RoR: Forum

Joe, I found this part to be especially enlightening:

"First, just because our minds have identity doesn't mean we don't have the ability to choose. The problem here is a strange view of the word choice. It's as if they've defined it to be impossible, since nothing could result in choice. If it were within our control, and our mind had identity, they say it's determined by that identity. If our mind doesn't have identity, there's equally no choice. This should make us discard that view of choice, since it's incoherent. ...

... The word choice then doesn't mean being able to go against our identity."

In her description of the implications of Identity, Rand used a universal negative, rather than any particular or universal positive:

"The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature ... "

This is a telling point; for it doesn't attempt to prescribe a particular action, but proscribes impossible actions (i.e., it allows for a "range" of behavior for an entity; which, for the mind, includes choice).

Ed

Post 1

Monday, December 17, 2007 - 9:16am

Yes, this is a very important point, and it is one that should be remembered when interpreting the word "determined" in the first part of that quotation: "The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act. . . . "

What she means by "the nature of an action" is the kind of action, not the kind of choice in the sense of whether one will think or not. That is why she did not say "An action is caused and determined." A human being may choose to think, but his nature determines only the fact that a thought process is possible to him, rather than other processes, such as boiling--it does not determine whether he will think, or whether he will carry his thinking through with the necessary diligence.

I guess many others realize this, but I had never given much thought to the first part of that quotation until now; I thought it might be merely an unfortunate formulation, when I thought about it at all. So thanks to Ed and Joe for stimulating my thinking about that passage.

Post 2

Monday, December 17, 2007 - 6:02pm

Joe,

Well written and agreed. Whats your position on "If Reality could be replayed many times from the same starting point, could a person choose a different choice?"

Post 3

Monday, December 17, 2007 - 6:44pm

"If Reality could be replayed many times from the same starting point, could a person choose a different choice?"

Only if as in "Groundhog Day" - but, then, because of remembering, it truly wasn't the same, was it......

Post 4

Monday, December 17, 2007 - 8:43pm

This should be a non-issue. After all, if an asteroid strikes the Earth and leaves a huge steaming hole, we don't go around looking for the history of the asteroid or saying that it wasn't really the asteroid that was responsible because the asteroid and its trajectory were all determined from the Big Bang onward. No, the asteroid caused the hole. What came before that lead up to the asteroid happening to be on that path or existing to begin with is not the relevant issue, except as it might apply to predicting or preventing such events in the future.

Similarly, there were an infinity of events that happened in a roughly causal path leading up to one's existence as a human being. How is it that we can assign responsibility to all these non-conscious or other-conscious events for our actions, but somehow we as the acting entity are excluded from the possibility of being a causal agent?

When we became conscious, then we were able to make choices. Consciousness without choice is impossible, just as knowledge without the capability of testing or denying a conclusion is impossible. To say that somehow we could have chosen differently or not is not the issue at all. The issue is who or what made the choice of A over B. Was it all the antecedent, non-conscious conditions that lead up to the present moment that we should for some strange reason give priority to, or is it us, ourselves.?

Post 5

Monday, December 17, 2007 - 10:19pm

Joe, you wrote,

In the most general sense, Free Will is the theory that you have control over your choices. If you decide between doing task A and task B, it's really you that's making the choice, just as it seems to be. Determinism, on the other hand, says that you don't really have a choice at all. It maintains that choice is an illusion, and that your actions are really out of your control.

Not true. Determinism does not say that you don't have a choice, that choice is an illusion and that your actions are out of your control. It simply says that your choices are necessitated by antecedent causes. In the case of "soft determinism," it says that your value judgments determine your choices.

Let us say that Robert Bidinotto were the Republican nominee for president, and Barack Obama, the Democratic nominee, and that you were a diehard supporter of Bidinotto and a diehard opponent of Obama. Do you have a choice as to which candidate to vote for? Yes. Nobody is forcing you to vote for Bidinotto. Is there any possibility that you will vote for Obama. No. Your choice to vote for Bidinotto is a fait accompli; it is necessitated by your value judgments. Does that mean that your vote is not in your control. No; it's in your control; it's simply determined by your political values. The soft determinist views all choices in this manner, i.e., as determined by the moral agent's value judgments.

This topic is important because morality rests on the idea of Free Will. If you don't actually have a choice, then how can anyone blame you or praise you for your choices? Morality is a tool for making choices, and if you have no choice, morality has no meaning.

True, but determinism does not say that you have no choice. This is a common misconception about about what determinism implies and entails.

One reason this is such a hotly contested issue is that the terms are used to describe wildly different concepts. For instance, some people claim that our choices are not determined because our brains are physical, and at the quantum level it's believed (by some) that things only happen by probabilities. Leaving aside the Objectivist's usual complaint about such theories violating the Law of Identity, that's still a terrible defense of Free Will, since it's really just determinism. It still accepts that our choices are controlled by physical laws, but claims the physical laws are random. So what? It just says we're controlled by a random factor, not a deterministic one. This is the kind of confusion that makes the whole discussion seem pointless.

Objectivism characterizes this view as "indeterminism." In his monograph Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation, Harry Binswanger writes, "Indeterminism...holds that not all human action is necessitated, because some actions allegedly have no causes at all.... In certain cases it is just a sheer, causeless accident which of two actions a man performs. Although they seem to be opposites, determinism and indeterminism are fundamentally similar in that both theories deny the possibility of choice and of self-control. Whether one's life is ruled by iron necessity or by a necessity interrupted by freak accidents, one is not in control of oneself." (pp. 5, 6) Of course, I don't agree with his assessment of determinism.

It should be obvious to anyone who can introspect at all that they are making choices. They make them all the time. What's the problem with that? The biggest problem that's difficult for people to resolve is how this ability to choose can exist along side of the Law of Identity. If our minds have identity, isn't our choices controlled by that identity? If our minds are a function of our physical brains, and the brains obey the Laws of Physics, can we really say we're making choices? After all, we had to make the choices we made because of who we are.

The problem with this view is that it is a form of epiphenominalism in which the mind is simply an epiphenomenon of the brain's activity. But this is the wrong way to think about the mind and the brain. Just as "the morning star" and "the evening star" are not two different planets, but the same planet (Venus) viewed from two different perspectives, so the mind and the brain (i.e., cerebral cortex) are not two different organs, but the same organ viewed from two different perspectives. The mind is simply the cerebral cortex viewed introspectively. So when the cerebral cortex acts, it is the mind that is acting; and vice versa. The flaw in epiphenomenalism is that it views the mind and the cerebral cortex as two separate, independent organs with the cerebral cortex controlling the mind. The flaw in the criticisms of epiphenomenalism is that they make the opposite error by claiming that it is the mind that controls the cerebral cortex. Both views see the mind and the cerebral cortex as separate organs with one controlling the other. In fact, there is just one organ of thought -- the cerebral cortex -- whose introspective aspect is the mind. It is true that the cerebral cortex acts through conscious awareness, not independently of it as the epiphenomenalists imply, but conscious awareness is still an integral part of the cerebral cortex, not an independent existent.

Determinism amounts to the position that even though we think we're aware of our own minds, it's all just an illusion.
Not true.
One view is that our brains function deterministically based on chemistry and physics, and our consciousness is not real. Essentially, we're imagining our own minds. The assumption here is that because our brains our physical, consciousness must not be real. They can't reconcile the mental world with the physical world, and so they abandon one. So this view of determinism would mean that our thinking is like a TV show, where we are really just passively displayed the illusion of thinking, but we're tricked into believing it's real.

This view is known as "materialism."

One Objectivist argument against determinism is that it invalidates all knowledge. If you don't really have any choices, then you can't choose between what's correct and what's incorrect. If your mind is just an illusion, then you aren't really grasping (an action) reality. You just think you are. If choices aren't real, then choosing to believe one thing vs. another is not real. Determinism is incompatible with knowledge.

The argument that determinism invalidates all knowledge and is therefore self-refuting is fallacious. See my refutations of it in The Personalist and in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies. We don't freely choose our ideas; if we did, then we could just as well have chosen to believe the opposite, which we clearly cannot do. In believing that the earth is round, for example, I could not just as well have chosen to believe that it's flat. In concluding that two plus two equal four, I could not just as well have chosen to conclude that they equal five. Our conclusions are determined by what we think is true, and if we think that something is true, then we cannot choose to think that it's false. Choice applies to actions, not to beliefs. We can choose to evaluate an idea; we cannot choose to believe an idea. A belief or conclusion is the inexorable result of a process of thought or evaluation.

So the Objectivist position is that Free Will is essentially correct. Not only that, but our conscious mind is compatible with a physical body. And both are compatible with the Law of Identity. We recognize that our actions can't be evaluated as if they were just random chemical or physical reactions. It's our consciousness that allows us to make sense of the world, and is the key to understanding our behavior. You can't look at men flying to the moon in enormously complex systems and attribute it to mere chemical reactions. Only our consciousness explains it. It is real, and our choices are real. The word choice then doesn't mean being able to go against our identity. It means simply that our minds can weigh the options and come to whatever decision they want to.

I agree, except for the very last sentence, which I wouldn't put the way that you have. I would have said, "Our minds can weigh the options and come to whatever decision they think is warranted."

- Bill

Post 6

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 1:10am

Thanks for the comments, guys.

Ed, thanks for highlighting the point.

Rodney, good post. Glad you found it useful.

Thanks Dean. My first answer would be that reality can't be replayed over and over. But my second answer would be that yeah, if everything was identical, the results would be. As far as I'm concerned, free will and determinism is not about repeatability. It's about choice, or the lack thereof. It's about whether our consciousness, including our decision making, is a passive illusion, or whether it is the active agent that makes the choices.

Phil, your last question is right on.

Bill, I don't have the time to debate you on this topic. Let me make a few statements, but I won't be able to go into it further (at least not at this point in time).

You claim that determinism doesn't reject choice, it just makes the "choice" necessitated by antecedent causes. I consider that the same thing. I know you don't. I think by necessitating the "choice", the word becomes meaningless. It is no longer an process of an active agent. It's simply the description of the necessitated action. But that's not the same thing. Calling it "choice" is conflating two entirely different ideas. The determinist "choice" is passive. The free will "choice" is active.

And I consider this the critical issue in the free will and determinism debate. I experience my choices as an active process of my mind. If that's true, then I actually made a choice between various alternatives. If it's not true, then my mind is simply an illusion, an experience that rationalizes the automatic reactions but makes me experience it as if it were my own decision. If it's true, I can be held morally responsible for my actions. If it's not true, the "underlying causes" are to blame. If it's true, you punish me. If it's false, you try to change the real causes (like society, TV, etc).

In terms of your own "value determinism", I've said elsewhere that I don't buy it. Your definition of value is an after the fact description of whatever choice was made. I "valued" highest whatever I happened to choose. There's nothing predictive about it, which we would certainly expect if necessitated my reactions.

In terms of your presidential value example, I find that even less compelling. In this case, value is being used to describe my principles. But what if my emotions conflict with those principles? What if I decide the Presidential contest is not worth my effort to focus deeply enough to investigate the options. Or what if, on a whim, I decide to exert my free will to win this debate? It absolutely is in my control. I can choose to ignore my political values. I can choose to do all kinds of stupid things. Many people do. There understanding of what's best for their interests don't force their actions. Their emotions don't force their reactions. They choose. They may choose the path of least resistance, or the path of least focus, or whatever. But arguing that they always act on their values is false. And the only thing that can save it is to switch to the post-descriptive sense in which whatever you happened to choose is by definition what you valued.

On a side note (and I don't think it matters at all in this debate), the problem I have with equating the brain and the mind is that I think the mind is best understood as a process. The mind is not simply our experience of the brain. It's our experience of the brain performing the process of awareness.

Post 7

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 12:29pm

Bill, you write:

We don't freely choose our ideas; if we did, then we could just as well have chosen to believe the opposite, which we clearly cannot do. In believing that the earth is round, for example, I could not just as well have chosen to believe that it's flat. In concluding that two plus two equal four, I could not just as well have chosen to conclude that they equal five.

Our conclusions are determined by what we think is true, and if we think that something is true, then we cannot choose to think that it's false. Choice applies to actions, not to beliefs. We can choose to evaluate an idea; we cannot choose to believe an idea. A belief or conclusion is the inexorable result of a process of thought or evaluation.

There are at least 2 counts on which the above is untrue: (1) Matters of Opinion (rather than Matters of Fact) and, (2) Choice of Means (rather than Choice of Ends):

When the subject matter is a matter of fact (such as in mathematics), the intellect -- upon experiencing a mathematical accuracy -- is compelled or determined to give its assent. This is not true regarding matters of opinion, however.

One matter of opinion is someone's choice of a means to an end. A real-life example may be job-searching. An individual may decide to search for jobs using the internet, the printed want-ads, or by simply showing up at businesses in a door-to-door fashion. There are still other means of finding jobs -- such as networking through other individuals -- but the point is that the choice of means is not necessitated, not like the "choice" of a mathematical answer (e.g., to "2 + 2") is. There is some wiggle-room (wiggle-room not found in mathematics) in the choice of a means to some end.

The reason that one's choice of means is a matter of opinion -- is because of our lack of omniscience. There are often multitudes of courses of behavior that can lead to a single end; and there is no way -- barring omniscience -- of always knowing the best available means to all of our ends.

So, in such cases, we are left to choose a given means.

Ed

Post 8

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 1:22pm

Joe wrote (to me),

You claim that determinism doesn't reject choice, it just makes the "choice" necessitated by antecedent causes. I consider that the same thing.
So, the person who chooses one alternative, because he has no desire -- no reason -- to choose another is not making a choice?
I know you don't. I think by necessitating the "choice", the word becomes meaningless. It is no longer a process of an active agent. It's simply the description of the necessitated action. But that's not the same thing. Calling it "choice" is conflating two entirely different ideas. The determinist "choice" is passive. The free will "choice" is active.

Isn't the voter engaging in an active process when he pulls the lever on the voting machine or punches the voting card? Even though he had no reason, no motive, to choose the alternative, didn't he still make a choice -- a choice necessitated by his political values?

And I consider this the critical issue in the free will and determinism debate. I experience my choices as an active process of my mind. If that's true, then I actually made a choice between various alternatives. If it's not true, then my mind is simply an illusion, an experience that rationalizes the automatic reactions but makes me experience it as if it were my own decision.
So you think that you actually could have voted for the candidate you hate and oppose, and rejected the one you love and support?
If it's true, I can be held morally responsible for my actions.
A person who commits a crime for idealistic reasons can be held morally responsible for his actions, even though he believed in what he was doing and had no reason to choose otherwise. A Catholic legislator who votes to outlaw abortion can be held morally responsible for his action, even though he thought it was the right thing to do, and could not have voted otherwise, given his moral values.
If it's not true, the "underlying causes" are to blame.
The underlying causes do need to be addressed, which is why philosophy is so important. How a person thinks determines how he will act. If you want to change people's behavior, you need to change their philosophy. But the fact that a person makes bad choices because of his philosophy does not mean that he cannot be blamed. To blame someone is simply to hold him responsible for his action -- to identify him as having consciously chosen the behavior. If the behavior constitutes a criminal act, then he deserves to be punished. The purpose of the punishment is to deter him and others like him from committing similar crimes.
If it's true, you punish me. If it's false, you try to change the real causes (like society, TV, etc).

You do both. You punish him and you try to change people's philosophy and their values, which is what Objectivism seeks to do. To make any fundamental, long lasting changes in the way people act, you need to change their ideas and their political and cultural values, changes which will be expressed in their choices and actions -- in how they vote, in how they raise their children and in how the conduct themselves in relation to others.

In terms of your own "value determinism", I've said elsewhere that I don't buy it. Your definition of value is an after the fact description of whatever choice was made. I "valued" highest whatever I happened to choose. There's nothing predictive about it, which we would certainly expect if it necessitated my reactions.

In some cases, there isn't, because it's not always possible to know someone's real values. Even the actor himself may not always know them, until he or she makes a choice. But there are many circumstances in which such knowledge does exist and in which the action is clearly predictable. I know that when I go in that voting booth that I'm going to vote for Bidinotto. There is absolutely no possibility whatsoever that I'll vote for Obama. Why? Because Bidinotto represents my political values and Obama opposes them. Yet it makes perfect sense to say that I "chose" to vote for Bidinotto, even though I could not have voted for Obama, given my political values.

Or consider another example. I'm taking a multiple choice test, and there are four possible answers, three of which I know to be wrong and one, I know to be right. Since I want to pass the test, I will necessarily choose the answer I know to be right. Are you telling me that when I chose the right answer, I didn't make a choice?

In terms of your presidential value example, I find that even less compelling. In this case, value is being used to describe my principles. But what if my emotions conflict with those principles?
Can you give me an example? In the example I gave, you are a diehard supporter of Bidinotto and a diehard opponent of Obama. How then could you be emotionally inclined to vote for Obama?
What if I decide the Presidential contest is not worth my effort to focus deeply enough to investigate the options.
You're straying from the example. But let me accept your condition and reply to you on your terms. If you decide the contest is not worth the effort to investigate the options, then you won't have an opinion about either of the candidates and will presumably abstain. Why vote if you don't have any reason to?
Or what if, on a whim, I decide to exert my free will to win this debate?
Once again, you're changing the example. My original example didn't involve someone whose purpose was to win this debate; it involved someone whose purpose was to cast a vote for his favorite candidate. If your purpose was to win this debate, then that would determine your choice. Of course, by choosing to vote for Obama just to win the debate, you wouldn't be winning the debate at all, but simply demonstrating that your purpose determines your choice.
It absolutely is in my control. I can choose to ignore my political values.
Yes, you can choose to ignore your political values, if a more important value (like winning this debate) supervenes.
I can choose to do all kinds of stupid things.
Not if you don't have a reason to. You can't choose to jump off a bridge or murder your best friend or become a suicide bomber, without any reason or motive for doing so.
Many people do. There understanding of what's best for their interests don't force their actions. [sic] Their emotions don't force their reactions. They choose. They may choose the path of least resistance, or the path of least focus, or whatever.
Choose it for no reason? -- just arbitrarily?
But arguing that they always act on their values is false. And the only thing that can save it is to switch to the post-descriptive sense in which whatever you happened to choose is by definition what you valued.

So what you're telling me is that people can just as well choose what they don't value as what they do value -- that their moral and philosophical values have no effect whatsoever on the choices they make -- that they just choose for the sake of choosing, not for the sake of any valued goal or purpose.

On a side note (and I don't think it matters at all in this debate), the problem I have with equating the brain and the mind is that I think the mind is best understood as a process. The mind is not simply our experience of the brain. It's our experience of the brain performing the process of awareness.

That's what I meant. Thanks for your clarification.

- Bill

Post 9

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 1:54pm

Bill, you write:

"If the behavior constitutes a criminal act, then he deserves to be punished. The purpose of the punishment is to deter him and others like him from committing similar crimes."

But deterrence is not the rationally-justified purpose of punishment -- retribution is (where the punishment fits the crime). If deterrence were the purpose of punishment, then it would be best if the punishment doesn't fit the crime, but instead exceeds it.

And the reason that this is true is because it would better deter more people (it would "serve its purpose" better).

Ed

p.s. In fact, when deterrence is our final purpose, it's even possible to imagine punishing innocent men -- if the expected deterrence of future crime is at a high-enough level as to outweigh the harm done to those innocent. Alternatively, it's not even possible to imagine punishing innocent men -- when retribution is our purpose for punishment.

Post 10

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 2:26pm

Sorry, Bill - but I"ve gone over yer arguments time and again, and the counter arguments , and the rebuttals, etc......... and it STILL sounds like ye wanting to have yer cake and eat it too.....

Post 11

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 3:05pm

Bill, just a few quick comments.

First, just because there are strong reasons or emotions in favor of a choice does not negate it as being a choice. That isn't my position. But as far as I know, that isn't your position either. You're not simply arguing that there are strong motivations at times, but that the motivations compel you to act in specific way. I take that to mean the experience of choosing that option is an illusion, since your action was necessitated by these influences. Instead of your active mind processing the choices, evaluating, and choosing, it would be passive mind that influences bubble up to the top and compel the actions.

Second, in order for you political values to "necessitate" actions, they have to be very strong, backed by emotions, with no costs and all benefits, etc. Sure, it's quite likely that someone will act on it. You will probably vote for Bidinotto. But you could decide not to for any reason, emotions, or whatever. The only way your values even appear to necessitate the choice is when all of the stars align and there can't be any possible motivation to pick anything else. But that's hardly a compelling(!) argument.

Third, absolutely people can choose actions that violate their moral and philosophical values. They do it all the time. And not because they secretly value something else more. It could be a willingness to evade the long term consequences, a choice to act on emotions, a desire to piss someone off or prove you have free will, or countless other motivations, some of which can be made up right then and there.

But that doesn't mean their values are meaningless. The choice isn't between being automatically compelled to action by random influences and being totally uninfluenced. It's not determinism vs. indeterminism. Free will is an option. It means we can look at our values, we can focus on long term consequences, we can feel emotions, we can look at this complex problem and actively choose between them. Our minds our acting, not simply reacting.

BTW, I was thinking after I posted that my last line might not be off topic. The mind as a process is certainly different from the view that the mind is a state. The state view has a pile of values, memories, instincts, or whatever. And they simply react to external stimulus. If you have the value "Liberty is good" and the knowledge "Bidinotto would promote Liberty as President", you could stand in a voter box and the option presented to you would force your mind to react by checking his name on the ballot. The active process of deciding would simply be an elaborate mental deception to make you feel like you're choosing, but in fact the action was automatic.

Post 12

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 6:23pm

I don't want to wade into the free will debate, but since I'm getting so much unexpected grassroots support here, and since the GOP is fielding such lousy candidates, I guess I should run for president.

Well, actually, depending on who's right, I may have no choice.

Post 13

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 6:43pm

You better run, because I may not be able to choose to vote for anyone but you! : P

Post 14

Tuesday, December 18, 2007 - 8:38pm

If I knew that 100 million others would follow suit -- I'd be willing to pencil in Robert Bidinotto on my voting card (and vote for him).

;-)

Ed

Post 15

Wednesday, December 19, 2007 - 1:48am

Joe wrote,

First, just because there are strong reasons or emotions in favor of a choice does not negate it as being a choice. That isn't my position. But as far as I know, that isn't your position either.
My position is that whatever choice you make is made for a reason, and it is the reason that necessitates the choice. For example, if you want to pass the test, you will choose what you think is the right answer. Your choice is necessitated by your knowledge and by your desire to pass the test. That doesn't mean that your knowledge and your desire to pass the test compel you to choose it. Compulsion means forcing you to act against your choice and against your will. To say that your value judgments necessitate your choice of action is not to say that they compel it.
You're not simply arguing that there are strong motivations at times, but that the motivations compel you to act in specific way.

No, that's not what I'm arguing, and that's the wrong way to view necessity in this context. Necessity and compulsion are not synonymous

I take that to mean the experience of choosing that option is an illusion, since your action was necessitated by these influences. Instead of your active mind processing the choices, evaluating, and choosing, it would be passive mind that influences bubble up to the top and compel the actions.

Nonsense! When I decide to vote for Bidinotto, it is the result of an active process of thinking that convinces me that he is worth voting for. Once I am convinced, there is no reason for me to vote for the other candidate.

Second, in order for your political values to "necessitate" actions, they have to be very strong, backed by emotions, with no costs and all benefits, etc.
Not true. All that is necessary is that benefits, as you perceive them, outweigh the costs.
Sure, it's quite likely that someone will act on it. You will probably vote for Bidinotto. But you could decide not to for any reason, emotions, or whatever.
I've already addressed this rejoinder in my previous post. Why do you continue to repeat it without replying to my answer?? As I said, if you are a diehard supporter of Bidinotto, and opponent of Obama, on what grounds could you be emotionally in favor of voting for Obama?! The answer is, you couldn't. And if, as you say, I could decline to vote for him for any reason, then you are acknowledging that reasons determine my choice. Sure, if someone threatens to murder your family if you vote for Bidinotto, then you wouldn't vote for him (assuming that the person could find out how you voted), but again that wasn't the example.
The only way your values even appear to necessitate the choice is when all of the stars align and there can't be any possible motivation to pick anything else. But that's hardly a compelling(!) argument.

But you argued that if your values necessitate your choice, then it wasn't a choice. Are you now retracting that view? Besides, if there is a motivation to pick something else, it must be one that favors the other alternative -- otherwise it's not a motivation to pick something else, because a motivation is necessarily preferential. I am motivated to choose A rather than non-A. So if the motivation favors the other alternative, then it will necessitate your preferring it.

Third, absolutely people can choose actions that violate their moral and philosophical values. They do it all the time. And not because they secretly value something else more. It could be a willingness to evade the long term consequences, a choice to act on emotions, a desire to piss someone off or prove you have free will, or countless other motivations, some of which can be made up right then and there.

You don't "make up" your motivations; your motivations are the result of your value judgments.

But that doesn't mean their values are meaningless.
It doesn't??
The choice isn't between being automatically compelled to action by random influences...
(Sigh) You're not automatically compelled, for Pete's sakes! Necessity in this context is not compulsion. Compulsion pertains to being forced to act against your will!!!
...and being totally uninfluenced. It's not determinism vs. indeterminism. Free will is an option. It means we can look at our values, we can focus on long term consequences, we can feel emotions, we can look at this complex problem and actively choose between them. Our minds our acting, not simply reacting.

Yes, your mind is acting, but it is acting for a reason. If you want to call that "reacting," fine. What you're calling "acting" is an arbitrary choice that is not made for the sake of any perceived end or goal. When you choose between alternatives, you're doing so for the sake of an end or goal. Your choice is goal-directed, not goal creating. You don't simply make a choice for the sake of making a choice, as if the end or goal didn't matter to you -- as if you are indifferent to which alternative you choose. A choice is a means to an end, not an end in itself!

- Bill

Post 16

Wednesday, December 19, 2007 - 3:18am

Bill, you say necessity and compulsion are different. Compulsion overrides someone's will. Are you simply saying that a person doesn't have a will, and so it can't be overridden? Otherwise, how is there a difference? These values, which exist seemingly independent of our will, forces us to "choose" an action.

Now one problem with responding line by line is that you missed the point of an entire paragraph because you broke it up and answered outside the context. You present an example of a person who has absolutely convinced himself that there is only one reasonable choice, feels it strongly, and has no other possible motivation to choose anything else. I pointed out that the example is worthless and proves nothing. We're wasting time here. You brought up this example of the stars aligning because you admitted that you can't define a person's values until after they chose, and were looking for an example that is so overwhelming in favor of a particular alternative that it would define their values accurately. I reject this method because it avoids defining "value" by having every conceivable motivation for acting be aimed at a single alternative. Instead of more rigorously defining your term, you've created the kind of situation where your term doesn't need to a definition. And where value determinism should be able to make predictions, the only cases you can hope to safely predict is one where the person has every motivation to act one way, and no motivation to act another, including acting on whim or just to prove he has free will. Far from being an example in your favor, it shows how weak the argument that values necessitate our choices are.

And no, I'm not taking back my position that if your actions are necessitated by your values, there is not choice. Notice I say your action is necessitated, not your choice. There is no choice in determinism. It's a stolen concept. There are alternatives that are physically possible, but the action is an automatic response to X. In your case, X is your values, whatever those are.

Besides, if there is a motivation to pick something else, it must be one that favors the other alternative -- otherwise it's not a motivation to pick something else, because a motivation is necessarily preferential.

I think you can be motivated to do more than one thing, and choose which you will act on. Are you suggesting that in your value determinism scheme, there is no mixed motivations? That when the calculation of which you prefer completes, you are 100% emotionally wedded to that action and feel no urge to do the other? I'm thinking about a hard decision. Which car should I buy? A or B. Both are nice. I choose A, but I clearly feel a desire to buy B instead. I am motivated to buy B. But I will myself to go with A instead.

What you're calling "acting" is an arbitrary choice that is not made for the sake of any perceived end or goal.

This is entirely wrong. Again, you posit that the alternatives are determinism, which is an automatic and passive response to stimuli, and non-identity or indeterminism, where you "choices" are not based on your will but are seeming random. As long as you insist on this false alternative, of course determinism will seem like the only possible alternative. But the alternative is not between being a slave to your values and not having any at all.

I don't understand how you view your own choices. If I'm trying to figure out whether to post or go to bed, it's an active process. First, I'm aware that there is a choice to make, and what the alternatives are. I put some focus into each choice to understand what the possible trade-offs are. I also am aware that I have certain emotional or physical needs. My emotions tell me that I want to make you understand. My body is telling me that I'm sleepy. I find it emotionally frustrating that you are so convinced of your position when it contradicts experience and is so poorly defined. As I consider the alternative, my mind starts to wander. I am sleepy after all. I focus more sharply. My moral values tell me that I'd appreciate posting more if we didn't have this big disagreement. I value clarity. I value making progress. I value getting to the heart of the issue. There are countless reasons for and against. I disvalue wasting my time, as I feel this topic usually is. I disvalue arguing about something I don't think I'll change my mind about. I disvalue the effort it takes to make myself as clear as possible on ideas that I consider simple. Short term, the costs are high. Long term, the benefits vary. If I convince you, we can have more intelligent discussions, and others may also learn and contribute. But that seems unlikely. Another possibility is that by formulating a response, I'll better identify the ideas, learn to communicate them, and benefit in the long term. Again, this whole thing requires focus. It requires looking at all of these competing alternatives. There is no magical values that I've decided on in the past that make my decision for me. The process is long and focused. I run the calculations. I look deep at the alternatives. I make a choice, knowing that the other alternative has benefits as well and I'll need to continue to evaluate as I go.

This is what I mean by an active process. As opposed to "here are my alternatives, and my values tell me I must do X".

And this is the important part. This active process, this awareness that I focus on the various alternatives, and form the will to act, is the critical issue. It means that I could have chosen either thing. That this experience of making a choice is not an illusion. That there is no magic "value" that necessitated it, and that suggesting so is not simply a gross simplification, but actually removes from the equation this active effort of focusing awareness. All determinism does this. It makes the "choices" simply automatic responses to some hidden values, or secret understanding, or outside influences, or emotional reactions, or whatever.

If I choose poorly, I can be blamed for not focusing enough. It's not something I can blame on outside influences, or inside influences. It can be understood that I may be even strongly influenced one way or another, but that the choice is still ultimately a product of my own focused awareness. My own reasoning mind. I don't remove myself from the decision making. I'm at the center of it. The buck stops here.

Determinism removes this active process from the equation. It makes the "choices" into straightforward mathematical products of input stimuli. The stimulus forces the choice. It necessitates it. The active process that I claim is the real decision making is removed. No longer is your mind the source of the actions. And so moral responsibility is taken with it. You can't be blamed. Your values can be blamed, but you're not even responsible for those. They arose from previous values, which arose from....who knows. But choice is an illusion.

And I mean that. Where we experience this process of choosing, requiring effort and focus, and ultimately deciding for whatever reasons (including whims or defiance), none of that would be real in the determinism framework. We may think we are focusing on the problem, but it is in fact these magical values (or other external stimuli) that are compelling our brain to function in a way that we merely experience as choosing. This long process I described earlier would be simply a rationalization. It would be an illusion created by our brains to make us feel like we're in control, while in fact the values colliding or mixing without our participation, making the choice for us.

And now it's time to reevaluate my choice. Not only am I even more tired, but now I have to fear a multi-page line by line dissection of this post. Good night!

Post 17

Wednesday, December 19, 2007 - 6:22am

A choice which is 'necessitated' by X ('value-judgement', desire, compulsion or whatever) is not a choice. It's a pre-Determined consequence.

To speak of a necessitated (aka, absolutely unavoidable) 'choice' is to stretch the meaning of choice to a breaking point of meaninglessness...or...it's to play equivocation with meanings.

LLAP
J:D

PS: Can't believe that this subject is STILL being argued in this forum; how many threads now?

Post 18

Wednesday, December 19, 2007 - 6:34am

ADDENDUM:

Maybe the discussion should turn to the choice about why (or how) a particular 'value-judgement' was employed, rather than (as is often usual) an existing conflicting one? :)

After all, all value-judgements have alternative competing ones, though only one gets...somehow...used.

LLAP
J:D

(Edited by John Dailey on 12/19, 6:38am)

Post 19

Wednesday, December 19, 2007 - 7:24am