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Saturday
November 26, 2005

Vegetative Robots and Value by Stephen Boydstun

Thought experiments are notorious for pre-packing the point to be demonstrated into the setup to be contemplated. In an essay in The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand (1984), Charles King raised just that sort of objection to Rand’s robot gedanken: "if the robot neither knows nor cares [what happens to things around it], the example seems uninteresting." I do not agree that the robot gedanken is without interest if the robot is devoid of thought and feeling. I will here extend Rand’s gedanken in such a way that it can inform the concept of purely vegetative value. (Read more...)
Discuss this Article (46 messages)

Tuesday, February 17, 2009 - 2:01pm

Ed:

I'd agree with all that. We're more than simple gradient seekers. For example, we choose what gradients to seek, to value, whereas simple actors appear to have no choice at all, they are pure wiring.

But underneath it all, we also share some of that same atavistic wiring, as simple actors. Our volition is built on top of that wiring, in precisely the same way our minds are built on top of our autonomous brain functions.

My conjecture is, from observation, we are driven by differences, not sameness. That built in attention grabber, the director of our interest, I think, is part of our atavistic, deep wiring.

None of that is to diminish volition, it is just an observation about what influences our choices, what volition is built upon, and in fact, the ability to choose gradient to seek, to value some gradient over other, is part of what makes volition unique in humans.

regards,
Fred

Tuesday, February 17, 2009 - 4:41pm

Fred,

I really understand you when I can re-word you. Let me try:

My conjecture is, from observation, we are driven by differences, not sameness. That built in attention grabber, the director of our interest, I think, is part of our atavistic, deep wiring.

What you're saying is that humans are "hard-wired" to seek out differences (over sameness). I agree with that but not with even the little implications you mention. For example, it's differences -- not sameness -- which inspires us to form concepts. But I don't see how that makes any impingement or infringement on free will in fact or even in principle (none at all).

Here is a little fabricated dialogue that might help you and others see why I am not concerned that humans are hard-wired to seek differences over sameness. It involves concept-formation and includes human valuation:

***************
Johnny: Hey Joey, is that a cell phone in your hand?

Joey: Well, sort of. You see, it's something they call an i-p-h-o-n-e and, while it performs the function of a cell phone, it also performs so much more. I mean, this thing speaks to me when I'm driving and gives me directions via GPS. No measly cell phone does that.

Johnny: Cool! Well, seeing how it is so different -- rather than the same -- from all the other cell phones out there, perhaps we should form a new concept for this new kind of a thing.

Joey: I think you're right, Johnny, but you wouldn't have been right if this new cell phone was like old cell phones are -- it wouldn't have been right to form a new concept, until something new and different comes along.

Johnny: Joey, sometimes your intelligence amazes me.

Joey: Thanks Johnny, I'm grateful to have a smart friend who can appreciate the whole level of my intelligence. I feel intellectually and psychologically visible in your presence. You mean a lot to me.

Johnny: You know, Joey, I think I found one way that we're different from animals. It's by how we can mean so much to each other. Animals can be important to other animals, but not in the same way or even at the same level that humans can be important to humans.

Joey: I think you're on to something there, Johnny. As humans, we -- categorically -- value things differently than animals do. But I've got to go now, I'm going to go and create some art, concretizing my abstract values.

Johnny: Okay, I've got to go, too. I'm going to go and produce something of value to trade with others of my species -- instead of using force on them to get what I want.

Joey: Very well. I hope we can converse again on this kind of an abstract level soon. I found it psycho-epistemologically edifying.

Johnny: Tah!
************

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 2/17, 4:54pm)

Wednesday, February 18, 2009 - 10:25am

Ed:

"But I don't see how that makes any impingement or infringement on free will in fact or even in principle (none at all)."

I don't think it negatively impacts on free will to acknowledge things like 'autonomous brain function' or to assert that the human mind has a bias towards seeking difference.

Its entirely consistent, i think with the concept of volition that humans are free to choose the gradients they seek/value, and are also free even to seek 'sameness.'

In fact, being my own devils advocate, I'll point out a rare exception to my own observation, in herd survival, the tactic of 'sameness to survive', in a herd, to not 'stand out', to not be picked off by a predator. An instance of 'fleeing' of gradient, to survive, even in animals.

But my observation is, as a bias, not only in humans, but in human constructs, like economies, that they are driven primarily by the concepts of gradient, not sameness. Wars, hurricanes impress gradient negatively via destruction, but gradient all the same, whereas competition with the Soviets and JFKs urging impressed gradient of a different kind in the 60's.

I don't know if you've ever seen this, check it out thoroughly, and then reconsider if human perception is not at least heavily biased towards difference, not sameness.

http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html

It's labeled 'an illusion', but it is an 'illusion' manufactured inside of the human brain.

I regard it as an example of objective evidence that, not only does the human mind have a bias towards difference, but will in fact manufacture difference where necessary in order to perceive the world, not as it is, but as our brain believes it should be.

If you download the image, and tear it apart with a paint program, or examine the pixels directly, the two squares are indeed the same shade of greyscale value.

You can also 'force' yourself to 'see' the world, as it is, by taking a piece of paper, cutting two holes in it over the area on your monitor where the two squares are, and exposing just the two squares where the 'A' and 'B' are.

I don't regard this as 'mysticism', I regard this as acknowledging the world as it is, with the limitations of our brains, as they are, in it.

regards,
Fred

Wednesday, February 18, 2009 - 10:51am

Fred,

I don't know if you've ever seen this, check it out thoroughly, and then reconsider if human perception is not at least heavily biased towards difference, not sameness.

http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html

It's labeled 'an illusion', but it is an 'illusion' manufactured inside of the human brain.

I regard it as an example of objective evidence that, not only does the human mind have a bias towards difference, but will in fact manufacture difference where necessary in order to perceive the world, not as it is, but as our brain believes it should be.

As before, I agree in a hard-wired "selectivity" toward difference over sameness, but I continue to disagree that it -- epistemologically -- means anything.

The very reason you can read these words is because the words and the background are different. If the words were the same as the background, you'd see a blank screen. My aphorism is that: It's the differences that make all of the difference in the world.

Ed

Wednesday, February 18, 2009 - 11:14am

Ed:

Totally for fun, but ... I think the iPhone example is a little mixed.

When folks 'join' the (once) $600 phone iPhone 'community,' they are for sure seeking 'sameness' within that community, but the whole point is to be 'different' than the non-iPhone community, to be set apart.

Apple's marketing is brilliant, btw -- selling membership to a non-existing exclusive community of cool.

As is, 'Mac vs PC.' It's brilliant.

And silly. I mean, how exclusive can it be? All you need to do is buy an iPhone. Or Mac. How hard can achieving 'cool' possibly be?

...and so, a brilliant bit of marketing by Apple.

I haven't perceived Apple's marketing campaign to be based on features, but rather, perception of membership in a non-existing community. The features are implied, the assumed 'cool' is pushed to the front and center. It's hard to miss Apple's emphasis.

In fact, the 'cool' is so implicit that, when these shoddily manufactured things break every 6 weeks, dedicated community members hide their shame until they surreptitiously replace their membership icons; it's their fault, and a twenty something at the Apple Store will roll his eyes and let you know, in case you didn't get the memo.

Their competitors who now offer 'the same features' are not getting it. They may have the same features, but they aren't 'iPhones.' Totally wrong non-existing community.

It would be like buying your 'mountain bike' at WalMart.

Silhouettes of dancing dread locks and ear budds flying; that's where we ilive, when we proudly iflash our iPhones...

even if we're living in Mom's basement.

In fact, especially if we're living in Mom's basement...

...just like that twenty something at the Apple store, guarding the keys to the cool castle...

regards,
Fred

Wednesday, February 18, 2009 - 11:29am

Good rejoinder, Fred.

:-)

Ed

Wednesday, February 18, 2009 - 2:30pm

Ed:

re: "As before, I agree in a hard-wired "selectivity" toward difference over sameness, but I continue to disagree that it -- epistemologically -- means anything."

WARNING: Thread Abuse in Progress.

What it might mean was also triggered by another thought in a related thread, a response to a bumped article in another thread, which I may be abusing by relating to the ideas in this thread. From that article (Scope of Volition):

"Our attention is guided by goals, whether voluntarily or not. In the case of attention being captured involuntarily, no conscious decision is made, and there is some subconscious mechanism that determines what is important enough to command our conscious awareness."

I was -- and still am here -- hypothesizing one possible 'some subconscious mechanism' which I believe contributes to that, based on observation.

How do we choose to value that which we choose to value?

My abuse is, and I admit it, that I have and still am relating the topic "Vegetative Robots and Value" to "Scope of Volition." What contributes to how we choose to value what we value? (I am not asserting 'only gradient.' I am asserting, we have a foundational bias towards gradient, based on observation that contributes to this process of choice.)

To me, there is a continuum, with overlap, a common foundation, of the processes that drive vegetative actors, and mankind with our superset 'volition', which is not the same as, but built upon that foundation. Our brains are more than autonomous functions, we are more than difference engines, but we are them even as we are more than them, and we are influenced by them, even as we are more than them.

I'm struggling to understand why acknowledging/asserting that is muddying any epistemological waters. To me, it is the opposite. It is fundamental to 'how we acquire knowledge' about the world, as it is, with us, as we are, in it.

For instance, we naturally see the world in visible spectrum, not infra red or ultra violet. It's a simple observation, a fact, and it(used to)exclusively influence what we chose to value in the world, as it is, with us in it, as we are.

One thing -- an example -- that distinguishes mankind is, today, we could also choose to see the world in infra red or ultraviolet, and sometimes do. As well, on a moments notice, we can consciously choose to value 'sameness' in a given circumstance. That for sure distinguishes us from simple actors and animals and so on.

But, I don't think that means the same thing as, 'we have perfectly decoupled our perception of the world, as it is, from the biases inherent in our means of perceiving it,' which is, our brains, as they are, autonomous functions and all, visual processing biases and all, difference engine seeking wiring and all, undernath all the really good stuff, the distinguishing wet bits.

We intellectually 'know' those grey squares are the same color. Can we will ourselves to 'see' the same color? (Well...almost.) So, what do we see when we don't know, and thus, what do we value when we don't know?

The way our hardwiring works impacts the way we acquire knowledge about the world, as it is, and thus, some of what we choose to value.

regards,
Fred

Wednesday, February 18, 2009 - 2:59pm

Okay, Fred.

My beef is with the notion that processed knowledge is any kind of an epistemological hindrance or distraction.

Think of Rand's main criticism of Kantian epistemology -- i.e., that we're blind because we have but one kind of an eye, which catches light in but one range of wavelengths, rather than in no range of wavelengths (or in all ranges of wavelengths). A related line of reasoning would be to say that we're tuned to detect differences rather than sameness -- and that that's supposed to be something bad or, at least, something suboptimal.

Starting with this issue of perceiving things in only a certain and imperfect way -- visual illusions don't have any meaningful bearings on the enterprise of epistemology. Until and unless someone like you is able to hit someone like me over the head with a heavy club of reason (to shake out my real or imaginary cobwebs), I will likely continue to refrain from engaging in deep thought about how visual illusions -- which are only illusions because we happen to see in one way (and not in other ways) -- throw any kind of a wrench into the engine of epistemology.

Ancient philosophers said that whoever it was that discovered water, it wasn't a fish. They realized that we're not tuned to sameness like we are to difference -- that we detect "changes" in our ambient stimulus array. This, genetically, is because changes are more important. Notice how you only need to detect changes or difference -- we do not need to be able to detect similarity directly (just like fish don't need to detect the sameness -- or metaphysical continuity -- of water).

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 2/18, 3:10pm)

Thursday, February 19, 2009 - 2:36pm

Ed:

I think I understand your objection. But I wasn't applying, or meant to imply, any of the following characteristics to my observation:

"hindrance or distraction. bad or suboptimal."

I regarded it as purely observational (the world as it is, with us in it, as we are.)

I regarded this observation as an acknowledgment of a bias; a traffic citation shy of a forceful restriction. For example, I thought I bent over backwards to also assert, 'we are free to value sameness, as well.'

We're also free to defy gravity, we do it all the time. Which is not to say, gravity is hardly a law, it is practically a suggestion.

I didn't mean it as an absolute constraint on our behaviour or perception of the world.

In fact, even in that 'illusion' example, it is possible to will yourself to see the same shade of grey in those squares ...once you know they are the same. (Somewhat ironically, kind of squint, lose focus, and try to look at the entire image.)

But, that is only after 'knowing' that they are the same shade of grey. Without that willful act, ie, when stumbling upon that image in the wild, and regarding it with our visual wiring/processing, as it is, we autopilot our perception of the world, and our brain automatically manufactures difference where we believe it to be. In this instance, we must will our way around our visual processing wiring to see the world as it is.

It might upset Rand to think of mankind as 'limited' in any fashion by our wetbits and wiring, but I can sleep at night with the thought of Rand upset at something. Perhaps, I don't know, in her romantic vision of the perfect man, the perfect man looks at those squares and sees them immediately for what they are, as they are, in the objective world, as it is.

I'm not sure if she would consider such acknowledgments as a threat to her romantic vision of the perfect man, but, well, more power to him. For me, it is useful to understand the world as it is, with me in it, as I am, which for me is entirely Rand enough.

regards,
Fred

Thursday, February 19, 2009 - 5:03pm

Fred,

First of all, I did it.

I did it!

I was able to unfocus my eyes (like you said) and see the B square get darker; even approaching the darkness of the A square. Thanks for sharing that "trick." I didn't think that I would be able to see both squares in the same shade. I thought that -- like the straight stick appearing bent while half-submerged in water -- that my senses would continue to deceive me. Actually, that's not accurate; the accurate thing to say is that senses never deceive, but merely track changes in the ambient stimulus array -- which segways into this:

But, that is only after 'knowing' that they are the same shade of grey. Without that willful act, ie, when stumbling upon that image in the wild, and regarding it with our visual wiring/processing, as it is, we autopilot our perception of the world, and our brain automatically manufactures difference where we believe it to be. In this instance, we must will our way around our visual processing wiring to see the world as it is.

As I said, it's most accurate to say that we see the world as it is (which sounds like, but is not, "naive realism"); and that we sometimes think weird things about what it is that we see. When we look at your illusion, for instance, we are seeing the world as it is. We're just believing something about it, and our beliefs may be mistaken. Further use of our senses (as when you say to unfocus the eyes, or to cut holes in paper, or to examine the illusion in isolation by extracting pixels) fixes everything.

Rand's formulation is that it's reason's job (not the job of the senses) to figure out what in the heck we are looking at, which segways into this:

Perhaps, I don't know, in her romantic vision of the perfect man, the perfect man looks at those squares and sees them immediately for what they are, as they are, in the objective world, as it is.

In her romantic vision of the perfect man, the perfect man would look at those squares and see the same illusion all of the rest of us do. However, when asked about what he sees -- when asked to identify the evidence of his senses -- the perfect man would ask how important it is that he get it right (rather than be fooled). If it's really, really important that he correctly identifies what he's looking at -- then he would ask for time to analyze the squares first (purposefully not relying solely on how things appear to be).

And, with enough time to research it (assuming it is important to know) this man will be able to give you the identity of the thing -- complete with a discussion of how it is actually a visual illusion (just like the scientists who created it can). If it's important enough, then he is willing to -- and he is equipped with all the power he needs in order to -- correctly identify reality.

:-)

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 2/19, 5:05pm)

Thursday, February 19, 2009 - 5:14pm

We're just believing something about it, and our beliefs may be mistaken.
.................

Not so much believing as presuming - a subtle but definite difference...;-)

Thursday, February 19, 2009 - 8:07pm

Rev',

Agreed.

Ed

Friday, February 20, 2009 - 5:55am

Ed:

"Rand's formulation is that it's reason's job (not the job of the senses) to figure out what in the heck we are looking at, which segways into this:"

We're in total agreement with that, you, me, Rand.

It's exactly reason's job to examine and understand the characteristics of our senses, our wetbits atavistic wiring, to fully understand the means by which we obtain information about the world as it is.

Before we can accurately put bullet on target, we need to understand our 'scopes,' and as well, much more, but our 'scopes,' as well.

I guess we'll just have to agree to agree.

regards,
Fred

Friday, February 20, 2009 - 8:40am

Fred,

I guess we'll just have to agree to agree.

Well put.

Ed

Tuesday, September 29, 2009 - 8:19am

Tuesday, September 29, 2009 - 9:04am

Ted:

I've noticed something about this graphic. The first time I saw it, it was very easy to see two shades of gray, and harder to see them as single shades of gray.

I've seen it often enough that I have to somewhat consciously try to see the two shades of gray now. It's like, when it comes to this graphic, my brain has taught itself a new bias.

regards,
Fred

Tuesday, September 29, 2009 - 9:48am

No, I wouldn't call this graphic, entitled "checker shadow illusion" an illusion. It is simply shows that the way things appear is context dependent. Kelley Addresses this with his concept of perceptual form in Evidence of the Senses. That a white piece of paper in shadow still appears brighter than a lump of coal in sunlight next to it even though the absolute brightness of the coal is greater is simply the way paper and coal appear in sunlight and shadow. Appear is a verb that always requires a locative modifier.

Yes, Fred, if I tilt my head to the right and focus my eyse on the top left corner of the B square and see the A square in my peripheral vision then the two squares appear of the same color. Once my eyes go back and forth they appear to differ again. it depends on how well you can isolate the squares from the interveningG half-shadowed dark and white squares.

Tuesday, September 29, 2009 - 11:33am

Ted:

What do you suppose is happening when we stumble upon an image like this in the wild? It's not really a checkerboard, it is a flat image of a checkerboard, in some kind of perpective, 3D representation. Our brains try to make sense of it, categorize it, recognize it. And apparently...shade it, or at least, provide a perception of shading where we believe it to be, relying on some visual subsystem autonomous classification-- that is yet consciously over-ridable, when we consciously think about it.

It seems, to me, that most people iniitally see the two shades of gray, as a bias. My guess is, that bias is, pattern recognition first -- 'that's a checkerboard, I've seen that before, checkerboards have alternating blocks of light and dark' -- and then our visual perception wetbits 'make sense' of the flat image, and catagorize it according to a pattern we already 'know.'

I don't think of this as an 'illusion' either. Nor, as a failure of any kind of the brain. It is just a bias for one type of information over another. The actual grayscale values are not that important to our understanding of the scene, we 'value' the pattern/order over that.

What it is, though, is an interesting and accessible example of control over our own neural nets-- when we consciously think about what we are looking at, we can actually 'see' our perception change.

To me, it's evidence of the machine inside of life. We are not passive moviegoers, all perceiving the exact same movie of reality. We can watch the same reality, but we are buffered by our perception engines, which we have some control over. There is still an objective reality, but part of that objective reality includes the characteristics, as they are, of our tunable neural nets as 'perception engines' of that objective reality.

I don't see that as any kind of a flaw or shortcoming, it just is what it is. What is intriguing to me is, when we stumble across such things for the first time, we are relying on almost totally autonomous visual processing -- we are not consciously analyzing the scene, we just look at it and our neural nets present the perception to us, automatically. We must _choose_ to see it otherwise.

It makes me wonder; what other examples of neural net perception going on up there is like that?

I sometimes experience odd aural pereceptions, especially in very crowded, noisy rooms. It's as if I had a 'near/far' sound filter that sometimes gets out of whack. For example, I can sometimes hear folks sitting far across the room and speaking in a normal tone of voice much more clearly than someone sitting very close to me and speaking in a normal tone of voice, especially if the room is overall very noisy. It's a very odd sensation. And yet, if I consciously think about it, I can 'bring in' the close conversation out of the noise.

I don't have a sample of that one...but, it's another example of tunable perception.

And, the above anecdotes make me wonder, and I think likely, that our higher order, more abstract processing is subject to the same kinds of tunable bias.

regards,
Fred

Tuesday, September 29, 2009 - 1:23pm

is called 'contexting'...

Tuesday, September 29, 2009 - 5:45pm

deleted
(Edited by Ted Keer on 9/29, 5:46pm)