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Post 40

Wednesday, September 30, 2009 - 8:36amSanction this postReply
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Robert:

Agreed. A concrete example of, for visual processing. Why, you could say, an example of context modifying behavior, as in "When {Context} and {Event} then {Behavior}...

So, depending on context, our neural nets adjust their weightings to bias towards certain outcomes. "Looking for patterns is generally useful, precise light intensity, not so much." But, we can consciously over-ride those weightings, reprogram our neural nets.

For things like perception of input from senses, I think there are lots of accessible, studyable examples of that.

So, how far up the neural net do such contextual bias go? That is what is applicable, I think, to this thread's discussion of Vegetative Robots and Value, and how we choose to value what we value -- how we choose to weight the various neural net connections that are inputs to higher weighted neural net connections. Sensory inputs are just one class of inputs, important ones, because they inform us of what 'is.'

Those perceptions of reality -- coupled with our imaginings about alternatives -- are themselves inputs into higher order analysis going on in our brains. The context for those hypotheticals, the context for what we call synthesis, is much more fluid, isn't it? That context is not bound by what is, and not even, by what could be, though, what eventually is is bound by what could be...

Imagine if someone's contextual bias was purely supernatural -- as in, not looking for the lion in the grass, but looking for the Magic Spirit in the Wind.

Strike that, we don't have to imagine that happening, there are more examples than we need already...

We're clearly able to imagine contexts in which to bias our thoughts...

regards,
Fred





Post 41

Wednesday, November 3, 2010 - 8:05amSanction this postReply
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At the upcoming Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, there is a symposium on Teleological Thinking in Scientific Explanations. This session will be on December 29 from 1:30–4:30 p.m. The commentator on the papers will be Jim Lennox. Abstracts of the papers are as follows:

“Teleology and Optimization in Ancient Greek Science”
Devin Henry
    In this paper I shall explore the use of “optimizing” explanations in Plato and Aristotle. We are first introduced to this form of teleological explanation in the Phaedo, where Socrates recounts how he had heard someone reading from the book of Anaxagoras. Building on Anaxagoras’ idea that “it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything,” Socrates tells us: “If, then, one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or be acted upon, or act. On these premises, it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best.” Socrates goes on to outline a teleological research program designed to reveal the cause (aitia) of things. The program involves three components: (1) an assumption that the world was designed by an optimizing agent; (2) a stage of inquiry aimed at uncovering the phenomena to be explained; (3) and a stage of inquiry aimed at mapping out design space that describes both the optimal and sub-optimal states for those phenomena. On this model, some phenomenon P is said to be “explained” when it is shown to match the local optimum. We find a similar explanatory strategy embodied in Aristotle’s methodological principle that “nature does nothing in vain but always what is best from among the possibilities allowed by the substantial being of each kind of animal” (IA II, 704b14-17). This principle expresses Aristotle’s commitment to the idea that nature optimizes, and so explanations that invoke this principle can be called “optimizing” explanations. I shall end the paper by suggesting that this form of teleological explanation, and the research program that embodies it, resembles the sort of optimality modeling embodied in the contemporary adaptationist research program.


“The Kingdom of Wisdom and the Kingdom of Power: Teleology, Early Modern Science, and Optimal Form”
Jeffrey K. McDonough
    The rise of the new science in the early modern period famously put pressure on traditional teleological explanations of natural phenomena. The exact nature of that pressure is complicated, however, and, I think, still not fully understood. This essay proposes to first revisit the supposed heyday of teleology in the medieval period, second examine some relatively specific ways in which the rise of the new science in the early modern period presented novel challenges to traditional teleological explanations, and finally explore Leibniz’s attempt to revitalize teleological explanations by emphasizing a new model of teleological explanation grounded in the notion of optimal form.



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Post 42

Thursday, August 25, 2011 - 9:09amSanction this postReply
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This looks excellent:

What Genes Can't Do
Lenny Moss
(MIT 2004)

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Post 43

Friday, August 26, 2011 - 12:42pmSanction this postReply
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Another book partly about genes -- its range is much wider -- is Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. I'm almost half-way through reading it and find it very interesting.

The table of contents and part of the book is here.

A précis is here.

Another book review is here.

One topic is, what is the primary unit of evolution? It critiques the selfish gene view and favors the "life cycle" view of the "developmental systems theory." "[H]eredity depends not on the 'transmission' of genetic information for phenotypic design, but on the reconstruction of pattern in ontogeny, a process that involves many other developmental resources besides the genes" (p. 202).



Post 44

Friday, August 26, 2011 - 2:20pmSanction this postReply
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Thank you very much, Merlin. The précis and review give good windows into the book. It appears to me to be an important work on several counts. It is germane to the further program suggested in “Vegetative Robots and Value” of considering indestructible robots (as limiting cases) corresponding to various types of animals, those without consciousness and those with their various levels of consciousness, to see further ways in which value is inseparable from life.

Post 45

Wednesday, February 29, 2012 - 10:24amSanction this postReply
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Fine presentation and fresh perspective on Rand’s ethics has been accomplished by Marc Champagne* in Sign Systems Studies (2011).

“Building on the work of Jakob von Uexküll, Thomas Sebeok and his school emphasized that any species-specific umwelt perforce has a normative dimension. In a bid to constructively expand on this important idea, we’ve added another Eastern-European thinker to the mix, and have called on Ayn Rand’s seminal ideas to explain why and how objects are given a normative charge.”

On a first read, one may want to begin on page 19.


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