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Post 100

Thursday, January 3, 2008 - 1:03pmSanction this postReply
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Here's a bunch of research ...


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Reflections on the interaction of the mind and brain. Prog Neurobiol. 2006 Feb-Apr;78(3-5):322-6.

Problems associated with the topic of the mind-brain interaction are reviewed and analyzed. If there is an interaction, then the "mind" and "brain" are independent variables; the mind represents subjective experience and is therefore a non-physical phenomenon. This fact led to the need for a field theory, termed here the "cerebral mental field" (CMF). By definition, the CMF is a system property produced by the appropriate activities of billions of neurons. An experimental test of this theory is possible and a test design is presented. ...

... In conclusion, features of the CMF can be correlated with brain events, even though the CMF is non-physical, by study of subjective reports from the human subject.
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Recap:
Data exist indicating that the mind is a "non-physical phenomenon."



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[The brain-mind debate. Problems in the philosophy of science with regard to psychiatry] Nervenarzt. 2007 May;78(5):498, 501-4.

[Article in German]


The present interdisciplinary brain-mind debate with regard to neurobiology shows deficits in the criticism of methods and in the precision of language and argumentation. Simplifying localisations of psychic functions, insufficient explanations and over-interpretations in the sense of physical determinism are the consequence. This can be demonstrated in deficits of neurobiological theories of volitional action. Therefore, the current concept of man is less perturbed than is proposed by neurobiologists. For psychiatry besides the neurobiological approach also a separate way of building models seems to be useful if present theoretical psychology and systems science would be regarded. ...
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Recap:
When speaking of minds and brains, experts haven't been speaking accurately enough. This has lead to "over-interpretations in the sense of physical determinism." This can be demonstrated.



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Does any aspect of mind survive brain damage that typically leads to a persistent vegetative state? Ethical considerations. Philos Ethics Humanit Med. 2007 Dec 17;2(1):32

... neuroscientific evidence indicates that raw emotional feelings (primary-process affects) can exist without any cognitive awareness of those feelings. ...
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Recap:
There's a difference between non-physical "cognitive awareness" and raw, physical "feelings."



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The emergence of mind and brain: an evolutionary, computational, and philosophical approach. Prog Brain Res. 2007;168:115-32.

... Classical philosophy of formal languages as well as symbolic AI assume that all kinds of knowledge must explicitly be represented by formal or programming languages. This assumption is limited by recent insights into the biology of evolution and developmental psychology of the human organism.

Most of our knowledge is implicit and unconscious. It is not formally represented, but embodied knowledge, which is learnt by doing and understood by bodily interacting with changing environments. That is true not only for low-level skills, but even for high-level domains of categorization, language, and abstract thinking. The embodied mind is considered an emergent capacity of the brain as a self-organizing complex system.

Actually, self-organization has been a successful strategy of evolution to handle the increasing complexity of the world. Genetic programs are not sufficient and cannot prepare the organism for all kinds of complex situations in the future. Self-organization and emergence are fundamental concepts in the theory of complex dynamical systems. ...
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Recap:
Developmental psychology of the human organism shows that we know more than we know we know -- and that genetics can't explain our self-organizational and emergent powers of awareness.


Ed


Post 101

Thursday, January 3, 2008 - 2:54pmSanction this postReply
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Reply to post #100

Emergence is a place-holder for ignorance of causes.

It is a fancy way of saying --- and then a miracle happens!

Reductionism forever.

Bob Kolker


Post 102

Thursday, January 3, 2008 - 8:13pmSanction this postReply
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Reply to post #101

Reductionism leads to Solipsism (or eventual contradiction). Here's a fancy way of showing that ...



Non-Reductive Materialism rocks.

;-)


Ed
[see http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/Appendix1.htm]



Post 103

Friday, January 4, 2008 - 2:12amSanction this postReply
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Mr. Ed says:


Non-Reductive Materialism rocks.

;-)

and I reply:

Only when reduction fails. Sometimes we are not smart enough or do not know enough to do a reduction. In that case we resort to various heuristic work-around strategies like non-reductive materialism and emergence. Whatever works.

It is better to resort to a heuristic than to be stymied.

Did the Egyptian builders tell Pharo that they could not build his tomb until they had a theory of energy, matter and motion based on the Least Action Principle? They did no such thing. They built the pyramid based on the best empirics they had at hand. There is an old saying: The Best is the enemy of the Good (enough).

I am willing to do "mind talk" as a facon de parler, but I do not believe for one millisecond there is a non-material ghost in my attic or an ectoplasmic bat in my belfry. Perhaps there is in yours, but I have no way of knowing that.

Bob Kolker




Post 104

Friday, January 4, 2008 - 2:25pmSanction this postReply
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Bobby McGee, you write ...

I am willing to do "mind talk" as a facon de parler, but I do not believe for one millisecond there is a non-material ghost in my attic or an ectoplasmic bat in my belfry. Perhaps there is in yours, but I have no way of knowing that.
Actually, according to your adopted ontology -- you have no way of knowing anything. And the reason that this is true is that reductive materialism entails indirect perception (e.g., "sense-datum" theory), which entails skepticism (i.e., representationalism), which entails solipsism.

Of course, reflecting on your "position" -- I wouldn't expect you to "know" any of this (either before or after you are told about it) ...

;-)


Ed


Post 105

Saturday, January 5, 2008 - 6:54pmSanction this postReply
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In Post 96, Ed wrote,
Bill,

What you are doing -- and what I am complaining about -- is hypothetically freezing someone's thoughts (on the last thought that they had immediately prior to an action).
Ed, this is nonsense. I'm not "freezing" anybody's thoughts. Obviously, thinking is a process, but at a particular moment in time, one can choose to raise one's awareness from a lower to a higher level. Is this news to anyone on this list, besides you? What I am saying here is fully in accord with the Objectivist view of free will. The only difference between my view and Peikoff's (as he presents it in OPAR) is that I hold that people make this choice for the sake of a value, and that their valuation determines their choice, whereas Peikoff says that "there can be no motive or value-judgment which precedes consciousness and which induces a man to become conscious [i.e., to focus his mind]." But as I pointed out in a previous post, if the choice to think does not proceed from any value-judgment, then a person cannot be held morally responsible for it, in which case, he cannot be blamed for the failure to focus.
This is impermissible. It's fine to hypothesize about the same person in the same external situation, in order to examine their choices and what-not. But when you over-determine the context by trying to include their intellectuality -- their moment-by-moment thoughts -- then you are merely postulating arbitrary data to fit your theory.
If you can't identify the same situation (the same in all respects, not just the same external situation), then you can't posit a theory of free will, because you can't acknowledge that in that situation a person could have chosen differently. The very idea of free will requires that one could have chosen differently under the identical circumstances. You say that thinking is a process and cannot be frozen in time, but this view applies to the external conditions too, since they are also in process, so on what grounds do you recognize sameness in the external conditions but not the internal ones?
The same person in the same external situation may choose differently because of different, instantaneous thoughts.
What's an "instantaneous thought"? You just said that a thought can't be frozen in time, because thinking is a process. But if so, then there's no such thing as an "instantaneous thought." You can't have it both ways, Ed.
Thoughts are the key to decision-making, not feelings -- feelings are dependent on prior and current thoughts.
Then what is the motive for the initial choice to think or to focus one's mind? According to Rand, "an infant or young child learns to focus his mind in the form of wanting to know something -- to understand clearly." (Ayn Rand Answers, p. 154) In other words, the infant's desire to know is the motive for his choice. Contrast Rand's view with Peikoff's in OPAR in which he says that "there can be no motive or value-judgment which precedes consciousness and which induces a man to become conscious." He further states that "it is invalid to ask: why did a man choose to focus? There is no such 'why.' There is only the fact that a man chose: he chose the effort of consciousness, or he chose non-effort and unconsciousness." (p. 60)
Thinking is a process, not a still-picture which can be isolated.
I agree, but the process of higher level thinking is initiated at some point in time by the choice to focus. If you don't know that, then you don't understand the Objectivist view of free will. And, as Rand observes, the choice to focus is motivated by the desire to know or to understand.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 1/05, 6:57pm)


Post 106

Saturday, January 5, 2008 - 9:26pmSanction this postReply
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Bill, thank you for your continued rational engagement with me on this issue. You write ...

Obviously, thinking is a process, but at a particular moment in time, one can choose to raise one's awareness from a lower to a higher level.
Agreed. But at other moments in time, moments -- as I'm about to show -- for which your theory doesn't effectively account, one won't choose to raise one's awareness. So you get the same external situation, but a different choice. Here, we still seem to be on common ground ...


(1) same person (the same moral agent)
(2) same external circumstances (at most, imperceptibly different circumstances)
(3) different internal (psycho-epistemological) circumstances
===============
(4) Different outcomes


Our uncommon ground regarding this event -- of a moral agent choosing differently under the same external circumstances -- is in our differing explanations of what constitutes "internal circumstances." You think you can, in principle, catalogue them.

For me, "internal circumstances" involve a complex interplay of sense-perceptions, memory, imaginations, conceptual integrations, deductive differentiations (factor analysis), etc. -- which go on like a symphony consciously directed only part of the time by an orchestra conductor (i.e., the "will" -- exercised somewhat sporadically).

For you, "internal circumstances" involve a linear, point-after-point train of thought that is ongoingly directed in lock-step fashion by the moral agent's most-felt desires. "Feelings first" would be your motto. We are, primarily, balls of feelings --supplemented with thoughts (when we "feel" like thinking).

Going after a thing? It's because you felt like getting it! Thinking of a thing? It's because you felt like thinking it! Blanking out? It's because you felt like blanking out! Focusing? That's because you felt like focusing! Using your imagination to brainstorm about a decision? ... etc., etc., etc.

Here is the nitty gritty ...


I'm with Aristotle, Descartes and Rand: Our feelings depend on thought.

You're with Hobbes, Hume, and Nietzsche: Our thoughts depend on feelings.


... and I just think I'm more right than you on that.


Ed



Post 107

Saturday, January 5, 2008 - 9:34pmSanction this postReply
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And, as for the pre-moral choice to think -- I'm with Rand (contra Peikoff) ...

See:
http://rebirthofreason.com/Articles/Thompson/Kids_and_the_Pre-moral_Choice_to_Live.shtml


Ed


Post 108

Saturday, January 5, 2008 - 11:17pmSanction this postReply
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Ed wrote,

I'm with Aristotle, Descartes and Rand: Our feelings depend on thought.

You're with Hobbes, Hume, and Nietzsche: Our thoughts depend on feelings.
As I stated in a previous post, it is not my position that feelings determine our choices, for one can be motivated to act against one's feelings for the sake of a higher value. For example, my mother had a tooth pulled without any pain killer, because she was allergic to novocaine. The extraction was extremely painful, but she valued having it done, not because she "felt" like it -- obviously, she didn't -- but because she valued the results. Similarly, a drug addict can be motivated to kick the habit, not because he feels like it -- obviously, he feels like taking the drug -- but because he wants to overcome his addiction.

The point I am making is not that people's choices are determined by their feelings, but that their choices are determined by their values. People can and often do value acting against their feelings.

As Rand says, there is a reason for the choice to focus, e.g., the desire to know, to understand. Do you disagree with her, because it sounds like you do? You apparently hold that we choose to think without any reason, motive or value judgment. In that case, how do you justify blaming someone for failing to focus, since he would have had no reason to do so?

I agree that our thoughts can determine our values. My thoughts determined my philosophical values, but my values also determined my choice to read Rand and to study her philosophy. So, our values determine our thinking, and our thinking, in turn, determines our subsequent values.

- Bill

Post 109

Sunday, January 6, 2008 - 2:02amSanction this postReply
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Bill, thanks for the example ...

... my mother had a tooth pulled without any pain killer, because she was allergic to novocaine. The extraction was extremely painful, but she valued having it done, not because she "felt" like it ...
But I will turn this around on you ...

I could claim that your mother's felt fear regarding life-threatening, anaphylactic shock (in response to novocaine) was your mother's strongest emotion -- and she really did feel like avoiding that at all costs. In this case, valuing means acting to gain the "disappearance" of a stubborn tooth without life-endangerment -- but it's still acting based on the most-felt desire.

But even when I do that, what's still missing from the equation is your mother's unique train of thought. We have her intention -- her intention is to be free of a tooth without dying in the process. [!] We have her stimulus-response mechanism -- the tooth hurts her now (pushing her to do something about it). We have her knowledge -- that the pain-killer might kill more than her pain.

But what we are missing in all of this is her original train of thought. Now, if we were defending determinism, then we'd have to just say something like this to our detractors ...

"We'll, let's all assume that she'd have the average train of thought. You know. Not too many thoughts leading to anxiety and chickening-out of the whole process -- and not too many thoughts leading to brazen-ness and telling the doctor: 'Screw it, Doc. Hit me up with some Novocaine!'"
No, in spite of all our back-pedaling -- we're still stuck trying to "average out" something that is unique and original (i.e., someone's intellectuality); unique and original to person, time, and circumstance. And you can't do that, because you can't accurately infer such a specific train of thought.


Ed

Post 110

Sunday, January 6, 2008 - 7:58amSanction this postReply
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To the readers of this forum on "Free Will and Evolution":
You may be interested to read my post 70 on the forum "Ayn Rand and Evolution".


Post 111

Sunday, January 6, 2008 - 9:59amSanction this postReply
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Replying to my Post 108, Ed wrote,
I could claim that your mother's felt fear regarding life-threatening, anaphylactic shock (in response to novocaine) was your mother's strongest emotion -- and she really did feel like avoiding that at all costs. In this case, valuing means acting to gain the "disappearance" of a stubborn tooth without life-endangerment -- but it's still acting based on the most-felt desire.

But even when I do that, what's still missing from the equation is your mother's unique train of thought. We have her intention -- her intention is to be free of a tooth without dying in the process. [!] We have her stimulus-response mechanism -- the tooth hurts her now (pushing her to do something about it). We have her knowledge -- that the pain-killer might kill more than her pain.

But what we are missing in all of this is her original train of thought. Now, if we were defending determinism, then we'd have to just say something like this to our detractors ...
Whoa! I'm not denying her original train of thought! Where did you get that idea?! She obviously had to be aware of the situation and thinking about it in order to respond to it emotionally. All choices presuppose awareness of the relevant alternatives, but they also presuppose that a person chooses one alternative over the other for the sake of a goal or value. What is it about this that you don't understand??

In Post 105, I gave you a quote from Ayn Rand, to wit: "[A]n infant or young child learns to focus his mind in the form of wanting to know something -- to understand clearly." (Ayn Rand Answers, p. 154) In other words, the infant's desire to know is the motive for his choice. You chose not to address this point, so in Post 108, I asked you directly if you disagreed with Rand's statement? Again, you chose not to answer me. I also stated, "You apparently hold that we choose to think without any reason, motive or value judgment. In that case, how do you justify blaming someone for failing to focus, since he would have had no reason to do so?" Again, you chose not to answer.

So, let me repeat the question: Do you or do you not agree with Rand's statement?

Secondly, if you don't believe that a value judgment determines a person's choice to think, then how do you justify blaming someone for his failure to exercise that choice?

- Bill



(Edited by William Dwyer on 1/06, 10:00am)


Post 112

Sunday, January 6, 2008 - 1:59pmSanction this postReply
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Manfred,

Would you please edit your post 70 on Ayn Rand and Evolution thread; so that the paragraphs are separated, instead of running together -- line after line? That'd make it easier for me (and others) to read.

Thank you,


Ed

p.s. Here's the link to it ...
http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/0679_3.shtml#70

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 1/06, 2:00pm)


Post 113

Sunday, January 6, 2008 - 2:29pmSanction this postReply
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Bill, you write ...

Whoa! I'm not denying her original train of thought! Where did you get that idea?! She obviously had to be aware of the situation and thinking about it in order to respond to it emotionally.
I'm not saying that you deny her thought, Bill -- just that you erringly gloss over it (i.e., don't integrate it) in your theory of value determinism.

Philosophers have a name for the type of experiment that sufficiently proves/disproves things. A kind of "one-and-you're-done" experiment (where one experiment settles the issue forever). I think they call it a "Crucial Experiment" -- or something like that. Here's an example (using your mom's tooth) of what a crucial experiment would look like for a proof of value determinism ...

-Mom has a toothache (which "pangs" her to make a decision about what to do about it)
-Mom's allergic to novocaine (and knows it)
-Mom has the intention to get her tooth pulled without risking death from anaphylactic shock (from novocaine)

[note: this is where you stop, Bill -- merely assuming that she'd have some generic thoughts about pain, teeth, allergic reactions, etc]

-Mom starts thinking about X
-she imagines Y as a result of X
-she conceptualizes how Y and Z are similar
-she remembers how Z made her feel before
-she focuses on Y again
-etc.

Bill, this train of thought -- this executive functioning -- which is going on in your mom's mind; is something for which you've had very little to say about. It's your mom's intellectuality (rather than her desires and intentions). In your outline of value determinism, you've extracted the intellectuality from the decision-making process. And that's not okay. That's what my H. Bergson quote was meant to prove.

You continue ...

"[A]n infant or young child learns to focus his mind in the form of wanting to know something -- to understand clearly." ...

Do you or do you not agree with Rand's statement?
I answered that in post 107. Yes.

I agree with Rand's statement that "focus" stems from a stimulus -- followed by a response to that stimulus. In the case of the stimulus bringing an unknown to mind, then the chosen mental focus is done in order to know or understand the stimulus more clearly. You can also choose to blank-out or muddy your focus -- because you're free to choose that. For instance, in the case of a fearful unknown, sometimes people unfocus and go into denial -- until or unless that works against them.

I'm out of time for now ...


Ed


Post 114

Sunday, January 6, 2008 - 4:06pmSanction this postReply
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Ed: Following your request I corrected my post 70 on the "Ayn Rand and Evolution" thread by separating the paragraphs. You're welcome.


Post 115

Monday, January 7, 2008 - 9:39amSanction this postReply
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Manfred,
 
I like how you characterized volition as negation. See my comments in the other thread.


Ed




Post 116

Monday, January 7, 2008 - 4:21pmSanction this postReply
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Ed:
~ The idea of volition being so tied to 'negation' that 'affirmation' seems given short-shrift gives me pause. At first it seems quite acceptable that such can be considered the 'primary' aspect of volition...at first. Such an aspect is clearly an application of the Will in saying (and acting re 'X') "NO."
~ Btw: the example of animals doesn't fit; a predator's Will will say 'yes' to the chase/fight, and sometimes 'no' to continuing. But, their Will is under no control other than their feelings/desires-of-the-moment. They have 'Will', but, no Volition (ie: control of it, which requires conceptual awareness*) as I see the latter subject.
LLAP
J:D

*Rand did characterize volition as 'a function of rationality,' no?


Post 117

Monday, January 7, 2008 - 4:29pmSanction this postReply
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Ed:

    This is not to say that Volition doesn't include the capability of saying/acting 'NO'; of course it does. But, it not only includes 'YES', it emphasizes an awareness that *I* Will (or...Will Not.)

    Overall, I see 'lethargy' or fear (a feeling/desire of 'NO' to effort here) as the problem volition is needed for handling by us humans. It's the emotional source of evasion. re a perception of a need that requires an affirmation, not a negation, of increased focusing.

LLAP
J:D

(Edited by John Dailey on 1/07, 4:31pm)


Post 118

Monday, January 7, 2008 - 7:59pmSanction this postReply
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John,

Besides straightforward negation of a thing perceived, I would say that re-affirmation (after initial denial) would most provocatively illustrate an exercise of free will. This occurs with the Modus Tollens form of logical reasoning ...

"p or not-p?"

If not-p, then q.
Not q.
========
Therefore, not-(not-p) ... or, more succinctly ... p.

Humans intellectually use this reasoning to decide things all of the time.

As far as the notion that animals can't "just say no" -- I'm holding my ground. Your example of, say, a cheetah who, after taking a terrible 60-mph tumble (when the gazelle "deeked" her out), who just up-and-quits instead of pursuing the chase further -- can be re-interpreted thusly ...

In the instance where this cheetah gave-up on the chase, the new cardinal or "over-riding" stimulus -- which the cheetah can't help but to respond to -- is, let's say, the pain in her shoulder and leg muscles; rather than the hunger in her belly (or the memory of her starving cubs).

Overall, I see 'lethargy' or fear (a feeling/desire of 'NO' to effort here) as the problem volition is needed for handling by us humans. It's the emotional source of evasion. re a perception of a need that requires an affirmation, not a negation, of increased focusing.
John, what excellent insight. In fact, I agree with it so much that I feel I could not have chosen otherwise about it!

;-)


Ed

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