Faith and Reason, a few thoughts

First, William, I noticed that you skipped the points I made in my first response to you, that inductive reason is not, by its nature, conclusive. It makes a leap. Remember, I said, “When discussing truth and knowledge, scientists go with degrees of certainty. A hypothesis is a guess, based on some evidence but not sufficient enough to make it a theory. The theory is not sufficiently certain enough to be a theorem, and a theorem is not a law. And, even some laws have disappeared.” I also said, “I am willing to accept theorems and laws as sufficiently supported enough to be considered true, to be considered knowledge, but I keep in mind that they could be wrong. And, I don’t deny the role of faith in making the inductive leaps.” If you have a problem with anything I said there, you haven’t made it known yet. You certainly haven’t refuted it or even challenged it?

Second, if something is self-evident, it shouldn’t have to be verified by anything. It is axiomatically true. If it does need verification, then that which verifies must also be verified and so on into infinity.

Third, you say the self can be identified by introspection, which is based on extrospection. Before a consciousness can identify itself, it has to be conscious of something external to itself. However, if it is not, itself, external to itself, then how does it become conscious of itself? Where is the self that is conscious of things external to itself? And, then, when it is conscious of itself, where is it? Is it inside or outside itself? Can a consciousness be conscious of itself being conscious of itself being conscious of itself and so on into infinity?

Finally, is that Objectivist principle that "faith" is acceptance of an idea without sensory evidence or rational proof provable with sensory evidence or rational proof? Or, is it an article of faith? If the term “faith” means acceptance of an idea without sensory evidence or rational proof, how is it provable on the basis of sensory evidence and reason? Can I sense what faith means? Is there a rational argument which proves what faith means? If I can sense it, show it to me. If it is rationally provable, lay out the argument for me. I suspect you can’t do either, and this is just a definition you accept on authority, a kind of faith.

Bis bald,

Nick

(William)I think inductive reason can be conclusive. For example, even though we can't enumerate all the instances of ice, we can nevertheless say that ice (of a certain density) will float. The conclusiveness of this statement is based on the law of identity. Things of a certain character will act the same way under the same conditions.

(Nick)It really depends on the textbook and the author as to whether or not certain examples of statements can be considered inductive arguments or just definitions or a list of properties of items. Normally, an inductive argument makes a general conclusion about the nature of certain objects based on observation of some of those objects, not all of them. If there are five abadabs and four of them are bugaboos, then inductive reasoning leaps to the conclusion that all abadabs are bugaboos. This is not conclusive. There is a high probability that they are, but there is a chance that the fifth abadab is not a bugaboo. If a hundred thousand abadabs are tested and found to be bugaboos, but there are a hundred thousand and one abadabs in existence, there is still a small leap of faith in the conclusion that “all” abadabs are bugaboos. There is room for uncertainty.

If five out of five abadabs are bugaboos, this is not necessarily an inductive argument. It is a defining characteristic of abadabs or a tautology, a deductive argument.

I have spoken before about the law of identity. The way Rand uses it is more than what Aristotle had in mind. It is a rule which maintains the identity of variables in an argument during the course of the argument. It doesn’t necessarily tell us about reality, only that, during the course of an argument, a tree is a tree. This doesn’t prove causality, and it doesn’t make inductive arguments true or conclusive.

(William)In order to say that they could be wrong, you must have some evidence to doubt their validity. If you lack that evidence, then you can't legitimately say that they could be wrong. For example, it's possible to make errors in addition. Is it therefore possible that when I add 7 plus 5 and get 12, I could be wrong? I don't think so. Similarly, even though certain "laws" have turned out to be wrong, it doesn't follow that if something is deemed to be a law, it could therefore be wrong.

(Nick)The examples of addition you show here are deductive, not inductive. They are based on definitions and rules of inference. Seven plus five is defined as 12. It is not jumping from particulars to a conclusion about a set of particulars greater than those inspected.

And, in debate, a winner only has to prove that one explanation, his or her proposal, is more plausible than others presented. One might use Occam’s Razor. Or, he or she needs to present a prima facie case which is not sufficiently challenged. However, this does not ensure that the winning proposition is true, only that it is more plausible than other propositions presented. I may not have evidence to prove that all abadabs are bugaboos, but if they have not all been inspected, I can legitimately say that it “could” be the case they are not all bugaboos.

(William)If by "verification," you mean derivation from antecedently known facts or propositions, then what you're saying is certainly true. Everything can't be proved on the basis of something else, otherwise you'd have an infinite regress. But what is self-evident still needs to be evident to observation, which is what it means to say that it's self-evident: namely, that it constitutes its own evidence -- that it isn't evident on the basis of other facts or propositions. As Aristotle observed, all reasoning must end somewhere. And it ends with what is evident to direct observation -- with what is self-evident.

(Nick)Yes, I agree that there needs to be axioms, things that are so evident that most rational people will not deny them. However, we must be careful not to over-use this strategy of declaring things self-evident. Bigots in the Old South once declared it self-evident that black people are objects, property, not equal to rich white males who own property.  Anyway, observation can be questioned. We do have blind spots. We do connect dots and project images onto things and people. Our histories and attitudes influence our perceptions. What is self-evident to one person may not be self-evident to another. (I wrote about this in my essay on perception, logic, and language.)

(William) Initially through introspection, on the basis of observing its own process of being aware of things external to itself, and secondarily, on the basis of observing externally that this process of awareness is a function of the physical brain and central nervous system.

(Nick)I’ll buy that through observation of external realty we become aware of our consciousness. That external reality is acting on us as we act on it, projecting our images onto it. Yet it does not objectify us. We objectify it. We are the subjects. We can never get to the end our selves as we can the being-in-itself, those things with fixed natures which are external to us, objective. But we, the consciousness which observes these completed, fixed things, cannot fully observe ourselves in the same way. We cannot make ourselves objects any more than the yardstick can measure itself. We are the standard for measuring other things but not ourselves.

(William)Strictly speaking, it is neither; it is itself. Is a physical object inside or outside itself? Same answer.

(Nick)A physical object is in-itself. A consciousness is for-itself.

(William)No, because actual infinity doesn't exist. But it can be conscious of itself being conscious of itself. However, extending the process of self-reflection much beyond that would simply be too difficult to maintain. You couldn't hold it in conscious awareness.

(Nick)That’s right. That’s why humans can’t be as complete and fixed as external objects. We are the subjects. Our natures are not yet complete. We participate in creating them. It’s where our freedom to become comes from.

(William)Nick, I'm not following you here. That's how Rand uses the term. What is it about this that you don't understand? I don't accept this on faith. I have actual evidence that that's how she uses the term. What more do you want?

(Nick)Because Rand used a term a certain way, it doesn’t mean that is the only way the term should be used or even that Rand is the ultimate authority on how terms should be used. Rand can be incomplete, and she can be wrong. Accepting something as true because Rand says it is faith in Rand’s authority, not independent sensing and reasoning.

Bis bald,

Nick

(William)I wrote that Rand uses the term "faith" to mean the acceptance of something as true without sensory evidence or rational proof. Nick replied that since I cannot prove this to be the case, I must therefore accept it on faith.

(Nick)No, I do not care how Rand uses the term. I am responding to the contention that I am using the term wrongly. I have explained repeatedly about how inductive reasoning is normally inconclusive and requires a leap of faith. I am being argued with, as if any evidence supporting a conclusion does away with faith. It does not. If you inspect a sampling and draw a general conclusion about the whole, you make an inductive leap. That’s what normal inductive reasoning does. If you disagree with that, then show me where.

(William), "Nick, I'm not following you here. That's how Rand uses the term. What is it about this that you don't understand? I don't accept this on faith. I have actual evidence that that's how she uses the term. What more do you want?"

(Nick)I do not care how Rand uses the term. You said that the meaning of “faith” as the acceptance of something as true without sensory evidence or rational proof could be proven with sensory evidence or rational proof. These are your words:  “What the term "faith" means in this context is the acceptance of an idea without sensory evidence or rational proof. And the fact that it means this -- the fact that the word is being used in this way -- is certainly provable on the basis on sensory evidence and reason.” Okay, I asked you to prove, on the basis of sensory evidence and reason, that that is what the word means—that the way the word is being used is accurate. If you can’t do that, then you are accepting the meaning of the word on faith, because Rand uses it that way.

(William)He replied, "Because Rand used a term a certain way, it doesn’t mean that is the only way the term should be used or even that Rand is the ultimate authority on how terms should be used."

Of course, it doesn't. Who said it did??

He continued, "Rand can be incomplete, and she can be wrong. Accepting something as true because Rand says it is faith in Rand’s authority, not independent sensing and reasoning."

Nick, are you being serious?? The issue here is what Objectivism MEANS by the term "faith," i.e., how Rand uses it. It's hard for me to believe that you don't understand this. It is not faith to accept that that's how she uses the term, if you have direct evidence that that's how she uses it, which, of course, I do. This has nothing whatever to do with "Rand's authority." Words can have different meanings and can be used in different senses. I was simply pointing out how Objectivism uses the term "faith" and that it differs from the way that you were using it. What's not to understand?

(Nick)I don’t need your lectures on how Objectivism uses terms. I am more familiar with Objectivism than most Objectivists I’ve met, even on this and other Objectivists’ boards. I am trying to make clear that the way I use the word “faith” is not improper or strange in any way according to conventional wisdom. I also think, if I were talking with Rand, she would agree with me that inductive reasoning is normally inconclusive, not completely certain, and uses a leap of faith to reach conclusions. If she doesn’t, then she doesn’t know much about logic and reasoning.

(Jon)Nick, after reading many of your posts, I'm honestly baffled as to why you'd want to identify yourself as even being a "Neo-Objectivist." Why use that term at all?

(Nick)If you are honestly baffled, then maybe you’d be willing to investigate and learn. Somehow, I don’t think you are willing to do that, are you? Have you read any of my posts where I actually explain where I agree and where I differ with Objectivism? Which ones did you read? How do they leave you baffled? Have you bothered to ask for specific clarification before jumping to the conclusion that I don’t merit association with the term “Objectivist”?

(Jon)Your method of discussing philosophical issues, with its characteristic vagueness and mysticism, is the exact opposite of the clarity and precision extolled by Ayn Rand.

(Nick)There are several places where Rand was not clear and precise. She digressed with polemics and was not careful in making her points. She was more provoking and inflammatory than she was precise. That is why her essays never appeared in respected professional journals. And, because my method of discussing philosophical issues is vague to you, it does not make my method of discussing philosophical issues objectively vague.

(Jon)She was the arch-proponent of reality independent of consciousness, direct awareness, objective definitions, Aristotelian logic, and all of the other requirements of rational certainty. She constantly derided skepticism and faith. She had nothing but ridicule for Existentialist "thinkers"

(Nick)She even disagreed with Aristotle in many places, and, yes, she abhorred Existentialists. I am not an Objectivist.

(Jon)What on earth attracts you to her philosophy?

(Nick)If you seriously want to know, go back and read some of my earlier posts. There is one titled NickOtani’sNeo-Objectivism. There is one titled Existentialism v. Objectivism. And, several of my posts go into what I agree with objectivism about and what I don’t.

(Jon)William, you've been patiently (and wonderfully) explaining fundamental Objectivist ideas, but I think you're laboring under a false assumption--namely, that the person you're addressing actually wants to understand what you're saying. He doesn't.

(Nick)I’m under no assumption you care to understand me, Jon. You want to make your wild inductive leaps of faith and condemn me, don’t you?

(William)Yes, I realize that, Jon; it's become all too obvious. And thanks for the compliment. I've tried to be as civil and patient as possible, but I can see that there's no point in continuing the dialogue.

(Nick)Yes, take a final cheap shot at me as you cut and run. Show me how a good Objectivist accepts responsibility.

Bis bald,

Nick

 

(Edited by Mr. Nicholas Neal Otani on 7/27, 3:36pm)