If the existence of minds demonstrates existence, this is to succumb to the primacy of consciousness.

Regarding existence as a property would certainly be more consistent with some of Rand’s statements about existence. But since, as you say, a property is not a thing, then “existence exists” is an abstraction all the way down. Whether or not if affirms something about the real world is another matter.

More to the point, you and Michael have quite different understandings of “existence”. For you, it’s a property, something that can be asserted of something. For Michael, it’s things. (He’s just not sure what sort of things, but he thinks that galaxies and guns feature in there somewhere.)

So you can both accept the truth of the statement “existence exists”, even though you have quite different conceptions of what it means.

But “existence” is supposed to be a single, unitary concept – a single thought that subsumes all subsequent thoughts. Yet here we have two: “existence-as-property” and “existence-as-things”. So “existence” cannot be a unitary thought.

Brendan

Descartes could've gotten more out of his cogito than he did. By accepting his self-awareness, he implicitly accepted that he was, that he was something, and that he was aware that he was something. Descartes explicated only the last bit; Rand captured all three.

 Well, here're the options: (1) existence trumps consciousnes (Rand's view); (2) consciousness trumps existence (theological view); (3) conscious and existence are equal (Descartes' view; (3) consciousness exists but existence doesn't, save as some part of consciousness (solipsist view); (4) existence exists but consciousness doesn't (maybe Skinner's view); (5) neither existence nor consciousness exists (I don't know whose view). I don't know which of these Brendan is going for. But there's the list should he care to enlighten us.

Existence, identity and consciousness are present in all states of awareness and are experienced and perceived directly.

Why, then, does Rand’s argument depend on an act of grasping a statement?  At this point, it’s probably a good idea to repair to the original quote that sparked this thread, and look at it with fresh eyes. Here is the relevant portion of the passage:

1) “Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies [that something exists] two corollary axioms: (2) Something exists which one perceives; and (3) that one exists possessing consciousness…”

I have slightly amended this quote in order to reveal an unspoken conclusion (that something exists), as well as to highlight the three arguments that apparently establish Rand’s axioms, Existence, Identity, Consciousness. The latter are in bold.

An argument is a series of connected steps that lead to, and support, a conclusion. The casual reader might assume from the above passage that Rand has established the validity of her axiomatic concepts. Such a view would be mistaken. Taking argument (1), we have seen earlier that it goes like this: “Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies [that something exists…”]

In other words, there is a thought, an act of understanding and a conclusion that something exists. Also, as we have seen, the preceding premises -- a thought plus a mental act -- imply that the conclusion, the "something" that exists, is consciousness. But Rand has not at this point in the argument established her axiom of consciousness – for that, we have to wait for argument (3).

But she needs the concept of consciousness in order to move her argument in (1) from “existence” to “something”. In other words, she has smuggled the conclusion of her third argument into the premises of her first argument; that is, she has begged the question.

“That something exists” must be the conclusion of argument (1), not only because it follows the premises, but also because it forms the connection between arguments (1) and (2), and the first premise of the second argument, which goes: 2. “…something exists which one perceives…”

In her first argument, Rand has apparently established the Existence axiom, and she now uses this to establish the Identity axiom. But, here, in order to move the argument from “something” to “perceives”, she has to appeal to yet another concept: a perceiving subject, the “one”. But she has also yet to establish this concept – for that, we have to wait until her third argument. So the addition of “one” represents another instance of premise-smuggling.

But in this second argument she does manage to suggest that the “something” is a material object, by teaming it with “perceives”. Which takes us to the third argument: “…one exists possessing consciousness…” This argument apparently establishes Consciousness, but only because Rand has already sneaked in a mental act and a perceiving subject into the previous arguments.

I think this brief analysis demonstrates that Rand’s arguments depend on verbal sleight of hand, and hidden assumptions that are not present in the term “existence”. Some further thoughts spring to mind – especially about that “defining of existence into consciousness” that you mentioned – but I’ll leave it there for the moment. I’m out of action for a day or so. I might post some more thoughts later in the week.

As for your question regarding existence and consciousness, I’m not entirely sure what you mean by “existence trumps consciousness”. If you mean that: if we discover that an idea we hold is inconsistent with the way the external world can be shown to work, that we should therefore modify our idea -- sure, I’ll agree with that.

Brendan