comfort, and so on are already present--and there are good, clear evolutionary reasons for them to be innately present.

Value determinism suggests that no such activity is required--values just are; we have them imbedded in us so they then determine that we will pursue them and what they require.

You seem to be presuming that "value determinism" either denies or precludes any developmental mechanism for acquiring or changing values. If it does deny or preclude any way for a human being's values to develop, it is dead in the water. But I don't see how Roger's position does such a thing.

This also implies that when someone values, say, theft over honest work, that's not his fault--it is just what is imbedded in him, innate to his value system, as it were. (This is where immorality, criminality become illnesses, just as was argued by the famous American trial lawyer, Clarence Darrow.)

I don't see Roger's position headed for trouble because it requires him to say that a preference for theft over honest work is innate.

I do think Roger's position is headed for trouble because at every step in the process of value development, the adult thief had to decide as he did, at that time and under those circumstances, in a chain reaching all the way back to infancy. And how do you square that with moral responsibility? The thief should have rethought his values, on many many occasions. But he didn't--and, on each of those occasions, the compatibilist insists that he couldn't have.

Robert Campbell

Post 50

Sunday, July 24, 2005 - 10:49pm

Robert Campbell wrote (in reply to Tibor Machan):

I see some wider problems with "value determinism" of the sort that Roger is proposing. The problem is not that Roger is positing "innate values." A newborn baby is already goal-directed. The newborn's goal structure is most unsophisticated, but such goals as getting fed, getting contact comfort, and so on are already present--and there are good, clear evolutionary reasons for them to be innately present.

Yes. And I would add to this the desire to be aware, which is present from birth (if not before), and which evolves into the desire to be conceptually aware as the child grows older. It takes quite a bit of duress, disease, handicapping, etc. to warp or destroy this natural tendency/goal/value in human beings. And even when it is suppressed or damped down, it often may recover and reassert itself later on. It is a natural, though not infinitely resilient, human drive.

[Tibor] Value determinism suggests that no such activity is required--values just are; we have them imbedded in us so they then determine that we will pursue them and what they require.
You seem to be presuming that "value determinism" either denies or precludes any developmental mechanism for acquiring or changing values. If it does deny or preclude any way for a human being's values to develop, it is dead in the water. But I don't see how Roger's position does such a thing.

Again, I agree with Robert here.

This also implies that when someone values, say, theft over honest work, that's not his fault--it is just what is imbedded in him, innate to his value system, as it were. (This is where immorality, criminality become illnesses, just as was argued by the famous American trial lawyer, Clarence Darrow.)
I don't see Roger's position headed for trouble because it requires him to say that a preference for theft over honest work is innate.

I do think Roger's position is headed for trouble because at every step in the process of value development, the adult thief had to decide as he did, at that time and under those circumstances, in a chain reaching all the way back to infancy. And how do you square that with moral responsibility? The thief should have rethought his values, on many many occasions. But he didn't--and, on each of those occasions, the compatibilist insists that he couldn't have.

There is an ambiguity here in the phrase "couldn't have" (rethought his values). I hold (and compatibilism holds) that if the thief had valued rethinking his values on any of those occasions, he could have rethought them. He not only could have acted differently, if he recognized that he should have acted differently; but he would have acted differently. Because he is free to rethink his values, if and whenever he values rethinking them, he is responsible for the actions that are determined by those values. It is because of that that I maintain the thief is responsible for his crime. To deny this model of responsibility in favor of a free will model adds an enormous additional burden. It requires not only that you prove that the thief could (and would) have acted differently if he had valued doing so. It requires further that one prove that the thief recognized that he should have acted differently. This is a little too much like mind-reading for my comfort.

Robert hypothesizes "many many occasions" on which "the thief should have rethought his values." I disagree. It's absurd to expect the thief to rethink his values at any time, unless he is aware of a good reason to do so. And how often does this happen in a thief's life? Not often, I'd imagine -- at least, not for a typical thief -- perhaps never, or at least not until well into his "career" as a criminal. It seems reasonable to me to suppose that while there may be occasions when others tell the thief he ought to rethink his values, there may well be no occasion when the thief himself is motivated to rethink his values. This requires doubt and second-guessing on his part, but there may be no occasions on which the thief thinks there is something wrong with his values. He couldn't have rethought his values, if he didn't think there was a good reason for doing so. Thus, the free will advocate would be committed to exonerating the thief from blame, just because the thief was not motivated to rethink his values. Do we really want to cut criminals this much slack?

Even worse, rethinking one's values doesn't necessarily lead one to change one's values, let alone to change them to the right values. Why should we think that it does? Suppose the criminal rethinks his values periodically, but concludes on each occasion that they are just as valid as he previously thought (even though they're not), and thus decides not to change them, because he genuinely believes there's nothing wrong with his values. This leaves him with the same values that would have determined his actions if he had not rethought his values. So, how then is it reasonable for us to hold him responsible for actions that he does not understand to be wrong, whether or not he has rethought the values associated with them?

There is another ambiguity here in the phrase "ability to do otherwise." The key in clarifying the phrase is to recognize that "could" (or could not) is conditional in human choice. Choice presupposes the ability to do otherwise, but only if you value doing otherwise. The free willist, categorical kind of "could", however, holds that nothing conditions choice, nothing determines your actions, that choice presupposes the ability to do otherwise, even if you do not value doing otherwise. I maintain that this is impossible -- you not only can (have the ability to) but must (are determined to) do what you value. Consider jumping out of a 10-story building. Although I could do this on an occasion when I recognized a sufficient reason to do so (e.g., suicide), I cannot at present do so, because I don't recognize a sufficient reason to do so (I am not in a state of deep despair). In other words, I do not agree with the hard free-willist view that you can do anything whatever at any time, regardless of motive, including rethinking your values, focusing, etc.

Once again, value determinism is how agent causation works. Agent causation only tells us that a person is the cause of his actions. Value determinism tells us how a person is the cause of his actions. Both concepts are indispensable to a full account of human choice and action -- and moral responsibility. It is because we can hold a person responsible when and only when his action is in accordance with his values (as against when he acts under coercion or fraud) that we can hold him responsible for having taken that action.

Best to all,
REB

Post 51

Monday, July 25, 2005 - 4:01am

Roger Bissell states: "Choice presupposes the ability to do otherwise, but only if you value doing otherwise. The free willist, categorical kind of 'could', however, holds that nothing conditions choice, nothing determines your actions, that choice presupposes the ability to do otherwise, even if you do not value doing otherwise. I maintain that this is impossible -- you not only can (have the ability to) but must (are determined to) do what you value." There is no argument to show that what Roger states is so. It is entirely ad hoc. Could does not mean "but only if you value doing otherwise," not in the English language, in any case. Certainly in the criminal law when it states that one ought not to have chosen to murder someone, there is no additional assumption "but only if you value" not murdering him. That is absurd. If some such conditional were to apply, and if such valuing is itself not something the agent could have chosen, then there is no personal responsibility for the crime, period. Compatibilism isn't what it purports to be, a happy merging of mechanical determinism and personal moral (and criminal) responsibility. It is the belief in the absence of personal moral (and criminal) responsibility. In this case Darrow was far more forthright than Dennett & Co., who wish to have their cake and eat it too. Compatibilism is a conceptual confusion in which one is both personally responsible for having done X (even though one could not have done otherwise because one's values determined what one did and those values are not something over which one is acknowledged to have any choice at all) and also unable to do other than what one does on each occasion. I am not here going to rehash it all but I would like to recommend, to those really interested in going over the issues, Ed Pols, Acts of Our Being (University of Massachusetts Press, 1983). It is a meticulous demonstration of free will in the sense in which when it comes to bona fide actions or conduct, they are up to the agent who indeed could do other than he did. (Illustrating value determinism by way of one's jumping off a roof top which, once it has been done cannot be reversed, is to use a false analogy. How about illustrating it by way of going to the edge of the roof in the first place, something one could have refrained from doing, probably should have refrained from doing, and wasn't determined by anything, certainly not by any values one couldn't help holding, to do.) There are, of course, conditions that constrain choice--one cannot up and fly away even if one tries or chooses to try. But this doesn't show that all basic choices are themselves conditioned. Indeed, the uniqueness of basic human choices is just that they are made (conditioned, if you will), by the person making them, not by something else. We are, to put it in another way, first causes of some of our actions, because we have the faculty of conceptual consciousness that enables us to be such first causes and the operations of which are unexplainable by external causation alone. Given that causation is a function of the nature of the beings taking part in causal relations, then given our nature as conceptually conscious entities, we can be and often are first causes.

Post 52

Monday, July 25, 2005 - 6:45am

Roger Bissell wrote:

Choice presupposes the ability to do otherwise, but only if you value doing otherwise. The free willist, categorical kind of "could", however, holds that nothing conditions choice, nothing determines your actions, that choice presupposes the ability to do otherwise, even if you do not value doing otherwise. I maintain that this is impossible -- you not only can (have the ability to) but must (are determined to) do what you value.

Yes, it's impossible, but the premise is wrong per my idea of volition, and that of probably many other volitionists. I reject the premise: nothing conditions choice, nothing determines your actions. Instead, it is that prior conditions do not uniquely determine, or necessitate, the choice. That is what choice is. If the prior conditions do uniquely determine an outcome, it is not a choice.

Roger's premise, of course, provides a rich source for determinists to build straw men of volition. It portrays choice as arbitrary and noncontextual. Of course, Roger tempers it somewhat by holding some value, if nothing else, to be the factor that always uniquely determines the outcome. Can we choose our values? I'll leave Roger to answer that one.

The determinist premise is that prior conditions do uniquely determine an outcome. In other words, there is no room for an authentic choice.

Yes, in the volitionist view, choices are conditioned. That's what makes them contextual and usually nonarbitrary. (I include "usually" to cover "weakly arbitrary" cases when the choices are equally valued.) But "conditioned" does not mean "fully and uniquely determined."

Post 53

Tuesday, July 26, 2005 - 11:19pm

I do see a serious problem with the notion that human beings hold values when they first emerge from their fetal stage, especially if values are held in conceptual or propositional form. A biological inclination--to seek nourishment--isn't holding a value. The suckling instinct isn't holding a value. Holding a value is when one, for examples, believes that pursuing wealth or happiness or becoming an engineer is a good thing. And these beliefs, for a being of conceptual consciousness, must be learned.
In any case, the initial issue here was wether free will is central to Objectivism. The free will debate cannot be carried out in sufficient detail here but whether Objectivism presupposes free will in human beings is really something of a textual and/or interpretative issue. I contend that Objectivism is committed to the idea that one could do other than one did, period, specifically as regard focusing one's mind, initiating the process of thinking (necessarily prior to having come up, via thinking, with answers to the question "What is of value?"). So at least let's agree that Roger Bissell's value determinism conflicts with Objectivism (a la Ayn Rand). That doesn't make it wrong, of course, but it does make it seriously different from Objectivism.

Post 54

Tuesday, July 26, 2005 - 11:45pm

I previously wrote:

Choice presupposes the ability to do otherwise, but only if you value doing otherwise. The free willist, categorical kind of "could", however, holds that nothing conditions choice, nothing determines your actions, that choice presupposes the ability to do otherwise, even if you do not value doing otherwise. I maintain that this is impossible -- you not only can (have the ability to) but must (are determined to) do what you value.

Merlin Jetton commented:

Yes, it's impossible, but the premise is wrong per my idea of volition, and that of probably many other volitionists. I reject the premise: nothing conditions choice, nothing determines your actions. Instead, it is that prior conditions do not uniquely determine, or necessitate, the choice. That is what choice is. If the prior conditions do uniquely determine an outcome, it is not a choice.

A choice is the act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more alternatives. Let's say, for instance, that a clearly Socialist candidate and a clearly Libertarian candidate were the only two people running for a particular office. This gives me two alternatives to choose (i.e., select) from, only one of which I could actually vote for (i.e., select). Let us say that I, being a staunch Libertarian all my adult life, most emphatically do not want to vote for the Socialist candidate, and am thus psychologically incapable of voting for him. Since I maintain that I must choose to obtain (select as the object of my action) that which I want over that which I do not want, when presented with such an alternative, the prior condition -- what I want to obtain -- determines my choice. And it uniquely determines my choice. I must choose it, and I am unable to choose otherwise.

Nonetheless, it is a choice, since it is the selection of one of the available alternatives. "Since I'm a Libertarian, I'm going to choose the Libertarian candidate. In fact, I have to vote for the Libertarian candidate, no doubt about it. I'm not even going to give it a moment's consideration. I have no reason to!" In logical terms, I have a standing policy to vote for Libertarians in general (premise one), then Joe Blow presents himself as a Libertarian candidate (premise two), and I then decide or choose to vote for Joe Blow (conclusion). I do not decide/chose in the concrete to vote for Joe Blow until he presents himself as a candidate. But once he announces as a candidate, I do indeed choose to vote for him (select him from the various alternatives), even though I could not have done otherwise. (I have no reason not to select him.)

Merlin again:

Roger's premise, of course, provides a rich source for determinists to build straw men of volition. It portrays choice as arbitrary and noncontextual. Of course, Roger tempers it somewhat by holding some value, if nothing else, to be the factor that always uniquely determines the outcome. Can we choose our values? I'll leave Roger to answer that one.

No, I don't "portray choice as arbitrary and noncontextual." (See above.) I specifically portray non-determined choice as arbitrary and noncontextual. To claim that I could vote for anyone other than the Libertarian (in the above example) because my choice in the voting booth is "not uniquely determined" by my values, is to claim that I could vote for someone else even though I had no reason to do so (i.e., even though I didn't want to). The fact that I do not value voting for the Socialist does not matter to the volitionist, who claims, against all the relevant evidence (about my values), that I am nevertheless capable of voting for the Socialist. This kind of choice, choosing to pursue that which I do not want over that which I want -- even though I have no reason to do so -- is "arbitrary and noncontextual."

As for choosing our values, the answer is yes and no. It depends on which sense of "value" you mean. A choice pertains to an action. So, while it's true that I can choose an action aimed at obtaining a specific object (i.e., a value), it is not true that I can choose to want to have (i.e., value) the object. A want or desire (and in that sense a "value") is not an action, but the product of an action, specifically, an evaluation, and while I can choose to engage in an act of evaluation, the want or desire that results is not itself a choice. (This analogy may help clarify the point: I can choose to engage in addition, but reaching 4 as the result of adding 2 and 2 is not a choice.) It is our wants or desires (aka "values") that uniquely determine what object (aka "value") we will choose to pursue.

Merlin again:

The determinist premise is that prior conditions do uniquely determine an outcome. In other words, there is no room for an authentic choice.

This is not true, unless Merlin wants to argue that my selection of the Libertarian candidate in the above example is not "an authentic choice" that is "uniquely determine[d]" by "prior conditions."

Merlin again:

Yes, in the volitionist view, choices are conditioned. That's what makes them contextual and usually nonarbitrary. (I include "usually" to cover "weakly arbitrary" cases when the choices are equally valued.) But "conditioned" does not mean "fully and uniquely determined."

What else is there, beyond my values, to determine my actions? In the absence of coercion, I can and must choose to obtain that which I (most strongly) value. How in the world can anyone escape this necessity? Even if you capriciously decide to choose something other than what you most want, you are doing so on the basis that you want to choose capriciously and contrary to your preferences more than you want to choose in keeping with your preferences. In such a case, the desire to make a capricious choice is the value that determines your higher-level choice of how to choose; it is how you prefer choosing.

In the past, I have been utterly perplexed by those who think my viewpoint is empty and tautological. The conclusion seems inescapable to me that value determinism is not an empty tautology, but an axiom of human choice (and a corollary of the Law of Causality as applied to human action). Even in the attempt to deny it (as in the above example of capricious choice), we still have to act in accordance with it. We can and must and do choose that which we prefer. We can't help it.

Best regards,
Roger Bissell

Post 55

Wednesday, July 27, 2005 - 12:33am

Tibor Machan wrote:

...at least let's agree that Roger Bissell's value determinism conflicts with Objectivism (a la Ayn Rand). That doesn't make it wrong, of course, but it does make it seriously different from Objectivism.

Shortly thereafter, I wrote:

The conclusion seems inescapable to me that value determinism is not an empty tautology, but an axiom of human choice (and a corollary of the Law of Causality as applied to human action). Even in the attempt to deny it (as in the above example of capricious choice), we still have to act in accordance with it.

Tibor grants that while my thesis of value determinism (which is how I think agent causation operates) conflicts with Objectivism (presently understood), it is not necessarily wrong. Indeed, if it is correct, then certain aspects of Objectivism are incorrect, in particular, the idea that, in any given situation, we could have done otherwise than we did, even if we had not wanted to. However, I am convinced that, contrary to Tibor's and many others' fears, large parts of Objectivism (e.g., the possibility of conceptual knowledge, morality, and legal responsibility) would remain unscathed.

Also, ironically perhaps, if, as I claim, value determinism must be accepted in any act of trying to deny it, then the rejection of value determinism must be a violation of the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept -- a most revered tool of Objectivist philosophical analysis. The irony, then, is that a tenet of Objectivism's methodology would have been used as a means to "reaffirm through denial" a view that refutes part of Objectivism's substantive philosophy. Objectivism itself would then have become "seriously different from" what it presently is ("Objectivism a la Ayn Rand"). (I disagree with how extensive Tibor thinks the damage would be.)

I think it's premature to say that I've made an ironclad case for value determinism, let alone that Tibor, Robert, and others have made a convincing refutation of it. But it is clear to me that the above is what is at stake in this debate.

Best to all,
REB

Post 56

Wednesday, July 27, 2005 - 8:06am

Roger Bissell wrote (post #54):

A choice is the act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more alternatives.

I strongly agree, although it's fairly clear that we have a different view on the nature of the act.

Roger presents a situation of choosing between a Libertarian candidate and a Socialist candidate, and adds that he is psychologically incapable of voting for the latter. He says prior conditions determine his choice, he must choose the Libertarian, and he is unable to choose otherwise.

One of the problems of discussing this topic -- volition vs. determinism -- is determinists equivocating on "determine" and other words of the same root. There is a huge difference between "determined by things outside a person's control" (determinism) and "a person determines", meaning the person decides or chooses (volition). Discussion would be much easier if "the person determines" were barred from the conversation, with only the person "decides" or "chooses" permitted.

What does Roger mean by "determine" here? If he means "his choice is determined by prior conditions", then there is no authentic choice at the time. It is akin to a habit, the result of choices made much earlier. This alludes to the ambiguity in "prior conditions determine." It easily includes *past decisions*. The situation as Roger describes it also ignores another choice -- not to vote at all. Roger might say that is not a choice. If so, why not? Because of prior *choices*?

No, I don't "portray choice as arbitrary and noncontextual." (See above.) I specifically portray non-determined choice as arbitrary and noncontextual.

Admittedly you haven't here (yet). But it is common for determinists to do so.

As for choosing our values, the answer is yes and no.

I'm glad that Roger believes that we can choose *some* of our values. We agree. It still stumps me why I consider myself a volitionist and Roger claims to be a determinist.

Post 57

Wednesday, July 27, 2005 - 2:25pm

Merlin:
>One of the problems of discussing this topic -- volition vs. determinism -- is determinists equivocating on "determine" and other words of the same root.

I'd extend this further: one of the problems discussing this topic is, it seems to me, is not just arguments over the meanings of words, but a general failure to distinguish between words and numbers; between the vagaries of psychology and the social sciences and the strictures of physics.

Following Newton, and his quadratic equations, the physical sciences experienced great success in making predictive theories. Physical events were found to follow the determinations of mathematics with great precision. This led people in any number of other fields to expect similar successes would eventually happen, and thus the rise of philosophic determinism across the board even to this day.

However, it is surely obvious to say that *nothing like* quadratic equations have been found in psychology, despite the best efforts of the social scientists; the parallel attempt to describe human psychological behaviour in verbal formulas is entirely innocuous, as there is nowhere near the precision and inflexibility of numbers in terms like 'determined', 'Socialist', 'Libertarian', 'volition' etc. These terms are *vague*, with multiple shades of meaning, and even the strictest of definitions are quite unlike a mathematical formula. (If they could be, psychological determinism such as Roger describes in his voting example would be far more of a problem than it really is).

The problem of determinism is *not* one of psychological, cultural, social, personal, political, or intellectual beliefs and influences of individuals, nor the sincerity or otherwise with which they are held. We are all 'determined' by, and likewise ourselves 'determine' such things to at least *some* extent, and it would be absurd for anyone to contend otherwise. And certainly we can study the effects of such influences on individuals and learn from such a study. These are all so vague that as a form of 'determinism' they are quite harmless.

Because all that is *nothing like* the true problem - or nightmare - of *strict physical determinism*, which holds that every event in the universe, including every thought you ever had or will ever have, every philosophy or art or music ever produced can be or could have been, in principle, predicted in advance either classically or probabilistically if we were simply in possession of the right theoretical equations. You are simply a cog in in a great physical clock, and your consciousness has about as much 'free will' as the chime striking the hour. *That* is the version of determinism that is the most credible, given the continuing successes in physics, and is also the most concerning.

- Daniel

(Edited by Daniel Barnes
on 7/27, 2:26pm)

Post 58

Friday, July 29, 2005 - 4:30pm

Roger Bissell wrote (originating article):

[N]ot one of the preceding summaries or essential statements mentioned the issue of free will vs. determinism, nor the idea that reason is volitional, in the sense of “could have done otherwise.” Yet, even if you answered “yes” to all of the foregoing litmus tests for being an Objectivist, you would still, in the minds of many Rand followers, not qualify as an Objectivist, if you also accepted the doctrine of determinism, the doctrine that implies that one could not have done otherwise than one did in a given situation.
Unlike many Objectivists, I maintain that rationality includes volition, in the sense of the self-aware monitoring and directing of one's mental processes, while also maintaining that, in any given situation, one could not have done otherwise than one did in that situation. . . . the standard Objectivist claim that man’s volition consists in the ability to have acted otherwise than he did in any given situation.

It seems to me there is a missing factor here. Let's consider that decision making, or making a choice, takes time. Let T0 denote the time at which person P recognizes there is a choice to be made between or among two or more alternatives. Let T1 denote a nanosecond prior to when makes his or her P choice. In other words, at T1 all deliberation about the alternatives is over.

I suggest that the following are about time T1 and not about T0:
(a) Roger's form of determinism that "implies that one could not have done otherwise than one did" and
(b) Roger's view of the standard Objectivist claim that man’s volition consists in the ability to have acted otherwise than he did in any given situation, which he rejects.

What happens between T0 and T1? P evaluates the alternatives and their consequences, maybe comes up with more alternatives that are not in the initially recognized set, and in such evaluation P takes into account his or her values. This is when P exercises his/her rational faculty.

Ergo, when Roger says that values determine P's choice, he is partly correct. (The other part, of course, is the rest of the situation.) When Roger holds that rationality includes volition, in the sense of the self-aware monitoring and directing of one's mental processes, he is correct. (Of course, that is not in dispute.) When Roger claims that the standard Objectivist claim is wrong, I agree -- if it is taken to apply at time T1.

However, I would argue that the standard Objectivist claim is not about T1, but T0! Relatedly, I would say that assuming it is about T1 -- explicitly or otherwise -- is to "build a straw man" about the standard Objectivist claim and to undercut the faculty of reason. Also, the length of the time span between T0 and T1 in part depends on how much thought P devotes to evaluating the situation and the alternatives. This is, I believe, one reason why Ayn Rand wrote passages like this:

[T]hat which you call 'free will' is your mind's freedom to think or not, the only will you have, your only freedom, the choice that controls all the choices you make and determines your life and character (Lexicon, "Free Will").

Post 59

Friday, July 29, 2005 - 5:23pm