Familiarity is necessary for a relationship, no question, but is this an adequate defense?

The time that any individual may give to another is finite, and, as such, must be used wisely.  However, how much of a sacrifice is to be made?  Should a relationship necessarily mean that other friends must lose significant portions of time with the individual, simply because he's now married his girlfriend?

Familiarity is something that should be established before the marriage; committing to familiarity should not be a part of the actual union. 

Further, what do we mean by exclusivity?  My only guess is that you mean sexual exclusivity.  If I'm correct in my assumption, is this implied by familiarity?  I would say, no, unless exlusivity is therefore applied to all relationships.  To do otherwise is to claim sex has an intrinsic value not to be shared out of the relationship.  I'm not claiming that sexual relations should be engaged in outside of a relationship; my point is simply that familiarity, by itself, is not an adequate defense.

Beyond familiarity as inadequate, exceptions could be made in exclusivity in general.  And, suppose after a marriage, a person finds that the marriage is not fulfilling in their lives, but leans that there's another person who brings so much more to his life.  Would not it be morally permissible to violate that exclusivity?  If you'd like an example familiar to the people here, think of Hank and Dagny's relationship in "Atlas Shrugged."  I'd hardly call his decision to have a sexual relationship with Dagny immoral on his part simply because he had a wife.

#2 - Joint Finances

As part of her job, my wife works with people who, while having no need to live in a mental health hospital, nevertheless have a hard time living on their own.  Perhaps they cannot hold a steady job, or cannot provide for themselves consistently, through a diagnosed mental health problem.  Some (not all, but some) of these people are hard-working, and often intelligent, but they simply cannot be trusted with money.  In this case, there is no reason why they cannot make good marriage partners, but to share finances with another could be disastrous.  While this is no doubt a minority situation, a caveat should exist in this aspect of the union.

(Edited by Joe Trusnik on 6/18, 1:55pm)

Greetings.

I have some time to respond to the plethora of comments addressed to me. They have been more analytical, targeted, and rhetorically skilled than the past round of ad hominem attacks. For this, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Trusnik, Mr. Lamont, and Mr. Rowlands, I commend you. It is my pleasure to debate this matter with men of your caliber. That being said, prepare for your grievances against my theory to be utterly crushed, demolished, and discredited!

Mr. Johnson: You will need to turn in nothing but your marriage license, once! (Or however many times you marry.)

What if I don't want to?  And if I don't and can't receive justice from the courts because I fail to "legitimize" my marriage or child, can I still be prosecuted under the same justice system that declines to serve me?

Mr. Stolyarov: Yes, you will still be able to be prosecuted for violating the rights of others; you will not be prosecuted for having an illegitimate child, but, if you happen to commit a crime while under that status, you can still be sued and will have the ability to defend yourself in court against the charges. You are still not entitled to violate the liberties of any other person, and the courts must ensure this—you are also still innocent of crime until proven guilty. However, you will not be able to initiate a court process.

Mr. Johnson: First, if the parents are actually violating someone's rights, then the government has the duty to take a hand in the matter.  But refusing to register their lives and their children's lives as being "official" and "sanctioned" by the State violates no one's rights, except those created by people wanting to make the government into a dictating nanny--even if it's a stand-offish one that simply refuses to act as its means of enforcement.

Mr. Stolyarov: I am glad we agree on the first point. Now, here are a few questions for consideration. Think about how you would answer them, and also about how my answers help reinforce my case.

• Does the upbringing of a child not take an extremely long time? (Yes.)
• Is the upbringing of a child not a process that builds upon its previous steps to produce an end result? (Yes.)
• When one builds upon prior steps, is it not necessary to preserve the foundation? A good example of this is Rand’s case for capitalism; it helped create widespread prosperity, and, now that we experience widespread prosperity, we still cannot afford to eliminate the conditions that caused it. The case with married parenthood is similar. It helps create a financially secure household protected against most economic turbulence, while allowing the child the synthesis of maternal and paternal care—it puts within the child’s reach the totality of resources the child will need in order to become a fully rational, autonomous being. In order for the child to continue on this path, it needs to have the initial security that fueled its rise.
• If the child could have the totality of these resources at hand, or once had access to this totality, do the parents have the right to deprive the child of the full range of those resources? Let us face the facts, Mr. Johnson: the vast majority of children whose parents get divorced are forced to move into inferior housing, sometimes from a single-family home to an apartment, must live on half the former family income if not less, must forfeit the lifestyle they had been accustomed to, for no fault of their own! This sounds a lot like intentional paralysis from the earlier comparison that I made.

Similarly, the child who lives with parents that are not bound by any contractual obligation, could stand to lose his former affluence at any time without any reason, just at the whim of one of the parents who may choose to abandon the child. There is nothing under the law that would hold back a parent who has conceived a child out of wedlock from walking out on his/her partner and the child and withdrawing the resources needed for the child’s care! If this is not clear and self-evident neglect, nothing is. The law must at least frown upon this state of affairs and include some manner of encouragement for parents of illegitimate children to begin to exercise their obligations.

Mr. Johnson: Second, all criminals--even convicted ones, though in this case we don't seem required to prove guilt or innocence--have a right to demand protection of their rights from the government.  It's not a case-by-case deal, where some folks have a right to protection and others don't.  The parents, just like their kids, have complete protection under the law--and just like the kids, only when their rights are violated, or they violate another's, should the State step in. 

Mr. Stolyarov: My claim is, of course, that the parents have violated the rights of the child to a stable and secure foundation for the development of autonomy when the parents have either conceived a child without the required contractual responsibility of raising it or have renounced this contractual responsibility.

Moreover, the punishment for crime inevitably involves the criminal’s forfeiture of certain rights. Imprisonment impedes the criminal’s normal right to move about freely or choose the place he wishes to be in. Fines impede the criminal’s normal right to the property he would have held in the money he is forced to renounce. The death penalty takes away an individual’s very right to life! So, at least, it would seem, for these penalties are all justified in proper contexts and do not constitute a violation of rights; the rights were waived by those who infringed on the rights of others in proportion to that infringement. I do not think that having a child illegitimately is as enormous a crime as theft or murder, so I suggest the punishment for the crime should be a far smaller, and, most importantly, reversible, waiver of rights by the offending party.  

Mr. Johnson: But, by refusal of its duty to seek justice for the parents simply because they don't get married, based on statistics that married people raise better kids makes the government involved, through omission.

Mr. Stolyarov: Wait a minute, Mr. Johnson. Let us logically extrapolate your case onto other sferes of government non-involvement. I advocate laissez-faire capitalism and believe that the government should not regulate economic affairs. But, if the government can be involved through omission, then, by not partaking in economic affairs, is the government still involved in economic affairs and, as a corollary, is the true separation of State and Economics impossible, since the government is involved if it is involved, and is involved if it is not involved?

This sounds as if A does not equal A.

Inaction does not equal action. Nothing does not equal something. Or, as our old friend Mr. Emrich would say, “The holes are not the cheese.”

Mr. Johnson: You are referring to some of the purest, most innocent, and virtuous beings in existence—and you compare them to disgraceful murderers!
 
Not really.  I think of them as being the same as you or I, with less skills to cope with life.  They require the protection of the parents, and when the parents themselves violate an actual right the government should step in.  You want to--apparently--create another right, applicable only to children: the "right" to have parents that are in a State-sanctioned marriage.  That is a gun to the head.

Mr. Stolyarov: No, children are not the same as adults, merely with “less skills.” Most children, especially young ones, have not had the chance to commit any moral errors—sure, they may make noise, break things inadvertently, or act improperly out of sheer ignorance, but these are not deliberate, malevolent inflictions of harm. Ergo, children are by definition innocent. They are not to blame for any tension that occurs in a family, nor can they rightfully be termed a “burden” on the parents; they have done nothing to warrant such a brand!

You say children require protection of the parents, but parents out of wedlock do not admit to being parents! They do not concede that they have a responsibility for raising the child over a lengthy period of time, since they refuse to assent to the contract which specifies certain conditions under which they would have a relationship with the child! Rather, they claim the prerogative of abandoning the child whenever their caprices so dictate, and their status immunizes them from the law’s ability to respond to this in any manner! This is a clear and present danger to the child, just as the threat of using force is often equivalent to or nearly equivalent to the use of force itself.

Mr. Johnson: But your contention is that since married people raise kids better, only married people deserve protection under the law--whether under criminal or civil proceedings you haven't made clear or I've missed reading.

Mr. Stolyarov: I have not stated that “only married people deserve protection under the law.” I have stated that if an individual conceives a child without being married, he/she can be temporarily denied protection under the law until he/she does get married and begins to take care of the child under the parameters of that marriage.

Mr. Johnson: By the non-act of the parents staying unmarried, the government has the (apparent) duty to protect one citizen's "rights" (the child) at the expense of another's (the parent's) by performing another non-act.  You say the government's non-act isn't official involvement, so how is the parents' non-act officially detrimental? 

Mr. Stolyarov: Because the parents have the obligation to be involved in the child’s upbringing, whereas the government has the duty enforce parental obligation without violating anyone’s right to privacy. If the government can enforce this obligation by not involving itself rather than by involving itself, it is far less likely that privacy rights will be intruded upon.

To summarize, ideally, parents should be involved, government should not be. If the one of the two conditions is breached, it is not necessary to breach the other in order to correct the first. So, if parents are not involved, and the government can correct this by not being involved, than the government’s best choice is to not be involved.

Mr. Johnson: And not for nothing, I'd still like a definition of the thin red line between neglect and good parenting.  At what point does the State decide a parent is acting in opposition to the child's welfare? 

Mr. Stolyarov: Let neglect in the context of child-raising be defined as “the denial of values by a parent to a child that a child either requires for its survival and development of its autonomy or that the child had formerly received or could receive of its own initiative in order to assist in the development of said autonomy.”

How can this definition be applied? If a child has been getting two pieces of candy a day until the age of five, and the parents later decided not to continue this practice, they are not guilty of neglect. Candy does not assist the child in developing its autonomy—with it or without it, the child can lead a wholesome existence. However, if a child has had a library of books in his room and the parents take that away and deliberately prevent the child from reading the books, that is neglect—the child loses a value that it once had, which would have developed his intellect and helped prepare it for autonomy.

Here is another example of neglect under my definition: when I was a high school student I was enrolled in the most accelerated possible classes, and often wondered why certain other students who were of similar intellectual inclinations and wished to participate in those classes were denied that opportunity. It turned out that many of their parents prohibited them from enrolling in those classes, for one reason or another. I thought then, and still do, that this sort of intellectual obstruction is one of the greatest injustices a parent can inflict upon a child, and thus, it would fall under the category of neglect by my definition.

So, if a child has a grand totality of resources available to it, under the setting of a marriage, which, in the manner explained in my treatise, assist its development toward autonomy, and the parents deprive it of that totality of resources or part of said totality by means of a separation, that is neglect. This is why the divorce of parents with children is immoral. Why is the raising of children out of wedlock immoral? Because at any time neglect can legally occur, without any ability by the government to remedy the situation as it should. One of the parents can at any time withdraw the values that assist a child’s development to autonomy, thus practicing neglect. The fact that the parents can marry (nothing is stopping them!) and do not do so implies that they are defaulting on their parental obligation and implicitly threatening to inflict neglect upon their child(ren).

I shall write more in due time.

I am

G. Stolyarov II

Greetings.

Before this debate proceeds, I would like to coin some new terms for easier reference to the concepts I have earlier described by their definitions.

Autonomization- a child’s process of transitioning into autonomy (i.e. material and intellectual independence and full rational capacity). (Verb: to autonomize, adjectives: autonomized or autonomizing).

Deplaintiffication- the temporary denial of a party’s right to be a plaintiff in court, until certain actions are carried out by that party. (Verb: to deplaintiffy, adjectives: deplaintiffied, deplaintiffying)

Marriage Resource Guarantee (MRG)-  The legal promise of access by a child to the sum total of resources available under a married relationship for a child’s autonomization, until such time as the child has been autonomized. (i.e. the full available material and intellectual resources plus parental care of both genders).

De Facto Resource Guarantee (de facto RG)- The immediate availability to a child of the totality of resources needed for autonomization, but the lack of legal security for the presence of such resources until the time the child has been autonomized.

More new terms may be necessary as the debate unfolds. Now, on to more arguments.

Jeremy: That refusal does, however, presuppose the government has taken a stance on the social upbringing of children, and given the latitude I described above concerning the extent of the government's reach into a child's welfare, the trouble that might be had by conceiving seems to outweigh--morally and philosophically if not existentially--those benefits.

Mr. Stolyarov: The government does not take a stance on the social upbringing of children, but rather a stance on enforcing the rights of said children. Having a child out of wedlock implies the imminent threat of depriving it of the de facto RG. Divorcing with a child still in custody deprives a child of the MRG—under my definition of neglect, which Jeremy has not yet addressed, this robs the child of values which greatly assist its autonomization, and without which most children would not autonomize successfully. (Call me the creator of proposals based on statistics if you will; I ask of you this: if there were a drug that, when injected into one’s vein, had a 75% chance of paralyzing him irreversibly in some manner, should the State not prohibit parents from administering the drug to their children? How does the situation differ with a divorce?)  

Under the MRG, parents have the right to make any social decisions concerning a child’s upbringing that does not impede upon autonomization.

Jeremy: The Branden quote you site is wonderful.  It describes in detail the extent to which a parent should provide for the welfare of their kid.  Nowhere does it say the State should punish parents who don't want their relationship or non-relationship sanctioned or un-sanctioned by the same State that apparently doesn't see fit to protect their own rights.  Are single parents (the wretches) expected to expect this self-same State to honor their child's rights, if their own are seen as trivial compared to the empirical observations--and predictions that they aren't capable of raising children--that lead the State to take such a stance on these matters?

Mr. Stolyarov: The Branden quote was meant to introduce the concept of parental obligation, not to illustrate consequences of non-compliance; because the issue is rather periferal on the Objectivist hierarchy, Rand and Branden did not have time to extensively explore it. I offer an extrapolation. Moreover, under my theory, by no means does the State compare any single parents to fiends or wretches (my stance on adoption, which I shall later expound, if necessary, even allows for certain types of single parenthood to exist unhampered). Yet, the State has the ability to say to them: “You are threatening the child with the initiation of force, i.e., the deprivation of a once-existing RG, either de facto or de jure. Please stop.”

Jeremy offers horror scenarios of criminal syndicates ganging up on parents of illegitimate children after their deplaintiffication. A rational individual will wish to prevent this; it will cost him very little, if any, time and effort to procure a marriage contract with his spouse and thus have all deplaintiffication removed from him! The modern trend toward the destruction of the family could be reversed by this deterrent effect, without the government spending a penny!

Jeremy: The government's single, all-encompassing prophetic "precautionary measure" is that it assumes one individual (the parent) must meet certain criteria (being married) before he or she is capable of protecting another individual's (the child's) rights.

Mr. Stolyarov: Deplaintiffication is not a precautionary measure. It is a response to an actual threat of force; the threat of the imminent deprivation of a de facto RG from a child’s upbringing.

Here is a clarification. A de facto RG needs not exist within an actual marriage; it just needs to be an actual real-life state where the financial and intellectual resources, as well as the parental care a child requires, are within the child’s reach. A de jure RG, such as an MRG, is one that is secured by law. The problem with an RG that is de facto, but not de jure, is that it can be legally withdrawn at any moment; the parent does not have a legal parental obligation to take care of the child; the government has no means of enforcing it, and the parent can walk out on the child as he/she sees fit. This very condition is tantamount to a threat to initiate force. For the government to seek to enforce parental obligation and give the child the right rather than the privilege to all available RGs, it needs to secure enforceable contracts that set up terms of custody under which the parents may raise children; the marriage contract is such a document. 

In the event of adoption, the situation is somewhat different; the child did not have a de facto RG to start with (if the child originated in a home where it was unwanted or in an orfanage) and the State must enforce any adoption contract that gives a child more values than the child had prior to the adoption. For example, a single adopted parent is superior to no parents whatsoever.

The purpose of my system is not for government to dictate the terms of a child’s upbringing, but to make sure that once a child has resource guarantees, that they are not taken away. From my prior list of questions, which Jeremy unfortunately chose to ignore, it is extremely difficult and unlikely to retain the results of a process without retaining the causes that brought them about. Thus, it is extremely difficult and unlikely to complete autonomization without keeping the RGs that existed for a particular child at the beginning of the process.

Jeremy: The children are in danger, Mr. Stolyarov.  They have special rights.  This problem requires the government to ensure all the protection humanly possible to prevent kids growing up wrong.  That's why it refuses to grant justice to unmarried people, right?  Am I still misrepresenting your stance, or proposal? 

Mr. Stolyarov: Oh, yes you are! (See above.)

Jeremy: This is a huge deal to many people--marriage might just be the best way to raise kids, but the government--as has been stated many times by everyone here--has no business prescribing the correct methods for raising kids, beyond that law-abiding parents should just be left the hell alone, and should be able to retain their rights in the process. 

Mr. Stolyarov: The government, under my plan, prescribes nothing that does not already exist for a child (in terms of tangible values)! The government only ensures that there is a guarantee that these values are not taken away arbitrarily from the child!

The child’s RG can exist out wedlock (de facto only), but it is under imminent threat of arbitrary withdrawal. Since an RG that a child already has is that child’s by right, the government may enforce it as a right. If the RG is not yet present (such as a child found on the streets and taken in by a single parent), the government has no right to compel any positive acts to take place.   

Mr. Trusnik: The time that any individual may give to another is finite, and, as such, must be used wisely.  However, how much of a sacrifice is to be made?  Should a relationship necessarily mean that other friends must lose significant portions of time with the individual, simply because he's now married his girlfriend?

Mr. Stolyarov: I answer this by reminding you that the romantic relationship exists on a different and higher plane from all others—proximity in that relationship does not in any manner obstruct proximity and commitment in friendships, relations, etc. Time allocation for each of these is up to an individual’s choice—this is too specific a question for filosofy to answer. Filosofy can only give generic guidelines; time spent building up a given romantic relationship should be substantial and proportional to one’s goals in the relationship. Each individual’s relationship is indeed unique, and unique goals are present. Thus, all that I can say in application to all relationships is that, in order to be perpetuated, the behavior of the parties within them needs to be active, consistent, and committed. Beyond that, it is your call.

 Mr. Trusnik: Further, what do we mean by exclusivity?  My only guess is that you mean sexual exclusivity.

Mr. Stolyarov: Yes, with an extension. I also mean romantic exclusivity, that an individual should not love more than one person in the romantic sense.

Mr. Trusnik: If I'm correct in my assumption, is this implied by familiarity?  I would say, no, unless exclusivity is therefore applied to all relationships.  To do otherwise is to claim sex has an intrinsic value not to be shared out of the relationship.  I'm not claiming that sexual relations should be engaged in outside of a relationship; my point is simply that familiarity, by itself, is not an adequate defense.

Mr. Stolyarov: Familiarity indeed is not a necessary allusion to the romantic sfere. My claim in the treatise was, however, that optimal romantic compatibility is best brought about through familiarity over time.

The reason for sexual exclusivity is not familiarity itself, but rather the state of optimal compatibility that is brought about through familiarity over time. Romantic love is the highest possible relationship between two individuals; “highest possible” implies that it can have no other relationship-equivalent for a given individual. Thus, it should exist between those individuals for whom there is optimal mutual compatibility. Familiarity is a way in which this compatibility could be attained.  

Mr. Trusnik: …suppose after a marriage, a person finds that the marriage is not fulfilling in their lives, but leans that there's another person who brings so much more to his life.  Would not it be morally permissible to violate that exclusivity?  If you'd like an example familiar to the people here, think of Hank and Dagny's relationship in "Atlas Shrugged."  I'd hardly call his decision to have a sexual relationship with Dagny immoral on his part simply because he had a wife.

Mr. Stolyarov: Rearden should have divorced Lillian and then undertaken a relationship with Dagny. Then there would be less moral ambiguity about the matter. Rearden admits, in Atlas Shrugged, to have committed a moral error by marrying Lillian in the first place. If he had followed my advice, he would have abstained from pursuing a marriage in the first place until he was reasonably certain that optimal compatibility would or could exist within it. His choice with respect to Dagny was also flawed, as, eventually, Dagny betrayed him in favor of John Galt.

Bad marriages could be ended by a divorce (in cases where no one else is the victim) without any moral issues. But while the marriage still is in effect, it is immoral to violate the exclusivity set forth by the contract. Contracts are absolute and binding. One’s whims, or a change in circumstances, do not entitle one to violate terms previously agreed upon.

Despite all this, Rearden is one of my favorite characters in Atlas. I am oft perplexed as to why Rand established his fate as ultimately worse than those of the other protagonists; he ends up with no relationship whatsoever, despite his former commitment to creating a lasting, rational one with Dagny.

Mr. Trusnik: As part of her job, my wife works with people who, while having no need to live in a mental health hospital, nevertheless have a hard time living on their own.  Perhaps they cannot hold a steady job, or cannot provide for themselves consistently, through a diagnosed mental health problem.  Some (not all, but some) of these people are hard-working, and often intelligent, but they simply cannot be trusted with money.  In this case, there is no reason why they cannot make good marriage partners, but to share finances with another could be disastrous.  While this is no doubt a minority situation, a caveat should exist in this aspect of the union.

Mr. Stolyarov: This is an interesting scenario. I respond as follows: I never stated that the marriage contract must be one-size-fits-all! In my treatise, I merely outlined elements that the contract should, ideally, possess. This does not mean that the State should impose a uniform marriage contract on all individuals (though it may well have a “generic” contract available for those who do not wish to write their own). Joint property agreements could include those in which one partner has control over the finances, and merely shares with the other jurisdiction over the tangible property that has already been bought for the household.

Which property is shared, and which is not, is a matter open to the discretion of the partners in the marriage. The point of my treatise was to analyze how joint property contracts contribute to a marriage, why they can be valuable, and why the government should give them the protection of the law. Mr. Rowlands, who opposes “contractualizing relationships,” seems to be willing to deny joint-property contracts in the context of a marriage their protection under the law, and my essay was a defense of why they should be protected.

I am

G. Stolyarov II

Greetings.

The comments I will address first are those concerning my theory on marriage. The remainder of the issues raised shall follow (I will not default to my opponents!). Mr. Lamont, I may add, has added certain comments concerning the “fascistic” nature of my ideas. This is not a good way to earn respect in a debate, and I hereby withdraw my prior inclusion of him into the category of those deserving respect in this argument. Nobody who employs the word “fascist” to characterize me or my ideas is worthy of mine.

There is more in Mr. Lamont’s statements that I do not sanction: “Unfortunately, Stolyarov seems to be of the opinion that volumes of rationalistic, a priori, post-rationalization constitutes “proof” or “rational thinking” and as such, is unwavering in his beliefs.”

It eludes me how in the world Mr. Lamont assumes the psychic telepathy needed to look into my mind and see whether I am indeed engaged in the devious scheme of post-rationalizing my conclusion.  The reason why I am “unwavering in my beliefs” is because I have actually performed my own thinking to reach them and do not consider the opposition thus far offered to be immune to logical refutation. How I become a whim-worshipping mystic by retaining the integrity to follow the direction of my own mind in the face of an overwhelming load of “peer pressure” to the contrary, eludes me entirely.

Mr. Lamont: With Objectivism’s radical rejection of the big government and religion, marriage becomes less relevant. Romantic relationships obviously maintain their importance, but they do not require a state, religious or social sanction in the form of marriage.

Mr. Stolyarov: And, ergo, you would bar others from enjoying the benefits of the marriage contract, as enforced by the State. Whose is the filosofy of regulating the behavior of others in their relationships? Your call to “get the government out of marriage” implies precisely this. Marriage ceases to be marriage if one of the parties can default on previously agreed terms at its own caprice without a formal process to dissolve the contract.

Mr. Lamont: “Contractualizing” a relationship, complete with terms, obligations, duties and legal binding is against the spirit of every romantic relationship I’ve ever had.

Mr. Stolyarov: Then you are free to engage in any fluid, hedonistic, whim-worshipping fancy J you can think up. Nobody is stopping you. But do not dare violate the rights of others in the process. Do not violate the rights of any children that may come about as a result of your adventurism, and do not violate the rights of any other more prudent managers of relationships who wish to have the protections of a contract.

People have the right to create legally binding contracts. The government has a duty to enforce these contracts. Children have the right to be protected by such contracts. That is the essence of my position. For this I am termed a fascist, statist, a collectivist of every possible stripe and creed, simply because I wish to preserve the contract-making liberties of every individual!

Mr. Lamont: I fail to see how political/legal recognition can enhance the love between two people - the essence of a romantic relationship.

Mr. Stolyarov: Then, as a corollary, you would fail to see how a business contract enhances economic relations between two parties, or how a property contract enhances the ability of one to enjoy the property he had attained without the fear of it being imminently withdrawn from him!

I am denounced as un-Objectivist by those who fail to see the importance and sanctity of the Contract, one of the critical elements in the capitalist system itself, without which the latter would not even exist!

By the way, has anyone noticed that the freest political and economic era in history had also coincided with the most rigorous voluntary social norms (and of course ultra-rigorous state enforcement of contracts)? I am referring to the Victorian Era in England and the Gilded Age in the United States (circa 1860-1914). Has anyone noticed that during that time, though it was not illegal, it was socially inconceivable to display any sort of sexual intentions toward an individual outside a contractual relationship? The era of laissez-faire did not begin in a state of Victorian “prudishness.” It brought the latter about. Compare, for example, the rampant prostitution, coquetry, adultery, and adventurism that existed in monarchical pre-Revolutionary France (a la Marquis de Sade and many more “upstanding” members of the French gentry) to the rigor of moral standards in relationships and public conduct that followed in the mid-to-late 19^th century. Why? Because government, by fostering dependence on itself from its subjects, also inevitably encourages decadent habits, while a lack of government controls inevitably causes the better ideas of self-responsibility to outcompete those of waste, licentiousness, and infidelity. Tell me again that my ideas of proper social morality are not consistent with laissez-faire, and you will be at odds with the whole of history.

In the 1920s, as big government first began to emerge, so did alarmingly high divorce rates (about 17%); as big government got bigger, so did irresponsibility and lack of contractualization in relationships. Whom does that label as the real statists here?

Mr. Lamont: The argument that a legally binding marriage is a “protection” from law is a circular argument for state imposition to protect us from state imposition.

Mr. Stolyarov: So, by the same token, is the Constitution an act of “state imposition,” since it, like marriage, is legally binding? Should we not have this dreadful act of “state imposition” in order to protect ourselves from the state imposition of arbitrary laws, censorship, tyranny, and indoctrination?

Mr. Lamont, you equivocate on the distinction between government acts designed to preserve liberties and those designed to take them away. An individual has the right to engage in a consensual contract and to have the assurance that he will get those benefits enumerated in the contract. The State has the duty to protect this right. Unless you disagree with the esteemed Dr. Friedman that the State has the duty to enforce contracts… (In which case your position is scarcely consistent with laissez-faire capitalism or Objectivism.)

 Mr. Lamont: In an Objectivist world, people should be free to bind themselves to one another through a bizarre contract if they wish, but such agreements are unnecessary (value-neutral and not therefore not desirable) and regressive, harking back to a church, state or social sanction where the focus was the attainment of that sanction rather than the life of the relationship itself.

Mr. Stolyarov: Aha! So you do not disagree with the act of individuals voluntarily crafting state-enforceable contracts! How can you call my position statist then, if this enforcement of contracts is precisely what I advocate?! Or maybe it is not my alleged “statism” that bothers you in my argument. Hmmm… perhaps it is the fact that I mentioned that marriage could conceivably hold values for those involved, and that I explained what those values could be. Our disagreement is not on the issue of liberties, but on the issue of morality. I state that it is moral to enter a lasting commitment through a marriage relationship. You, on the other hand (and this does not apply exclusively to you, Mr. Lamont, but to all those whom it may concern), believe that the only moral course of action is temporary, “fluid,” promiscuous licentiousness, and you seek desperately to justify such conduct by setting up every conceivable vicious-looking straw man in order to portray the other side as monstrous, totalitarian, menacing, and “fascist,” when, in reality, all the other side suggests is for you to look into your own life and begin practicing self-responsibility and prudence, for which a favorable but by no means coercive legal environment should be established.

And you accuse me of post-rationalization! How ironic!

I would not have received the vitriolic commentary of some had this been an issue of mere disagreement between us; I suspect (though I cannot be certain, as I indeed do not possess psychic telepathy) that it more related to the guilt that they would experience if they were to concede that marriage does indeed hold genuine values and that they, in their relationships, had pursued fluidity instead, which holds negative value, as I had always asserted and will not hesitate to re-assert now. 

Mr. Lamont: Illegitimate according to whom? The state? Social metaphysics? And illegitimate for the purposes of what?

Mr. Stolyarov: Illegitimate according to objective reality; they were not created under optimal parameters for their autonomization (the purpose), and their rightful RGs can be easily taken away at someone else’s whim. It is not legitimate for someone else to wield that authority over a child, and thus the child becomes an illegitimate offspring of the parent who can abandon him with impunity.

Mr. Lamont: In an incredibly tenuous stretch of post-rationalization, Stloyarov infers that a child not raised by a married couple is (more?) likely to suffer, “abuse, trauma, or neglect.” This does not comprise a guarantee.

Mr. Stolyarov: Refer back to my “drug with a 75% chance of paralysis” example.

Mr. Lamont: The existence of one, single exception to Stolyarov’s gross generalizations debunks his claim and fails to establish the causal relationship required to “prove” that a marriage is the best environment to raise children.

Mr. Stolyarov: Exceptions will exist because children, too, can exercise their willpower to overcome deficient conditions. Thus, Mr. Lamont establishes a faulty and impossibly rigorous standard of rejection. With the paralysis drug, 25% of all cases can be absolute exceptions, yet I say the government still has the duty to forbid parents from administering the drug to their children.

Mr. Lamont: Indeed, I am personally aware of examples of children suffering as a result of bitter, resentful parents; people who are bitter and resentful because they are married. They sacrifice their happiness and their children’s psychological health to an abstraction - to the marriage. And they remain in this static state because a divorce (which would be best for all concerned) would mean a failure in the eyes of their

friends/church/family/society. They couldn’t possibly embarrass themselves publicly, but settle to disgrace themselves privately by being ugly to one another and their children. There is just as strong a case for the state intruding in a married relationship as is there is for an unmarried one, if this is what Stolyarov favors.

Mr. Stolyarov: As a matter of fact, there are certain cases where the State should intervene in a married relationship (if one partner fysically abuses the other against the other’s wishes, for example, then the State could compel a separation if even only one party in the marriage agrees to it). However, in the case Mr. Lamont presents, the retention of the marriage is voluntary from all viewpoints (reluctant voluntariness is voluntariness nevertheless). So, no, the State should not interfere to dissolve the relationship. The State could, on the other hand, interfere if the parents are fysically abusing the children or practicing neglect under my definition.

Also, Mr. Lamont, you overlook every child’s right to seek foster care. This does not mean the child will get it, but the child should be able to appeal to a legal agency if he/she deems his/her parents to be of detriment to him/her. If the children truly think they are suffering under a marriage as you describe, they can attempt to prove it in a court of law and be transferred to somebody else’s custody. The existence of scenarios like the one you described should not penalize other children who are happy in a two-parent marriage from losing that happiness through said marriage’s dissolution. 

Mr. Lamont: There are many, many examples of people who resent getting married and resent having children. If anything, these choices should be discouraged, or at least better considered, rather than what Stolyarov proposes.

Mr. Stolyarov: I say these choices should be better considered on an individual level! I have written that individuals who are not prepared for marriage or are not certain of a partner’s optimal compatibility, should wait and see before getting involved. I did, however, recognize that this is not the fault of the institution of marriage! It is the fault of the particular people who make poor decisions, and no reason to abolish or even criticize the institution of marriage itself. Marriage does benefit a vast amount of individuals, and, to “discourage” it via the state’s non-enforcement of contracts is criminal. To “discourage” it as a matter of blanket application to all individuals is merely sloppy thinking and indicative of one’s own dreary value premises concerning relationships to start with (a good example of this is “fluidity” or the “expectation of dissolution”).

I am

G. Stolyarov II

Greetings.

I am trying my best to address all of the other side’s arguments in chronological order, so, with preference given to the marriage issue, if you posted more recently, please be patient.

Mr. Rowlands: Stolyarov and Citizen Rat have both commented on the "leftist infection" in Objectivist circles.  This only shows their own conservatism.  Like so many other false-dichotomies, Objectivists reject this view.  Our choices aren't a lifetime commitment to someone we don't love for the sake of satisfying our church, community, family, or anyone else, or indiscriminate sex with anyone and everyone.  Conservatives and hippies think in those terms. 

Mr. Stolyarov: If only this were true (in the ideal Objectivism, it likely would be)! However, as I had mentioned earlier, too many Objectivists of today had grown up during the “culture wars” and had unwittingly adopted the package deals of American politics and culture. I have noticed, for example, that the typical Objectivist uses the very same arguments as the typical leftist to justify abortion and euthanasia, and the very same arguments as the typical Rousseauian socialist to justify the elimination of marriage! Objectivism is a young filosofy and the radically original thinking required of its adherents is, alas, not yet present in many of them; they have been too immersed in Objectivism’s antithesis to refrain, however well-intentioned they may be in their attempt to do so, from accepting some elements of the mainstream paradigm as almost metafysically given.

I, on the other hand, have studied the entire corpus of Rand’s works and can state with certainty that she abhorred the sort of licentiousness that is implied in the standard “liberal” package of views. Her own views on the matter were not well discussed or extrapolated, as she focused on more fundamental issues, but Rand would have decidedly rejected the notion of “homosexual marriage,” the notion of “sharing with the world” one’s highest romantic affections, or the idea of indecent exposure— she used to, for example, mock empiricism as the “mini-skirt period of [filosofy].” Rand wrote nothing on euthanasia, a mere tangential paragraf on abortion, nothing against the institution of marriage, and remarks of contempt aimed at indecent exposure and pornografy. The views I am battling against on this forum do not, in their bulk, come from Rand. They come from the leftist mainstream, and I often find myself arguing against real leftists who say the same things people have stated on this forum with respect to these issues, and who use almost identical language, too! (You must recall that I live on the ultra-liberal North Shore of Chicago, so I have these experiences almost daily.)

Mr. Rowlands: One side claims loyalty and commitment (i.e., duty) is the highest value.  That's intrinsicism.

Mr. Stolyarov: Wait a minute. The cardinal Objectivist virtues include Integrity, defined by Peikoff as “loyalty in action to one’s convictions and values” (Italics mine.) and Pride, also defined by Peikoff as “the commitment to achieve one’s own moral perfection.” So, if you reject all loyalty and commitment, you are guilty of subverting two cardinal Objectivist virtues. Indeed, if you are a man of integrity, you will not commit infidelity in a relationship, nor will you renege on a contract nor seek circumstances that would make it easy for you to violate prior agreements. If you are a proud man, you will not be a mindless “identity-swapper,” trying to “grow and change” by means of renouncing your past and the values once dear to you. Rather, you will accept your identity and your nature for what it has become and accomplished thus far, and build it up from there.

Mr. Rowlands: Next, this whole talk about illegitimate children is a travesty of justice.  Even pretending for the moment that it was bad that someone has a child out of wedlock, it's still evil through and through.  The attack is not directed at the parent.  If it was, you'd call them irresponsible or something (still pretending here).  But attacking the child?  Stigmatizing the child?  The innocent one?  It's disgusting.  And notice the real issue here.  If you're using it to make the parent feel bad, you are assuming that parent is caring and loving.  It's through the strength of their value for the child that you attack them.  You're turning their love against them, just as guilt can be used to turn someone's integrity against them.  You're not attacking the worst of the parents. You're attacking the best.  No more pretending.

Mr. Stolyarov: Let us get Mr. Rowlands’ editorializing out of the picture and analyze the intent of deplaintiffication as I see it.

The best of parents would wish to protect their own status and that of the child; thus, they will not subject themselves to raising the child out of wedlock. If they, by their care for the child, can be so moved as Mr. Rowlands suggests, they will perform the simple act of signing a marriage contract, and will join the ranks of good parents as if no violation had happened. On the other hand, the bad parents, the ones that would not care about their children in either case, would not do this and would remain deplaintiffied. They would themselves remain deprived of the full protection of their rights, in punishment for their negligence, while the government would be able to single out the illegitimate children and perhaps attempt to, with the children’s consent (because they are equipped to give consent in a limited set of circumstances), transfer them to a more caring foster home. Given the correlation between deplaintiffied parents and bad parents that would result from the trend Mr. Rowlands suggests, the state’s error in singling out a deplaintiffied household as a dangerous one would be minimized.

I do not see the grave moral vice in this. As a matter of fact, all laws to some extent depend on people’s virtues to be enforced. The filosofy behind punishment, especially severe punishment like the death penalty, assumes that individuals adhering to the principle of self-interest will avoid committing a criminal act. When used in the proper context of government, the death penalty is an excellent deterrent against crime and appeals to the virtues of citizens for its functionality. 

 Mr. Howison: There is no straw man. Stolyarov *does* advocate the initiation of force. Marriage may be an enforceable contract, but you cannot sell yourself into slavery - a contract that doesn't allow you to change your mind and leave the contract is invalid.

Mr. Stolyarov: So, if Tom signs a contract by which he will give $2,000 to Tim if Tim delivers a shipment of tires to Tom’s automobile factory, Tim, once he receives the payment, has the right to “change his mind” at any time and “leave the contract” as he sees fit without delivering on the promised services? That is called fraud, Mr. Howison. A contract mutable by a single party is no contract; it does not have any sort of significance outside of a mere list of ideal circumstances of the proposed value trade. In order for a contract to be voided, all involved parties have to consent to this, and this consent needs to be objectively documented by an impartial arbiter (i.e. the court system or some entity whose testimony can be held up in court).

If you call binding contractual obligations slavery, Mr. Howison, then welcome to the Land of Socialism—binding contractual obligations, initiated voluntarily by individuals and enforceable by law, are the foundation of any free, capitalistic economy.   

Mr. Howison: This goes way beyond enforcing a contract - especially given that it is a contract written by the government, rather than a private agreement.

Mr. Stolyarov: I never stated that a marriage contract must be written by the government. The government could furnish a generic contract, but private individuals would be able to craft their own agreements that follow the general guidelines of what constitutes a marriage while being free to determine specifics (i.e. what property is shared, how it would be partitioned in the event of separation, etc.).

Jeremy: I want you to consider for a moment what kind of "legal" system denies you justice--the redress of violations of your rights--while retaining the ability to prosecute you on behalf of others with "more rights".

Mr. Stolyarov: Please refer back to my argument w.r.t. (with respect to) criminals waiving part of their rights in proportion to the magnitude of the crime they commit. (I will refer to this concept as the proportional rights waiver.)  This already happens w.r.t. any conceivable punishment!

By the way, I would like to somewhat refine my position on deplaintiffication, given the horror stories concerning criminal syndicates, etc., that you had presented. Deplaintiffication of illegitimate parents would occur only within the scope of the civil court system, since marriage is properly a matter for the civil courts and is usually independent of the criminal court system’s jurisdiction. Often, the two court systems are not centrally coordinated and deplaintiffication w.r.t both systems would necessitate such central coordination, meaning additional government expenditures, which are undesirable.

Thus, Jeremy, you win the criminal syndicates debate. No more deplaintiffication of illegitimate parents in the criminal courts. They will still be able to sue to protect themselves against thieves, murderers, rapists, arsonists, and other violators of the law. They will not be able to seek protection of their rights in civil court, however, which may, of course, damage their standard of living, but is of no imminent irreversible threat to either them or their children.

The waiver of rights should be proportional to the crime. I think I have devised a policy to make it so in this case.

Jeremy: Second, by not acting in economic affairs the government violates no one's rights.  By not acting on behalf of those whose rights have been violated in whatever way, the government defaults on its duty to protect the rights of all law-abiding citizens (and in the case of criminals, whatever rights remain to them.)

Mr. Stolyarov: The key frase above is “whatever rights remain to them.” Illegitimate parents do not have the right to initiate the use of the civil court system; they are themselves violating the precepts of that system by denying children their civil rights.

Mr. Johnson: In fact, you are able to completely side-step this issue by laying down a blanket law, which requires no evidence, investigation or trial: you just make single parents themselves the crime--not any actions they may or may not perform.

Mr. Stolyarov: Illegitimate parenthood constitutes an implicit imminent threat to withdraw a de facto RG. By legally allowing individuals to withdraw a de facto RG without consequence, a government that does not penalize illegitimate parents forces children to enjoy the RG as a privilege, and not a right. But an RG is a right by definition, since it entails what is necessary for a child’s autonomization.

The offense is easily reversible, and I do not understand why my very minimal and very merciful policy is evoking such an intense response, especially when it is an extreme liberalization of the current activities of government in this sfere.

Jeremy: It's the act of not attaining contractual agreement, you say?  Who's to say a married parent won't be just as neglectful?  I can not spend money on my kid.  I can not dedicate any personal time to their upbringing.  I can not do all sorts of wonderful things for my kid, and can be married at the same time.

Mr. Stolyarov: An MRG can be violated in the context of a marriage as well; this pertains to the realm of parental neglect and ought to be prosecuted case-by-case, if the child or someone acting on the child’s behalf files a complaint with the court system.

Jeremy: Again, you elevate the act of getting a marriage license to the level of immutable, unbreakable physical law.  I can get married twelve thousand times to the same person and never once take care of my kid.  I can never get married at all and provide twelve thousand wonderful opportunities for growth and learning for my child.

Mr. Stolyarov: If you are so willing to provide the 12,000 opportunities you mention, why not get married? I do not see the extreme reluctance that an individual in that situation would have, and I do not see how such a good parent would refrain from the 12,001^st act of good parenting, when it implies the mere assignation to the fact that the 12,001 opportunities are the child’s as a right, not a mere privilege.

The good parents, as I have already mentioned, will have no qualms about removing their status of illegitimacy; it is the bad ones that deplaintiffication will ever hamper significantly, and they likely do not deserve custody of the child in the first place.

Now, the moment you have waited for:

Jeremy: And so I have only one question (really about ten or so):  why bother with the "married/unmarried" argument?  Why not make the acts they do or don't perform illegal?  Why should one phase of a relationship--marriage--be more legal than another?  It's the predicted acts they perform while in that state that make it more legitimate than not being married, correct?  Why not go after the illegal acts themselves?  Why not make sure parents aren't denying their child that "library of books" you mentioned? 

Perhaps because it's a travesty to advocate such a thing?  Perhaps because the State dictating what should or shouldn't be included in a child's upbringing is too close to A Brave New World for your liking?  Perhaps because it's impossible to advocate such an invasion of privacy and rightly call yourself "liberty-minded"? 

Mr. Stolyarov: I am trying here to reconcile two mandates for government into a single policy; one is the mandate of parental obligation, the other is the mandate of privacy rights. I seek a government that is as hands-off as possible while ensuring that no one’s rights are being intruded upon. Thus, instead of spending money on imposing active penalties in this situation, I have recommended that the government undertake the passive, free, encouragement that is deplaintiffication.  I have created a rule that is easily enforceable and can be a reliable indicator, in future cases, of which parents are fulfilling their obligations and which are not (since those who do not care about their children will not bother to remove the “illegitimate child” label from them).

So I am in essence getting the best of both worlds. I do not see any reason for you to posit either your grievances or your double binds w.r.t. this.

This should be enough food for thought tonight. I will respond further tomorrow.

I am
G. Stolyarov II