Greetings.

Jeremy: Does a parent who loses a job impinge on the child's "right" to his former resources?  Or a parent that dies?  You will say "no, it's not their fault", but it is  a denial of former resources that could crush any chance of a good childhood.  What should the government do about this?  It has an immovable duty to protect the rights of the child--so is Welfare a good idea again?

Mr. Stolyarov: If we examine Branden’s statement on parental obligation, the answer is to be found:

A reasonable expectation that they will be able to afford the basic minimum necessary for food, clothing, shelter and education, should be the prerequisite of rational parents' decision to have children. However, parents are not morally at fault if, due to the father's or mother's illness or some other unforeseeable economic disaster, they are unable to provide for their child as they had expected to; in such a case, they are obliged simply to do the best they can.

So no, the State should not intervene in these unfortunate circumstances, nor are they a basis for a Welfare system.

Jeremy: A woman who leaves a cheating spouse and moves to a new city with her children, securing a better job than she or her husband ever had, will still be denied protection under your law.

Mr. Stolyarov: Allow me to modify my position even further to accommodate this scenario.

The commission of adultery or infidelity is already a violation of the terms of the marriage contract; one cannot expect one party to loyally adhere to terms that the other party neglects or outright defies. Thus, I would suggest that it should be the right of a couple to obtain a divorce in any case where adultery has taken place, though this needs not happen if the couple voluntarily agrees to the contrary.

If children are present in the relationship, each party should still have the obligation to provide the equivalent standard of living to the children as had existed prior to the divorce. This could be managed through child support payments, for example. As for the synthesis of maternal and paternal care, the parent who retains the children could be encouraged to marry again (presumably to the person with whom he/she had the adulterous affair), and thus have the children taken care of by a stepparent in lieu of the parent who now lives apart (but who can, by all means, visit and be visited).

Jeremy: This contractual obligation--as I've said and which you've ignored--is not a guarantee.  Neither is it "imminent" that an unmarried parent will neglect their child. 

Mr. Stolyarov: Contractual obligation is not a guarantee that neglect will not occur, but it is an affirmation that an RG is a child’s by right, and that the government will be able to intervene in the event that neglect does occur. A marriage is a parent’s promise that he/she will not neglect the child, and, if that legally binding promise is broken, the State has the power to enforce it and punish the violator(s). Absent the legally binding promise, the State has no such recourse, and the parents are legally free to do whatever they wish to the child. The unmarried parent commits neglect by denying that what is a child’s by right (an RG) is a child’s by right and that the parent cannot abandon the child at whim if he sees fit.

Compare the situation to that of a monarch: a monarch does not directly oppress all of his citizens; he allows most of them to hold what property they have, in exchange for payment of certain taxes and duties. However, the monarch can, at whim, take everything anyone holds away without penalty! An individual’s rights are not recognized in an absolute monarchy; rather, what he has are mere privileges granted by the monarch to keep what he “owns.” I hope you agree with me that such a state is oppressive and immoral. How does parenting out of wedlock differ?

Jeremy: Children that play baseball are 100% more likely to be hit by a baseball than children who don't play baseball.  Children whose parents have no vehicle are 200% less likely to die in a car crash caused by their parents than those children whose parents have two vehicles.  Children that live in a house are 100% more likely to die from a house fire than those that live in a cardboard box.  Should the State not prohibit parents from...well, doing anything of their own free will when it comes to their kids?

Mr. Stolyarov: Jeremy, you improperly compare relative likelihood to absolute likelihood. Let us say my likelihood of dying in a fire on a given day while living in a cardboard box is 0.000001%. 100% more likely than that is 0.000002%, still quite insubstantial.

On the other hand, the paralysis drug harms in 75% of all cases in which it is used. The absolute likelihood in this case is 75%, but the relative likelihood of harm, as compared to living in a house, would be 100% * (75/0.000002)= 3,750,000,000% greater than the latter scenario. Do you see the enormous difference?

Relative likelihood compares the propensity of one event to occur to that of another. Absolute likelihood compares the propensity to nothing; it merely states the expected probability, given a set of any size, that an event will take place.

Here are some actual statistics: http://www.cbpp.org/6-15-01wel.htm. I would like to focus on a few figures in particular.

In 2000, of children with family incomes 200% or more above poverty level (i.e. all children who have any semblance of a decent standard of living),  83.6% lived with two married parents, and 16.4% did not. The absolute likelihood that a child not in a married household will enjoy an adequate standard of living is thus 16.4%, less than his chances of escaping harm by taking the paralysis drug! In the meantime, a household with married parents has a 100%* (83.6/16.4)= about 510% greater likelihood of adequately taking care of its children. 

Is it fair to allow children to placed in such odds with impunity, given that most do not recover from the resulting deprivation?

Jeremy: And comparing a physical state, unchosen and irreversible, to a mental state is silly.  If I am paralyzed I can't will my body to be un-paralyzed.

Mr. Stolyarov: FDR reportedly did, and other less famous cases likely exist—one hears once in a while about this mountain climber or that diver who suffered severe brain or nervous system damage from an accident, but who, after weeks or even months of rehabilitation had, through sheer persistence, managed to regain control of his limbs, speech, learning capacities, etc. It is possible, but not likely, just as statistics prove w.r.t. the households in which children are raised.

Jeremy: If I had a bad childhood, I can persevere and endure and one day make a decision to be a responsible, capable adult--I can will myself to be a worthwhile individual.  G., bad stuff happens all the time.  Children are remarkably resilient.

Mr. Stolyarov: But this does not mean that children should be deliberately thrust into bad situations! This is just like saying, “Crime happens all the time. So the government should be allowed to, if it wishes, commit a few acts of robbery here and there. They won’t really hurt; after all, people are very resilient and have been able to recover from the wrongs and deprivations dealt them.”  

 
I am
G. Stolyarov II

Greetings.

Mr. Rowlands: See my article "Valentine's Gifts".  I ask again, why the assumption that communal property with two people doesn't have the side effects of communal property in general? 

Mr. Stolyarov: I have read your article and consider the argument therein an extreme simplification of the matter. First, joint sharing of property does not imply sharing of all property (though it could). A couple can choose to keep separate finances but live in and assume mutual responsibility for the same house and the material objects therein. Then, their combined expenses on the house would be significantly smaller than their expenses had they lived in separate homes, while they would still be taking home the same salaries. Moreover, it would be quite ineffective for the couple to raise children, if, each time they went to the grocery store to buy the kids food, they would have to discern whose money would be spent; sharing finances, in this case, would eliminate such a hassle.

As for your gift-giving scenario, a wife so picky about her husband’s choice of Valentine’s Day present, even in the case in which the couple shares finances, is an exception, not the rule, and not an exception worthy of filosofical categorization. To refute her position, she is not entitled to complete control over the entirety of the shared funds; the husband can also use a part of these shared funds for whatever purpose he deems fitting, including the purchase of whatever gift he wants to buy his wife. Moreover, with shared finances, it is entirely proper for portions of the shared pool of money to be allocated to each partner based on a consensual agreement; the partner will have the ability to generally dispose of these finances as he/she sees fit, though consultation with his/her partner will likely be frequent. The advantage of this arrangement is increased flexibility; if an individual happens to urgently need money and not have any of his own at hand (it could be stored away in a bank account, for example), he can ask his partner for the balance. Given the sorts of material decisions that need to be made in a marriage, this flexibility is more than a welcome addition to the contract.

Here is another scenario: a wealthy heiress marries a struggling and impoverished young artist. (She enjoys his works and admires his sense of life.) Both individuals genuinely love one another, and the heiress wishes to turn her financial resources into fuel for a major project to finance the development of the classical arts. However, she herself does not have the same in-depth exposure to the world of art as her husband; thus, she wishes that her husband would have an expert hand in directing the flow of finances in her project. To render this easier for him, she agrees to shared control of the entirety of their finances. (Besides, she would not want him to live in the run-down inner city apartment that he had formerly inhabited, either!) Of course, she also wants to give her husband the financial security to work in peace, without having to worry about the next month’s rent.

I can cite tens of situations, if not more, in which joint property would be beneficial, and, so long as it is so, and certain individuals whom it may concern view this to be so, there is absolutely no warrant for passing a blanket judgment condemning joint property ownership. In your world, a patroness of the arts and her artistic husband would be condemned as filthy collectivists. I will have none of it.

Mr. Rowlands: Why do you pretend there is no "tragedy of the commons"? 

Mr. Stolyarov: I pretend nothing: I simply believe there is nothing inherently tragic about human life and cooperation in this universe. The word “tragedy” in your response hints that you consider any relationship that shares property, or residency, or (and why not, by the premises you had chosen to follow?) even lasting affection to be tragically doomed to failure from the beginning. If you do not believe success and happiness in a relationship is possible, check your premises, not those of the successful and happy.

 Mr. Rowlands: Why do you think it won't lead to resentment?

Mr. Stolyarov: That question is like asking, “Why do you think technological progress will not lead to global warming?” or “Why do you think drinking Diet Coke will not lead to cancer?” or “Why do you think free-market competition will not lead to coercive monopolies?” I cannot believe you would follow the path of assuming the positive (that resentment would occur) without necessarily proving that this will happen in every instant.

I do not believe that each relationship will automatically lead to resentment; the claim that it will is as arbitrary as that which contends that technological progress will lead to global warming, or drinking Diet Coke to cancer. Having not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the positive will occur in every case, one should, by all logic, act as if the positive would not occur; this does not mean it will not occur, but that it will, with overwhelming likelihood, not occur in all cases, and should not be held as an expectation.

On the moral battleground in this debate, our primary difference can be thus refrased: I view relationships as capable of lasting and indefinite success, you expect all of them to fail and to head toward failure from the onset through your theory of “diminishing returns.”  

Mr. Rowlands: Yes...we went through a period of "separate but equal" here in the US as well.  I can see the parallels.  Thanks for making that issue crystal clear.

Mr. Stolyarov: So you do oppose gender-segregated lockerrooms and washroom facilities! Your equivocations on the nature of ”separate but equal” are just another ploy to make my arguments seem as if they were something vile and prejudicial (and maybe racist, too, no?), when in fact the situation is far more complex than you choose to recognize. “Separate but equal” based on racial guidelines is arbitrary, because there are in fact no significant fysiological differences between the races (skin color or eye shape do not matter; they are as metafysically irrelevant as the differences between, say, brown, red, and black hair). But the fact that the two genders are different is indisputable, both fysiologically and dispositionally. This does not mean that each individual lacks complete free will; it merely means that no individual can defy his/her nature. Only females can bear children, and thus they would have a much more intimate relationship with their children than males ever could. This is just a single example that I used! There are many more distinguishing characteristics—others include the gentleness/firmness behavioral trends, roles in romantic relationships, and even modes of focus (recent studies have discovered that males tend to focus more directly and intensely on single objects of interest, while females tend  to take in a greater amount of periferal information about their surroundings—I certainly can see this in terms of my own experiences; place me in a meeting room where the same fifty people gather once every week, and I would not be able to tell you what any of them wore on any given day; my mind simply does not focus on these aspects. Ask any woman I know, and she would likely be able to infer an abundance of information about those people’s hygienic habits.).

The differences between the genders, though they do not deny the equal rights and prerogatives of each individual do, in a non-coercive manner, establish the need for different gender-based standards in relationships. These standards, too, tend to be non-coercive. No one objects, for example, to segregation of lockerrooms and washrooms, and if anyone does, he is rightfully labeled a pervert.

The very fact that people have orientations in relationships implies that there is something distinguishing about the gender they prefer to engage in relationships with, so why not grant each permanent relationship the same economic prerogatives (which I do not object to) while recognizing, in order that we do not institutionalize any logical errors, that homosexual and heterosexual relationships are different?

Mr. Rowlands: As for your views that "males relate to males in inherently different ways than they relate to females", I want to make a couple points.  First, do you even know any gay couples?  How is it you know so much about how they behave? 

Mr. Stolyarov: The point of my treatise and this argument is not to explain how they behave; that is, frankly, irrelevant, and not a matter of my interest. The point is to observe that they behave differently. This can be said without explicit awareness of minute specifics. This is not a value-judgment, just an observation, and I do not understand the bitterness and ad hominem orientation of your response to such a simple, commonsense fact. Does a brother treat a brother in the same way he treats a sister? I asked this question in my essay. The response was icy silence. You know that the answer is, “No,” that gender is an aspect contributing to an individual’s nature, yet you refuse to recognize this because it would undermine your scheme to destroy the institution of marriage by obliterating the concept through altering the definition.

Mr. Rowlands: And my third point is, whether intentional or not, you only referred to homosexual men.  I suppose, like most men, you think lesbians aren't as bad?

Mr. Stolyarov: That was quite a snide and disrespectful remark to make, assuming that I am a bigot simply because I happened not to wish to rewrite my entire treatise by mentioning each possible homosexual relationship in every single sentence. I was using intellectual shorthand, Mr. Rowlands, by citing only one example while more existed; I thought that one example would be enough to get my point across.

Mr. Rowlands: You pick criteria that kicks out homosexuals, while ignoring that criteria as not "the exclusive criteria" so you can let infertile heterosexual couples in. 

Mr. Stolyarov: Once again, I only used childbearing as an example of how the relationships could differ; do not for a moment make and perpetuate the dishonest assumption that this is the standard for my position and the criterion by which I exclude homosexuals from the definition of marriage; my criterion is the different but equal nature of each gender and the inherent differences in interactions between members of a certain gender as opposed to members of another gender, etc. By the way, this, by extension, could mean that male homosexuals and female homosexuals would get separate names for their permanent relationship contracts as well, so mine is not a prejudicial scheme aimed merely at separating homosexuals from heterosexuals.

Mr. Rowlands: Funny thing is, what's the opposite of radical?  I'm thinking 'conservative' fits the bill.  Do you really think your belief in marriage is "radical".  That you're really breaking new ground by saying that whatever your parents did is good enough for you?

Mr. Stolyarov: No, the opposite of “radical” is “orthodox,” which defines one who follows a package of ideas indiscriminately, without evaluating each idea on its own merits, and whose most vicious backbiting is aimed at him who dares defy the orthodoxy by thinking for himself. Your contraposition essentially equates “radical” with “far left,” which is precisely what the stale orthodox leftists want you to think.

I am breaking new ground by seeking to remove Objectivism from the spirit of orthodoxy; unless it ceases to adhere like a fundamentalist church {though even most churches are more tolerant these days!} to flaw-riddled package-deals and to sneer at dissenters, it will become effectively dead before you know it. My radicalism comes from the fact that I accept no package-deal whatsoever! I am no typical conservative. To give examples, I support cloning and open borders, oppose the war on drugs, am an atheist, and am quite skeptical of the disciplinarian approach of raising children.  Nevertheless, while I disagree with conservatives on many issues, I recognize that liberals are by far the greatest danger to our culture today. I have the gall to view certain conservatives as intelligent, thought-provoking, and worthy of learning something from—for this I receive the same furious reaction from Objectivists as I get from religious fundamentalists when I inform them that I am an advocate of Reason. (“May your deluded Satanic soul be damned to perdition!” say they.)

Mr. Rowlands: "So, if you reject all loyalty and commitment, you are guilty of subverting two cardinal Objectivist virtues."  Sloppy.  That's like saying your choices are blind loyalty versus no loyalty.  You miss the whole point of duty vs. principles.  A duty upholds these actions for their own sake. 

Mr. Stolyarov: Wrong. If ever come to see a person as of ultimate value (optimal compatibility) to me in a romantic sense, I will see it as a selfish imperative to seek to render our relationship permanent so that I can enjoy this value indefinitely. It is precisely from the selfish perspective that there are no tragic limits to one’s happiness that I advocate permanence and commitment in a relationship. You evade this because you do not think such happiness is possible. I, on the contrary, have seen it, read of it, and have deduced from principle that it can, and has the right to, exist.

Mr. Rowlands: You have to reject your simple dichotomies.

Mr. Stolyarov: Who exactly has the simple dichotomies here? Maybe it is you, who holds that, simply because I believe in abstinence until marriage and permanence within it, that I must be a “religious conservative!” Or you, who thinks that simply because I oppose homosexual “marriage,” I must be a prejudiced bigot. Or you, who thinks that an individual must either be a far left “radical” or have nothing original or new to say? Or you, who cannot pick apart the view that lasting happiness is indeed possible in this earth from a blind commitment to duty for duty’s sake? For every time you wrongly accuse me of a false dichotomy, I can genuinely accuse you of five, so let us not play this silly discrediting game anymore. You cannot win it.

Mr. Rowlands: Now as for your continued belief that attacking the child is right, you really disgust me.  You didn't bother arguing that this wasn't an attack on the parent's decency, or that it would only work against a caring parent.  You didn't argue that your attacking a child to pressure the parents. 

Mr. Stolyarov: Now that is blatant evasion, pure and simple, designed to tarnish the readers’ perception of the actual points I made. Here is what I actually wrote, which is precisely what Mr. Rowlands accuses me of not writing:

“The best of parents would wish to protect their own status and that of the child; thus, they will not subject themselves to raising the child out of wedlock. If they, by their care for the child, can be so moved as Mr. Rowlands suggests, they will perform the simple act of signing a marriage contract, and will join the ranks of good parents as if no violation had happened. On the other hand, the bad parents, the ones that would not care about their children in either case, would not do this and would remain deplaintiffied.”

Mr. Rowlands: Disgusting.

Mr. Stolyarov: Maybe you ought to stop admiring the gruesome features you put on your straw men and start arguing against my real position.

I am

G. Stolyarov II

 

(Edited by G. Stolyarov II on 6/22, 8:02am)

Greetings.

First, I would like to thank Mr. Tingley for his willingness to assert the truth in the face of hostility—indeed, I have found myself utterly perplexed when I had read from Mr. Rowlands that diminishing returns might actually be a good thing! I am sure outsiders to the SOLO elite who are following this debate are, too, confounded at how this statement can be anything but outright intellectual disarmament. I have discovered a lot by observing mentalities who would not present a simple apology at any cost, who would not admit wrongdoing or mistakes in any situation, but who would rather seek to cover them up through further smear tactics. What I have found will soon be systematically presented in my essay, “The Mark of the Fanatic.”

I seem to be getting a lot of sanctions with "0" votes from somebody. It may be you, Mr. Tingley, and, in that event, I thank you earnestly for your intention. I assure you, in my consideration, they are just as good as the real thing. I regret, however, that the SOLO administration does not think so. I am afraid you have been disenfranchised for your dissent. If this policy were that of a government, which would it remind you of?

Second, Mr. Dawe, I had made it an explicit point to address all comments in chronological order. Yours are not yet up on the queue. It is as simple as that; I do not wish to deny those who have waited patiently the chance to respond to their arguments. And besides, I have work to attend to as well, so my responses will, understandably, be somewhat delayed.

Third, the comments:

Mr. Rowlands: As for your 'encouragement', I find it repulsive.  You threaten to take their children for their own good.  You threaten to not protect them from attack (while not allowing them to do it themselves, I'm sure).  What happens if you still don't get what you want?  Put up signs on their door that says nobody will be prosecuted for attacking, stealing, raping, or murdering these people?  Invite attacks?

Mr. Stolyarov: Once again, please read my specification of my position: civil, not criminal deplaintiffication; deplaintiffied parents will still be able to sue in criminal court for violations of their rights, but they will not have the authority to sue in a civil court until they recognize the rights of their children to autonomization as specified in such a court.

Mr. Rowlands: This all stems logically from the positive rights you've given to the children, though.  I can't fault your logic.  If you accept that a child has a right to a good bring-up, good being defined by whoever is in charge, this certainly is the path that would be taken. 

Mr. Stolyarov: You mean to say you do not accept that a child has the right to a good bring-up? You mean to say you disagree with the Branden statement I had repeatedly cited. Know, then, that this statement was adopted from a 1962 Objectivist Newsletter article, explicitly sanctioned by Rand, but later, after the 1968 schism, disappearing down the “memory hole” of orthodoxy, to use the words of one of my libertarian acquaintances.

Mr. Rowlands: As soon as you grant a right that someone else needs to fulfill, you've created a slave society, no matter how you try to obscure the violent force necessary.

Mr. Stolyarov: Nobody is trying to enslave anyone here. Parents had a choice to procreate or not (or to behave or not in ways that might bring about conception); they made a choice to bring a human being into dependence on them, and thus they must bear the objective consequences of autonomizing that human being. A is A, reality is real, and actions have consequences. Your wishes, whims, and fiats will not alter the absolute natural law which mandates that, if you bring a child into this world, you must ensure that it be raised in a manner befitting a human being.

Mr. Rowlands: What I can't figure out is why you think you get to pick which positive rights exists.  Once you concede the principle that the government gets to decide what is proper for the upbringing of a child, why do you think it will end with merely a marriage license?  Why not advanced schooling?  Medical care?  A nice house in a good neighborhood?  Why do you think that your particular goals would be okay, and that they won't go any further once you've set the precedent?

Mr. Stolyarov: Because, according to Branden, parents are merely obliged to do the best they can in their situation, without intentionally depriving the child of what RGs it may have had in the past. This does not imply a positive obligation from the State on behalf of the children, except to enforce the parents’ non-deprivation of existing available resources from said children.

 Mr. Dawe: Ayn Rand recognized that freedom was necessary to man to be this heroic being. You fall into the trap of trying to force through legislation and license what should amount to personal choice.

Mr. Stolyarov: You see? I did get to your comments. I have followed up on my initial promise; it is a pity that you are yours are now seeking to throw into the mix of this argument any snide commentary that would make me seem an inconsiderate blackguard.

I force nothing on people that would violate their freedom. I only ask of them that, with the right to voluntarily sign contracts, they should also consent to the consequences enumerated under such contracts and also to the consequences that result from their engagement in such contracts, such as the creation of any children that could come about. This is like saying, if you sign a business contract, you must deliver the promised goods, and if you default on this, you are guilty of fraud, and the State must take due recourse against you.

 Mr. Dawe: Are you sure it was optimal? Are you sure they were acheiving maiximum value? Could they possibly have been unhappy?

Mr. Stolyarov: Here are some facts about the Reagan marriage that prove your speculations wrong: http://www.prweb.com/releases/2004/6/inktomi134421.php. (This is from a Russian designer of compatibility tests.)

“The man who puts into the marriage only half of what he owns will get that out.” - Ronald Reagan

I still remember that Sunday May 29, 1988 when former President Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy just appeared on Arbat St. in Moscow. This was a time of big surprises and certainly Reagans' street walk was the most memorable one. That was probably the closest I have ever physically been to any president. Today, paying tribute to President Reagan, I was intrigued by the longevity of his marriage with Nancy, lasting over half a century. Then I decided to test how well they match by compatibility with Compatti.com.

…

What struck me first is the balanced compatibility potential in all categories of life, such as: sharing of space, communications, lovingness, sexual attraction and non-verbal communications with three moderate spikes in daily interactions, long-term sustainability and handling responsibility. I guess this may explain their daily work as a team in the White House, a half-century long marriage and well handled responsibilities as parents, president and the first lady.

The reason why Ronald and Nancy Reagan were able to create such a strong mutual affection can be found in the quote above; it is perfectly consistent with what I had written in my treatise concerning the basis of a strong marriage, and experience has shown consistent with my derivations. Though it was not my burden, I have indeed proved the negative in this case (that they were not unhappy)—showing you beyond all reasonable doubt that a happy marriage can be possible, and can be possible under the filosofy elucidated in my treatise.

Mr. Dawe: Really? No relationship other than the one you approve of is capable of maximum value. Must they all be maximum value? Is it okay for people to be married/partnered and not acheive maximum value if it is their choice? Choice, Freedom, free will, self-determination? No?

Mr. Stolyarov: Legally, yes, it is. But on a moral plane, I do not see why someone would not wish to attain maximum value, why someone would settle for something less than the very best if the very best were available to their pursuits. That mentality sounds like sacrifice of one’s own happiness to me. And I will never sanction such glorification of mediocrity in any filosofical system to which I adhere.

Mr. Dawe: The majority of people beleive in some irrational theistic beleif too, so that is good, right?

Mr. Stolyarov: You remember my “that is why” clause, which means that all those multitudes of people throughout the centuries had implicit reasons behind their lifestyles; I am not jumping on the bandwagon, I am merely seeking to furnish a systematic understanding, a logical comprehension of what those people sensed and thought self-evident. I am trying to explain why they lived as they did. I have found, in the process, that they made right choices which had stood firm in the face of my stern and rigorous filosofical tribunal.

Mr. Dawe: I have a little line my mother taught me when I was about ten: "Fool me once, shame on you. fool me twice, shame on me." One does not continue to hug a cactus after feeling the thorns. 

Mr. Stolyarov: I am afraid I must let out a protracted, incredulous sigh at this point. How many times must I critique the arbitrary mentality and dismal sense of life of expecting failure as a metafysical principle?

Mr. Dawe: "No man is obligated, either legally or morally, to enter a romantic relationship in the first place, but, if he does seek one, he should exercise the moral fortitude and consistency to render it everlasting. " 

Sacrafice as a moral virtue?

Mr. Stolyarov: Wait, “moral fortitude and consistency” are now equivalent to “sacrifice” under your system? I suppose the contrary, which would be your perception of selfishness, would be “moral flimsiness and erratic, unprincipled behavior.”

I advise you to re-read Nathaniel Branden’s Essay, “Counterfeit Individualism” in The Virtue of Selfishness.

Mr. Dawe: "divorces should not be granted to couples with children until the children reach functional maturity."

Choice, Freedom, free will, self-determination? The freedom to be an admitedly bad parent? No? I find being a parent to be my top priority and greatest value. I choose to be so.

Mr. Stolyarov: The “freedom to be a bad parent” is the “freedom to make someone else suffer.” That someone else, as I have already remarked, is a most pure and innocent being. Neither you nor anyone else has that sort of freedom. It is tantamount to “the freedom to kill,” or “the freedom to rob.” Remember, you are entitled to whatever you wish only so long as you harm no one in the process. When will the ridiculous view of children as semi-people at best, and non-entities without rights at worst finally be buried in the graveyard of obsolete superstition?

If you choose to be a good parent, my congratulations to you personally.

Mr. Dawe: Not sacrafice, removal of personal choice and freedom. The freedom to choose right and wrong.

Mr. Stolyarov: Every man has the freedom to choose right and wrong… and to bear the objective consequences emanating from the nature of his decisions.

Mr. Dawe: This whole sectio is BS somantics with the goal of satisfying your existing belief. It's none of our damn business and, really, why do we care what others do if it doesn't harm us?

Mr. Stolyarov: Because it does harm us, by obliterating a legitimate concept and a legitimate institution. I have no problem with equal rights and equal treatment for homosexuals—for some reason my opponents have misrepresented me as actually “caring” about what they do with their lives. I do not make it a practice to spy on others’ bedrooms. All I want is for accurate recognition of terms to take place. You would not give the state liberty to choose any word by which to call anything, would you?

Let us say that Tom has always looked up to cats as his ideal animal. But Tom lacks any cats; he has a dog instead. Tom wants to sign a contract with Tim by which, in exchange for receiving Tom’s dog, Tim will give Tom twenty dollars each month for five years. Tom likes cats so much that he writes about them everywhere, and in his contract with Tim, he calls his dog a cat. “Well,” he reasons, “it has four legs; it is an animal. Heck, it’s even of the same fylum, class, and order on the taxonomic hierarchy! It’s just like a cat and should have the same legal consideration as a cat!” Should the State allow him to claim in his contract to be offering Tim a “cat”?

Definitions guard against the arbitrary. Ayn Rand knew this. It is a pity that many here do not.   

I am
G. Stolyarov II