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Just as you can't be a relativist and, at the same time, argue about morality (because if you're a relativist, then for you, there is no such thing as a valid argument for 'human morality'), likewise you can't be a determinist and, at the same time, argue about determinism (because if you're a determinist, then for you, there is no such thing as a valid argument for determinism.
The latter point above is true because determinism stipulates that all personal arguments be predetermined to come out in one predetermined way for you (and for those with which you attempt to argue) – whether the predetermination was primarily genetic, or from past experience with the external environment (the important thing is is that it mustn't involve personal agency; aka: choice).
But, as I've pointed out in previous posts, a conclusion is not the sort of thing that is chosen anyway; it is predetermined by one's understanding, whether the understanding is correct or incorrect. To be sure, a conclusion can result indirectly from the choice to think or not to think, but that choice is itself determined by one's interest in knowing the truth about a given issue. What is being claimed on behalf of each particular moral [or determinism] standpoint in its conflict with its rival is that its distinctive account ... of morality [or determinism] ... is true.
Two aspects of this claim to truth are important to note at the outset. The first is that those who claim truth for the central theses of their own moral [or determinism] standpoint are thereby also committed to a set of theses about rational justification. For they are bound to hold that the arguments advanced in support of rival and incompatible sets of theses are unsound, not that they merely fail relative [or deterministically] to this or that set of standards, but that either their premises are false or their inferences invalid. True, but there is no contradiction in holding both that they are unsound and that they are predetermined. But insofar as the claim to truth also involves this further claim, it commits those who uphold it to a non-relativist [non-deterministic] conception of rational justification, to a belief that there must be somehow or other adequate standards of rational justification, which are not the standards internal to this or that standpoint, but are the standards of rational justification as such. Right, and those standards are features of objective reality. If one's viewpoint reflects them -- if it conforms to reality -- then it is true; if it deviates from them, then it is false. The fact that one's ideas are predetermined by one's understanding of reality does not render them indefensible or unjustifiable, if one's understanding is correct and one's ideas conform to reality. Again, one's conclusions are not the sorts of things that are chosen; they are predetermined by one's grasp of reality, whether correct or incorrect.
The present controversy is a case in point. Determinists and volitionists disagree and, if this forum is any indication, intractably so. Why do they disagree? Why don't they simply choose to perceive the truth and overcome their disagreements? Why haven't the volitionists convinced the determinists; or the determinists, the volitionists? Because conclusions don't work that way; one cannot simply choose to to believe differently. To be sure, one can arrive at different conclusions, but only if one becomes aware of a flaw in one's argument and recognizes that the opposite argument has merit. Is the failure to reconcile these two opposing viewpoints -- determinism and free will -- due to a refusal to think on the part of either side? Is it due to moral neglect -- to a perverse unwillingness to focus? If so, then we must blame one side or the other; we must hold one side or the other morally responsible for the disagreement. I doubt that anyone here would be willing to do that -- to accuse the other side of moral neglect simply because they hold a different view on the issue. I think it's plain that both sides in this debate are predetermined to think the way they do by the differences in their respective understanding of the issue. In this respect, differing conclusions are indeed "relative" -- relative to the thinkers' knowledge and understanding.
Does that mean that true knowledge is impossible -- that only opinion can be advanced on behalf of a particular idea? No, for it is precisely this sort of argument that is trotted out in favor of skepticism. Since error is inadvertent and involuntary, it is argued that no one can ever be sure that he or she is not making an error. The proper rejoinder, however, is not to claim that error is voluntary or chosen and that the remedy is simply to choose to identify the truth -- it is not to argue for epistemological free will -- but to point out that, involuntary error notwithstanding, we can still claim knowledge; otherwise we couldn't identify the fact that we have erred. Erred relative to what? To what we recognize as the truth.
To be sure, people can evade; they can behave in an intellectually dishonest manner, but not all disagreements are the result of evasion or intellectual dishonesty. And to the extent that they are not, honest error is a factor; well meaning but incorrect or incomplete understanding determines our differing conclusions, not the 'choice' to reject truth in favor of falsehood, or falsehood in favor of truth. Yet, the argument advanced by those who hold that determinism is incompatible with objective thought and knowledge is implicitly relying on that very premise. Nor does it matter for the soundness, objectivity or reliability of one's conclusions whether one is determined by one's desire to know the truth to focus on the facts and arrive at a true conclusion, or whether one freely chooses to do so independently of that desire. In either case, one is justified in claiming knowledge. Aristotle said that 'Truth is the telos of a theoretical enquiry' (Metaphysics, 993b20-21) and the activities which afford rational justification are incomplete until truth is attained. What is it to attain truth? The perfected understanding in which enquiry terminates, when some mind is finally adequate to that subject-matter about which it has been enquiring, consists in key part in being able to say how things are, rather than how they seem to be from the particular, partial [or deterministic] and limited standpoint of some particular set of perceivers or observers or enquirers. Since we are not omniscient, all of our respective viewpoints are "limited" by our context of knowledge, our experience and our understanding. Does that mean that we cannot claim knowledge -- that only God or an "unlimited" and omniscient being can? No, of course not. If we've integrated our ideas without contradiction and based them on a perception of reality, then we can claim knowledge. Omniscience is not required. Progress in enquiry consists in transcending the limitations of such particular and partial [or deterministic] standpoints in a movement towards truth, so that when we have acquired the ability of judging how in fact it seems or seemed from each limited and partial [or deterministic] standpoint, our judgments are no longer distorted by the limitations of those [deterministic] standpoints. And where there is no possibility of thus transcending such limitations, there is no application for the notion of truth. This is a non sequitur. The fact that one's context of knowledge is limited does not mean that it is therefore distorted. Here, MacIntyre shows how to arrive at the truth of a matter (i.e., by shedding the subjectivity – a concept which, by the definition of determinism, is implied by determinism -- and adopting a kind of 3rd-person and fully-integrated objectivity). If one's values ultimately predetermine one's choices and one values a fully-integrated objectivity, then those values can predetermine one to approach an issue with precisely that perspective and frame of mind. He also shows how it is that progress occurs (by noting, and transcending, the limitations of rival views). And he also shows how truth could become useless to a sect of humans persistently interacting with each other -- when none are willing or able to transcend their personal limitations (e.g., Relativists, Subjectivists, and Determinists, for instance). The fact that one is determined by one's values does not mean that one cannot be motivated to seek out new knowledge and understanding. There is, of course, a sense in which no one can "transcend" his personal limitations. If he could, they wouldn't be his limitations. Everything is limited -- by the law of identity. For a thing to transcend its limitations in this sense, it would have to transcend the law of identity, which is impossible. If the argument for free will is that determinism implies epistemological limitations, then free will implies omniscience and would violate the law of identity.
I know that's not your argument, but in that case, the "limitations" you ascribe to determinism are not the ones that you think are fatal to it. Compatibilist determinism is not the same as relativism. An epistemological relativist holds that truth is relative -- that what is true for one person is not true for another -- which is a direct denial of objective knowledge. Determinists are not committed to that position, just because they hold that people are determined by their values, experience and knowledge to arrive at different views of the truth. A determinist need not hold that whatever view a person is determined to arrive at must be considered true. Compatibilists recognize that just as people often make mistakes in logic unintentionally and involuntarily, so people are often determined to arrive at false conclusions. Besides, as I noted above, conclusions are not the sorts of things that one freely chooses in any case. One doesn't freely choose to believe in capitalism; if one did, one could just as well choose to believe socialism, given the same knowledge and understanding. But it's easy to see introspectively that this is false. Understanding the case for capitalism, as I do, I cannot simply choose to believe otherwise. The same is true for the socialist. In a sense, we are all prisoners of our ideas until and unless we see a reason to change our minds and to think differently.
- Bill
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