Animal Cognition

Dean,

As I see your analysis, I can't help but get the feeling that the characteristics of present/past are being imposed on the future, as I stated above.

Looked at from the perspective of already being in the future relative to what transpired, a person could not have chosen differently than what he did because it has already been done. But when you look at it from the perspective of before and when the even took place, there is an enormous variety of outcomes that can still happen.

Not one of them is fixed. Why? Because they haven't happened. "Having happened" is a characteristic only of the past, not the future. The certainty of "having happened" does not apply to the future. The future does not exist yet, so it cannot have any characteristics, only potential characteristics. Except one - that it will happen. (Not what will happen, so maybe lack of certainty is also an attribute of the future.)

Then there is the whole thing of what an individual is. Is he something that has no volition, who cannot decide his future based on chosen values, including the possibility of changing his mind, since all outcomes are predetermined (even the one of changing his mind)? Predestination is not an Objectivist doctrine.

I am getting the impression that some snake oil has been sold in the studies of what constitutes scientific method.

Michael

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 1/18, 10:22am)

Post 181

Wednesday, January 18, 2006 - 9:18am

Ellen - The simple fact is that Classical Mechanics was not designed to describe everything, and fails in a number of areas:

Black Body Radiation
Relativistic Speeds
- these are addressed by Quantum Mechanics, as you mentioned, but again this proves my point, that it also does not apply to many areas such as molecular chemical reactions and neural nets and free will... So if you are telling me that (and I accept your definition of Free Will) Free Will is in opposition to Classical Mechanics, I am Ok with that in and of itself.

However, your implication was that this was a "failing" of Objectivism and not that, as I contend, it is simply a non-issue because Classical Mechanics does not address or explain the phenomena (free will as much as Black Body Radiation or Relativity) observed!

So, there IS NO FAILING because the theory has no legitimate conclusion it can bring to the table. Again, as an example,
The electric burner on your stovetop should, according to the classical formulae, be so bright as to be literally blinding. It isn't! So, the model fails. If it fails here, even though we can now explain it with another theory (Quantum Mechanics), it also fails to address the idea of Free Will.

Post 182

Wednesday, January 18, 2006 - 10:06am

Kurt:

However, your implication was that this was a "failing" of Objectivism and not that, as I contend, it is simply a non-issue because Classical Mechanics does not address or explain the phenomena (free will as much as Black Body Radiation or Relativity) observed!

There are problems with this though and rather fundamental ones too I believe. Personally, I believe that there is something "special" about life/free will. I think it's something that our science cannot explain, at least yet. However, I also am fully aware that this is a leap of "faith". I am open to the possibility that free will is only an illusion and that it might not really exist. If our science cannot explain something, or even refutes it, shouldn't we be at least a little suspect instead of dismissing it as self-evident?

Does this mean I conclude that Objectivism is bunk? Certainly not. I just think it's self-evident that this foundation is not so "self-evident" and there's a leap here. Our perceptions of reality have historically ALWAYS been incomplete at best and often dead wrong. This seems to be very clearly a somewhat shaky foundational element of Objectivism. However, I wonder how much it matters if our perception of free will is the self evident element, and fundamental reality might be different on a level that doesn't affect us in a perceivable way? Does this matter to the Philosophy?

Post 183

Wednesday, January 18, 2006 - 1:13pm

Kurt, you wrote:

"So if you [Ellen] are telling me that (and I accept your definition
of Free Will) Free Will is in opposition to Classical Mechanics, I am
Ok with that in and of itself."

Then we're agreeing that classical mechanics doesn't provide a basis
for "free will." However, you didn't address my further point that
neither does quantum mechanics provide a basis for the form of volition
(I'll change to that term) you want, that indeed what's proposed
contradicts the most foundational level of current physics.

As to an alternate mechanics: As I understand the situation in modern physics,
quantum mechanics is considered to be the wider theory and to apply universally,
whereas classical mechanics is considered still to hold in a narrower range --
at least it gives the same results within that narrower range even if very
precisely speaking there might be considered to be errors in the theory of
classical mechanics. (Aside to Dragonfly: Please step in and correct me if
you think I'm getting any of the details of the physics wrong.) I'm unaware
of any still-wider theory than quantum mechanics which has been proposed and
which could provide what's needed for what I call "effective" volition to
integrate with physics.

In this situation, one has two recourses for supporting a theory of "effective"
volition: Either one can say, well, physics just hasn't gotten there yet --
a wider theory remains to be developed; or one can say that physics as such
has limited applicability and doesn't cover the form of motion which
is needed if "effective" volition exists. With either of these possible
approaches, the fact remains that there's a misfit between current physics
theory and any theory, Objectivist or otherwise, of "effective" volition.

You commented that I seem to consider this misfit a "failing" in the O'ist
theory of volition. I don't consider the misfit per se necessarily a failing.
As I indicated, the failing could instead be in current theories of physics.
My initial comment which started our back and forth (see my post 80) was that
I'm always surprised by O'ists considering themselves supporters of modern
science AND of the O'ist theory of volition, since there's a lack of integration
between the two. I would expect to see more concern displayed, especially on
the part of those O'ists who are interested in physics, and more of an attempt
to explore (and to attempt to remedy) the problem. I'll add, however, that
there are other reasons besides the misfit with theories of mechanics because
of which I consider the O'ist theory of volition inaccurate, but I haven't
time and energy at least now for trying to address those reasons.

Ellen

___

Post 184

Wednesday, January 18, 2006 - 1:54pm

Ellen:

I would expect to see more concern displayed, especially on
the part of those O'ists who are interested in physics, and more of an attempt
to explore (and to attempt to remedy) the problem.

The problem is that this disconnect occurs in a foundational axiom. Objectivists are generally not tolerant of questions like this. To admit that a leap of faith (or something like it) occurs so low in the ladder of deduction is not an easy thing to do for some. After all, faith=evil :-)

However I do want to make it clear that it seems quite different (better) here and I am grateful to participate and learn more.

Post 185

Wednesday, January 18, 2006 - 3:47pm

C.S., I just caught up to your post 159 replying to me on the issue of
more than one possible future. (I didn't see that yesterday when I
checked this list.)

I refer you to pages 100-103 of *Elbow Room*. Every one of the comeback
arguments which Dennett describes there and argues are wrong, I persist
in considering right. The possibility (whether as one of alternate future
possibilities or not) exists that I might yet come round (as I assume
you would view it) to thinking that Dennett and you are correct. But thus
far I remain of the belief that Dennett is brushing past the issue of how
one could ever attain knowledge of the world if the picture he presents
of the nature of deliberation were true.

I still haven't read *The Intentional Stance*. I acquired that book in
December but haven't had time yet to start reading it. I expect that
that one might help with my understanding what you mean by "intention,"
a term which in the past, on another list, was among the terms on
which we weren't understanding each other's meaning.

In regard to your question as to whether I have any idea what a physics
which would encompass what I think of as "'effective' volition" would
look like, yes, I have ideas on that score, but ideas which are very
much in a drawing-room stage.

Ellen

___

Post 186

Wednesday, January 18, 2006 - 7:13pm

If Objectivism must include the idea "Determinism is false" or "Determinist except for some perfectly random events is false" then I am no Objectivist.

Its more important to me to have knowledge consistent with reality than it is important to me to be an Objectivist.

I'm finished with this conversation for now. Maybe I will continue it again in the future, with working models of life in deterministic digital form backing my claims.

Post 187

Wednesday, January 18, 2006 - 8:32pm

Dean,

Regardless of what you come up with, I have no doubt it will be interesting. You think with your own mind and I respect that a lot. So whatever comes, whether something new altogether or a renewed endorsement of the traditional Objectivist position on determinism, I expect to see great things from you.

(I'm tempted to say that it is predetermined...)

Shine on.

Michael

Post 188

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 6:45am

I think that ultimately what you are discussing Ellen begs the question - the fact is that none of these theories, Quantum or Classical, are designed to describe volition or free will, therefore they don't "contradict" it. Also, I have not heard of a near universal belief amongst physicists that their theories "contradict" the idea of volition or free will either. Why is that? My guess is because they are not going to use physics to describe something so far outside of its current boundaries.

Post 189

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 8:09am

Ellen:

I refer you to pages 100-103 of *Elbow Room*. Every one of the comeback
arguments which Dennett describes there and argues are wrong, I persist
in considering right.

I haven't read Elbow Room, neither The Intentional Stance, as I thought the relevant ideas would be treated more extensively (and probably be better developed) in his later works Consciousness explained and Freedom evolves, but perhaps I should buy the earlier books too!

The possibility (whether as one of alternate future
possibilities or not) exists that I might yet come round (as I assume
you would view it) to thinking that Dennett and you are correct. But thus
far I remain of the belief that Dennett is brushing past the issue of how
one could ever attain knowledge of the world if the picture he presents
of the nature of deliberation were true.

You know, there will be more joy in heaven...

Post 190

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 8:17am

Kurt:

Also, I have not heard of a near universal belief amongst physicists that their theories "contradict" the idea of volition or free will either. Why is that? My guess is because they are not going to use physics to describe something so far outside of its current boundaries.

I'd say: because they don't think that physics has much relevance to the question of "free will", most of them probably think it's a pseudo-problem anyway.

Post 191

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 8:33am

Cal, free will/determinism is not a pseudo problem. If most physicists think it is, that's probably because they're not philosophers and are not sufficiently aware of the issue's complexities and nuances. There's something to be said for an intellectual division of labor. Physicists are not philosophers any more than philosophers are physicists.

- Bill

Post 192

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 10:51am

I think the only problem that exists is a psychological problem, namely that many people feel that determinism is true, this would take their individuality away, that it would reduce them to marionets with no will of their own and that their life would have no meaning. As Dean said in his excellent post #177:

"Boo-hoo, I'm determined to do what I do anyways, so I might as well just curl up into a ball in my bed and die."

It's the same attitude that many religious people have who think that without God there would be no morality and that life would have no meaning if we're "just" the result of the mindless and mechanical process of evolution instead of the creation of a benign omnipotent creator. We should leave such primitive notions behind us. There is no real problem, it exists only in our imagination.

Post 193

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 1:39pm

Cal, you have no proof is the problem.

Post 194

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 1:54pm

Mr. Bob Mac wrote this tired bromide ...

=====================
Our perceptions of reality have historically ALWAYS been incomplete at best and often dead wrong. This seems to be very clearly a somewhat shaky foundational element of Objectivism.
=====================

If a straight stick is put halfway under water, then it "appears" bent. Bob would then say that our perception is incomplete at best, and possibly wrong. Bob would lament that he has 2 "different" perceptions of the self-same stick -- and that "perception" has failed him. Quite the contrary.

A stick seen (in air) as straight, and (in water) as bent -- is proof that perception doesn't "lie." The reason the stick in the water looks bent -- is because, besides the stick, we're perceiving water's refraction of light. The very first time this happened, we would have 2 choices ...

1) lament that perception "failed"
2) rejoice that perception allowed for us to recognize that aspect of reality known as refraction

#1 is the easy way out, and contradicts the reality of scientific advance -- at the very least, with regard to refraction (if we merely mistrusted perception, then there'd be no reason to look for -- in order to explain the 2 different phenomena)

#2 allows for us to continue discovering things about things. If your perception of any self-same thing changes, then another thing (another identity) has been brought into your direct perception of reality -- and you might then work to discover it.

Indirect perception is contradictory. It involves a "likeness" or "representation" that can never be directly compared with the real McCoy. If it could, if we could perceive the real deal -- in order to compare it to the representation (that's how you coherently GET a representation, by comparing it to the thing it represents) -- then we'd have direct perception, and wouldn't need the representation anymore.

In short, direct perception can re-affirmed through its own denial.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 1/19, 1:55pm)

Post 195

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 2:18pm

C.S. wrote (post 189):

"You know, there will be more joy in heaven..."

Laughed in delight. Right. I'll say this about that:
If I ever do "come round," I think I'll be able to improve on some
of Dennett's arguments because of how hard a sell I'll have been.

Ellen

Post 196

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 2:30pm

C.S., I definitely recommend getting *Elbow Room*. That goes into a lot of philosophic issues, and, I think, is charmingly written. The first chapter has a good discussion of the reasons why people fear the idea of determinism. (I, btw, have no fear of the idea of determinism. Indeed, once upon a time, given my scientific background, I just assumed it was true -- along with, I'd venture to say, almost any scientist while thinking like a scientist. As one of my psych professors sometimes said, "Oh, well, yeah, when I'm shooting the breeze over some beers after work, I talk as if there were free will, but as a scientist of course I know better." Anyway, I think you'd be entertained by the discussion in the first chapter of *Elbow Room* of why people fear determinism.)

Since I haven't yet read *The Intentional Stance* I don't know if that adds to his later books, but I suspect it does because there are a number of times in the two you cited where he refers the reader for details to *The Intentional Stance*. I'll let you know what I think of the book when I get around to reading it.

Ellen

___

Post 197

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 4:14pm

Ed:

Indirect perception is contradictory. It involves a "likeness" or "representation" that can never be directly compared with the real McCoy. If it could, if we could perceive the real deal -- in order to compare it to the representation (that's how you coherently GET a representation, by comparing it to the thing it represents) -- then we'd have direct perception, and wouldn't need the representation anymore.

You're right that we cannot compare the representation directly with the real McCoy, and it isn't necessary either. We have the ability to make a representation that works in practice. We had to learn this ability as an infant. As Rand observed: "As far as can be ascertained, an infant's sensory experience is an undifferentiated chaos" (the devil can cite Scripture for his purpose) Without a proper representation, we would continually bump our noses against the wall (such experiences may have helped the learning process, it is a way of comparing the model with reality). Fortunately we've become quite adept at it, but sometimes the model is misaligned, for example with optical illusions and sometimes in pathological conditions, such as in the case of the man who mistook his wife for a hat.

One example that I personally find striking is when I look with a telescope at the craters on the moon. Depending on the set-up, the light sometimes seems to come from below. This is in general an unnatural situation, and the model in my brain assumes that the light is coming from above, with the result that the craters no longer look hollow, but look convex, like circular domes (this is in fact a variation on the Necker cube illusion). I know rationally that this is incorrect, but once I see the domes, I can't get rid of them, no matter how often I blink with my eyes (it's quite frustrating). I'm unable to replace the incorrect model by the correct one. The only way to get rid of the illusion is to turn the image around some way, so that the lighting looks again natural. That the illusion with the moon craters is so strong is no doubt due to the fact that cues that in other situations would help to select the correct model (like seeing depth by binocular vision and by different focus) are missing.

Post 198

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 4:56pm

Michael,

from the perspective of...the future...a person could not have chosen differently...But ...from the perspective of before ...an enormous variety...can still happen.
...
"Having happened" is a characteristic only of the past, not the future.
...
The future does not exist yet, so it cannot have any characteristics, only potential characteristics. Except one - that it will happen. (Not what will happen...)

The argument "God" "creates" the universe, time and space, is attacked by Peikoff and, AFAIK, accepted O'ist doctrine. The universe, encompassing all time, doesn't need creating. It exists. The future exists. "Here" and "now" is a point on a space-time manifold that already exists.

From what I know of physics, the future had better exist, right now, at this instant. Enough "future", (the time-dimension) to absorb and sink all the energy and matter currently in flux. Consider what happens when waves hit a boundary - they are reflected. Or on a sphere, continue around. We haven't found anti-matter fluxes coming back at us.

Therefore, I suspect destiny awaits in a singularity, perhaps to be re-radiated into uniform infrared, unless someone clever does something interesting.(Perhaps makes another fine puzzle to be un-scrambled by some other poor bastards, as was said to have already happened).

Consciousness is a unique state of matter, a state of matter which exploits potential energy, robs entropy, accelerates thermodynamics, helps nature do what its doing faster - makes the universe more uniform in the time dimension, makes the balloon more round.

To this end *I* apply my *volition*. The four forces define energy potentials, and causes change to minimize potentials. (From a space-time perspective, are the principles behind the motif of the universe' tapestry). My volition is a similar cause of change. Though of course, nature to be commanded must be obeyed. But life does command nature within its scope. Its is as if we're skating down-hill. We've got to go downhill (energy & entropy - wise), but we choose how we turn, and what we do on the way.

Dean thinks we're, as Cal said, Marionettes of nature. I don't think so, nor do a few Nobel "crack-pots".

I suspect the specific state of the universe, the universe being a quantum-mechanical entity, simultaneously "crystallized" into something definite from everything possible at once. Our psychological arrow of time gives us an illusion of things developing, and marvel that something came from nothing.

In QM it seems something definite crystallizes from everything possible, a single path from a sum of all possible paths, in time as well as space, such as Feynman Diagrams depict. Think of a Feynman diagram for the universe.

At any rate, I find it more comforting, and aesthetically pleasing to think of myself (the organizing principle) as a unique force and dimension of nature, which hasn't been proven otherwise. Art is fuel, motivation and inspiration.

Enough chatting with myself for today!

Scott

Post 199

Thursday, January 19, 2006 - 6:51pm