|Jordan: “Do chairs exist in my bathtub? I observe, and nope. Chairs in my bathtub don't exist.” |
So how do you know that the missing articles are chairs? Surely it’s because you already know what chairs are, by previous observation of actual chairs. In that case, in order to observe the absence of non-existing stuff, you need a concept of non-existing stuff. So remind me what you observe to form that concept?
Jordan: “It compels us to accept (1) that thoughts exist, which means existence exists (existence axiom), (2) that thoughts exists, which means something exists (identity axiom), and (3) that having the thought exists, which means consciousness exists (the consciousness axiom). Do you accept this?
Of course not. Omit the italics and what do you get: (1) that thoughts exist…(2) that thoughts exist…” Same premise, different conclusions. Something’s wrong here. Look again at your argument (1). The existence of thoughts imply the act of thinking, which implies a thinker. You're not implying that existence is a thinker, are you? This topic was covered in my post 13 (not 37), to which you replied, so we’re going over old ground.
“Rand continues that "to be conscious is to be conscious of something," by which I think she means something that's not the consciousness.”
Yes. Back to the original quote: “Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms…” The two “corollary axioms” are of course something that one perceives and consciousness. So there’s the same problem: one set of premises, two conclusions.
“This theory also entails an existence external to consciousness, something I don't think we can deduce from the axioms. If this is what you're getting at, then okay. But I doubt it's what you're getting at.”
That’s one of the things I’m getting at, as I mentioned in post 16, which you also replied to. You’re not finding this sort of stuff too taxing are you? I’ll understand if you want to have a lie down.