|Michael: “One who would establish a world of objects would be a God (or a God wannabe), not a human being. That is where you are going, isn't it?’ |
No, I was writing shorthand. Let’s say: "she wants her argument to establish a theory about a world of objects “out there”, that is logically prior to, and independent of, consciousness."
Michael: "As to your phrase "logically prior to," the acceptance of the facts on which axiomatic concepts are based precedes logic and does not derive from it. Such acceptance is implicit without question or doubt in all pre-conceptual forms of awareness."
See my reply to Jordan below.
Jordan: “Rand defined consciousness in such a way as to avoid Decartes’ cogito. For Rand, consciousness is primarily a response to and an identifier of (external) existence.”
Yes, Rand subscribed to the tabula rasa or Blank Slate theory of consciousness, that the activity of the mind is a response to perceptual stimuli. But tabula rasa is a concept, or rather a set of concepts, while “existence exists” is supposed to be the most fundamental concept, which depends on no other concept.
And that’s why “existence exist” cannot be the fundamental concept. In saying that Rand defined consciousness in a certain way, you’re agreeing that she made her primary axiom logically dependent on a particular theory of mind, in which case EE cannot be a fundamental, primary concept.
Or you can apply your own test: can “existence exists” be reduced to constituent parts? I think it can – and one of those parts is a definition of consciousness.