Reading Epistemology Intro - now I'm really piste

Cal wrote:

So for example drawing conclusions about the logic of an argument is referring to the supernatural?

Isn't that what you are implying? You said "...you're omitting the context of Bob's remark, namely that the discussion was about conclusions about the physical world based on sensory evidence, not about any conclusion whatsoever." to which my question is what else is there but the physical world? And what conclusions do we come to other than that which is based from our physical world? Which is why I ask what other conclusions are we talking about here? Conclusions about the unphysical world?

Do you think we couldn't arrive at the certain conclusion that 2 + 2 = 4 if the information of our senses is not 100% reliable or if our physical theories are not 100% certain?

I'm sorry Cal, my senses are not 100% reliable so I'm not actually sure if you are figment of my imagination or if you really are a person posting this. I'd give it a probability of 60% you are real. But then again I'm not 100% sure that my previous statement was true. But I am certain that I can never be 100% certain, but then again I'm not 100% certain I can never be 100% certain.

If you keep ignoring my arguments and think that such logic chopping constitutes an argument I see no reason to continue this discussion, I'm not interested in sophistry.

Are you certain of that?

(Edited by John Armaos on 8/05, 1:59pm)

Post 41

Saturday, August 5, 2006 - 4:46pm

I wrote, "How do you falsify something by experimental evidence, if you can never be sure of the evidence that it's false?" Cal replied,

Can we only falsify something if we're 100% sure of the evidence? Isn't evidence that is 99% certain good enough to discard a theory?

As I understand falsification, it means you've demonstrated conclusively that a proposition cannot be true. If it's only 99% certain that the proposition is false, then it might be true, in which case, you can't say that it's false, because a proposition that's false cannot possibly be true. And if you can't say that it's false, then you haven't falsified it.

For example, the discovery of a black swan falsifies the proposition that all swans are white. It doesn't do it with 99% certainty. It does it with 100% certainty.

If you see something in the distance that looks a black swan, but you think there's a small chance it's a decoy, then even though you're 99% certain it's a black swan, you still need to examine it up close to make sure, and until you do, you haven't falsified the proposition that all swans are white, since there's still a slim possibility that all of them are indeed white. But once you've examined the swan-like object up close and removed all doubt that it is a real swan, you can then say that you're 100% certain there exists a black swan, at which point, you will have falsified the proposition that all swans are white.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 8/05, 4:48pm)

Post 42

Saturday, August 5, 2006 - 8:59pm

Maybe you misunderstood. I have an interest in Objectivism because I admire the rationality and logic. I cannot however get around some of the fundamental problems in the roots of the philosophy. By "swayed", I mean swayed from my conclusion that serious problems exists in the philosophy and not somewhere else, like a misunderstanding or an error in logic. In this sense no solutions have been presented here nor elsewhere. The arguments against Objectivism are consistently more compelling to me.

Well, that's what I meant. You can still keep your interest and yet still find solutions to problems you see. But I abide by the rule that people have just got to figure it out for themselves. I can tell you what *I* do: if I see glaring problems, I'll just go my own way to find solutions on my own. And I'll end up with a conclusion, for myself, and just having done that, I'm happy. It's enough that *I* have a conclusion. And... that's it. I don't really think about looking to be swayed by an outside force... If someone wants to sell me on something, they gotta know that my mind is working and weighing. I might not bite. I think that's why I'm having a hard time responding to you, because of the swaying thing-- the difference here is that when I come to a conclusion, I don't think about being swayed from it, because what would be the point of coming to a conclusion in the first place? You have to trust your own mind somewhere along the line. If not, then I'm not sure what to tell you.

Post 43

Saturday, August 5, 2006 - 9:01pm

You are a fascinating completely unique individual. Just like everyone else. ;)

Hey, that reminds me of high school! [laugh]

Post 44

Saturday, August 5, 2006 - 10:38pm

Jenna, it seems like you are a relativist. Whatever works for others is okay, and you will decide for yourself if it works for you. It doesn't really matter if others agree or disagree. That's their problem, not yours. (I could be wrong. Correct me if I am.)

Well, that's okay up to a point. There is a point where I have got to draw a line and say, "Hey, if this is what you believe, then I condemn you." If you don't do that, if you think Hitler is just no better or worse than Gandhi, that each has his own views that work for him but perhaps not for you, then I have to condemn you too.

There are some things worth taking a stand on. There are some views I'd like to promote and some I'd like to debate and denounce. I don't care if you like chocolate ice cream more than vanillia, but I do care if you think some people are more or less human and more or less deserving of human rights.

I may not feel responsible for people starving in Africa, but if someone is being mugged or raped outside my window, I will not pull the shade. I will get involved, even if it is to tell somone else. I won't say, "Oh well, to each his or her own."

I will pick my fights and not waste my time on an ineffective bigot, but I do think getting the most rational and compelling argument out there is important, even if it doesn't sway the bigot. I tried to illustrate that in my post on the Bigot in the Bar, a post that was deleted from the OL forum. Do you think it should have been? Do you think it is wrong to advocate or take a stand?

Imagine you are a peacekeeper in a third world country and you see a warlord come into a village and begn hacking people to death with a machettee. You call in to your chain of command and report this situation and request assistance to stop this from happening, but your supervisor says,"No, don't impose your morality on these people. Just stay out of it. Mind your own business." How would you take that? How would you take it if you were one of the people being hacked to death?

Of course, I may be entirely wrong about you, in which case I apologize. You did say you would vote for women because you wouldn't want others not to vote for you because you are a woman. That's a principled position, high on Kohlberg's model, unlike Mel Gibson's reasons for saying his racism was wrong, that it is against his religion.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 45

Sunday, August 6, 2006 - 7:13am

Bill:

As I understand falsification, it means you've demonstrated conclusively that a proposition cannot be true. If it's only 99% certain that the proposition is false, then it might be true, in which case, you can't say that it's false, because a proposition that's false cannot possibly be true. And if you can't say that it's false, then you haven't falsified it.

We are not talking about logical propositions, like mathematical statements. Take for example Fermat's last theorem. In fact it was until recently not really a theorem but a conjecture (Fermat almost certainly didn't have a valid proof). It could in principle have been disproved by one single counterexample (now it finally has been proved we know that there doesn't exist a counterexample). But with physical theories you never have 100% certainty. A good example is the theory of light: according to Huygens light consisted of waves, but according to Newton light consisted of particles. The diffraction and interference experiments by Young and Fresnel and the verification of Maxwell's equations in the 19th century definitely falsified Newton's theory. Well, until it was discovered in the 20th century that light also consists of particles. The apparently rock-solid dichotomy between waves and particles turned out to be not so solid after all.

Does that mean that the scientists in the 19th century shouldn't have said that they's definitely falsified Newton's theory of light? Certainly not, according to all the knowledge and information they had at the time this was a valid conclusion, there was no need to qualify it by explicitly stating that there was a very remote possibility that they were wrong. In science you know that you never can exclude such a possibility. That is no reason to abstain from making definite statements about the truth or the falsity of a theory if there is enough convincing evidence.

For example, the discovery of a black swan falsifies the proposition that all swans are white. It doesn't do it with 99% certainty. It does it with 100% certainty.

If you see something in the distance that looks a black swan, but you think there's a small chance it's a decoy, then even though you're 99% certain it's a black swan, you still need to examine it up close to make sure, and until you do, you haven't falsified the proposition that all swans are white, since there's still a slim possibility that all of them are indeed white. But once you've examined the swan-like object up close and removed all doubt that it is a real swan, you can then say that you're 100% certain there exists a black swan, at which point, you will have falsified the proposition that all swans are white.

It isn't that simple. How do you know when you've removed all doubt that the black object is a real swan? It may be a different bird that is a swan look-alike. It does happen that two completely different species have a strong resemblance, due to convergent evolution and/or the phenomenon of mimicry. Perhaps you'll have to dissect the black bird to get a definitive confirmation, or you might even have to study its DNA. It has happened in the past that DNA research showed that the classification of certain species was in fact incorrect. This is again an illustration that you never can be 100% certain that you've falsified the theory. That is no problem: when your degree of certainty is high enough you may safely say that you're certain that you have falsified that theory. That this "certainty" is not a mathematical certainty doesn't matter at all. We have to be practical and live our lives without worrying about the exact number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin.

Post 46

Sunday, August 6, 2006 - 9:59am

For example, the discovery of a black swan falsifies the proposition that all swans are white. It doesn't do it with 99% certainty. It does it with 100% certainty.

If you see something in the distance that looks a black swan, but you think there's a small chance it's a decoy, then even though you're 99% certain it's a black swan, you still need to examine it up close to make sure, and until you do, you haven't falsified the proposition that all swans are white, since there's still a slim possibility that all of them are indeed white. But once you've examined the swan-like object up close and removed all doubt that it is a real swan, you can then say that you're 100% certain there exists a black swan, at which point, you will have falsified the proposition that all swans are white.
It isn't that simple. How do you know when you've removed all doubt that the black object is a real swan? It may be a different bird that is a swan look-alike. It does happen that two completely different species have a strong resemblance, due to convergent evolution and/or the phenomenon of mimicry. Perhaps you'll have to dissect the black bird to get a definitive confirmation, or you might even have to study its DNA. It has happened in the past that DNA research showed that the classification of certain species was in fact incorrect.

No it was not incorrect, your definition of a swan was not as narrow as when you accounted for genetic variances. All you did was give a more specific definition of a classification of animal. In essence how you defined swan, how you classified the species, changed to a more specific definition. Whereas before you called the bird a swan, because it shared similar qualities with other animals such as weight, beak size, wing span etc. to which a classification of swan was given. When you looked into it further, you realized there were still further differences between these swans that required an even further more narrow classification of the animal. Your initial classification of swan was defined with different or more broad parameters than your classification of swan with DNA analysis. This is what it means when Objectivists say knowledge is contextual. Your first conclusion that there are black and white swans was not incorrect, for the conclusion that comes afterwards with DNA analysis that says swans are only white, is a different conclusion than the first because the premises have changed. The second conclusion takes into account DNA analysis, the first does not. They are therefore different conclusions. The second conclusion gives us a more complete description of reality when compared to our initial analysis of the birds.

In fact this is also what conceptual knowledge means when we classify animals. The fact that we call certain animals "birds" means we are comparing similar qualities among animals and have given a general classification called bird to these animals. And when we see certain living organisms that share similar qualities in a broader definition we classify them as animals, and we see certain objects that exhibit life, we call them organisms, so on and so on. When we start refining the classification, does it mean we are incorrect to call a Robin, a Swan, and an Oriole a bird because they are not exactly the same in every which way? Are we incorrect to call a bird, a reptile, and an insect an animal even though they are vastly different from each other? No of course not, because these terms are broad enough to include these entities. But to say that we can't, takes away any ability to conceptualize anything in our world. And this is a huge problem in the way scientists think these days.

But to take your argument and see where it logically concludes, even after DNA analysis, you would still have to say according to your logic we still don't know whether the black bird we saw is not a swan because we always have to leave the possibility we are incorrect. And to what end can we take this? If it's possible we are incorrect about anything we do, are we incorrect about making the assertion it is possible we incorrect about anything we do? Which means it's possible we are correct about everything?

Post 47

Sunday, August 6, 2006 - 6:05pm

Nick:

You don't know me, and although I've only seen your name in an on-and-off manner for about a month or so on an internet forum, I don't have any information, or any need, to call you anything. If you want to call me a relativist right off the bat, fine. If you want to read into the conversation I'm having with someone else on a particular topic in a certain context, and call me a relativist as if you knew everything about my life, just from that, whatever-- I don't care. I've been called many things in my life, but really, the only person that defines me is me. What others wish to call me doesn't change what I know about myself. If you really need to put me into some category, at least click on my name and read all the posts I've done here, on my website, *and* on OL.

Post 48

Sunday, August 6, 2006 - 7:40pm

Jenna:

No, I've read more than a few of your posts and drew some provisional conclusions. I told you what those conclusions were and gave you a chance to correct me if I am wrong. That's not the same as name calling.

If you don't want me interfering with a discussion you are having with someone else, don't post on a public forum. I will make observations, generalizations, and judgments as I see fit, the same as others do with me. If you don't like that, I don't care.

bis bald,

Nick

Post 49

Sunday, August 6, 2006 - 9:42pm

As I understand falsification, it means you've demonstrated conclusively that a proposition cannot be true. If it's only 99% certain that the proposition is false, then it might be true, in which case, you can't say that it's false, because a proposition that's false cannot possibly be true. And if you can't say that it's false, then you haven't falsified it.
We are not talking about logical propositions, like mathematical statements. Take for example Fermat's last theorem. In fact it was until recently not really a theorem but a conjecture (Fermat almost certainly didn't have a valid proof). It could in principle have been disproved by one single counterexample (now it finally has been proved we know that there doesn't exist a counterexample). But with physical theories you never have 100% certainty. A good example is the theory of light: according to Huygens light consisted of waves, but according to Newton light consisted of particles. The diffraction and interference experiments by Young and Fresnel and the verification of Maxwell's equations in the 19th century definitely falsified Newton's theory. Well, until it was discovered in the 20th century that light also consists of particles. The apparently rock-solid dichotomy between waves and particles turned out to be not so solid after all.

"Turned out" to be not so solid after all?! I don't think you can say that, Cal, because on your theory of knowledge, no proposition that isn't logical or mathematical could ever turn out to be either true or false. What could the words "turn out" possibly mean in this context, if there is no final verdict that reveals the proposition for what it actually is (either true or false)? In that case, there is no "turning out" -- no conclusive demonstration -- of a proposition's truth or falsity.

The best you can say, on your theory of knowledge, is that a scientific proposition appears to be true or false. But, strictly speaking, even that statement doesn't make sense. Since, on your theory, you aren't able to tell when a scientific proposition actually is true or false, how could you say that it even appears true or false? To put it another way, in order to say that a scientific proposition appears true or false; you have to be able to distinguish a true scientific proposition from a false one (just as in order to say that an animal appears to be a dog rather than a cat, you have to be able to distinguish one animal from the other). But, on your theory, you're not able to make that distinction, because you can never know when a scientific proposition really is true or false, since every "true" scientific proposition could conceivably be false, and every "false" scientific proposition could conceivably be true. Besides, as I noted above, if it's less than fully certain that a scientific proposition is false, then it might be true. And if it might be true, then you can't say that it is false, because a proposition that is false cannot possibly be true.

Perhaps you will say that a scientific proposition is true if it corresponds to reality and false if fails to correspond. But, according to you, one can never know when it corresponds or fails to correspond, so one can never know when a scientific proposition is true or false.

Does that mean that the scientists in the 19th century shouldn't have said that they's definitely falsified Newton's theory of light? Certainly not, according to all the knowledge and information they had at the time this was a valid conclusion, there was no need to qualify it by explicitly stating that there was a very remote possibility that they were wrong.

I agree, because they had no evidence, and no reason to believe, that they could be wrong.

In science you know that you never can exclude such a possibility.

On the contrary, you can exclude it if you have no reason to believe that it exists. In order to say that you could be wrong, you need some evidence to doubt the truth of your conclusion. Lacking such evidence, you have no rational grounds on which to say that you could be wrong. The fact that you were wrong in the past is not evidence that you could be wrong now, any more than the fact that your reasoning was mistaken in the past is evidence that it could be mistaken now.

For example, the discovery of a black swan falsifies the proposition that all swans are white. It doesn't do it with 99% certainty. It does it with 100% certainty.

If you see something in the distance that looks a black swan, but you think there's a small chance it's a decoy, then even though you're 99% certain it's a black swan, you still need to examine it up close to make sure, and until you do, you haven't falsified the proposition that all swans are white, since there's still a slim possibility that all of them are indeed white. But once you've examined the swan-like object up close and removed all doubt that it is a real swan, you can then say that you're 100% certain there exists a black swan, at which point, you will have falsified the proposition that all swans are white.
It isn't that simple. How do you know when you've removed all doubt that the black object is a real swan? It may be a different bird that is a swan look-alike. It does happen that two completely different species have a strong resemblance, due to convergent evolution and/or the phenomenon of mimicry. Perhaps you'll have to dissect the black bird to get a definitive confirmation, or you might even have to study its DNA. It has happened in the past that DNA research showed that the classification of certain species was in fact incorrect.

If you still have doubts that the bird could be a black swan, because you haven't studied its DNA, then you haven't falsified the proposition that all swans are white, because you still think it's possible that they could all be white. You're still in the same position as the person who sees the bird at a distance and isn't sure whether or not it's real. But if you've examined the bird thoroughly, using DNA testing if necessary, and thereby fulfilled what you believe to be sufficient conditions for its verification, then you've confirmed that it is a swan and have thereby falsified the proposition that all swans are white.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 8/06, 10:04pm)

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 8/06, 10:12pm)

Post 50

Monday, August 7, 2006 - 7:44am

John:

No it was not incorrect, your definition of a swan was not as narrow as when you accounted for genetic variances.

You're missing the point. It is not a question of genetic variances. The concept "species" and the classification of living beings in general is already centuries old, and while we in general can distinguish different species by their external features, this is not the essential characteristic. That is determined by the interrelation with other animals. A better (though not perfect) criterion for determining whether an animal belongs to a certain species is the possibility to produce fertile offspring. This is also already quite an old criterion. That we may distinguish subvariants of a species is not relevant; the point is that external features in some cases can be misleading and can lead to incorrect classifications, which has happened often enough in the past. For some reason Objectivists want to define the possibility of making errors away by using the magic word "context". That doesn't make sense to me.

Post 51

Monday, August 7, 2006 - 7:44am

Bill:

"Turned out" to be not so solid after all?!

No need to shout, that doesn't make your argument more convincing.

I don't think you can say that, Cal, because on your theory of knowledge, no proposition that isn't logical or mathematical could ever turn out to be either true or false. What could the words "turn out" possibly mean in this context, if there is no final verdict that reveals the proposition for what it actually is (either true or false)? In that case, there is no "turning out" -- no conclusive demonstration -- of a proposition's truth or falsity.

Sigh. Do I really have to explain it again? The fact is that we can live very well with high probabilities instead of absolute certainties. Let me also use that magic word of Objectivists: "context". Saying that something is true or false is in the context of statements about the physical world not the same as in logic or mathematics. For all practical purposes we can say that something is true or that we're certain of something when the probability of that is high enough. It's silly to demand exact 100% certainty in such cases as if such empirical truths are the same as logical or mathematical truths.

I don't think you can say that, Cal, because on your theory of knowledge, no proposition that isn't logical or mathematical could ever turn out to be either true or false. What could the words "turn out" possibly mean in this context, if there is no final verdict that reveals the proposition for what it actually is (either true or false)? In that case, there is no "turning out" -- no conclusive demonstration -- of a proposition's truth or falsity.

Yes there is. The keyword is context (see, I can talk like a real Objectivist): there is a conclusive demonstration to the best of our current knowledge. And that's all what we need; we don't have to bother about the possibility that we'll be proven wrong at some time in the future (for the nitpickers: to the best of the knowledge at that time), which doesn't mean that this possibility doesn't exist. Have you any idea how big the graveyard of discarded theories really is? And therein lies the difference between scientists on the one hand and cultists and religionists on the other hand. The first realize that their knowledge, no matter how solid it seems, is tentative knowledge, while the latter ones are sure of their "eternal" truths.

Post 52

Monday, August 7, 2006 - 12:27pm

The apparently rock-solid dichotomy between waves and particles turned out to be not so solid after all.
"Turned out" to be not so solid after all?! I don't think you can say that, Cal, because on your theory of knowledge, no proposition that isn't logical or mathematical could ever turn out to be either true or false.

No need to shout, that doesn't make your argument more convincing.

I wasn't shouting at you. I was simply expressing a skeptical question, combined with an exclamation for emphasis. You also claimed in an earlier post that I "shouted" at you "in capital letters," which I never did.

I don't think you can say that, Cal, because on your theory of knowledge, no proposition that isn't logical or mathematical could ever turn out to be either true or false. What could the words "turn out" possibly mean in this context, if there is no final verdict that reveals the proposition for what it actually is (either true or false)? In that case, there is no "turning out" -- no conclusive demonstration -- of a proposition's truth or falsity.
Sigh. Do I really have to explain it again? The fact is that we can live very well with high probabilities instead of absolute certainties. Let me also use that magic word of Objectivists: "context". Saying that something is true or false is in the context of statements about the physical world not the same as in logic or mathematics. For all practical purposes we can say that something is true or that we're certain of something when the probability of that is high enough. It's silly to demand exact 100% certainty in such cases as if such empirical truths are the same as logical or mathematical truths.

I don't think you understand my point, which I elaborated on in the subsequent portion of my post -- the part that you didn't comment on. In response to my statement that if there is no final verdict that reveals the proposition for what it actually is (either true or false), there is no "turning out" -- no conclusive demonstration -- of a proposition's truth or falsity," you replied,

Yes there is. The keyword is context (see, I can talk like a real Objectivist): there is a conclusive demonstration to the best of our current knowledge.

But, don't you see, you're then saying that there is a final verdict -- a conclusive demonstration. The qualification "to the best of our current knowledge" is unnecessary. Either you know it or you don't. If you know it, then saying that you know it "to the best of your current knowledge" is redundant.

And that's all what we need; we don't have to bother about the possibility that we'll be proven wrong at some time in the future (for the nitpickers: to the best of the knowledge at that time), which doesn't mean that this possibility doesn't exist. Have you any idea how big the graveyard of discarded theories really is?

You said the same thing in your previous post, when you wrote, "In science you know that you never can exclude such a possibility." To which I replied,

On the contrary, you can exclude it if you have no reason to believe that it exists. In order to say that you could be wrong, you need some evidence to doubt the truth of your conclusion. Lacking such evidence, you have no rational grounds on which to say that you could be wrong. The fact that you were wrong in the past is not evidence that you could be wrong now, any more than the fact that your reasoning was mistaken in the past is evidence that it could be mistaken now.

You never bothered to reply to my rejoinder. Instead, you seized on yet another opportunity to bash Objectivists as cultists and religionists:

And therein lies the difference between scientists on the one hand and cultists and religionists on the other hand. The first realize that their knowledge, no matter how solid it seems, is tentative knowledge, while the latter ones are sure of their "eternal" truths.

Ignoring your attempt to compare Objectivism to dogmatic religion, let me stress that a truth, if indeed it is a truth, is necessarily eternal. This is not religious dogmatism; it is sound philosophy. In your previous post, you gave the following example:

[A]ccording to Huygens light consisted of waves, but according to Newton light consisted of particles. The diffraction and interference experiments by Young and Fresnel and the verification of Maxwell's equations in the 19th century definitely falsified Newton's theory. Well, until it was discovered in the 20th century that light also consists of particles. The apparently rock-solid dichotomy between waves and particles turned out to be not so solid after all.

So would you say that Young and Fresnel definitely falsified Newton's theory or that they simply thought they falsified it? You say they falsified it until it was "discovered" that light also consists of particles. So, does that mean that Newton's theory actually was false (i.e., did not correspond to reality) until it was "discovered" that light also consists of particles, at which point it became true? Does the correspondence of a proposition to fact depend on our awareness of its correspondence, such that if we don't know that it corresponds, then it doesn't, but that if we do, then it does? Does reality change as our knowledge changes? Does our knowledge determine reality? If so, then we have a primacy-of-consciousness metaphysics, which is what you're defending, without actually naming it.

"Discovered" -- now that's an interesting word. It almost suggests the identification of a fact, doesn't it?! Did Young and Fresnel "discover" that Newton's theory was false -- did they identify its falseness as a fact? -- because that's what "discovery" means. Or did they merely think they had identified it -- merely think they had discovered it? And if the latter, then a genuine discovery that light also consists of particles is incompatible with the possibility of its falsehood. If it really is a discovery and not simply another belief, then it must be true. And if it is true, then it cannot be falsified by future discoveries. Indeed, if it could be falsified by future discoveries, then those discoveries could in turn be falsified by future discoveries, in which case, they cannot be regarded as genuine discoveries either. But if they cannot be regarded as genuine, then they cannot serve as a basis for falsifying previous discoveries.

The only way in which one can posit the possibility of future falsification is if one assumes the possibility of present verification, because it is only by discovering what is true that one can discover what is false. But to discover that a proposition is true is to discover that it cannot be false, because that's what it means for a proposition to be true: A true proposition is one that cannot be false. Thus, to regard a proposition as true is simultaneously to regard its falsification as impossible. Just as one cannot believe that a proposition is true and believe simultaneously that it could be false, so one cannot believe that a proposition is true and believe simultaneously that new evidence could prove it to be false.

Of course, people can be mistaken. Just as they can regard a proposition as true and be mistaken about its truth, so they can regard it as incapable of being falsified and be mistaken about that. But if they have no evidence that they could be mistaken -- if they have no reason to doubt the truth of a proposition -- then they cannot, in logic, recognize that possibility. This is not dogmatism; it is non-contradictory identification.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 8/07, 1:04pm)

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 8/07, 1:31pm)

Post 53

Monday, August 7, 2006 - 3:09pm

John:

No it was not incorrect, your definition of a swan was not as narrow as when you accounted for genetic variances.

You're missing the point.

You know Cal that's funny, because I was thinking you were the one missing the point about the swan example. Through your myopic analysis you have missed the bigger picture here.

It is not a question of genetic variances. The concept "species" and the classification of living beings in general is already centuries old, and while we in general can distinguish different species by their external features, this is not the essential characteristic. That is determined by the interrelation with other animals. A better (though not perfect) criterion for determining whether an animal belongs to a certain species is the possibility to produce fertile offspring.

And that's not the point of the example. Swan is a species which meets the criterion as you say defined as the possibility of producing fertile offspring, but what difference does that make to the example if instead swan we said bird? In fact if anything you are missing the point by being pedantic about the example given. So if we are going by the current definition of species, Bill could just go up to the bird, take a blood sample, then conduct a DNA analysis, and guess what? We have the same principle at work here wouldn't we? That he could say with certainty, whether that bird belonged to a group of birds we call "swan". Since the criterion would be a species based on DNA similarities. You are attaching a set of criterion for calling something a swan to Bill's example beyond what the example is saying the criterion for swan is. Perhaps Bill chose a poor choice of words and criterion for the definitions of them but the concept is not lost. In fact Cal, by being pedantic about the criterion you've missed the point of the concept that is trying to be conveyed here.

This is also already quite an old criterion.

I don't understand what difference does it make how old the criterion is? So this criterion of fertile offspring could be verified before the existence of DNA analysis by attempting to breed the animal with others in a group we suspect to be the same species wouldn't we? Otherwise how did anyone come up with that criterion without observing it that way first? Are you saying knowledge works backwards? First you conceptualize knowledge and then break them down into percepts?

For some reason Objectivists want to define the possibility of making errors away by using the magic word "context". That doesn't make sense to me.

No that's not what this conversation is about and that's not what Objectivism is. Objectivists don't say there's no such thing as errors. I would suggest you try reading some Objectivist literature first before making that kind of judgement. If you think that's what Objectivism is you haven't bothered to learn anything about it. I'm not an expert but I only offer my understanding of it. Go to the source if you want to understand what Objectivism is more accurately than what I am able to describe to you. In fact what the dispute seems to be here is where those errors occur, not whether errors exist. Obviously errors exist because I believe that you are in error.

I would maintain that sensory perception cannot be in error as that would make little sense to the term error. As you can only make errors in judgement, how you integrate and conceptualize that sensory knowledge is what can lead to those errors. You see what you see. How you interpret what you see any further is another story. So if the criterion was a classification of animal called Swan based on whether the animal could produce fertile offspring with another, then to make a judgement about an animal that appears to be a swan without attempting to breed the animal with others first or conducting a DNA analysis, saying it was a swan with certainty before doing this would be an error in judgement. If anything before conducting this experimentation you could only say with certainty you suspect it was a swan from identifying external features first. Since by that criterion, without doing that first you can't say with certainty the animal meets the definition of species would you? It would require more than identifying external features. But what if we had a definition for a term for which the criterion of it entailed comparing identifiable external features only? Think of an example of this and tell me why I couldn't say with certainty why something I identify by external features that share similarities with another does not belong in the same group or to the same word?

How about the word "ball", how I identify a "ball" is by identifying its external features and how its used, namely a "ball" is an object that takes the shape of a sphere that is used for sport. Are you telling me by this criterion I can't ever say with certainty whether something I see is a ball or not?

Indeed it seems that is what you are saying and this is the absurdity of your logic.

Post 54

Monday, August 7, 2006 - 3:13pm

Bill:

I wasn't shouting at you. I was simply expressing a skeptical question, combined with an exclamation for emphasis. You also claimed in an earlier post that I "shouted" at you "in capital letters," which I never did.

Uh oh, I never wrote that. Your quotation marks suggest literal quotes, but that is misleading. I'll refresh your memory, I wrote '...his last resort is to tell them that their ideas are "corrupt" and that all in big letters, as if shouting makes an "argument" more convincing.' Big letters are not the same as capital letters; you always use bigger letters than other people, which is the visual equivalent of shouting.

But, don't you see, you're then saying that there is a final verdict -- a conclusive demonstration. The qualification "to the best of our current knowledge" is unnecessary. Either you know it or you don't. If you know it, then saying that you know it "to the best of your current knowledge" is redundant.

It seems as if my previous messages were written in Chinese... but let me try again: when we use words like "true", "certain", "know" etc. with reference to empirical knowledge they don't have the absolute meaning that we assign to them when we use them in purely logical or mathematical arguments, they indicate high probabilities, not absolute certainties, as we would have to be omniscient for that. Words can have different meanings in different contexts, you know. Normally the addition "to the best of our current knowledge" is redundant, as most people understand this implication. Only Objectivists seem to think that we can have 100% certainty in our theories about the physical world.

On the contrary, you can exclude it if you have no reason to believe that it exists. In order to say that you could be wrong, you need some evidence to doubt the truth of your conclusion. Lacking such evidence, you have no rational grounds on which to say that you could be wrong. The fact that you were wrong in the past is not evidence that you could be wrong now, any more than the fact that your reasoning was mistaken in the past is evidence that it could be mistaken now.
You never bothered to reply to my rejoinder.

I did reply to it when I wrote: "Have you any idea how big the graveyard of discarded theories really is?" It's really silly to think that while we in the past have been mistaken millions of times, we now can be sure that we're not mistaken. I find such hubris really astounding.

Ignoring your attempt to compare Objectivism to dogmatic religion, let me stress that a truth, if indeed it is a truth, is necessarily eternal.

See above. The meaning of "truth" depends on the context in which it is used, and in the "physical" context it's certainly not eternal. Ask any decent scientist.

So would you say that Young and Fresnel definitely falsified Newton's theory or that they simply thought they falsified it? You say they falsified it until it was "discovered" that light also consists of particles. So, does that mean that Newton's theory actually was false (i.e., did not correspond to reality) until it was "discovered" that light also consists of particles, at which point it became true? Does the correspondence of a proposition to fact depend on our awareness of its correspondence, such that if we don't know that it corresponds, then it doesn't, but that if we do, then it does? Does reality change as our knowledge changes? Does our knowledge determine reality? If so, then we have a primacy-of-consciousness metaphysics, which is what you're defending, without actually naming it.

Let me note first that I was only talking about one specific aspect of Newton's theory, namely that light consists of particles. As far as we know now (I won't repeat that phrase every time, consider it implied in my statements) that particular aspect was not false. That doesn't mean that it was first false and then became true; it only means that at that time the conclusion that it was false was warranted. The scientists didn't have to state explicitly that their conclusion was tentative, just as they don't have to do it now - it's simply implied in every scientific endeavor. Is it now really that difficult? I think this anwers also the rest of your post. Only one last point:

But if they have no evidence that they could be mistaken -- if they have no reason to doubt the truth of a proposition -- then they cannot, in logic, recognize that possibility. This is not dogmatism; it is non-contradictory identification.

So what do you think: did the scientists at the time of Young and Fresnel have reason to doubt the truth of their proposition?

Post 55

Monday, August 7, 2006 - 6:04pm

So - how many angels ARE on the head of a pin?

Post 56

Monday, August 7, 2006 - 8:30pm

Nick:

You are wrong about me. You were not interfering, you were drawing conclusions about me out of context. Not only that, you went on asking me rhetorical questions as if I agreed to what you concluded, and at the end told me I could correct you. Oh, I do hate it when a conversation turns into a situation where it's as if I'm on trial. Perhaps you could have taken a different tone, a different way of discourse. Judgement goes both ways, so my judgement is that this will be our last conversation, unless you're interested in getting to know me person-to-person rather than accuser-to-person.

Post 57

Monday, August 7, 2006 - 9:35pm

I was drawing conclusions about you not only on the conversation in this thread on this board but also on the thread on the other board where you spoke of your visualization of people seeing the world from different perspectives. That is a relativist's postion, that nobody is more right or wrong than anyone else; they just have different perspectives.

Sure, I haven't read everything you've ever written, but I think that is asking a little too much. We don't have to know everything before making some judgments. I don't know if the floor is going to hold me up when I take my next step, but I go ahead and take it.

I am willing to admit that I am wrong, but you have a bit of a tone in your approach too, accusing me of accusing you.

BTW, I told you at the beginnng and end of my post that I could be wrong and you could correct me. At the end, I told you I would apologize if I am wrong. You still think I'm the one with the bad attitude? I'm almost bowing down to you, and you still brow beat me and threaten me. What do you want? Are you a Dominix too?

bis bald,

Nick

Post 58

Monday, August 7, 2006 - 11:34pm

I wasn't shouting at you. I was simply expressing a skeptical question, combined with an exclamation for emphasis. You also claimed in an earlier post that I "shouted" at you "in capital letters," which I never did.
Uh oh, I never wrote that. Your quotation marks suggest literal quotes, but that is misleading. I'll refresh your memory, I wrote '...his last resort is to tell them that their ideas are "corrupt" and that all in big letters, as if shouting makes an "argument" more convincing.' Big letters are not the same as capital letters; you always use bigger letters than other people, which is the visual equivalent of shouting.

Oh, so you're claiming that I'm shouting all the time, simply because I use a larger font than others. Cal, that's hilarious! I use a larger font, because I find it easier to read and more pleasing to the eye -- at least to mine. I certainly don't use it as a form of shouting. If I wanted to shout at some point in the discussion, I'd use larger letters selectively, not uniformly, and they wouldn't be a larger font, but caps, which is the rhetorical convention.

But, don't you see, you're then saying that there is a final verdict -- a conclusive demonstration. The qualification "to the best of our current knowledge" is unnecessary. Either you know it or you don't. If you know it, then saying that you know it "to the best of your current knowledge" is redundant.
It seems as if my previous messages were written in Chinese... but let me try again: when we use words like "true", "certain", "know" etc. with reference to empirical knowledge they don't have the absolute meaning that we assign to them when we use them in purely logical or mathematical arguments, they indicate high probabilities, not absolute certainties, as we would have to be omniscient for that.

I understand that that's your position, Cal. Do you understand that I am arguing against that position and what my argument against it is? It sure doesn't look that way.

Words can have different meanings in different contexts, you know.

Yes, I'm aware of that, but it's not a counter to my argument, which you evidently are not seeing.

Normally the addition "to the best of our current knowledge" is redundant, as most people understand this implication. Only Objectivists seem to think that we can have 100% certainty in our theories about the physical world.

But there's a good reason for such a view, which I've tried, apparently unsuccessfully, to explain.

On the contrary, you can exclude it if you have no reason to believe that it exists. In order to say that you could be wrong, you need some evidence to doubt the truth of your conclusion. Lacking such evidence, you have no rational grounds on which to say that you could be wrong. The fact that you were wrong in the past is not evidence that you could be wrong now, any more than the fact that your reasoning was mistaken in the past is evidence that it could be mistaken now. You never bothered to reply to my rejoinder.
I did reply to it when I wrote: "Have you any idea how big the graveyard of discarded theories really is?" It's really silly to think that while we in the past have been mistaken millions of times, we now can be sure that we're not mistaken. I find such hubris really astounding.

But this reply is non-responsive; you're not addressing the gist of my argument.

Ignoring your attempt to compare Objectivism to dogmatic religion, let me stress that a truth, if indeed it is a truth, is necessarily eternal.
See above. The meaning of "truth" depends on the context in which it is used, and in the "physical" context it's certainly not eternal. Ask any decent scientist.

No, the meaning of "truth" is correspondence with reality. A proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to reality. Ask any decent philosopher. Its correspondence is eternal, because it doesn't change with a change in our knowledge. If a proposition is discovered not to have corresponded to reality, even though we thought that it did, then it never did correspond. It didn't suddenly fail to correspond when we discovered that it failed to. Similarly, if it's discovered to have corresponded to reality even though we thought that it didn't, then it always did correspond. It didn't suddenly come to correspond when we discovered that it did.

So would you say that Young and Fresnel definitely falsified Newton's theory or that they simply thought they falsified it? You say they falsified it until it was "discovered" that light also consists of particles. So, does that mean that Newton's theory actually was false (i.e., did not correspond to reality) until it was "discovered" that light also consists of particles, at which point it became true? Does the correspondence of a proposition to fact depend on our awareness of its correspondence, such that if we don't know that it corresponds, then it doesn't, but that if we do, then it does? Does reality change as our knowledge changes? Does our knowledge determine reality? If so, then we have a primacy-of-consciousness metaphysics, which is what you're defending, without actually naming it.
Let me note first that I was only talking about one specific aspect of Newton's theory, namely that light consists of particles. As far as we know now (I won't repeat that phrase every time, consider it implied in my statements) that particular aspect was not false. That doesn't mean that it was first false and then became true; it only means that at that time the conclusion that it was false was warranted.

I agree, but then aren't you saying that truth really is eternal, if it doesn't change with the change in our knowledge?

The scientists didn't have to state explicitly that their conclusion was tentative, just as they don't have to do it now - it's simply implied in every scientific endeavor. Is it now really that difficult? I think this anwers also the rest of your post.

Here I don't agree. If all the evidence supports a scientific conclusion and none contradicts it, then there is nothing tentative about the conclusion. The term "tentative" implies that the conclusion is provisional -- that it awaits further confirmation. But if all the evidence supports the conclusion and none contradicts it, then no further confirmation is, or can be, forthcoming. In that case, the conclusion is not tentative but certain.

Only one last point:
But if they have no evidence that they could be mistaken -- if they have no reason to doubt the truth of a proposition -- then they cannot, in logic, recognize that possibility. This is not dogmatism; it is non-contradictory identification.
So what do you think: did the scientists at the time of Young and Fresnel have reason to doubt the truth of their proposition?

Not that I am aware, in which case, they could not in logic have recognized the possibility that they were mistaken.

- Bill

Post 59

Monday, August 7, 2006 - 11:43pm