Metaphysics from Descartes

In a sense, you are more right than me (the purpose of thought is action), but again, I'm using 'intentionality' to mean that when we think, we think "about" things -- real things that beckon our actions.

First of all, all thinking is thinking of a subject about an object (that's essential to the verb "thinking"). For much of the thinking that goes on in the world, the self is basically a subject. In the special case of introspection, however, the self 'becomes' an object. This is because of what is essential to the verb "thinking."

Clear enough?

There are parts of us that are unique, and there are parts of us that are not. Only objective philosophy recognizes this dynamic.

(Ed)This 'problem' arbitrarily assumes that introspection has to be as 'complete' as extro-spection (weak analogy fallacy, coupled with a straw-man fallacy -- in order to appear to make a point).

It fails to integrate that the objective view of the mind is the 1st-person view of it (3rd-person views of another's mind are, necessarily, subjective views). This case is the reverse of what is usual, and a common error of even professional philosophers.

(Nick)If introspection is not as complete as extro-spection, then the 1^st person integration of the mind requires many more inductive leaps than the more complete extro-spection. In effect, one is creating a self, not discovering it. This is not Objectivism. It is Subjectivism.

(Ed)While it's true that we want this freedom (it's within our shared human nature to want this; ie. it is an objective value), it is arbitrary to state that we "try" to make folks fixed -- and subsequently try to generalize from that.

While some humans yearn for a changeless relationship to others (where there is no learning or growing), healthy humans don't. In a sense, this line of reasoning trades on a mental defect (which is assumed true of all of us).

(Nick)We try to make folks objects. When people are objects, it means they are acted upon, used like tools. Women don’t like to be sex objects. It means they can’t do anything. Other people do things to them. We should treat people as subjects, not objects. Relationships should be subject-subject, not subject-object. Sartre said Hell is other people. He was thinking of all the ways people observe us and try to make us objects. If there were no other people in the world, we would be free, not worried about our appearance to others. We do feel free when we are behind a screen, observing others. Those others are objects to us. When someone notices us, then we become the object in their eyes. Our freedom is threatened. When we think we are alone, we feel free. We pick our noses or masturbate. We don’t feel shame until someone notices us. We see ourselves as they see us. It takes someone with a strong ego to not worry about what others think of him or her. If I don’t respect the people who look down on me, who judge me and determine that I am worthy of ridicule, then I feel no more shame than I would if an insect perceived me in an unflattering way. Never-the-less, I won’t tolerate it. I seek people who respect me, who treat me as a subject, and I will treat them as such. Both Rand and Sartre, as well as Kant, thought people should treat each other as ends, not as means.

(Ed)But Rand had so much more to say about individuality than this short quip. I won't list examples of what it is that is patently obvious (I'm 'above' that).

(Nick)NickOtani’sNeo-Objectivism preserves what Rand says about man’s independent and unchanging, fixed, nature, but it also includes Sartre’s freedom to become, within Objectivism’s parameters.

Bis bald,

Nick  

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If introspection is not as complete as extro-spection, then the 1st person integration of the mind requires many more inductive leaps than the more complete extro-spection. In effect, one is creating a self, not discovering it. This is not Objectivism. It is Subjectivism.
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(Ed)Please put that in a syllogism (or series of syllogisms). It is currently an enthymeme (wherein intermediary premises are being merely assumed). And I'm pretty sure it will fall on it's face, if it is understood sufficiently (as syllogisms afford).

(Nick)Intermediary premises are not being merely assumed. They are being omitted out of respect for the intelligence of the reader. If I explain things too much, people sometimes think I am being condescending. I try, therefore, to assume my reader can make connections, but I can be wrong sometimes. Anyway, our empirical observations are always influenced by attitudes and prior learning. (I refer to my post on perception, logic, and language for a short course on perception.) The more our perceptions are limited, the more uncertain they become, the more we have to connect the dots in our minds. So, the more we act on what we perceive rather than simply discover it. If we are acting on something rather than simply discovering it, we are participating in creating it. Reality is, to some extent, in the subjective eye of the beholder. When that beholder examines the tools he or she uses to examine, turning the eyes back in on themselves to observe what observes, the inductive leaps become even greater than normal, when the eyes are looking outward.

If inspection is incomplete, mental integration is necessary to make it more complete.

Introspection is less complete than extro-spection.

Therefore, greater mental integration is necessary to make introspection as complete as extro-spection.

Greater mental integration requires greater mental action on the part of the inspector; it is not passive discovery.

Introspection requires active participation on the part of the inspector.

Introspection is active, not passive.

The greater something depends on the mental, as opposed to the empirical, the less objective it becomes.

The mental comes from within the observer and is not independent of him, objective, unless one adopts the permanency and independence of platonic forms or the a priori mathematical truths which cannot be observed empirically.

Imagination is the mental construction of truths which cannot be verified completely by empirical observation.

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Women don’t like to be sex objects. It means they can’t do anything. Other people do things to them. We should treat people as subjects, not objects.
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Women can be perceived as (sexual) objects of desire, and they can also be whole persons. There doesn't have to be a necessary dichotomy here. There can be a time to treat someone as a subject, and there can be a time to treat someone as an object (either of desire, or of research).

We should treat people as subjects when it is appropriate to treat them so (ie. in the right contexts).

(Nick)Rand would never say such a thing. She would never submit to being used, except when she is surrendering to a man. This is her non-feminist side with which many disagree. Her novels are about the individualists who would not subjugate themselves to others.

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Sartre said Hell is other people. He was thinking of all the ways people observe us and try to make us objects. If there were no other people in the world, we would be free, not worried about our appearance to others.
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(Ed)Sartre didn't know what the 'Hell' he was talking about. Caught up in a primitive 'social-metaphysics' -- the man gave other's views of him primacy (a primacy of consciousness, over-and-above the more proper primacy of existence). You don't need to be the only person in the world -- in order to be free. Sartre was dead-wrong there.

(Nick) don’t think you are trying to understand. You are shifting from an abstract statement to concrete interpretations.


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When someone notices us, then we become the object in their eyes. Our freedom is threatened.
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(Ed)Only the freedom of the short-sighted and simple-minded (like Sartre was). Only the freedom of those who readily give up their freedom to the irrational and un-objective whims of other people.

(Nick)Allowing one’s self to be used as an object is giving up freedom. You said, above “there can be a time to treat someone as an object…”

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It takes someone with a strong ego to not worry about what others think of him or her. If I don’t respect the people who look down on me, who judge me and determine that I am worthy of ridicule, then I feel no more shame than I would if an insect perceived me in an unflattering way.
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(Ed)Now (finally) you're getting somewhere. Now (finally) you're acknowledging the objectivity of personal existence. Now (finally) you're alluding to a primacy of existence -- over-and-above a primacy of consciousness 'social metaphysics'. You, here, answer your own conundrums (just listen to yourself, man).

(Nick)Have you read my post about Prufrock and Henley, the subject and the object?

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NickOtani’sNeo-Objectivism preserves what Rand says about man’s independent and unchanging, fixed, nature, but it also includes Sartre’s freedom to become,
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(Ed)As if Rand didn't include a freedom to become! Give me a break.

(Nick)She doesn’t deal with it effectively. She declares it to be self-evdent that man has free will, but this conflicts with her advocacy of an objective reality and causality. A more complete philosophy must do more than this. Existentialism does more than this, and NickOtani’sNeo-objectivism does more still.

Bis bald,

Nick

For all existence, one is what one repeatedly does. For humans, you are what you repeatedly intend. The 'self' is that unique intentionality.